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Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is a common, recurrent and disabling mental 
illness which is poorly treated by currently prescribed drug therapies. The discovery of 
treatment tools that target putative mechanisms of illness in depression is thus a 
clinical priority. Depression is characterised by hyporeactivity to reward and 
hyperactivity to aversive stimuli, which putatively reflects altered function in fronto-
striatal-limbic brain regions innervated by monoamines. Yet, very few studies have 
used dopaminergic drugs to probe the association between neural reward- and 
especially penalty- signalling and depression. Such intervention designs are important 
for overcoming the limitations of correlational studies through randomization and 
experimental manipulation. Preliminary findings raise the intriguing possibility that 
dopamine antagonists with antidepressant properties may exert their effects via reward 
and/or penalty signal normalisation, however further studies are warranted. This thesis 
aims to address this knowledge gap by exploiting the advantages of a placebo-
controlled design to examine how a novel D2 antagonist with antidepressant 
properties, lurasidone, modifies activity in the brain’s reward/penalty network in 
depression.  
 
We recruited 43 medication-naïve participants across the range of depression severity 
(Beck’s Depression Inventory –II score range: 0-43), including healthy volunteers, as 
well as people meeting full-criteria for MDD. In a double-blind placebo-controlled 
cross-over design, all subjects received either placebo or lurasidone (20mg) across two 
visits separated by one week. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with the 
Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task assessed reward functions via neural responses 
during anticipation and receipt of gains and losses. The analyses focused on these two 
phases of reward processing as well as medication and depression effects on 
Prediction Error (PE), the brain’s key dopaminergic learning signal encoding the 
difference between reward or loss outcome and their anticipation. We hypothesised 
that subjects scoring high on depression would show a baseline difference in fronto-
striatal activity which would be reverted by acute-dose lurasidone. Moreover, we 
sought to address a key concern in pharmacoimaging studies, namely that shifts in 
global or regional CBF could underlie changes observed in BOLD fMRI signal. We 
therefore also used arterial spin labelling (ASL), an imaging modality that allows the 
quantification of cerebral blood flow at rest, to disentangle global and regional CBF 
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changes from BOLD fMRI signal. As such, this was the first investigation examining 
the acute effects of lurasidone in the human brain (across a spectrum of depression 
severity), on a well validated neuroimaging reward task, together with a concerted 
attempt to control for known potential confounds. 
 
Our findings showed that lurasidone altered fronto-striatal activity during anticipation 
and outcome phases of the MID task without modification of behaviour. There was a 
significant three-way Medication-by-Depression severity-by-Outcome interaction in 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) after correction for multiple comparisons. Follow 
up analyses revealed significantly higher ACC activation to Penalty Outcomes in high- 
versus low depression participants in the placebo condition, with a normalisation by 
lurasidone. We found an opposite pattern of signal normalisation for Reward 
Outcomes in the ACC and Nucelus Accumbens (NAcc). Lurasidone enhanced ACC 
and NAcc signalling to positive feedback in depressed individuals, however, this 
pattern did not remain significant after stringent correction for multiple ROI 
comparisons. Instead, we found that lurasidone significantly increased NAcc 
activation in individuals with higher symptoms of anhedonia. For the PE analyses, we 
found support for a normalisation in reward-related PE encoding in the amygdala and 
penalty-related PE encoding in the ACC in one of the three PE models tested. Finally, 
sensitivity analyses demonstrated that comorbid anxiety symptoms, self-reported 
changes in sedation and state anxiety and increased striatal CBF under lurasidone did 
not confound lurasidone’s effects on reward and penalty processing in depression. 
 
Taken together, an acute dose of lurasidone normalises (reduces) neural ACC 
responses to negative outcomes and PE encoding, without modification of behaviour 
in individuals with elevated depressive symptoms. Lurasidone also normalises 
(increases) striatal (NAcc) responses to positive feedback as a function of anhedonia 
severity. Potential mechanisms at the receptor level are discussed with reference to 
activity at Dopamine D2 and Serotonin 5-HT1A, 5-HT2A, and 5-HT7 receptors. The 
results provide evidence for abnormalities in neural reward-penalty systems in 
depression and highlight the potential of targeted pharmacological treatments to 
normalise penalty and reward-related processing in depression. The thesis brings 
increased knowledge and precision to our understanding of the effects of lurasidone, 
during different phases of reward and penalty processing across the continuum of 
depression and anhedonia severity.  
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 Introduction Chapter 1 -
A map of the introduction chapter of this thesis is illustrated below. 
 
Figure 1.1. Map of Introduction Chapter. 
 
Ultimately, the aim of the introduction is to summarise and integrate three elements: 
depression, the neural underpinnings of reward/penalty processing and  acute 
pharmacological interventions. This leads to the final section of the introduction in 
which I present the thesis aims, objectives and hypotheses (using lurasidone 
(dopamine antagonist) to probe the association between neural reward/penalty 




 Introduction to depression 1.1
The first section of the chapter introduces unipolar and bipolar depression and 
provides a brief overview of the current evidence regarding prevalence, aetiology and 
treatment options. I then discuss susceptibility and onset of depression within the 
framework of dual valence systems (Forbes and Dahl, 2005), in which depression is 
characterised by reduced positive and/or increased negative affect. I discuss the 
challenges of treating depression and the need to target putative mechanisms of illness 
in depression. Thus, I review the potential of neuroimaging methods to investigate the 
neural substrates/mechanisms underlying depressed mood and for relating the 
dimensional characterisation of depressive symptoms to dysfunction of specific brain 
circuits.  
 Clinical presentation and diagnostic criteria 1.1.1
Depression is a common, recurrent, and disabling mental illness. A depressive episode 
can occur in the context of both unipolar major depressive disorder (MDD) and 
bipolar disorder (BP).  
The diagnostic criteria for depression is summarised in Table 1.1. There are two 
cardinal symptoms: low mood and anhedonia (according to DSM IV and DSM-5) 
(Stringaris et al., 2013). A diagnosis requires that an individual displays at least one of 
these cardinal symptoms alongside other symptoms such as sleep and appetite 
disturbances, and psychomotor agitation or retardation.  
 
The current major diagnostic manuals, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the 10th 
Revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; World Health 
Organization, 1992) show essentially the same diagnostic features for a ‘major 
depressive episode’ (DSM-5) or ‘depressive episode’ (ICD-10) (i.e. a clinically 
significant severity of depression). This is shown in Table 1.2. However, these 
manuals differ in the thresholds as the DSM-5 requires a minimum of 5 symptoms, 
whilst the ICD-10 requires four. Thus, the DSM-5 identifies higher severity cases. 
Moreover, the DSM-5 recognises the importance of considering the duration of 
depressive symptoms independently of severity or number of symptoms. Therefore, it 
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has developed a new category ‘persistent depressive disorder’ which requires a two 
year duration and fewer number of symptoms.  
Table 1.1. DSM-5 criteria for a major depressive episode. Taken from Cleare et al., 
(2015) with permission. 
 
Table 1.2. Classification of depressive states according to the DSM-5 and ICD-10. 
Taken from Cleare et al., (2015) with permission. 
 
The inherent heterogeneity of depression may conceal distinct causal processes and 
pathways in the development of depression. Yet, it is of clinical importance to 
characterise these different symptom profiles and their respective severity. For 
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example, anhedonia (reflecting reduced interest, activity and enjoyment), strongly 
predicts poor antidepressant outcome (Uher et al., 2008). This finding was robustly 
replicated in STAR*D data (Uher et al., 2012). Moreover, in the Treatment of 
Resistant Depression in Adolescents (TORDIA) trial, anhedonia was the only 
dimension (of the 5 dimensions of the Child Depression Rating Scale (CDRS)) to 
predict a longer time to remission, and fewer depression-free days with a selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) (McMakin et al., 2012). Thus, anhedonia profiles 
may call for a different treatment approach as compared to individuals presenting with 
low mood (Uher et al., 2012). A further discussion of dimensional approaches is in 
Section 1.1.4. 
 
 Depression: importance. (Descriptive Epidemiology: the size and 1.1.2
nature of the problem) 
Depression is a major public health problem, ranked among the top ten leading causes 
of disability and morbidity worldwide (Collins et al., 2011). Depression is associated 
with significant physical, emotional, and behavioural problems in social, family, and 
employment contexts (Maughan et al., 2012) in addition to suicide-related risk 
behaviours (Sharp et al., 2012). As shown in Figure 1.2, depression reaches its peak 
incidence in adolescence and young adulthood, and after onset, depression typically 
runs a life-time course (Birmaher et al., 2007; Thapar et al., 2012; Phillips et al., 2013; 
Perlis et al., 2009). Depression has a cumulative prevalence of 10% by age 16 
(Costello et al., 2003) and adolescents with major depression are up to 30 times more 
likely to die of suicide (Brent et al., 1992). A meta-analysis showed that one-year and 
lifetime prevlance of MDD was 4.1% and 6.7% respectively, with females having 1.5-
2.5 times higher prevalence than males. This meta-analysis pooled rates from 23 
studies, and it should be noted that it gave prevalance rates about half the rates that are 
commonly reported (e.g. Kessler et al., 2003). This could be due to problems of recall 
bias when assessing lifetime risk, and prospective studies have shown that lifetime risk 
could be up to 40% in females (Andrews et al., 2005). In addition to profound personal 
suffering, MDD places a staggering economic burden on society with an estimated 
annual cost of $210.5 billion (Greenberg et al., 2015; Kleinman et al., 2003) in the 
USA. In summary, depression is a global public health concern, has its orgins in early 
life, and is potentially lethal.  
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Adolescents may be particularly prone to MDD because of the physical and socio-
affective maturation processes that occur during this period (Davey et al., 2008; 
Greimel, 2011). These maturation processes include dramatic biological changes 
within the brain, affecting the neural bases of reinforcement processing (Rubia, 2013). 
Specifically, the most robust evidence for the relationship between depression risk and 
reduced striatal response to reward has been found during mid-adolescence; a time in 
development when healthy low-risk groups show maximal striatal response to reward 
(compared to both childhood and adulthood, Figure 1.2) (Luking et al., 2016c). This 
may best be explained by adolescence being a time of maximal difference between the 
subcortical (e.g. nucleus accumbens) structures that mature earlier and the cortical 
(PFC) structures that only reach full maturity in early adulthood  (age 26) (Casey and 
Jones, 2010). Thus, the developmental imbalance between cortical and subcortical 
systems may provide new insights into the mechanisms mediating depression in 






Figure 1.2. (A) The onset of major depressive episodes (MDEs) begins to sharply 
increase around age 12–15. Red dotted line illustrates the cumulative age of onset for 
individuals with unipolar depression (i.e. with MDE, without manic episodes, ME). 
HE: hypomania (adapted from Luking et al., (2016) and Beesdo et al., 2009). (B) 
Striatal response to monetary reward shows a quadratic (i.e. inverted U shape) 
relationship with age from childhood to adulthood. Mid-adolescence (12-15years) 
shows peak striatal response (adapted from Luking et al., (2016) and Van Leijenhorst 





 Depression as a disorder of reward and penalty processing 1.1.3.1
(hyporesponsivity to reward and hypersensitivity to penalties and 
punishment) 
Early studies used field study experiments and demonstrated that depression is 
associated with (i) low rates of response-contingent positive reinforcement (ii) high 
rates of punishing events and (iii) low reward value of positive events and high 
aversiveness of negative events.  
In these field study experiments, participants monitored the daily occurrence of 
pleasant activities and depressed mood. These studies showed an association between 
number of pleasant activities experienced daily and depressed mood in depressed, non-
depressed psychiatric controls and healthy volunteers (Grosscup and Lewinsohn, 
1980; Lewinsohn and Graf, 1973; Lewinsohn and Libet, 1972). Moreover, depressed 
individuals reported less engagement in pleasant activities compared to non-depressed 
psychiatric controls and healthy controls (Lewinsohn and Graf, 1973; Macphillamy 
and Lewinsohn, 1974). Similar to research on pleasant events, a relationship was 
found between self-reported daily fluctuations in depressed mood and aversive events 
both in depressed patients (Grosscup and Lewinsohn, 1980) and college students 
(Rehm, 1978). This finding is considered to be relatively robust given the different 
measures of mood and unpleasant events reported across studies. Moreover, studies 
contrasting diagnostic groups demonstrated that the frequency of unpleasant events 
differentiated depressed and non-depressed controls, even after controlling for the 
frequency of pleasant events (Lewinsohn et al., 1985). Further studies also 
demonstrated elevations on total unpleasant events in depressed versus healthy control 
groups (Lewinsohn and Talkington, 1979).   
An elaboration on these behavioural models included the proposition that depression 
originates not only from inadequate engagement in pleasurable activities and excessive 
experience of aversive events (i.e. frequency), but also characterised by diminished 
reward value of pleasant events and increased aversiveness of unpleasant events (i.e. 
subjective ratings). Indeed, daily ratings found reduced subjective enjoyability of 
events in depressed individuals (Macphillamy and Lewinsohn, 1974) and that 
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depressed participants rated unpleasant events as more aversive than healthy controls 
(Lewinsohn and Talkington, 1979).  
More contemporary research that integrates neuroscience and laboratory paradigms for 
studying the effects of reward and punishment in depression supports the evidence 
from the field studies described above. These studies are examined in extensive detail 
in the literature review in Section 1.5. In particular, Figure 1.12 in Section 1.5 
illustrates how clinical terminology and phenomena map onto the science of reward 
processing. For now, it is sufficient to mention that evidence converges with the 
notion that depressed individuals exhibit deficits in motivation, reward learning and 
responsiveness to reward (Henriques and Davidson, 2000; Henriques et al., 1994; 
Treadway et al., 2012) and heightened sensitivity to negative events and avoidance 
(Elliott et al., 1997a; Elliott et al., 1996; Eshel and Roiser, 2010; Lewinsohn et al., 
1973) relative to healthy subjects. These behavioural phentoypes correspond to altered 
function in a circumscribed network of brain regions, particularly fronto-striatal-limbic 
systems which are innervated by dopamine and are associated with approach-related 
behaviour (Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Of note, the cardinal symptom of anhedonia has 
received increasing attention in the study of reward in depression. The impaired ability 
of depressed individuals to modulate behaviour as a function of reinforcement, 
reduced motivation to expend effort, and reduced activity in the ventral striatum 
during reward anticipation is largest in patients reporting anhedonic symptoms and has 
been found to be uniquely associated with anhedonia rather than general distress 
(Pizzagalli et al., 2008; Stringaris et al., 2015; Treadway et al., 2012). As such, this 
thesis is devoted to probing the neural circuits, including the striatum, anterior 
cingulate cortex, orbital frontal cortex, insula (etc.), that are part of a reward system 
and are implicated in depression and anhedonia (Section 1.3).  
The observational and experimental evidence have been converged into a theoretical 
framework. Figure 1.3 illustrates Lewinsohn’s behavioural model for the causes, 
correlates, consequences and maintaining processes in depression. Here, an individual 
with low rates of response-contingent positive reinforcement and/or elevated rate of 
aversive experiences may develop depressed mood via mechanisms such as increased 
focus on one-self, self-criticism, and negative expectancies. Subject to persistent 
dysphoric emotions and thoughts such individuals may exhibit a decreased motivation 
to seek and a reduced ability to experience reward (Drevets, 2001). Moreover, 
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depressed individuals may be sensitive to the saliency of punishing stimuli, and they 
may act to minimise exposure to such negative outcomes. Punishment avoidance could 
be adaptive in some circumstances. However, the continual use of a strategy to avoid 
negative outcomes in a rigid or context-insensitive manner is likely to reduce the 
probability of being exposed to rewarding environments. This in turn, may exacerbate 
depressive symptoms (Smoski et al., 2008). Thus, avoiding risk often will lead to 
missed opportunities for rewards. In light of this, engaging in an increasing number of 
rewarding experiences, and a decrease in the experienced aversiveness of events is 
associated with clinical improvement in depression (Grosscup and Lewinsohn, 1980; 
Richards et al., 2016). Indeed, Behavioural Activation (BA) (described in Section 
1.1.5.1), as part of cognitive-behavioural therapy requires depressed patients to 
increase behaviours that lead to a sense of self-efficacy and mastery, as well as those 
that result in pleasurable consequences (Jacobson et al., 1996).  However, in BA 
individuals pursue some form of reward while exposing themselves to potential 
punishment. For example, engaging in social activities carries the possibility of 
positive (e.g. making friends, having fun) and negative consequences (e.g. social 
exclusion, criticism). Thus, it involves a dual process of increasing approach-related 
behaviours and reducing sensitivity to punishment avoidance strategies, both of which 
are important factors in the maintenance of depression (Chapman et al., 2007; Martin-
Soelch, 2009). It is also important to note that this model links to a learned 
helplessness model in which catastrophic responses to perceived failure (which are 
correlated with depression severity (Elliott et al., 1997a; Elliott et al., 1996)) could 







Figure 1.3. Schematic illustration of Lewinsohn’s behavioural model of depression. 
Causes, correlates, consequences and maintaining processes in depression involve low 
rates of response-contingent positive reinforcement and/or elevated rate of aversive 
experiences, leading to increased depression (via increased focus on one-self, self-
criticism, negative expectancies), leading to reduced engagement and increased 
avoidance of activities/interpersonal, thereby perpetuating the cycle. Treatment-
induced increases in positive reinforcement and reduced sensitivity to punishment 
avoidance lead to reductions in depression.  
 
 Categorical and dimensional approaches to researching 1.1.4
depression 
One of the major issues for clinicians and guidelines is that categories help to guide 
decision-making, however, illnesses seem to exist along a continua (Cleare et al., 
2015; Matthews and Hampshire, 2016; Plomin et al., 2009; Rose and Barker, 1978) 
(Figure 1.4). There is now a greater emphasis on thinking of depression along a 
continuum of severity from normal sadness to severe impairment and illness (Angst et 
al., 2000; Ayuso-Mateos et al., 2010; Lewinsohn et al., 2000; Paykel and Priest, 1992). 
Researching quantitatively also involves harnessing the potential of unselected 
population-based cohort studies in youth, and studying dimensions across all 
individuals. Indeed, surveys in communities have shown that key symptoms of 
depression are common in the community and exist across the whole range of severity 
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(Jenkins et al., 1997). This research approach is in line with the Research Domain 
Criteria (RDoC) framework (Morris and Cuthbert, 2012) (e.g. as in (Stringaris et al., 
2015b) where symptom levels are related to the brain measurements). It also does 
justice to findings concerning the genetic underpinnings of common mental illness 
(Plomin et al., 2009) as well as current approaches to understanding neural system 
perturbation in a dimensional way (Matthews and Hampshire, 2016). Thus, these 
research strategies (which are consistent with the overarching aims of the RDoC (Insel 
et al., 2010)) - may provide greater sensitivity for detecting aetiological pathways in 
the depression phenotypes that are otherwise concealed in analyses that take the 
existing psychiatric classification as the starting point (i.e. group difference analysis).  
Increasingly more neuroimaging studies are using a dimensional approach (Holroyd 
and Umemoto, 2016; Morris and Cuthbert, 2012; Pan et al., 2017; Phillips, 2013; 
Stringaris et al., 2015a; Whitton et al., 2015). For example, Satterthwaite and 
collegues uncovered a common brain mechanism that spans categories of MDD and 
bipolar depression. They mapped continuous depression severity and anhedonia 
symptoms to intra-functional connectivity between brain regions implicated in reward 
processing (Satterthwaite et al., 2014). Stringaris et al., (2015) showed that alterations 
in the brain’s reward network operate as a mechanism across the spectrum of risk for 
depression (healthy-subthreshold-MDD) in a community sample of adolescents. Thus, 
for the aforementioned reasons, the current thesis also used a dimensional analytical 
approach. Please also refer to Methods Section 3.1.1 for a justification of the 






Figure 1.4. A dimensional perspective to depressive disorders and response to 
treatment. Taken from Cleare et al., (2015) with permission.  
 
 Treatment options for depression 1.1.5
 Depression: psychological treatment options 1.1.5.1
There are a variety of cognitive-behavioural, psychodynamic and systemic 
psychological approaches available for treating depression. As the systematic review 
in Section 1.6.3.8 examines how cognitive-behavioural therapy and behavioural 
activation impact upon reward and penalty processes, I briefly give an overview of 
these therapies below. 
In brief, CBT is a therapy that is time-limited, structured, and focused on the present 
and specific problem. It is based on the principle that negative thought and belief 
patterns affect mood and behaviours. Treatment generally involves psychoeducation; 
strategies to reduce negative beliefs (cognitive restructuring); behavioural procedures 
(e.g. exposure to fears, behavioural activation); self-esteem enhancement; problem 
solving; emotion-regulation; acute crisis management; and relapse prevention. 
Behavioural activation is a type of cognitive behavioural therapy in which the main 
focus is on directly changing behaviours by increasing the opportunities for obtaining 
positive reinforcements from the environment (Jacobson et al., 2001). Expecting a 
reward or a loss is an important psychological mechanism of BA. The goal of BA is to 
facilitate patients in expanding access to positive reinforcing activities and in-turn 
increase the rate of response-contingent positive reinforcement available to them 
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(Figure 1.3) (Jacobson et al., 2001). In order to achieve this, in BA, patients review 
activities that make them (or used to make them) feel rewarding and give a feeling of 
accomplishment and complete behavioural experiments. As a result, patients gradually 
cultivate reasonable expectations about positively reinforcing activities. BA has 
received increasing attention as its rationale may be simpler than CBT in general, as it 
does not require as extensive skills on the part of the therapist or the patient (Ekers et 
al., 2011a; Ekers et al., 2011b; Hopko et al., 2003). A recent multi-centre, two-arm 
Phase III, non-inferiority
1
 randomised control trial demonstrated that BA is as 
effective as CBT in terms of depression treatment response measured by the Patient 
Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) at 6, 12 and 18 months and less costly to deliver 
(Richards et al., 2016). 
 
 Depression: pharmacological treatment options 1.1.5.2
The prevailing hypothesis of depression over the last decades has been the monoamine 
hypothesis. This implicates reduced monoamine function in depression (Dale et al., 
2015) and hypothesises that acute monoamine potentiation (i.e. increasing the synaptic 
concentration of monoamines, such as serotonin) is the central mechanism of 
antidepressant action (Ross and Renyi, 1969).  Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs) (e.g. fluoxetine) and serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors 
(SNRIs) emerged from this research and are currently first-line treatment options for 
MDD. Tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) such as amitriptyline seem to be particularly 
effective in treating melancholic depression profiles, however, they induce 
anticholinergic and membrane stabilising (quindine-like) effects which make them 
poorly tolerated and dangerous in overdose (Cleare et al., 2015). Other selective 
monoamine ruptake inhibitors, such as the norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (NRI) 
reboxetine are available. However, meta-analyses show that it may be less efficacious 
to SSRIs (Cipriani et al., 2018; Cipriani et al., 2009), and this could be related to its 
poor tolerability (Wiles et al., 2014) or high placebo response rates (Cipriani et al., 
2018). Bupropion is one of the few antidepressants that prevent the reuptake of 
                                                 
1
 As this was a non-inferiority RCT, the investigators aimed to establish whether the clinical 
effectiveness of BA is not substantially inferior to CBT. Unlike usual RCTs where null hypothesis is no 
difference, here the null hypothesis is that there is a difference. 
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dopamine (in addition to noradrenaline) (i.e. dopamine and noradrenaline reuptake 
inhibitor, DNRI) (Dwoskin et al., 2006; Stahl et al., 2004). It has been suggested that 
agents that effect dopamine may be more suited to treat apathy and anhedonia 
(Argyropoulos and Nutt, 2013; Nutt et al., 2007). 
Clinical guidelines for the pharmacological treatment of MDD, not only include 
SSRIs, SNRIs, NRIs and DNRIs, but also augmentation or combination treatment with 
atypical antipsychotics (dopamine/serotonergic antagonism) when an individual does 
not respond to first-line treatment. First line augmentation treatments include 
quetiapine and aripiprazole, and second line treatments include risperidone and 
olanzapine. In contrast to MDD, bipolar depression is not treated with SSRIs as they 
confer increased mania risk (Connolly and Thase, 2011). Instead bipolar depression is 
treated with atypical antipsychotics such as quetiapine, olanzapine, risperidone and 
lurasidone and the mood stabiliser lithium (Loebel et al., 2014c; Suppes et al., 2016b; 
Tohen et al., 2014). 
It is important to note that several other hypotheses of depression have been brought 
forward in pre-clinical and clinical research and these include blockade of α2-
adrenoceptors on norepinephrine cell bodies and terminals (e.g. mirtazapine) thereby 
increasing norepinephrine release, targeting glutamate receptors (e.g. N-methyl-d-
aspartate (NMDA) receptor antagonist ketamine) and modulation of cholinergic and γ-
aminobutyric acid (GABA)ergic transmission (MacQueen et al., 2017).  
 Depression: poorly treated 1.1.5.3
Despite the availability of a variety of treatments, up to 40–50% of MDD patients fail 
to respond to antidepressant medication (Trivedi et al, 2006) or psychological 
treatment (DeRubeis et al, 2005) and the likelihood of remission (i.e. complete 
recovery) is even lower (from 30%-45% (Carvalho et al., 2009) to 53%) (Gartlehner et 
al., 2011; MacQueen et al., 2017). Response to second-line treatment happenes only in 
50% of non-responders (Brent et al 2008) and about 25% of responders relapse in the 
next year (Vitiello et al 2011). Moreover, this must be considered in light of recent 
evidence that RCTs may not only over-estimate efficacy of antidepressants, but also 
may exaggerate placebo response because of various biases (Wang et al., 2018). It is 
also striking that despite increases in pharmacotherapy (prescribing medication) (Beck 
and Patten, 2004), there has not been a reduction in the prevalence of MDD (in 
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countries which have reported before-after comparisons) (Brugha et al., 2004; Kessler 
et al., 2005). Thus, depression not responding adequately to treatment is common 
(Gonzalez et al., 2010) and is responsible for much of the staggering disability and 
cost associated with depression (Crown et al., 2002; Fekadu et al., 2009; Fostick et al., 
2010; Souery et al., 2006).  
 
 Depression: poorly understood 1.1.6
Taken together, mechanisms in depression are still poorly understood, and this impacts 
treatment efficacy. Indeed, there has been little progress in depression genetics (Wray 
et al., 2018), pathophysiological findings for depression are often inconsistent (Ma, 
2013), and there has been a lack of rational drug discoveries. This prompts the need to 
define other avenues of therapy. Towards this aim, there is a need to understand the 
various neurobiological mechanisms for depressive symptoms in order to generate 
specific predictions about treatment development (i.e. “rational treatment advances”) 
and to detect predictive biomarkers for treatment selection. Recently, reward and 
penalty related processes have emerged as a promising candidate mechanism, and this 













 Reward and penalty processing 1.2
As mentioned in the previous section, depression has been conceptualized as an 
imbalance in dual valence systems (Forbes and Dahl, 2005), involving reduced 
positive and/or increased negative affect. Core aspects of the disorder may include 
reduced interest in participating in pleasant activities, reduced opportunities to 
experience rewarding situations and difficulty activating and sustaining positive 
emotions (Forbes et al., 2005; Hopko et al., 2003). This may also co-occur with 
heightened sensitivity to negative outcomes/feedback and biased information 
processing and representations that mediate choice behaviour, including preferential 
attention, planning, memory and self-referential processing towards negative 
information (Beck, 2008; Disner et al., 2011; Gotlib et al., 2010a; Grimm et al., 2009; 
Sylvester et al., 2003). Some research implicates these processes in the maintenance 
and onset of depression, and these processes may in turn exacerbate depressive 
symptoms (Gotlib, 1981; Gotlib and Krasnoperova, 1998; Gotlib et al., 2004; 
Papageorgiou and Wells, 2003).  
 
Neuroimaging has been valuable in the search for the neural substrates underlying 
depressed mood, and in Section 1.5, I discuss how neural mechanisms of reward and 
penalty-related function have recently emerged as a promising candidate. However, 
before reviewing the behavioural and neuroimaging literature linking aberrations in 
reward and penalty processing to depression, it is necessary to define some key 
concepts. In this section, I first define the terms and stages of reward and penalty-
related processing, and experimental paradigms which are used to probe these various 
processes. I then outline the neural circuitry underlying reward and penalty-related 
processing (from animal and human literature) and an overview of various theories of 
dopamine function in reward and penalty processing. 
 What is reward? What is penalty? 1.2.1
A rewarding stimulus is one that, through the activation of a distributed and integrated 
set of neural systems, leads to a hedonic reaction (‘liking’) and generates motivation to 
approach the stimulus (‘wanting’) (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008; Richards et al., 
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2013).  In contrast, a punisher or penalty could be either the absence of a reward or an 
aversive stimulus that leads to an aversive reaction and motivates behaviour away 
from the stimulus.  
 Primary versus secondary rewards 1.2.2
Rewards and punishers have been categorised into primary and secondary categories. 
Primary rewards consist of stimuli which have a direct positive value for an individual 
receiving the reward (i.e. reinforce behaviours without having to be learned). Primary 
rewards or punishments have a physiological meaning, like pleasant and unpleasant 
food, beverages, sounds and pain. In contrast, secondary rewards (e.g. money, power, 
some forms of social acknowledgment), have no immediate direct value, and gain 
reward value through the learning of stimulus-reward associations. Valuation of 
primary rewards may depend on the state of the organism (e.g. hunger, thirst), and 
may be more rewarding under circumstances of deprivation. However, secondary 
rewards are less prone to saturation and therefore possess a relative stable value. 
Stimulus types are important considerations in neuroimaging literature, as 
demonstrated by a meta-analysis that assessed how representations of primary and 
secondary rewards overlap in the human brain (Sescousse et al., 2013). They showed 
that monetary, erotic and food reward engaged a common brain network including the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, ventral striatum, amygdala, anterior insula and 
thalamus. But there were also key differences, with for example, secondary monetary 
rewards being presented in evolutionary more recent cortical regions, whilst food and 
erotic (i.e. primary) rewards being more strongly represented in the insula and 
amygdala (Figure 1.5). Thus, experienced reward value recruits a core “reward 




Figure 1.5. Illustration of brain regions consistency and commonly activated by 
monetary, erotic and food reward outcomes (green = monetary rewards, red = erotic 
rewards, blue = food rewards). Taken from Sescousee et al., (2013) with permission.  
 Incentive-based processing 1.2.3
Coupling stimuli and actions with positive (reward) or negative (penalty) outcomes 
facilitates the selection of appropriate actions so that the organism can change their 
behaviour to maximise reward and minimise punishment. Thus, adequately encoding 
reward and penalty-related information and relating it to action is essential for 
adaptive behaviour and survival (Gottlieb et al., 2014; Hikida et al., 2016), as well as 
subjective pleasure and well-being (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015). Many brain 
regions are involved in different levels of incentive based learning, from those that 
regulate basic survival functions, to those underlying higher cognitive control for 
decision making. These are discussed in more detail in Section 1.3. When outcomes 
deviate from expectations, these links change to control future behaviour and this is 
discussed in more detail in Section 1.4 (Prediction Error).  
Approach behaviours are those that move the organism towards rewards, whilst 
avoidance behaviours are those that move the organism away from punishers. In 
addition, rewards and punishers facilitate learning through positive or negative 
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reinforcement respectively (Bissonette et al., 2014). A reward (or absence of a 
punisher) following a behaviour will make the future occurrence of that behaviour 
more likely and this often elicits subjective feelings of pleasure. In contrast, 
behaviours following punishers (or lack of rewards) will make the future occurrence of 
that behaviour less likely (Bissonette et al., 2014). Punishment stimuli can consist of 
the presentation of aversive stimuli or the removal of an appetitive stimulus (often 
operationalised as monetary loss) in response to certain behaviour (Lutz and Widmer, 
2014). As discussed in Section 1.1.3.1, reductions in reports of pleasure and approach-
related behaviour, (and vice versa for punishers) are prominent features of depression.  
 Stages of reward and penalty processing 1.2.3.1
Reward and penalty processing can be considered as a composite construct, consisting 
of multiple components. Each phase reflects a different psychological state and 
separately shapes human behaviour (Pizzagalli et al., 2009a). Thus, distinguishing 
between these phases is important for understanding which aspects of reward or 
penalty processing might be dysfunctional in depression, or how different symptoms 
of depression are related to precise facets of hedonic function.  
In terms of reward processing, this has been described by Rizvi et al., (2016) in seven 
phases. These are summarised in Figure 1.6. For reward processing the stages can be 
summarised as follows: (i) building a stimulus-reward association through learning 
and repeated pairings, leading to (ii) interest/desire (wanting a reward), (iii) 
anticipation (a state of readiness for a reward), (iv) motivation (initial energy 
expenditure to attain a reward, (v) effort (sustained energy expenditure to attain a 
reward), (vi) consummation (i.e. hedonic response to reward), and (vii) feedback 
integration (updating reward presence and values). Although the reward process has 
been described as a linear process, it is important to note that on a behavioural level, 
these aspects of reward can occur simultaneously. For example, an individual can feel 
interested and anticipating a reward, and the effort that is made to attain a reward can 




Figure 1.6. Model of the stages of reward and penalty processing, adapted from Rizvi 
et al., (2016) with permission.  
 
 Types of task  1.2.4
There are various types of task that are designed to tap into different phases of reward 
or penalty processing (see Figure 1.12  in Section 1.5 ). One of the most extensively 
used paradigms is the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task (Knutson et al., 2000) and 
has been applied across clinical and non-clinical populations in conjunction with 
functional neuroimaging. It has been shown to robustly activate a fronto-striatal-limbic 
network (see meta-analyses: Bartra et al., 2013; Diekhof et al., 2012; Kerestes et al., 
2014). Moreover, the MID has good test-re-test reliability. Plichta et al., (2012) 
showed that the MID task evokes robust activation in the ventral striatum with high 
effect sizes of VS-mean summary values (ES: 0.96-1.43) and excellent group-level 
activation reliability at the whole brain level and within target Regions of Interest 
(ROIs) (intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC): 0.94). Moreover, within-subject 
reliability of ROI-mean amplitudes across sessions was fair to good for the MID task 
(ICCs = 0.56-0.62), thereby suggesting that the task is suited for within-subject 
designs (Plichta et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2014). 
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A full description is given in Methods Section 3.5, but in brief, the task is an example 
of an instrumental reward task that requires participants to press a button as fast as 
possible (instrumental action) preceded by an incentive cue and followed by feedback. 
For example, participants receive a reward (a sum of money) in a reward trial or avoid 
losing in a penalty trial if they respond to the target within an individually titrated 
response window. Variations in the task include introducing different reward valences, 
i.e. the positive states associated with reward receipt (or absence of a penalty) vs. 
negative states associated with loss (or reward omission).  
This thesis used an adaptation of the original MID task from Knutson et al. (2001), to 
include three trial types where participants gain (reward trial), lose (penalty trial) or do 
not win/lose (no-incentive trial). In this way, the MID task allows for the investigation 
of all four types of outcome in the consummatory phase (reward (successful response), 
missed reward (missed response), penalty (missed response), and avoided penalty 
(successful response). In this study positive outcomes were operationalised as 
monetary gains, and negative outcomes or penalties were operationalised as loss by 
deducting a certain amount of money from the participant’s credit. This is because 
missed rewards and losses are qualitatively distinct processes (with different 
expectation-outcome contingencies) and are likely to elicit varying degrees of aversive 
responses (Knutson et al., 2001). This same framework can be used to understand the 
differences between two kinds of positive outcomes: rewards and avoided losses.  
There are other reward decision-making tasks, which tend to be similar to the 
instrumental-reward tasks such as the MID, with the only difference that the 
participants are given the opportunity to choose between two or more instrumental 
actions. An example of such task would be the Effort-Expenditure for Rewards Task  
(EEfRT) (Treadway et al., 2009b) or wheel of fortune task, which has been used to 
explore the effort-based decision-making associated with anhedonia. 
Last of all, some studies have utilised passive tasks, which involves passive viewing or 
tasting of appetitive (happy, pleasant e.g. chocolate), aversive (unpleasant e.g. moldy 




 The neural circuitry of reward processing 1.3
The concept of an anatomically identifiable ‘reward circuit’ originates from animal 
studies showing that electrical stimulation in specific mid-brain sites is highly 
reinforcing. Indeed, early studies with intra-cranial self-stimulation to the medial 
forebrain bundle demonstrated that rats would maintain rapid rates of more than 2,000 
responses per hour for a continuous period of 26 hours, ignore available food and 
would only slow on the basis of physical exhaustion (Olds, 1958; Routtenberg and 
Lindy, 1965). Several brain regions form part of this incentive-based learning circuit, 
however, on the basis of self-stimulation, pharmacological, physiological, and 
behavioural studies, the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and ventral tegmental area (VTA) 
dopamine (DA) neurons appear to be at the centre (Haber and Knutson, 2010; 
Hikosaka et al., 2008; Rolls, 2000; Wise, 2002). The cell bodies of midbrain DA 
neurons lie in the densely packed dorsal sector of the substantia nigra (pars compacta) 
and the more medially located VTA. The principal targets of ascending DA 
projections include other subcortical structures (principally the striatum), various 
limbic structures (e.g. amygdala and insula) and parts of the frontal cortex (e.g. orbital 







Figure 1.7.  A schematic illustration of mesolimbic, mesocortical and nigrostriatal 
pathways. The diagram shows DA nuclei within the ventral tegmental area projecting 
to the nucleus accumbens and prefrontal cortex, and within the substantia nigra 
projecting to the dorsal striatum (caudate and putamen). Inhibitory firing from the 
ventral pallidum maintains DA firing rates at tonic levels. Excitatory projections from 
prefrontal cortex project, amygdala and hippocampus synapse on striatal targets, 
including the NAcc. The NAcc sends GABAergic projections to the ventral pallidum, 
suppressing inhibition of VTA, thereby facilitating phasic burst firing of VTA DA 
neurons. Figure taken from Treadway and Zald, (2011) with permission. 
 
There is now a wealth of evidence from studies of functional neuroimaging (fMRI and 
PET) in unselected samples of human subjects, that link reward and penalty processes 
to this dopamine-rich fronto-striatal-limbic neural circuit (Boschen et al., 2011; 
Delgado et al., 2008; Eshel and Roiser, 2010; Jensen et al., 2007; Pohlack et al., 2012; 
Quevedo et al., 2017). Meta-analytic evidence suggests that specific neuroanatomical 
areas of the network underlie various facets of reward and penalty processing, 
including desire, anticipation of reward, effort to attain rewards or avoid penalties, 
consummation and cognitive aspects of learning stimulus-outcome associations 
(Bartra et al., 2013; Diekhof et al., 2012; Haber and Behrens, 2014). Below, I provide 
an overview of the intrinsic organisation and anatomical projections of the main 
regions of the circuit (striatum, amygdala, insula, OFC and ACC), and how this relates 
to its particular functions. 
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 The striatum 1.3.1
Organisation of the striatum: The striatal dopamine neurons appear to be at the centre 
of the reward network (Haber and Knutson, 2010). The striatum is a large subcortical 
structure and has a high density of DA receptors, which is the common target of all 
antipsychotic medications. Anatomically, the striatum can be divided into three main 
sections. The putamen and the caudate are separated by the internal capsule and 
together form the dorsal striatum, whilst the ventral striatum (VS) is formed of the 
ventral caudate (head), ventral putamen and nucleus accumbens (NAcc) (Haber and 
McFarland, 1999; O'Doherty et al., 2004).  
Connections of the striatum: The striatum is a heavily interconnected structure. The 
NAcc, caudate and putamen receive connections from the Ventral tegmental area 
(VTA) and substantia nigra via the mesolimbic and nigrostriatal DA projections 
respectively (Oades and Halliday, 1987), as well as from the ventral pallidum, and 
thalamus. An important distinction between the dorsal and VS, is that the VS alone 
receives a dense projection from the limbic areas: amygdala and hippocampus 
(Friedman et al., 2002; Fudge et al., 2002; Haber and Knutson, 2010). Cortico-striatal 
terminal projections from the prefrontal cortex (PFC) are organised in a function 
topographic manner in the striatum. Specifically, the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), 
orbital frontal cortex (OFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) project primarily to 
the rostral striatum, with the vmPFC projection most medially (to the NAcc), the ACC 
most laterally, and the OFC terminal ending between these two portions. However, it 
is also important to note increasing evidence that projections for the vmPFC, OFC and 
ACC also converge in sub regions of the VS, thereby suggesting functional integration 
or an anatomical substrate for modulation between these circuits. Efferent projections 
from the striatum project primarily to the midbrain and the pallidum (Haber et al., 
1990; Parent et al., 1997). A schematic illustration of the connections and associated 
neurotransmitters of the ventral striatum are shown in Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9.   
To summarise, the convergence of mid-brain, limbic and prefrontal projections to and 
from the striatum, places the striatum as a key entry port for processing emotional and 
motivational information that in turn drives action output. The specific functions of the 
striatum, both from animal and human literature are described briefly below (see 




Functions of the striatum: The ventral striatum has most strongly been associated with 
stimulus-reward and stimulus-penalty learning. Once it is learned that a given stimulus 
will be followed by a reward or punishment, VS activation occurs to increasingly 
distal reward and punishment-predictive cues (Cromwell and Schultz, 2003; Wassum 
et al., 2012). Indeed, ventral striatal dopamine firing and BOLD response seems to 
encode prediction error (PE). PEs reflect the deviation of actual outcomes from their 
expectations and this is covered in detail in Section 1.4. PEs guide outcome prediction 
to gain future rewards and to avoid potential losses (Boksem et al., 2008; Montague et 
al., 2004). Specifically, the VS displays a response pattern in which activation  
increases when anticipating rewards, but decreases when the anticipated  reward is not 
obtained (Knutson et al., 2003). The VS response is greatest when rewards or 
punishments occur unpredictably (Cohen et al., 2005; Yacubian et al., 2006; Yacubian 
et al., 2007). This implies that the role of the VS during reward consummation may be 
best understood in terms of tracking the PE (McClure et al., 2003; O'Doherty et al., 
2003). Specifically, dopamine release in the VS is necessary for reward learning that 
attributes incentive salience or ‘motivational wanting’ to reward cues (Berridge, 2007; 
Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015; Berridge et al., 2009; Flagel et al., 2011). In the 
context of punishments, dopamine release is related to motivated action away from a 
punisher (McCullough and Salamone, 1992; Salamone and Correa, 2012; Salamone et 
al., 1994; Tidey and Miczek, 1996; Young, 2004). Dopamine-based brain 
manipulations in rodents powerfully and specifically change incentive salience 
without altering hedonic reactivity (Cagniard et al., 2005). VS activation is higher, the 
larger the rewards, suggesting that the region is involved in coding expected reward 
magnitude (Yakubian et al., 2007). The body and tail of the caudate and putamen (i.e. 
dorsal striatum) seem to be most involved in the translation of incentives into goal-
directed actions that promise higher amounts of reward in the future (i.e. stimulus-
response-reward learning) (Delgado et al., 2007; Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; 
Haruno and Kawato, 2006). Effortful responses to obtain a reward are correlated with 
signal change in the caudate and putamen and inactivation of the caudate abolishes 
such actions (Aharon et al., 2001; Diciano and Everitt, 2004). Moreover, striatal 






Figure 1.8. Schematic illustrating the connections of the ventral portion of the 
striatum. Taken from Haber and Knutson, (2010) with permission. Blue arrows = 
inputs; Grey arrows=outputs; Amy=amygdala; BNST=bed nucleus stria terminalis; 
Dacc=dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; Hipp=hippocampus; Hypo=hypothalamus; 
MD=medio-dorsal nucleus of the thalamus; OFC=orbital frontal cortex; 
PPT=pedunculopontine nucleus; S=shell; SN=substantia nigra, pars compacta; STN= 
subthalamic nucleus; Thal=thalamus; VP=ventral pallidum; VS= ventral striatum; 
VTA=ventral tegmental area; vmPFC=ventral medial prefrontal cortex. 
 
 Insula 1.3.2
The insula and the anterior portion of insula in particular have been primarily linked to 
the processing of aversive information (Liu et al., 2011; McCabe et al., 2012; 
Sescousse et al., 2013; Waechter et al., 2009). A meta-analysis directly compared 
reward valences and revealed that whilst the NAcc and OFC were more active in 
response to positive versus negative rewards, the anterior insular cortex was involved 
in the processing of negative reward information (Liu et al., 2011). This observation 
ties in with a medial-lateral distinction for positive versus negative rewards 




The insula appears to be critical for the interface between cognitive and affective 
processing. For example, the insula is activated during both aversive pavlovian 
conditioning (e.g. anticipation of punishers) and aversive trace conditioning (Buchel et 
al., 1999; Buchel et al., 1998; Chua et al., 1999). Moreover, insula activity is 
modulated by perceptual awareness of threat (Critchley et al., 2002), penalty (Elliott et 
al., 2000), or error-related processes (Menon et al., 2001). Insula activation also seems 
to be involved in pain intensity coding (Ploghaus et al., 2001; Tracey et al., 2000; 
Davis, 2000). A study by Paulus et al., (2003) demonstrated that insular activity was 
greater when individuals selected a risky versus a safe response and when the 
probability of selecting a safe response followed a punished response. Moreover, this 
response was correlated with measures of harm avoidance. These results suggest that 
insula activation represents aversive somatic markers that guide risk-taking decision-
making behaviour (Paulus et al., 2003). This is in line with the insula’s anatomical 
connections, receiving input from dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortex 
(Selemon and Goldmanrakic, 1988) and the amygdala (McDonald et al., 1999). 
Moreover, in healthy control samples, model-based fMRI has illustrated that penalty-
related PEs are more strongly associated with insular BOLD activity than reward-
related PEs (Garrison et al., 2013). Thus, signalling punishment prediction error 
following outcome might be the computational mechanism by which the insula 
facilitates negative value learning. Whilst making decisions, the insula might signal 
cue negative value (i.e. punishment prediction), which could drive avoidance 
behaviour. Indeed, damage to the anterior insula specifically impairs punishment 
avoidance (Palminteri et al., 2012). To summarise, the insula is predominantly 
involved in evaluative roles of negative responses, and as negative affect is usually 
associated with risk, that insula is involved in anticipation of risky decision, especially 
for uncertainty–averse responses in anticipation of loss. 
 
 Amygdala 1.3.3
As described in Section 1.3.1, the amygdala has direct connections with the VS and 
the VTA. The amygdala is a prominent limbic structure. It provides contextual 
information which is used for adjusting motivational level to upcoming rewards and 
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punishers. Indeed, the ACC and amygdala estimate costs and benefits of potential 
options. The amygdala appears to be particularly important in the context of penalties 
(Zald, 2003) or when rewarding stimuli are devalued (Baxter and Murray, 2002; 
Gottfried et al., 2003). However, when controlling for arousal, direct comparison of 
amygdala responses to rewards versus penalties tends to show no significant 
differences. This implies that amygdala activation in fMRI may respond more to 
stimulus arousal rather than valence/value (Anderson et al., 2003; Small et al., 2003). 
Last of all, the amygdala has shown to be sensitive to DA modulation during reward 
processing in healthy volunteers (Murray, 2007a; O’Daly et al., 2014; Russo and 
Nestler, 2013; Tye et al., 2010a).  
 
 Orbital frontal Cortex (OFC) 1.3.4
 
Several cortical regions have been implicated in top-down, regulatory functions during 
reward and penalty-related processing. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is another 
region whose involvement in reward processing has been extensively documented in 
animal studies. The OFC receives somatosensory, visual and olfactory inputs, and as 
such, has been shown to take part in representing the reward value of primary 
reinforcers such as touch, smell and taste (Rolls, 2000, 2016). Single-cell recording of 
neurons in the PFC have shown that they respond to the taste of glucose and that the 
neuronal response reduces when the monkey has been fed to satiety with the same 
taste (Rolls, 1989). In contrast, neurons in the primary taste cortex show sustained 
responses and are not modulated by satiety, thereby suggesting that OFC neurons 
encode reward value rather than detection of taste. Moreover, OFC lesions seem to 
abolish behavioural flexible responses, which lead to perseveration errors on reward 
reversal tasks (Clarke et al., 2008; Izquierdo et al., 2004). This demonstrates the 
OFC’s role in updating stimulus-reward associations on the basis of changes in reward 
contingencies. Thus, the OFC represents incentive, rather than sensory features of 
stimuli and have been associated with effort-related decision making that guide 
behaviour (Walton et al., 2003).  In human fMRI studies, this region tends to respond 
to contextual aspects of reward during anticipation, such as the anticipated magnitude 
and probability of rewards, and to a lesser degree to penalty-related cues (Knutson et 
al., 2005; Yacubian et al., 2006). 
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 Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) 1.3.5
The ACC involves the integration of diverse striatal and prefrontal functions and this 
is reflected by its anatomical position with many pathways leading through the ACC 
(Haber and Knutson, 2010). These functions involve comparing valued options during 
reward anticipation and choosing among them to channel choice into a motor 
response. The ACC and VS show functional connectivity at rest (Pan et al., 2017) and 
input from the ACC to the VS allows for flexible deployment and adaptation of 
behaviour to changing circumstances (Alexander and Brown, 2011; Holroyd and 
Coles, 2002b; Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016; Holroyd and Yeung, 2012; Shahnazian 
and Holroyd, 2017; Umemoto and Holroyd, 2016; Walsh and Anderson, 2012; Walton 
et al., 2007). Electrophysiological (EEG) studies have shown that the Feedback 
Negativity (FRN), an event–related potential which indicates the early appraisal of 
feedback and appears larger following the presentation of negative feedback, has its 
origins in the ACC (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd and 
Coles, 2002b; Holroyd et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2005). Specifically, an FRN signal 
may be generated as ACC neurons shift from encoding expected to actual outcomes 
(i.e. a Prediction Error signal) (Hyman et al., 2017). The ACC is an interesting 
example as it seems to encode both reward and penalty-related types of prediction 
errors, as shown in primate (Amiez et al., 2006) and human studies (Holroyd and 
Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Oliveira et al., 2007). This could be related to 
different sub-regions, with pre-genual ACC being related solely to reward prediction 
errors whereas antero-medial ACC activity correlated with both reward and penalty 
prediction errors. The antero-medial ACC has been associated with conflict-
monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2004) or error detection (Carter et al., 1998), and this 
could explain why the ACC encodes both reward and penalty-related PEs.  
 
To summarise, I have outlined the circuitry that underlies the intertwined and highly 
connected networks that provide the substrate for functional integration of incentive-
based learning. To develop an adaptive behavioural response to rewards and penalties, 
information about motivation and the stimuli need to be combined with a strategy and 
an action for obtaining goals. The dopamine–rich striatum is at the centre of the 
network receiving and providing inputs to midbrain, limbic (amygdala and insula) and 
cortical (OFC, ACC) structures. In the cortex, orbital networks link stimuli with 
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outcomes; connections to ventral medial regions provide motivational input; cingulate 
regions integrate such value signals with action representations. The insula and 
amygdala seem to be primarily involved in the processing of negative reward 
information, using aversive somatic markers that guide risk-taking decision-making 
behaviour. Now that I have outlined the major dopaminergic pathways; in the next 
section, I go into further depth about the hypothesised roles of the key 
















 Reward and Dopamine 1.4
 Dopamine’s role in reward: hedonia, prediction error, incentive 1.4.1
salience 
The first theory for dopamine’s role in reward suggested that brain dopamine systems 
mediate unconditioned pleasure or ‘liking’ responses which are produced by primary 
(food, sex) reinforcers as well as the conditioned pleasure from secondary reinforcers 
(Wise, 2008). Indeed, this founded the ‘hedonia hypothesis’. However, later studies 
used intelligent behavioural paradigms to show that dopamine is not necessary or 
sufficient for generating hedonic ‘liking’ responses (Berridge, 2007; Berridge et al., 
2009; Berridge et al., 1989). Since these early studies it now seems that dopamine has 
a more specific role in incentive salience, reward learning and other processes, which I 
will now discuss in turn.  
Incentive salience was termed by Berridge and colleagues and refers to the ‘wanting’, 
‘motivating’ or ‘desire’ attribute of a rewarding stimulus (Berridge et al., 2009). Thus, 
when incentive salience is attributed to a reward-related stimulus it transforms a mere 
perception or memory into a motivationally potent incentive that commands attention 
and induces approach behaviours. Incentive salience has been mapped to the NAcc 
(Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015). A central premise to this theory is that reward 
processing is a composite construct, consisting of multiple components such as 
reward-related learning, ‘wanting’ to obtain a reward and the ‘liking’ or pleasure 
experience when one interacts with the reward (Berridge, 2007; Berridge et al., 2009). 
Berridge and colleagues have argued that dopamine causes ‘wanting’ for rewards, 
more than ‘liking’ or learning for those rewards (see Figure 1.9). 
For example, increases in extracellular dopamine in mice (produced by genetic 
manipulation or microinjections of amphetamine to the NAcc) failed to increase 
hedonic ‘liking’ reactions to sucrose rewards (Cagniard et al. 2005; Peciña et al. 2003; 
Wyvell and Berridge 2000). Moreover, hyperdopaminergic mouse, with 170% higher 
levels of extracellular striatal dopamine, showed higher behavioral ‘wanting’ for 
sucrose on several instrumental, approach, and consumption measures. However, the 
mice did not show better or faster instrumental learning, Pavlovian learning, and 
learned stimulus-response patterns were not stronger than normal (Cagniard et al. 
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2005; Yin et al. 2006). The hyperdopaminergic mouse also failed to show higher 
‘liking’ reactions to sucrose taste, despite its higher ‘wanting’ for these rewards 
(Peciña et al. 2003). This model suggests that elevated dopamine is a sufficient cause 
for elevated ‘wanting’ (but not for elevated ‘liking’ or learning). A study by Flagel et 
al., (2011) bred ‘sign-tracker rats’ that had much higher release of dopamine in the 
NAcc in response to a conditioned stimulus than an unconditioned stimulus and ‘goal-
tracking rats’ that did not show a differential response to the CS and US. Importantly, 
the CS evoked dopamine release in both sign- and goal-tracking rats, but this signal 
increased to a greater degree in sign-trackers, as they attributed incentive salience to 
the CS. Dopamine blockade abolished the sign-tracking conditioned response, but kept 
a goal-tracking CR intact (Flagel et al., 2011). Again, this suggests that dopamine is an 
integral part of stimulus–reward learning that is specifically associated with the 
attribution of incentive salience to reward cues. It seems that opioid, endocannabinoid 
and GABA neurotransmitter systems are more closely tied to consumatory phases of 
reward processing, as demonstrated in rodents sweet tasting (Berridge et al., 2009).  
Another important piece of evidence against the hedonia hypothesis is that striatal 
mechanisms in general and NAcc dopamine in particular participate in aspects of 
aversive learning, responsiveness to aversive stimuli and punishment (e.g. shock, tail 
pinch, restraint stress, aversive conditioned stimuli, aversive drugs, social defeat) 
(McCullough and Salamone, 1992; Salamone and Correa, 2012; Salamone et al., 
1994; Tidey and Miczek, 1996; Young, 2004). Indeed neuroimaging has shown the 
association between human NAcc activity and response to aversive processes and 
motivation to avoid negative outcomes (Liu et al., 2011). Thus, there is an emphasis 
on mesolimbic and nigrostriatal DA in reinforcement learning and motivational 
behaviour (Salamone and Correa, 2012; Yin et al., 2008). There is still uncertainty as 
to whether there are distinct DA neurons that respond differentially to appetitive and 
aversive stimuli, and what proportion of neurons respond to each. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that phasic DA activity can be enhanced by at least some aversive conditions, 




Figure 1.9. Nucleus Accumbens dopamine in motivated behaviour (approach for 
rewards, avoidance for aversive stimuli), and lack of involvement in the 
consummatory phase of subjective liking and aversion responses. Taken from 
Salamone and Correa (2012) with permission.  
 
In contrast to the incentive salience hypothesis, it has been argued that dopamine 
signalling encodes the distinction between a predicted reward and a received reward, 
and thus encodes a prediction error (PE) teaching signal. Schultz and colleagues 
formulated the prediction error hypothesis on the basis of single-cell recording 
experiments from midbrain dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra and VTA of 
awake monkeys whilst they engaged in an instrumental or pavlovian conditioning task 
(Ljungberg et al., 1992; Schultz, 1998; Schultz and Romo, 1990). In a typical 
experiment, a thirsty monkey was seated before two levers. After a visual stimulus 
was presented on screen, the monkey had to press one of two levers to receive a juice 
reward (Figure 1.10). During the early phase of learning, dopamine neurons displayed 
a phasic burst in activity only at reward delivery. However, after several trials, the 
monkey learnt the correct stimulus-action-reward association and dopaminergic 
neurons no longer fired to the reward. Instead, there was a temporal shift of dopamine 
firing to the presentation of the cue, alongside anticipatory licking behaviour. If an 
expected juice reward was omitted, the neurons responded with a dip of activity below 
basal firing rate at the time at which the reward would have been received. This has 
been termed as a negative PE (when the outcome is worse than expected). There is a 
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positive PE when the outcome is better than expected (i.e. delivery of unexpected 
rewards), eliciting a phasic activation, and a reward that occurs exactly as predicted in 
value and time elicits no phasic change in dopamine neurons (null prediction error). 
This suggested that dopaminergic activity is sensitive to both the occurrence and 
timing of the reward, and coded for a prediction error signal described as the 
difference between the reward and its prediction (Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11, Model 
1) (Schultz, 2016). This positive and negative PE signal has been consistently 
produced in both humans (Garrison et al., 2013) and animals (Cohen et al., 2012) 
using a variety of tasks and neuroimaging modalities (Schultz, 2016). In particular, 
positive dopamine prediction error activation promotes behaviour that leads to 
increased reward, whilst negative dopamine prediction error ‘dips’ do not.  
It is also important to mention that although rewards and reward predicting stimuli 
have objective, physical properties, the utility of the reward is determined by the needs 
of the individual and is therefore intrinsically subjective. Numerous studies have now 
shown that the value of outcomes reduces (or are ‘discounted’) by delays in reward 
delivery. This is referred to as ‘temporal discounting’ and describes the preference of 
sooner, but smaller rewards over larger later rewards. Neurons in several brain 
regions, including the dorsal and ventral striatum, OFC and PFC show this property of 
temporal discounting. Thus, a modification of the original PE models of reward 
learning proposes that dopamine neurons encode subjective value as opposed to 
objective value in temporal discounting. In this way the neurons are key inputs into 
value-based decision making processes. As such, the dopamine PE signal uses 
teaching signals of the Rescorla-Wagner (Kremer, 1978) and temporal difference (TD) 
(Morita et al., 2012; Sutton, 1988) RL models.   
The Rescorla–Wagner (RW) model (see Figure 1.10 for equation) is a formal model of 
instrumental and Pavlovian conditioning and describes the associative strength 
between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (UCS). Change in 
associative strength between a CS and an UCS is a function of differences between 
what was predicted (i.e. the animal’s expectation of the UCS, given all the conditioned 
stimuli present on the trial) and what actually happened in a conditioning trial. In other 
words, we make predictions about what will happen and we compare these predictions 
to what actually happens. If the prediction is wrong, then the difference between what 
was predicted and what actually happened is used for learning. The idea that 
64 
 
prediction error signals can take on both positive and negative response characteristics 
is the central feature of this form of learning model. 
Whilst the RW model is trial based and estimates predicted reward pertaining to a 
particular stimulus across trials, the TD model estimates the future-predicted reward 
from discrete time-points i within a trial until the end of the trial (Schultz et al., 1997). 
Indeed, timing of different stimuli within learning trials influences how associative 
strength changes and is a critical factor in modulating the efficacy of conditioning 
(Sutton, 1988). In this way, the TD model also overcomes some of the initial 
limitations of the RW model such as an inability to learn sequential stimulus-based 
predictions (e.g. when one stimulus predicts another stimulus which in turn predicts 
reward). For example, once it is learned that a given stimulus will be followed by a 
reward, phasic dopamine release in the NAcc occurs to increasingly distal reward-







Figure 1.10. Prediction Error Hypothesis (A) Peri-event time histogram demonstrating 
the firing rate of a dopaminergic neuron in a monkey’s midbrain. Adapted from 
Schultz et al., (1997). (Top panel) Prior to learning, a drop of appetitive fruit juice 
occurs in the absence of a conditioning stimulus and the unpredicted nature of the 
stimulus activates the neuron. (Middle panel) After learning a cue is associated with 
the reward and predicts its occurrence (stimulus-action-reward contingency), the 
dopamine neuron responds to the cue but fails to be activated by the predicted reward 
itself. (Bottom panel) After learning, the conditional cue elicits a response, but the 
reward fails to occur due to the monkey not making the required behavioural response. 
The activity of the dopamine neuron is depressed exactly at the time when the reward 
would have occurred. Original sequence of trials is plotted from top to bottom. CS: 
conditioned, reward-predicting stimulus; R: primary reward. (B)  Rescorla-Wagner 
learning model where: ΔѴΧ  is the change in the strength, on a single trial, of the 
association between the Conditioned Stimulus labelled "X" and the Unconditioned 
Stimulus. α is the salience of X (bounded by 0 and 1). β is the is the rate parameter for 
the US (bounded by 0 and 1), or ‘association value’. λ is the maximum conditioning 
possible for the US. ѴΧ  is the current associative strength of X. Ѵtot is the total 




 Integration of perspectives 1.4.2
The roles of dopamine in prediction error (reward learning) and incentive salience 
have thus far been considered as separate, competing hypotheses. However, recent 
studies (Hamid et al., 2016; Syed et al., 2016) which recorded the dynamics of NAcc 
dopamine concentrations during an instrumental learning task suggest that these 
theories can be integrated and considered within one framework. Specifically, they 
demonstrated that phasic dopamine bursting contributed to learning and incentive 
salience simultaneously. Reward is anticipated by an increase in phasic dopamine 
firing which encodes the predicted reward value (before the stimuli appears) and only 
under circumstances when an overt action is required. This implies that initial phasic 
dopamine activity encodes expected value, which promotes reward seeking through 
action/movement (Collins and Frank, 2016; Hamid et al., 2016; Syed et al., 2016). 
Indeed, an experiment in humans, which controlled for reward learning histories, 
showed that individuals had learned preferences for actions which they had freely 
chosen relative to actions that were not chosen (Hamid et al., 2016). (Figure 1.11 
(Martins et al., 2017) shows how trial-to-trial presentation of reward-predicting cues, 
when an action is required, elicits progressive ramping-up in DA encoding expected 
value. If a reward occurs or is omitted then there is a sudden jump or dip in value, 
mimicking a reward or penalty prediction error respectively. Whilst the expected value 
‘ramps up’, there is decline in PE signal due to learning (on a trial-by-trial basis) and 
the presence of a fixed phasic dopamine peak. In support of this model, Hamid et al., 
(2016) showed that if dopamine phasic activity is manipulated before choice, it 
impacts the incentive or willingness to work for a reward without affecting learning. In 
contrast, if dopamine phasic activity is altered during actual reward impacts upon 
learning. Thus, although there is a role of dopamine release in learning, it is strongly 
associated with coding for the value of a motivation to promote action (Collins and 
Frank, 2016). This view brings together both phasic and tonic dopamine levels rather 





Figure 1.11. Functions of dopamine (DA) in action and learning. (A) Model 1: Phasic 
dopamine transients encode prediction error (PE) signals. The phasic DA peak and PE 
decreases with learning, reflecting an increase in the predictability of reward value and 
timing, in the presence of a fixed baseline of DA. (B) DA concentration signals the 
value of overt action and directly incentivises choice accordingly. DA signals a reward 
prediction error during reward on trial n – 1, thereby reinforcing the value of the action 
so that it is incentivising on trial n. (C) Model 2: Phasic dopamine transients encode 
reward value (expected and actual). A reward cue elicits a phasic jump and ramping 
up in DA-encoding expected value, when an overt action is required. Reward 
occurrence or omission leads to a sudden jump or dip in value, mimicking a reward or 
penalty prediction error. Whilst the expected value ‘ramps up’, there is decline in PE 
signal due to learning (on a trial-by-trial basis) and the presence of a fixed phasic 
dopamine peak. Adapted and taken from Collins and Frank, (2016) and Martins et al., 
(2017) with permission. 
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 What is the relationship between reward BOLD signal and 1.4.3
dopamine? 
We have therefore seen that a host of methods including optogenetics, microdialysis, 
voltammetry and single-cell recording have been used in animals to formulate 
hypotheses for dopamine’s role in incentive-based learning and action. However, the 
method used in this study is in-vivo non-invasive neuroimaging using Blood-Oxygen-
Level-Dependent Magnetic Resonance Imaging in humans. Thus, an important 
assumption and question is whether BOLD signalling is related to dopaminergic 
activity. Indeed, there is evidence that an increase in DA release is spatially and 
temporally correlated to an increase in BOLD signal in the context of reward 
processing (Knutson and Gibbs, 2007; Schott et al., 2008b). Recently, a direct link has 
been found between reduced mid-brain transporter density and neural activity during 
reward processing within the mesolimbic pathway in healthy and depressed human 
participants (Dubol et al., 2017b). Nevertheless, ascribing the changes in BOLD signal 
to one or more receptor systems is highly speculative as the precise mechanism by 
which BOLD signal is modulated cannot be determined with fMRI alone. 
Moreover, several studies have used computational models to demonstrate that BOLD 
signal in various brain regions links to Prediction Error. Functional MRI studies of 
prediction error are generally based on a Rescorla-Wagner or Temporal Difference 
modelled prediction error. These are implemented in various learning algorithms (e.g. 
SARSA, Q-Learning, advantage learning) such that the estimated PE is calculated for 
each stimulus event. The time series described is subsequently regressed onto the 
acquired fMRI images to determine voxels in which the estimated PE correlates with 
the BOLD activation value (O'Doherty et al., 2004; O'Doherty, 2004). This highlights 
one of the advantages of the PE model, namely its testability.  
These studies have shown that PEs are encoded in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
including the ACC, VS and other midbrain structures such as the ventral tegmental 
area (VTA). PE-signals have also been detected in the insula and amygdala (Gradin et 
al., 2011; Seymour et al., 2004). However, valance (e.g. reward versus punishment, 
monetary gain versus loss) is controversial and there are suggestions that there are 
both overlapping and distinct brain regions encoding reward- and penalty-related PEs. 
For example, a meta-analysis in healthy volunteers showed that activity in the striatum 
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and prefrontal cortex correlates with reward PEs, whereas punishment PEs are 
reflected by insular activity (Garrison et al., 2013). Another meta-analysis found a 
high degree of overlap in the brain regions encoding both expected or experienced 
wins and losses (Liu et al., 2011).  
At a mechanistic level of explanation, Kumar et al., (2008) have suggested that phasic 
DA neuronal firing leads to DA release which could facilitate  longer duration 
postsynaptic activity, such as post-synaptic potentiation and inhibition (Kumar et al., 
2008; Menon et al., 2007b). They propose that these longer post-synaptic responses 
could underlie the BOLD signal that correlates with the predicted TD signal (Menon et 
al., 2007a). This could also account for both the activations and deactivations 
described by the predicted TD signal. 
 
 Interim summary 1.4.4
 
In summary, this section has summarised stages of reward and penalty processing, 
behavioural tasks that probe these processes as well as brain and neurotransmitter 
systems that underlie reward and penalty processing. Several brain regions form part 
of an incentive-based learning circuit including meso-cortic, meso-limbic and 
nigrostriatal pathways, for which the neurotransmitter, dopamine is of key importance. 
Although commonly referred to as the ‘brain’s reward circuit’, this circuit equally 
responds to aversive stimuli. Dopaminergic neurons are involved in numerous 
processes including motivation and reward- and aversion-related cognition 
(mesolimbic pathway), as well as executive processes including inhibitory control, 
cognitive flexibility, attentional control (mesocorticol pathway). Dopamine’s precise 
contribution to learning (via prediction error), ‘wanting’ (incentive salience) or 
‘liking’ has been the source of much debate. Recent evidence suggests that incentive 
salience and prediction error models can be integrated within the same framework, 
with DA release in learning coding for the value of a motivation to promote an action.  
We thus have an emerging picture in which depression has been conceptualised as an 
imbalance in dual valence systems (reduced positive and/or increased negative affect. 
(Forbes and Dahl, 2005), and I have outlined brain and neurotransmitter systems 
which underlie processing of rewards and penalties. In the next section I bring these 
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two components together by directly examining behavioural and neural deficits of 




















 Systematic Review: Reward and penalty-related 1.5
processing in Depression across electrophysiological 
and fMRI studies. 
This chapter will examine reward- and penalty-related processing as a central 
mechanism in depression. I provide a systematic review of behavioural and 
neuroimaging evidence of aberrations in reward and penalty processing in depression. 
Specifically, I focus on case-control studies, familial depression risk studies, 
longitudinal studies and intervention studies. Prior to this, it is important to 
conceptually bridge clinical terminology with the science of reward processing. 
For the purpose of mapping reward processing events to experimental equivalents and 
their clinical phenomena in depression, the several phases of reward processing 
(described in Figure 1.6, Section 1.2.3.1) can be parsed into four sets of reward 
processing events: prediction decision, action and experience, Figure 1.12 below).  
The prediction stage involves activating existing knowledge about the value of the 
object. Anticipatory anhedonia, defined as a lack of interest in activities that used to be 
enjoyable (Treadway and Zald, 2011), is the clinical, depressive symptom that is most 
related to this phase. In translational terms, the prediction stage tends to be the reward 
or penalty anticipation phase of the experiment when a cue indicates to the subject 
whether a win or loss is to be expected. A typical task that is used to examine this is 
the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task (Knutson et al., 2001), although there are 
others too (e.g. Wheel of Fortune Task, Card Guessing Task).  
The second decision stage involves computing the cost associated with attaining a 
reward. Depressed individuals commonly show difficulties in volition or motivation 
(Kendler, 2016; Kendler, 2017) which best map onto this phase of processing. 
Translationally, this stage links to the decision stage of the experiment (e.g. of a 
gambling task) whereby the individual chooses between available options.  
The third action stage is where motor effort is required in order to approach a reward 
or to avoid a punisher. Complaints such as low energy and fatigue are commonly 
reported by depressed individuals, and are most related to this phase (Kendler, 2016; 
Kendler, 2017). Translationally, the action phase involves the individual making an 
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action, such as button press or lever presses, and this provides a measurable way to 
examine task-related effort responses (e.g. the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task) 
(Treadway et al., 2012; Treadway et al., 2009a).  
The forth experience phase encompasses the consummation of reward and the 
subjective feelings that are associated with it (e.g. enjoyment). It also involves 
feedback integration, so that future rewards can be assessed on the basis of past 
experience. Consummatory anhedonia, defined as the lack of pleasure in activities or 
experiences that used to be pleasant (Treadway and Zald, 2011), best maps onto this 
stage. In translational terms, this corresponds to the phase in which an individual is 
presented with the outcome (e.g. win outcome, loss outcome) in the MID task.  
  
Figure 1.12. Illustration of the identified phases of reward and penalty processing and 
a mapping of these onto their associated clinical and translational terminologies. The 
outer layer (blue) demonstrates how these phases are linked in a continuous loop. 
Disruption of this cycle is thought to be associated with the common depressive 
symptoms identified in the next layer (orange). These symptoms are studied using 
translational concepts (purple), which are tapped into using experimental tasks such as 
the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task, the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task 
(EEfRT) and the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (in green). 
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 Data source and search strategy 1.5.1
We searched Pubmed, Scopus, PsychInfo and Web of Science for articles published in 
English from January 1, 2000 to February 1, 2017 using the following terms and their 
derivatives: depression, anhedonia, reward, motivation, reinforcement, punishment 
and aversion, prediction error, decision making and risk taking. 
 Detailed Inclusion and exclusion criteria 1.5.2
Inclusion criteria: Studies were required to provide a measure of depression or 
anhedonia in people with major depression disorder (MDD), at high-risk of depression 
(HR) or healthy controls (HC). We only selected studies that measured depression, or 
depressive symptoms, through questionnaires, structured interviews, or clinical 
diagnosis. In terms of reward paradigms employed, and following the classification 
described in Richards et al., (2013), we included instrumental-reward tasks and 
decision-making tasks, which require participants to complete an action correctly in 
order to obtain a reward (or avoid a penalty), being this action linked to the 
reward/penalty value in a trial-by-trial level. Hence, we excluded reward paradigms in 
which rewards/aversive stimuli were presented passively. Either positive (e.g. wining 
money) or negative (e.g. losing money) reward manipulations were permitted. No age 
restrictions were applied. 
Exclusion criteria: Studies were excluded if they lacked a standard measure of 
depression. We excluded studies that measured depressive symptoms only in patients 
with another disorder (e.g. bipolar or schizophrenia, etc.), and did not include a 
depressed group also. This was done because our primary question concerns the 
effects of depression on reward processing and in the absence of a depressed control 
group, drawing inferences about such effects would be impossible. We also excluded 
studies in which reward processing was measured through non-experimental methods 
such as self-report measures or questionnaires. Furthermore, to guard against 
heterogeneity, we excluded studies in which physical punishment was delivered (e.g. 
heat, pain, electrical shock, etc.) as these are likely to engage different brain networks 
to receiving, for example, negative feedback. Similarly, studies were excluded if they 
employed passive exposure to pleasant/unpleasant stimuli such as facial emotions or 
images/tastes. For all studies, data extracted, if available, included design features of 
the studies and measurements. These are detailed in Table 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5. 
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 Search Results  1.5.3
As shown in Figure 1.13, the initial search returned 58,401 studies; these were reduced 
to 26,492 after duplicates, as well as non-human and non-experimental studies, were 
removed based on keyword searches in EndNote (X7). Inter-rater reliability analysis 
based on 30 randomly selected articles showed a 97% of agreement across 
investigators. The final list included 171 studies; within those, there were 66 fMRI 
studies and 32 EEG studies and 73 studies employing mostly behavioural tasks or 
other methodologies. Data extracted, if available, were (a) type of study (observational 
or/and treatment study; cross-sectional or longitudinal), (b) sample characteristics 
(healthy, at-risk of depression (defined as the presence of either MDD in a parent, high 
depression scale scores in the absence of MDD diagnosis, or remitted MDD), 
depressed, or participants with other disorder; total sample size; percentage and 
sample size of depressed group; percentage of females in depressed group; percentage 
of medicated; mean, SD, and age range of depressed and comparison groups), and  (c) 
methodology employed (behavioural, EEG, FC, or fMRI; reward task; depression 
measure; type of reward). Rewards were defined as monetary (i.e. the participant wins 
-or is led to believe they will win money based on performance), affective or primary. 
Additional data were extracted from papers that contained fMRI and EEG measures, 
as described below. Compared to reward processing, the neural bases of penalty 












 Functional MRI studies  1.5.3.1
For the fMRI studies, there were n=66 fMRI studies of which 50 reported coordinates 
for reward-related neural activity. Upon inspection of the studies, there were only a 
sufficient number of studies for the following contrasts: Reward Anticipation (mostly 
vs. baseline or vs. a neutral outcome); Reward Feedback (mostly vs. baseline or vs. a 
neutral cue); Loss Feedback + Loss Anticipation (mostly vs. a neutral cue /outcome). 
Therefore, we extracted the results of 38 studies (Admon et al., 2015; Arrondo et al., 
2015; Casement et al., 2016; Chan et al., 2016; Chandrasekhar Pammi et al., 2015; 
Chung and Barch, 2015; Dichter et al., 2012; Dillon et al., 2014; Felder et al., 2012; 
Forbes et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2010; Gorka et al., 2014; Gotlib et al., 2010; Gradin 
et al., 2011; Hagele et al., 2015; Johnston et al., 2015; Knutson et al., 2008; Luking et 
al., 2016; Mori et al., 2016; Olino et al., 2011; Olino et al., 2014; Pizzagalli et al., 
2009; Redlich et al., 2015; Remijnse et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2012; Rzepa et al., 
2017; Satterthwaite et al., 2015; Schiller et al., 2013; Segarra et al., 2016; Sharp et al., 
2014; Smoski et al., 2009; Smoski et al., 2011; Steele et al., 2007; Stoy et al., 2012; 
Stringaris et al., 2015; Ubl et al., 2015a; Ubl et al., 2015b; Yang et al., 2016). Sixteen 
studies were not included because they did not report on any of these contrasts or 
related variations (e.g. risky vs. safe choices, inequality vs. fairness). However, these 
16 studies are referred to in the general discussion. Demographic information for the 
32 studies with the relevant contrasts is presented in Table 1.3, and the methods and 
results are summarised in Table 1.4.  
With reference to the distribution of studies in terms of group comparisons, a total of 
24 studies used a case control design to compare people diagnosed with Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) and healthy volunteers (HV), 10 used non-depressed 
subjects at-risk of MDD (HR). A final group of 8 studies measured symptoms of 
depression continuously in subjects recruited from the community. Three of these 
studies belong to more than one definition.  
In the following sections, I review the pattern of behavioural and neuroimaging (fMRI 
and EEG) findings which have emerged from the literature, and how such alterations 
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- information not provided; ^A continuous measure of anhedonia; +MDE = major depressive episode; where possible, ages are presented separately for the depression and the 
HV group (the latter below).  
Abbreviation of measures: BDI = Beck’s Depression Inventory; BHS = Beck Hopelessness Scale; BPRS = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale; CDI:T = Child Depression 
Inventory, total of child and parent reports; CDIP = The Cervical Dystonia Impact Profile; CDS = Cardiac Depression Scale; DASS = Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale; 
DAWBA = development and well-being assessment; HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; HAMD = Hamilton Depression Rating Scale; HRSD = Hamilton Rating 
Scale for Depression; IDAS = Inventory of Depression and Anxiety Symptoms;  KSADS = Kiddie Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia; MADRS = 
Montgomery–Åsberg Depression Rating Scale; MASQ = Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; MFQ = Mood and Feelings Questionnaire; MINI = Mini International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview; NRS = Nutritional Risk Screening; PANAS-C = Positive and Negative Affect Scale for Children; PAS = Physical Anhedonia Scale;  PHQ = 
Patient Health Questionnaire; RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale; SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms; SCID = Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-











Table 1.4. Summary of the methods and results of fMRI studies utilising reward and penalty (loss) anticipation contrasts and reward and penalty 





Task condition contrasts 
Brain regions of activity difference 
MDD <HV  
HR<HV 
Decrease with depression 
MDD >HV  
HR>HV 
Increase with depression 
Admon et al. 
(2015) 
Yes 
Feedback: reward + loss > 
neutral 
L caudate; R caudate - 
Arrondo et al.  
(2015) 
No Anticipation: reward > neutral R accumbens; L accumbens - 
Casement et al. 
(2016) 
No 
Anticipation: reward > 
baseline 
- dmPFC 




Anticipation: reward > loss  
(parametric modulation, 
decision phase)  
- R middle temporal cortex (p<0.001) 
Loss: Neural Loss Aversion 
(parametric modulation with 
loss values of feedback phase) 
R anterior insula; R dorsal striatum (putamen); R 
parahippocampal cortex 
L cuneus; R lingual gyrus; R middle 
occipital cortex; L VTA/midbrain; L lingual 
gyrus; R posterior cerebellum; L middle 
occipital cortex; R inferior occipital cortex; 
R lingual gyrus; L posterior cerebellum; R 
posterior cingulate cortex; R precuneus 
Chung & Barch 
(2015) 
No 
Anticipation: reward > 
baseline 
Lateral globus pallidus - 
Dichter et al. 
(2012) 
Yes Anticipation: reward > neutral  - 
L caudate; R anterior cerebellum; 
R cingulate gyrus (anterior); L cingulate 
gyrus (anterior); R frontal gyrus (middle); R 
frontal orbital cortex; L occipital fusiform 
gyrus; R occipital fusiform gyrus; R 
paracingulate gyrus (anterior); L 
parahippocampal gyrus (anterior); L parietal 
lobule (superior); R precuneous cortex, 
lingual gyrus; R Supplementary motor 
cortex; R supramarginal gyrus (posterior); L 
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supramarginal gyrus (posterior) 
Feedback: reward > neutral 
R angular gyrus; L central opercular cortex; R central 
opercular cortex; L cingulate gyrus (posterior); L frontal 
orbital cortex; R frontal orbital cortex; R frontal pole; L insular 
cortex; R intracalcarine cortex; L planum polare; L precentral 
gyrus; R Superior lateral occipital cortex; L supramarginal 
gyrus (anterior); R supramarginal gyrus (posterior); L temporal 
fusiform cortex (posterior); L temporal gyrus (posterior, 
superior); R temporal Pole; R thalamus; L thalamus; L 
precuneous cortex; L supramarginal gyrus (posterior) 
- 
Dillon et al. (2014) Yes Feedback: reward > neutral R parahippocampal gyrus; VTA/SN - 
Felder et al. (2012) Yes 
 Loss: feedback on non-win 
trials 
L angular gyrus; R caudate; R cingulate gyrus (Posterior); R 
frontal gyrus (middle); L frontal gyrus (middle); R frontal 
gyrus (superior); L frontal gyrus (Superior); R inferior frontal 
gyrus, pars opercularis; L frontal pole; R occipital cortex 
(lateral, superior); L paracingulate gyrus; L postcentral gyrus; 
L precentral gyrus; precuneous cortex; L temporal gyrus 
(middle, posterior); R middle temporal gyrus 
- 
Forbes et al. (2009) No 
Anticipation: reward > 
baseline 
L caudate head 
R DLPFC; L DLPFC; L DLPFC 
 
Feedback: reward > baseline L caudate head 
L medial frontal gyrus (Brodmann’s area 10); 
L DLPFC (Brodmann’s area 9); R DLPFC 
(brodmann’s area 9) 
Forbes et al. (2010) No 
Anticipation: reward > 
baseline 
- medial frontal gyrus; anterior cingulate 
Feedback: reward > baseline VS - 
Gorka et al. (2014) Yes Anticipation: reward > neutral - 
R dACC 
 
Gotlib et al. (2010) No 
Anticipation: reward > neutral 




Feedback: reward > neutral 
R anterior cingulate gyrus; L posterior cingulate gyrus; L 
midcingulate gyrus; L putamen or lentiform nucleus; L 




anterior cingulate gyrus 
Loss: anticipation loss > 
neutral + feedback loss > 
neutral 
L lentiform nucleus or globus pallidus; L midcingulate gyrus;  
R caudate; L putamen 
L cingulate gyrus 




modulation of the cue value, 
decision phase  
R hippocampus; R posterior parahippocampal gyrus - 
Feedback: Parametric 
modulation of the Reward 
Prediction Error + parametric 
modulation of reward value 
L putamen; L nacc; R nacc; L caudate; R caudate & 
thalamus; midbrain; R hippocampus 
- 
Hagele et al. (2015) Yes Anticipation: reward > neutral R VS; L VS; R ventral striatal - 
Johnston et al. 
(2015) 
Yes Feedback: reward > neutral ACC; nACC; posterior cingulate insula 
 Loss: feedback loss > neutral nACC DRN hippocampus; amygdala; insula 
Knutson et al. 
(2008) 
Yes 
Anticipation: reward > neutral L superior frontal gyrus 
L anterior cingulate; L precental gyrus; R 
postcentral gyrus 
Feedback: reward > neutral 
R MPFC; L insula; R putamen; L putamen; L superior frontal 
gyrus; L insula; L postcental gyrus; L inferior parietal lobe 
- 
Loss: feedback loss > neutral L parahippocampal gyrus - 
Luking et al. 
(2016) 
Yes 
 Feedback: reward > neutral 
caudate body; L ventral putamen; R ventral putamen; L 
medial globus pallidus; R medial globus pallidus; 
parahippocampal gyrus; anterior insula; anterior insula; 
anterior insula 
- 
Loss: feedback loss > neutral 
caudate body; L ventral putamen; R ventral putamen; L 
medial globus pallidus; R medial globus pallidus; 
parahippocampal gyrus; anterior insula; anterior insula; 
anterior insula 
- 
Mori et al. (2016) Yes Anticipation: reward > neutral - 
L angular gyrus; R angular gyrus; R middle 
frontal gyrus; R Inf parietal lobe 
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Loss: anticipation loss > 
neutral 
L angular gyrus; L inferior frontal gyrus - 
Olino et al. (2011) No 
Anticipation: reward > 
baseline 
caudate body - 
Olino et al. (2014) No 
Anticipation: reward > 
baseline 
striatum - 
Feedback: reward > baseline striatum - 
Pizzagalli et al. 
(2009) 
Yes 
Anticipation: reward > neutral 
L putamen,report voxel peak p-value); R occipitofrontal 
fasciculus; R middle occipital gyrus 
R uncus/parahippocampal gyrus; R inferior 
frontal gyrus; L inferior frontal gyrus; R 
middle frontal gyrus; R middle frontal gyrus; 
L middle frontal gyrus; R subgenual 
cingulate; R superior temporal gyrus; L 
occipitofrontal fasciculus/cingulum; L 
inferior parietal lobule; R lingual gyrus; R 
cerebellum 
Feedback: reward > neutral 
R caudate; R caudate; L caudate; L caudate; R insula; R 
insula; R inferior frontal gyrus; R middle frontal gyrus; R 
middle frontal gyrus; R middle frontal gyrus; R medial 
frontal gyrus; L precentral gyrus; R rostral anterior cingulate; 
R dorsal anterior cingulate; L posterior cingulate; R middle 
temporal gyrus; L cerebellum; L cerebellum 
L fusiform gyrus 
 
Loss: anticipation loss > 
neutral + feedback loss > 
neutral 
R cerebellum; R caudate; L caudate; L thalamus; R inferior 
frontal gyrus; R middle frontal gyrus; L precentral gyrus; L 
posterior cingulate; R superior temporal gyrus; R middle 
temporal gyrus; L middle temporal gyrus; L inferior occipital 
gyrus 
L insula; R medial frontal gyrus; L 
postcentral gyrus; dorsal anterior cingulate; R 
posterior cingulate; L middle temporal gyrus; 
L lingual gyrus; L precuneus; R cerebellum 
Redlich et al. 
(2015) 
No Feedback: reward > neutral nACC - 
Remijnse et al. 
(2009) 
Yes Feedback: reward > neutral - 
gyrus temporalis superior; gyrus precentralis; 
occipital; putamen 
Robinson et al. 
(2012) 
Yes 
Feedback: unexpected reward 
(after learning) 
R putamen; L mid-cingulate cortex; L mid-occipital cortex - 




Loss: anticipation aversive 
taste > neutral +  
feedback aversive taste > 
neutral  
 
MFG; IFG; frontal pole; PCC; ACC - 
No pgACC; pgACC; pgACC; vmPFC - 
Satterthwaite et al. 
(2015) 
No Feedback: reward > loss 
posterior cingulate; R anterior insula; L ventral striatum; R 
ventral striatum; anterior cingulate 
- 
Schiller et al. 
(2013) 
Yes 
Loss: anticipation loss > no 
loss +  
feedback loss > no loss 
L SFG; L IFG (pars triangularis); L SFG - 
Segarra et al. 
(2016) 
Yes Feedback: reward > neutral 
medial frontal cortex; R VS OFC thalamus and midbrain; L 
lingual gyrus, occipital lobe; L OFC; R inferior and middle 
temporal gyri; R angular and supramarginal gyri, parietal 
lobe; L angular and supramarginal gyri, parietal lobe 
- 
Sharp et al. (2014) 
Yes 
Feedback: reward > baseline 
R middle temporal gyrus; inferior frontal gyrus; R ventral 
striatum; R inferior frontal gyrus; R inferior parietal lobe; 
supramarginal gyrus; medial frontal gyrus; L cingluate gyrus 
- 
No R VS - 
Smoski et al. 
(2009) 
Yes 
Anticipation: reward > neutral 
caudate; cingulate gyrus; L cingulate gyrus; R cingulate 
gyrus; R frontal gyrus (inferior, pars triangularis); L frontal 
gyrus; R frontal gyrus; frontal pole; hippocampus; lingual 
gyrus; L occipital cortex; R occipital cortex; occipital cortex 
lateral superior; occipital fusiform gyrus; L post central 
gyrus; L precentral gyrus; R precentral gyrus; L precuneous 
cortex; R precuneous cortex; R subcallosal; R temporal 
gyrus; temporal gyrus; temporal pole; L thalamus; R 
thalamus 
parietal operculum cortex 
Feedback: reward > neutral 
R thalamus; frontal gyrus; frontal gyrus; lingual gyrus; 
occipital; occipital cortex lateral superior 
anuglar gyrus; cuneal cortex; frontal gyrus; 
occipital fusiform gyrus; precuneous cortex; 
R temporal pole; thalamus left 
Loss: feedback no win > 
neutral  
frontal gyrus; frontal orbital cortex; amygdala; caudate; 
central opercular cortex; cingulate gyrus; frontal operculum; 
frontal pole; heschl's gyrus; R hippocampus; insular cortex; 
lingual gyrus; occipital cortex (lateral inferior); R occipital 
cortex (lateral, superior); parietal lobe; planum temporale; 
postcentral gyrus; precuneous cortex; putamen; subcallosal 




Smoski et al. 
(2011) 
Yes Anticipation: reward > neutral 
R frontal orbital cortex; R frontal pole/OFC; L hippocampus; 
R occipital pole; R subcallosal cortex 
- 
 Feedback: reward > neutral R occipital fusiform gyrus; R occipital pole - 
Steele et al. (2007) 
No Feedback: reward > loss R VS; L VS  
 Loss: feedback loss > reward  Medial frontal cortex - 
Stoy et al. (2012) No 
Anticipation: reward > neutral R VS - 
Loss: anticipation loss > 
neutral 
R VS; L VS - 
Stringaris et al. 
(2015) 
No Anticipation: reward > neutral 
R caudate head; R caudate; L caudate; R medial frontal 
gyrus; R superior frontal gyrus; L superior frontal gyrus; L 
middle frontal gyrus; L caudate head; L putamen; Right 
caudate head; R caudate 
- 
Ubl et al. (2015) No 
Anticipation: high reward > 
neutral 
R VS; R middle OFC; L rostral ACC - 
Loss: anticipation high loss > 
neutral 
L rAcc - 
Ubl et al. (2015) (2) No Anticipation: reward > neutral - 
right frontal superior gyrus; right amygdala; 
left hippocampus 
Yang et al. (2016) Yes 
Anticipation: high reward > 
low reward + reward > 
baseline  
L anterior lobe; L caudate; L frontal lobe middle frontal 






 Behavioural results 1.5.4
Several types of paradigms have been used to probe how MDD patients process 
information in the context of reward or loss (Figure 1.12). Two broad conclusions 
have emerged from this literature, with depressed individuals (MDD and depressive 
symptoms by clinical interview/self-reported questionnaire) showing hyposenstive 
responses to rewards (positive feedback) and hypersensitive/maladaptive responses to 
penalties (negative feedback).  
 
 Hyposensitivity to reward 1.5.4.1
Depressed individuals generally show blunted responses to rewarding information 
which could reflect defecits in approach or appetitive systems (Eshel and Roiser, 
2010). Depressed patients displayed blunted responsiveness to reward  (but not to 
anticipated punishment or to nonreward or avoidance) (McFarland and Klein, 2009). 
Moreover, in probabilistic instrumental learning tasks, depression was associated with 
a failure to develop a response bias towards high-probability wins (Henriques and 
Davidson, 2000; Henriques et al., 1994; Pizzagalli et al., 2008b; Vrieze et al., 2013b). 
This may reflect indifference to reward in depression and a reduced capacity to 
modulate behaviour according to prior reinforcements. These impairments in reward-
related behavioural responses correlated specifically with the severity of self-reported 
anhedonia, independently of overall depression severity (Chase et al., 2010; Steele et 
al., 2007; Vrieze et al., 2013b). Moreover, MDD patients have shown to be less 
willing to expend effort in order to receive high monetary rewards relative to healthy 
controls. They were also less able to effectively use this information about reward 
magnitude and probability to guide choice behaviour (Treadway et al. 2012). This 
finding has been replicated in tasks in which effort has been operationalised as number 
of button presses and strength of response on a handgrip (Clery-Melin et al., 2011). 
 
However, there were also contradictory behavioural findings in depressed patients in 
the literature. Two paradigms are discussed in greater detail below, the Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT) and delay discounting tasks. The IGT is a laboratory probe developed to 
measure decision-making under uncertainty and risk (Bechara et al., 1994). Some 
studies (Cella et al., 2010; Ding et al., 2016; Moniz et al., 2016; Must et al., 2006; Olie 
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et al., 2015) suggested that depressed adult participants with MDD adopt a more 
disadvantageous strategy on the IGT compared to age-matched controls; however, the 
opposite has also been reported in MDD (Smoski et al., 2008) and in those scoring 
high on depressive symptoms (Byrne et al., 2016, noted a positive correlation between 
IGT score and their depression scale). There are also studies that found no difference 
when comparing at-risk (Westheide et al., 2007) or depressed (Dalgleish et al., 2004; 
Jollant et al., 2016; Oldershaw et al., 2009) groups to healthy volunteers. Similarly 
conflicting results were found in delay discounting tasks which probe the tendency of 
people to discount rewards according to how distant they are in time (Odum, 2011). 
Indeed, significant associations between delay discounting and depression go in 
different directions. Lempert et al. (Lempert and Pizzagalli, 2010) found that 
anhedonic individuals tended to choose larger but delayed rewards, whereas Imhoff et 
al. (Imhoff et al., 2014), as well as Pulcu et al. (Pulcu et al., 2014), found delay 
discounting and depression to be significantly correlated.  
 
 Hypersensitivity and maladaptive responses to penalties 1.5.4.2
In contrast to behavioural responses to reward outcomes, depressed individuals seem 
to show an opposite behavioural response pattern to loss events. There was converging 
evidence of heightened sensitivity to negative outcomes/feedback and biased 
information processing and representations that mediate choice behaviour, including 
preferential attention, planning, memory and self-referential processing towards 
negative information (Beck, 2008; Disner et al., 2011; Gotlib et al., 2010a; Grimm et 
al., 2009; Sylvester et al., 2003).  
Indeed, MDD patients (Elliott et al., 1997a; Elliott et al., 1996) and remitted MDD 
patients (Santesso et al., 2008) showed rapid deterioration in performance following 
an error made on a previous trial, and this was correlated with depression severity 
(Elliott et al., 1996). In line with learned helplessness models, a catastrophic response 
to negative feedback may be related to perceived failure triggering further failure-
realted thoughts and impacting on subsequent actions and task performance 
(Seligman, 1972). Indeed, MDD patients are most sensitive to misleading negative 
feedback which could reflect a tendancy to exaggerate the importance of uncertain or 
misleading negative information (Murphy et al., 2003). With a perceived lack of 
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control, future actions may be biased thereby leading to a cycle of learned helplessness 
(Seligman, 1972). Another potential explanation is that depressed individuals fail to 
use negative feedback to improve future performance (Elliott et al., 1997a; Steele et 
al., 2007). Individuals with high scores on the BDI were significantly less likely to 
adjust behavioural actions following error trials relative to participants with low BDI 
scores (Holmes and Pizzagalli, 2007). The authors suggested that this could reflect 
abnormalities in motivation or performance monitoring in addition to blunted 
responses to reinforcement (as opposed to hypersensitivity). However, in the next 
section we will see how this explanation may not be fitting in the context of neural 
findings of hyperactive responses to penalties. Taken together, depression seems to be 
related to maladaptive responses to penalty feedback, and various mechanisms could 
underlie this, including, hypersensitivity to punishment, failure to adapt and learned 
helplessness.  
In summary, depression seems to be broadly associated with reduced expectation of 
future rewards, diminished ability to modulate behavior as a function of reward or 
penalty history, reduced willingness to exert effort in order to gain reward and 
hypersensitivity to negative feedback. However, some contradictory findings have 
been reported. The tendencies described above may cause or exacerbate depressive 
symptoms, as a failure to adapt behaviour to reinforcers may lead to less rewards and 
more penalties, in a self-maintaining vicious cycle. 
 
 Functional MRI studies 1.5.5
 Reward anticipation and outcome 1.5.5.1
Overall, for whole-brain and ROI analyses we found 24 studies comprising 32 
experiments, 119 foci and 822 subjects for reward anticipation and 22 studies 
comprising 27 experiments, 135 foci and 572 subjects for reward feedback. 
Cross-sectional studies 
Adolescents and adults with depression were found to show altered responses in the 
ventral and dorsal striatum, and in frontal regions including the ACC, OFC, medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and middle frontal gyrus during reward anticipation, 
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relative to matched healthy controls (HC). The most consistent neural correlate of 
adolescent depression was reduced activation in the caudate (Forbes et al., 2006; 
Forbes et al., 2009; Olino et al., 2011) and this response persisted even following 
positive feedback (i.e. a win in the previous trial) (Olino et al., 2011). Reduced striatal 
activation was also reported in depressed adults in the caudate (Smoski et al., 2009; 
Zhang et al., 2013) and posterior putamen (Pizzagalli et al., 2009), although activation 
in the caudate has been more localised to the ventral caudate and NAcc in adult MDD 
as compared to adolescent MDD (Arrondo et al., 2015; Hagele et al., 2015; Luking et 
al., 2016c; Stoy et al., 2012a). The evidence relating depression and hypoactivity in 
frontal regions is mixed. Some studies showed that the MDD group had lower activity 
in inferior OFC (Forbes et al., 2006; Smoski et al., 2011), paracingulate cortex 
(Smoski et al., 2011), ACC (Smoski et al., 2009) and middle frontal gyrus (Smoski et 
al., 2009), whilst others reported higher activity in these regions (Casement et al., 
2014; Forbes et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2006; Gotlib et al., 2010a; Knutson et al., 
2008; Ubl et al., 2015a). Thus, when depressed individuals are presented with cues 
anticipating rewards, a reduction in striatal activity is a more consistent finding, with 
alterations (increases or decreases) in  prefronal regions also being reported.  
A prominent finding of the literature review was the association between depression, 
consummatory anhedonia, and blunted striatal responses to reward outcomes (Admon 
et al., 2015a; Forbes et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2010; Gotlib et al., 2010b; Hagele et 
al., 2015; Knutson et al., 2008; Pizzagalli et al., 2009a; Segarra et al., 2016; Sharp et 
al., 2014; Yang et al., 2016). This is surprising as one might expect the outcome phase 
to report more inconsistent results as it is a complex period with multiple processes 
occurring simultaneously. These include the response to the reward itself (including 
information about its pleasurability or value), evaluation against expectation, 
integration into memory and preparation for the next trial. Some studies also reported 
decreased or increased responses in frontal (Forbes et al., 2009; Remijnse et al., 2009; 
Segarra et al., 2016; Sharp et al., 2014) and limbic regions (Johnston et al., 2015; 
Smoski et al., 2009).  
In sum, these fMRI findings fit with predictions based on animal work (Schultz et al., 
1997) about the centrality of the striatum in reward processing. In light of prior 
evidence (see Section 1.3 on the neural circuitry of reward and penalty processing), 
reduced responsivity in the VS, caudate and putamen in MDD for reward anticipation 
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may represent dysfunctions in coding the incentive salience or magnitude of reward-
related stimuli and the initiation of goal-directed actions. Altered responses in frontal 
regions (either higher or lower) implicate abnormal monitoring of incentive-based 
behavioural responses (OFC and middle frontal gyrus) and conflict monitoring (ACC). 
For the outcome phase, blunted striatal responses could reflect defecits in hedonic 
function. However, the dominant model of striatal dopamine activity is that the 
salience or anticipatory activity predicts the outcome in cued-reward tasks (Schultz, 
2016). In this context, any blunting in anticipatory processing or reduction in salience 
of cues (associated with depressive illness), could also affect outcome processing. 
Accordingly, blunted striatal activation to reward outcomes could indicate weaker 
perceived action-outcome relationship and/or weaker responses to unpredictable 
rewards in depression. 
 
However, when drawing inferences from these studies, it is important to be aware of 
their methodological and conceptual limitations. Several of the studies were conducted 
in clinic or convenience samples which are liable to selection, referral and Berkson 
type biases (Berkson, 1946; Sackett et al., 1979). This may give rise to spurious results 
particularly when effects of comorbidity were not assessed. Indeed, several studies 
included MDD patients with comorbid anxiety disorders and this makes it difficult to 
delineate the specificity of the findings to MDD. There was also a high prevalence of 
patients taking medication, which may confound neuroimaging findings given that 
some medications are associated with reduced activity in striatal regions (Eshel and 
Roiser, 2010; McCabe et al., 2009). Finally, the studies reviewed indicate the ‘state’ 
aspects of neural changes and cannot delineate whether reward alterations are a cause, 
correlate, or consequence of depression. Thus, studies on individuals at high risk for 
depression are required to understand whether anticipatory neural function is abnormal 
in individuals prior to depression onset and thus represents a vulnerability marker for 
future MDD. Indeed, depression is frequently transmitted across families from one 
generation to the other. Offspring of depressed parents have a three-to-five fold 
increased lifetime risk for developing MDD and thus represent a high risk (HR) 
population (Goodman, 2007; Rice, Harold and Thapar, 2002; Sullivan, Neale and 




Longitudinal fMRI studies 
We found nine longitudinal studies examining the link between depression and reward 
processing (Admon et al., 2015b; Carl et al., 2016a; Morgan et al., 2013; Morgan et 
al., 2016; Mori et al., 2016a; Stoy et al., 2012b; Stringaris et al., 2015c; Telzer et al., 
2014; Walsh et al., 2016). Five of those studies were conducted as part of treatment 
trials (Admon et al., 2015b; Carl et al., 2016a; Mori et al., 2016a; Stoy et al., 2012b; 
Walsh et al., 2016), none of which included randomisation, placebo, or other control 
equivalent. Among the treatment modalities, three studies reported on behavioural 
activation (BA) and two used escitalopram, whereas five of the studies were 
observational (Admon et al., 2015b; Morgan et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2016; 
Stringaris et al., 2015c; Telzer et al., 2014). As in the cross-sectional studies, the MID 
was the most commonly employed task; six out of nine studies used the MID (Admon 
et al., 2015b; Carl et al., 2016a; Mori et al., 2016a; Stoy et al., 2012b; Stringaris et al., 
2015c; Walsh et al., 2016).  
Decreased activation in the striatum when anticipating a reward was associated with 
subsequent depressive disorder and an increase of symptoms in observational fMRI 
studies that reported task activation during that phase (rather than during decision 
making or using a connectivity analysis) (Gotlib et al., 2010; Olino et al., 2014; Sharp 
et al., 2014). HR youth exhibited decreased activation in putamen and insula (Gotlib et 
al., 2010) and VS (Olino et al., 2014) during reward anticipation compared to a low 
risk (LR) group. This was true even when controlling for depressive symptoms and 
positive affect (Olino et al., 2014). Thus, these familial depression risk designs suggest 
that individual differences in reward function may lead some individuals over the 
lifespan to have reduced anticipatory responses to rewards, irrespective of episode 
status (i.e. trait marker). The contribution of the frontal cortex to depression, however, 
was not consistent (Morgan et al., 2013; Stringaris et al., 2015c). Four of the five 
longitudinal observational studies were conducted in adolescents. Two of these 
employed connectivity measures during win feedback: one found that accumbens-
mPFC connectivity was positively correlated with a history of depression (Morgan et 
al., 2016), while the second reported that caudate-dACC connectivity was decreased in 
depression (Admon et al., 2015b). Further studies examining alterations in network 
integration, and connectivity analyses such as Dynamic Causal Modelling would be 
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useful in characterising the strength of the association between depression and 
abnormal fronto-striatal connectivity.  
 
 Penalty anticipation and outcome 1.5.5.2
Overall, for whole-brain and ROI analyses, there were only 13 studies (less than half 
than that reported for rewards) reporting activation changes for either loss anticipation 
or loss feedback. 
 
Loss-related responses were predominantly localised to the striatum, insula, ACC, 
parahippocampus and amygdala (Admon et al., 2015a; Gotlib et al., 2010b; Luking et 
al., 2016a; Rzepa et al., 2017; Ubl et al., 2015a). This is in line with studies suggesting 
that penalty-related responses more robustly activate limbic and cortical regions 
involved in conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2004; Gradin et al., 2011). For the 
anticipation of losses, there were mixed findings with some studies showing blunted 
(Admon et al., 2015a; Rzepa et al., 2017; Schiller et al., 2013; Stoy et al., 2012a; Ubl 
et al., 2015a) and others, increased (McCabe et al., 2009; McCabe et al., 2012) 
responses in depressed relative to healthy control subjects. In contrast, several studies 
reported elevated loss-related signals in the anterior and posterior cingulate, anterior 
insula, and striatum to losses or missed rewards (Admon et al., 2015a; Engelmann et 
al., 2017; Gotlib et al., 2010b; Luking et al., 2016b). This was suggested to reflect 
heightened sensitivity to negative outcomes. As mentioned above, responses in the 
outcome phase may not only reflect reponse to the penalty itself, but also evaluation 
against expectation. Thus, increased BOLD responses could represent a stronger 
perceived action-penalty outcome relationship and/or stronger responses to 
unpredictable negative outcomes in depression.  
 
 Prediction error 1.5.5.3
As detailed in Section 1.4, mathematical algorithms have also been used to give 
insights into the nature of brain signals during the processing of reinforcing stimuli. 
Although, this approach has still not been applied extensively in the study of 
95 
 
depression, in particular for penalty-related prediction error (PE) signalling, it is 
important to summarise the emerging trends. 
The majority of studies in the literature review demonstrated reduced encoding of 
reward-related PE in several regions of the fronto-striatal-limbic reward circuit in 
depression (Gradin et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2008; Rothkirch et al., 2017; Ubl et al., 
2015a). Specifically, there was reduced reward-related PE in the ventral striatum 
(Gradin et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2008; Ubl et al., 2015a), ACC (Kumar et al., 2008), 
medial OFC (Rothkirch et al., 2017), retrosplenial cortex (RC) (Kumar et al., 2008),  
midbrain (Gradin et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2008) and hippocampus (Kumar et al., 
2008). The degree of signal reduction in these regions correlated with syndrome and 
anhedonia severity (Gradin et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2008; Rothkirch et al., 2017). 
Thus, impaired neural coding of reward-related PEs by depressed individuals could 
reflect attenuated neural resources for processing reward learning signals that can be 
linked back to blunted attention and salience processing of appetitive cues. In other 
words, the PE results may be consistent with diminshed ability of depressed patients to 
use reinforcement to change behaviour (Section 1.5.4), with the most severly ill 
patients exhibiting the greatest abnormality.  
In contrast to the reward PE findings, there was a relative paucity of research linking 
penalty-related PEs to depression. Whilst there is some evidence of enhanced 
encoding of penalty-related PE in the ventral striatum  in depression relative to healthy 
volunteers (Ubl et al., 2015), there is also evidence of no group differences in penalty-
related PE encoding in the striatum and insula (Rothkirch et al., 2017), and this may be 
related to medication status. The results of Ubl and collegues suggest that penalty-
related learning of stimulus-response-outcome associations in depression might be 
biased by increased salience attribution to stimuli (Berridge, 2007; Jensen et al., 2007). 
Such increased PE signalling may bias action selections and avoidance behaviour in 
loss-related events (Garrison et al., 2013). However, there is clearly a need for a 




 Explanation for discrepancies in findings 1.5.5.4
As we have seen in the review, there are several sources which could lead to variations 
in the findings linking reward and penalty processes to depression. This can broadly be 
divided into individual differences, power issues, sample characteristics and 
differences in study and task design. Figure 1.14 provides a comprehensive overview 
of these factors.  
For example, with regards to individual differences in the literature review, it is worth 
speculating about the fact that there was a lower heterogeneity in the younger than 
older age subsamples. The younger samples were more likely to be community-based, 
narrower in age range, and had lower levels of medication, whilst the older sample 
was more diverse in terms of demographic variables. Medication was often reported 
inconsistently and therefore we could not assess its effects on the outcomes. It should 
also be noted that for the fMRI analyses, the younger sample contained more females 
than the older sample, which may have influenced the results. There is also the 
overarching issue of power. Many of these studies had relatively small sample sizes 




Figure 1.14. Schematic diagram summarising factors which may contribute to discrepant results across fMRI studies examining reward and 
penalty processing in depression.  
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 Electroencephalography (EEG) studies 1.5.6
In contrast to fMRI, EEG studies provide millisecond temporal resolution. Event-
related potentials enable a chronological delineation of reward-related activity by 
separating out the neural responses of anticipation and consummation with high 
precision (Banaschewski and Brandeis, 2007; Goldstein et al., 2006; Novak and Foti, 
2015). Despite the limitations in spatial resolution, ERP methods are optimal for 
detecting subtle changes in the temporal dynamics of reward and penalty function.   
The Feedback Negativity/Feedback-related negativity (FRN)
2
 (also termed reward 
positivity (RewP) is an event–related potential which indicates the early appraisal of 
feedback (~300 ms after stimulus presentation at fronto-central recording sites) and 
appears larger following the presentation of negative feedback (Gehring and 
Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak et al., 2005; Holroyd and Coles, 2002b; Holroyd et al., 
2004; Yeung et al., 2005). It was initially postulated that this ERP is not sensitive to 
absolute outcome values; rather, it reflects a measure of neural sensitivity to outcome 
valence (Foti et al., 2011a; Luck and Kappenman, 2011; Proudfit, 2015). However, 
more recently there is evidence that the FRN is also sensitive to variations in outcome 
magnitude (Sambrook and Goslin, 2015). Moreover, an FRN signal may be generated 
as neurons shift from encoding expected to actual outcomes (i.e. a Prediction Error 
signal) in the ACC (Hyman et al., 2017). 
In terms of longitudinal EEG studies, in non-clinical and familial-depression risk 
samples, blunted RewPs during consumption of monetary reward was linked to 
increased depressive symptoms and prospectively predicted MDD (Bress et al., 2013; 
Bress et al., 2015a; Bress et al., 2012; Kujawa and Burkhouse, 2017; Nelson et al., 
2016). Nelson and colleagues found that blunting of reward feedback at baseline was 
associated with, and predictive of, greater dysphoria at follow-up in a community-
based sample of 444 adolescent girls (Nelson et al., 2016). Similarly, EEG recordings 
across two time points, two years apart, showed a stable association between blunted 
                                                 
2 The RewP difference wave is calculated as gain minus loss difference, resulting in a 
fronto-central positivity (Novak et al., 2015). The FRN calculates the loss minus gain 
difference instead, resulting in fronto-central negativity. There is growing evidence that 
primarily reward-related activity following favourable outcomes elicits a relative positivity, 
supporting the RewP conceptualisation. The magnitude of the valence effect (win vs. loss) is 
the same in each case. 
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FRN and increased depression scores in children and young adolescents (Bress et al., 
2015b; Bress et al., 2012). These findings were consistent with another study that 
found low baseline FRN amongst adolescents with increased symptoms of depression 
at a 21-month follow-up, even after controlling for baseline symptoms (Bress et al., 
2013). No studies in the current review examined longitudinal associations between 
the FRN and depression in adult participants. Moreover, it is important to assess 
neural correlates in clinical samples. For example, FDR samples include participants 
who will remain healthy or develop adolescent or adult-onset depression and these two 
conditions differ in terms of course, symptomatology, neural substrates and/or 
vulnerability factors. 
A recent study was the first EEG study to decompose both anticipatory and 
cosumatory phases of reward and penalty processing within the framework of the MID 
task in MDD (Landes et al., 2018). This found that MDD adolescents had delayed 
neural processing of reward cues, as indexed by a prolonged cue-P3 latencies, relative 
to controls. During the outcome phase, the MDD group had shorter feedback-P3 
latencies in the reward versus punishment condition, and this was not found in the 
comparison healthy control group. The authors suggested that this could reflect 
delayed allocation of attentional resources to reward predicting cues in adolescent 
MDD as a result of monetary rewards being less motivationally relevant (Landes et al., 
2018). 
Taken together, and in line with the fMRI studies, these EEG results suggest a 
decreased brain sensitivity to anticipating and consuming rewards in depression. 
Whilst fMRI studies suggest this deficit to involve the striatum, the source of the FRN 
is still debated; however, it may partially reflect striatal signals (Carlson et al., 2011; 
Foti et al., 2011b), or the indirect influence of striatal signals on other neural regions 
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002a; Luu et al., 2003) 
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Table 1.5. Summary of the methods and results of the EEG studies adhering to the inclusion criteria.  





LP filter EEG net Signal measured 
(feedback 
contrast):  
Main finding reported for the 
relationship between depression 
and the FRN/RewP:  
Liu et al. (2014) FCz 250-350 0.1 30               - FRN (loss – gain) MDD: M= -0.66, SD= 4.67 
HV: M= -7.89, SD= 4.91 
Foti et al. (2014) Fz, FCz 250-350 0.01 30 Custom cap and the 
ActiveTwo BioSemi 
system 
FRN (loss – win) MDD: M= -2.69, SD= 4.39 
HV: M= -4.9, SD= 3.43 
Weinberg & Shankman 
(2017)+ 
Cz, FCz 220-360 0.1 30 ActiveTwo BioSemi 
system 
FRN (loss – gain)  At risk (remitted non-melancholic 
MDD): M= -4.43, SD= 6.23 
HV: M= -4.27, SD= 5.04 
Mueller et al. (2015)+ FCz, Cz 250-400 0.5 50 ActiveTwo BioSemi 
system 
FRN (negative – 
positive) 
MDD: M= -.09, SD= 1.98 
HV: M= 0.38, SD= 2.78 
Webb et al. (2017)+ FCz 250-350 0.1 30 HydroCel Geodesic 
Sensor Net 
FRN (loss – win) MDD: M= -4.71, SD= 6.83 
HV: M= -3.31, SD= 6.44 
Padrao et al. (2013)+ Fz 260-310 0.01 70               - FRN (loss – gain)  High anhedonia: M= -6.31, SD= 
3.75 
Low anhedonia: M= -5.9, SD= 
4.77 
Bress et al. (2013) Fz, FCz 250-350   - 104 Custom cap and the 
ActiveTwo BioSemi 
system 
FRN (loss – gain)  With MDE at follow up: M= -
2.32, SD= 8.97 
Without MDE at follow up: M= -
5.9, SD= 9.76 
Nelson et al. (2016)+ FCz 250-350 0.1 30 ActiveTwo BioSemi 
system 
RewP (gain – 
loss)  
r = -0.133 
Bress, Meyer, & Hajcak 
(2015) 
Fz, FCz* 275-375 0.1 30 ActiveTwo BioSemi 
system 
FRN (loss – gain) r = 0.54 
Bress, Meyer, & 
Proudfit (2015) 
Fz 275-375 0.1 30 ActiveTwo BioSemi 
system 
FRN (loss – gain) r = 0.41 
Bress et al. (2012) Fz, FCz, Cz* 275-375 0.1 30 ActiveTwo BioSemi 
system 
FRN (loss – gain) r = 0.38 
Ait Oumeziane & Foti 
(2016) 
Fz, Cz, FC1, 
FC2* 
260-310 0.01 30 ActiCAP and the 
actiCHamp system 
RewP (gain – 
loss)  
r = 0.02 
- information not provided; * = electrodes were pooled, + = authors were contacted and provided data   
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Table 1.6. EEG studies with FRN/RewP findings that were excluded.  
Paper Sample N Age Task Finding Contacted  Reason for exclusion  










Post induction sadness rating 
was positively associated with 
the FN in high but not low risk 
participants 
No The longitudinal follow up from this study was 
included instead as it differentiated between 
participants who did/did not have a subsequent MDE 
and made group comparisons  
Belden et al. 
(2016) 
MDD vs. 






Depressed had a smaller 
response to rewards compared 
to control. No difference to 
losses 
No Sampled from the Pz electrode  
Foti & Hajcak 
(2009) 





Positive correlation between the 
FN (TF3/SF1 PCA component) 
and the DAS-21 
No PCA 




60 Adults  Probabilistic 
reward task  
Reward-related neural activity, 
derived from PCA, was reduced 
in remitted depressed 
participants, relative to controls 
No PCA 






gy, plus a 
sibling pair  
140 Adults  Doors 
Guessing 
Task 
Neural response to rewards did 
not differ between siblings with 
and without a history of MDD 
No PCA 





Higher depressive symptoms 
were associated with blunted 
FN-Delta activity but not FN-
Theta activity  
No PCA   











Controls had a more negative 
response to errors following 
errors compared to correct 
following an error, whereas 
depressed didn’t demonstrate 
this difference 
Yes Peak extraction and conducted a trial n-1 analysis 
Santesso et al. Healthy  29 Young Monetary Higher negative emotionality Yes Peak extraction 
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(2012) adults  Incentive 
Delay task  
(combined BDI-II and PANAS 
NA scales) was associated with 
a more negative response to 
penalties  




27 Adults  Probabilistic 
punishment 
task 
Found a larger negative 
deflection for the remitted 
MDD group, compared to 
control  
Yes Peak extraction 




47 Adults  ‘Spatial 
Compatibilit
y Task’ 
Diagnosis x Feedback 
interaction. Negative feedback 
conditions elicited a greater 
negative wave compared to 
positive in controls, whereas the 
most negative feedback differed 
from positive and moderately 
negative feedback in the 
depressed group.  
Yes Separated feedback types – no means for loss minus 
gain provided  










The amplitude was reduced in 
MDD compared to control, 
across learning and feedback 
types  
 





 Summary using the Bradford Hill Causality Criteria framework 1.5.7
In summary, at a behavioural level, depression seems to be chatracterised by reduced 
expectation of future rewards, diminished ability to modulate behaviour as a function 
of reward or penalty history, reduced willingness to exert effort in order to gain reward 
and hypersensitivity to negative feedback. This behavioural phenotype may 
correspond to alterations in function in a network of fronto-striatal brain regions 
innervated by monoamines. The most consistent neuroimaging finding related 
depression to blunted striatal signals during reward feedback. There were also trends 
linking reduced striatal responses during reward anticipation to depression and in 
particular, the cardinal symptom of anhedonia, and the prediction of subsequent 
depressive disorder. There were comparitively fewer studies utilising paradigms that 
probe loss anticipation and feedback. Among these studies, there were mixed findings 
for the relationship between penalty anticipation and depression, with some studies 
showing blunted, and others, increased responses to penalty cues in depressed relative 
to healthy control subjects. Heightened sensitivity to negative outcomes in depression 
may be reflected by elevated loss-related signals in the ACC, anterior insula, and 
striatum.  
Thus, the evidence from case-control studies, familial depression risk and prospective 
studies suggest that neurocognitive processes of reward and penalty processing are 
central to depressive risk and the depression phenotype. Sir Bradford Hill described 
the aspects of an association that need to be considered when deciding whether the 
likely interpretation of any association is causation (Hill, 2015; Höfler, 2005; Holt and 
Peveler, 2006). These are summarised in Table 1.7 with reference to examples in the 
literature reviewed here. 
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Table 1.7. Explanation of the Bradford Hill criteria for determining whether an association is causative. Adapted from Hill, (2015), Hofler, (2005) 
and Holt and Peveler, (2006). 
Criteria Meaning Evidence for the association between the behavioural and neural correlates of 




A strong association is more 
likely to have a causal 
component than is a modest 
association. 
 
 The majority of published studies show an effect. See meta-analyses (Keren et al., 
2018, in press; Zhang et al., 2013). 
 Effect sizes for associations between reward/penalty processing and depression 
are small. More precise associations, e.g. with specific symptoms rather than 
overall illness severity, or model based derivation of neural correlates, may show 
stronger associations. 
 
Consistency The results have been 
replicated by different 
researchers and under different 
conditions. 
 
 Mixed findings across reward and penalty anticipation and outcome. 
 Most consistent results for reward outcomes. 
E.g: (Admon et al., 2015a; Forbes et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2010; Gotlib et al., 
2010b; Hagele et al., 2015; Knutson et al., 2008; Pizzagalli et al., 2009a; Segarra et 
al., 2016; Sharp et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2016). 
 
Specificity A factor influences specifically 
a particular outcome or 
population. 
 
 Reward and penalty-related behaviours and fronto-striatal brain activation 
specific to (i) depression (not comorbid anxiety) and (ii) anhedonia. 
E.g: (Elliott et al., 1997a; Forbes et al., 2006; Pizzagalli et al., 2009a; Stringaris et al., 
2015a). 
 
Temporality The factor must precede the 
outcome it is assumed to affect. 
 
 Responses during reward anticipation and outcomes predict depression onset. 
E.g: (Bress et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 2016; Sharp et al., 2014; Stringaris et al., 
2015a). 
 
Biological The outcome increases  Reward and penalty-related behaviours and fronto-striatal brain activation linked 
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gradient monotonically with increasing 
dose of exposure or according 
to a function predicted by a 
substantive theory. 
 
to dimensional measures of anhedonia and depression severity. 
E.g: (Admon et al., 2015a; Holmes and Pizzagalli, 2007; Stringaris et al., 2015a; 
Vrieze et al., 2013b). 
 
Plausibility There is a credible scientific 
mechanism that can explain the 
association.(i.e. the observed 
association can be plausibly 
explained by substantive 
knowledge (e.g. biological) 
explanations. 
 
 Dimensional measures of anhedonia and depression severity and impaired 
reinforcement learning are associated with reward and penalty-related fronto-
striatal brain activation and monoamine function. 
E.g: (Admon et al., 2015a; Holmes and Pizzagalli, 2007; Kumar et al., 2008; 
Rothkirch et al., 2017; Stringaris et al., 2015a; Vrieze et al., 2013b). 
Coherence The association should not 
conflict with present substantive 
knowledge. It is like face 
validity. 
 
 Coherence within the behavioural and neuroimaging literature is good. 
E.g behavioural: (Henriques and Davidson, 2000; Henriques et al., 1994; Pizzagalli et 
al., 2008b; Vrieze et al., 2013b). 
E.g neuroimaging: (Admon et al., 2015a; Forbes et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2010; 
Gotlib et al., 2010b; Hagele et al., 2015; Knutson et al., 2008; Pizzagalli et al., 2009a; 
Segarra et al., 2016; Sharp et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2016). 
 Incoherence arises between levels of understanding, i.e. the extent to which 
behaviour concurs with neural correlates of reward/penalty processing.  
Experimental 
evidence 
Causation is more likely if 
evidence is based on 
randomised experiments. An 
intervention shows results 
consistent with the association. 
 
 Futher studies needed 
(see Section 1.6, Table 1.8 and Table 1.10 for pharmacological and psychological 
intervention studies).  
Analogy There are similar results we can 
draw a relationship to. 
 
 A potential analogy is the relationship between fear/anxiety and evolutionarily-
preserved threat networks. 
106 
 
When considering these findings, the following conceptual and empirical challenges 
must also be considered. 
First, postulating depression to be a generalised inability to anticipate or perceive 
pleasure (or avoid pain) may be overly simplistic. Depressed individuals can still crave 
rewards, as evidenced by the increased levels of drug and alcohol dependency in 
depression (Conway et al., 2006). We have found that reward anticipation deficits in 
depression were specific to anhedonia and not present in those with low mood only 
(Stringaris et al., 2015c). Anhedonia is a core feature of depression closely linked to 
reward processing (Zhang et al., 2016). Unfortunately, very few studies included 
measures of anhedonia to quantify the degree to which reward system dysfunction was 
moderated by levels of anhedonia. Future studies should use anhedonia measures 
alongside depression symptoms to address this question. It should also be noted that 
differential patterns of response to primary rewards have been found for depressed 
patients with different constellations of appetite symptoms (decreases vs increases in 
appetite amongst those depressed) (Lamers et al., 2017; Simmons et al., 2016). It is 
therefore possible that reward aberrations do not affect all depressed patients, or are 
not present throughout the course of the illness. Further studies that examine reward 
processing in relation to these specific symptoms will be helpful. Moreover, the 
improved temporal resolution afforded by electrophysiological measures (EEG/MEG) 
has not been fully exploited in prior studies linking reward processing and depression. 
Depression studies that combine the high temporal precision of EEG/MEG with the 
spatial precision of fMRI are needed. 
Second, the empirical association between brain and behaviour findings in reward 
processing in depression remains unsatisfactory. We found that most purely 
behavioural studies report a significant relationship between reward processing and 
depression. Very few studies demonstrate aberrations in depression that span the three 
levels of explanation: brain circuit, task behaviour, and clinical symptom. 
Third, there were surprisingly few experimental studies embedded in treatment 
studies, thus limiting causal inferences about the role of reward processing in 
depression. Whilst some pharmacological (Admon et al., 2016; Lally et al., 2015; Stoy 
et al., 2012b) or psychological (Rice et al., 2015) interventions show promise in 
probing reward signal, they do not yet demonstrate that affecting reward mediates 
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depressive symptoms. The following section of the introduction will thus explore the 





















 Intervention studies 1.6
 Antidepressant Drugs 1.6.1
Since the serendipitous discovery of the first clinically useful antidepressant drug 
(Ban, 2006), a range of antidepressant drugs have been developed that, with few 
exceptions, act to increase transmission of monoamines. It was hypothesised that acute 
monoamine potentiation (i.e. increasing the synaptic concentration of monoamines, 
such as serotonin) was the central mechanism of antidepressant action (Ross and 
Renyi, 1969). However, blockade of transporters can be detected within hours after 
drug administration, whilst clinical improvement requires days or weeks (Taylor et al., 
2006; Vetulani and Sulser, 1975). The discrepancy in the neurochemical and 
therapeutic effects of antidepressants subsequently led to various theories which 
attempt to explain the delay in antidepressant drug efficacy in depression. 
It is useful to refer to three perspectives (or levels of explanation) for the mechanisms 
of antidepressant drug action: neurochemical, neuroplastic and neurocognitive theories 
(Harmer et al., 2017).  
First, neurochemical theories have been informed by animal models, human MRI and 
post-mortem studies and focus on intercellular mechanisms such as neurochemical, 
cellular and molecular processes. Neuroadaptive changes occur over days to weeks 
after the initiation of antidepressant treatment, thereby mirroring the delayed 
therapeutic effect of antidepressants (Sugrue, 1983). However, in recent years, there 
has been a shift from an exclusive focus on the neurochemical theories of 
antidepressant drug action to a broader conceptualisation of the effects of 
antidepressants on neuroplasticity and emotional-cognitive function. Second, 
mechanisms of neuroplasticity (such as pre and post-synaptic signalling, number and 
function of synapses, gene expression) are a fundamental process that underlie 
learning and memory as well as the ability of neuronal circuits to adjust to the external 
environment and subsequently make adaptive responses to future related stimuli (Citri 
and Malenka, 2008). Antidepressants promote synaptic plasticity in animal 
experimental studies by reversing or blocking the synaptic deficits caused by chronic 
stress (Bessa et al., 2009a, b; Duman and Aghajanian, 2012; Karpova et al., 2011; 
McEwen et al., 2015; McEwen and Morrison, 2013). The actions of SSRI and 
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norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor drugs on synapse number are subtle and delayed 
(Bessa et al., 2009a, b). Third, the neuropsychological theory enters the area of clinical 
psychology because it examines how antidepressants modify emotional processes, 
both at a neural and cognitive level. In contrast to neurochemical theories, 
neuropsychological effects of antidepressant drugs occur early, before changes in 
mood, yet are related to later clinical change (Harmer and Cowen, 2013; Harmer et al., 
2017). The extent to which the psychological changes relate to the effects of synaptic 
plasticity (i.e. whether these reflect similar, parallel or dependent processes) remains 
unclear, as research to date has not addressed this question directly.  
The main focus of the section below is on the third theory: the effects of 
antidepressant drugs on core psychological processes important in depression (Figure 
1.15). I begin by describing how antidepressants alter negative bias; evidence which 
led to the formation of the cognitive neuropsychological model of antidepressant drug 
action (Harmer and Cowen, 2013). I then describe how similar experimental medicine 
approaches have been applied to the investigation of reward processing and their 
modulation by antidepressant drugs in depression, which is the focus of this thesis.  
 
 Cognitive neuropsychological model of antidepressant action 1.6.2
 Normalisation of negative emotional biases by antidepressants 1.6.2.1
Catherine Harmer’s group have pioneered a research strategy that focuses on key 
neuropsychological factors that maintain depression (e.g. negative affective biases) 
and the modification of which occur shortly after antidepressant treatment (Harmer, 
2013). This approach provides an experimental medicine model by which 
psychological and pharmacological processes in depression can be assessed, integrated 
and understood.  
Antidepressants lead to behavioural changes that are opposite to those seen in the 
depressed state and that resemble healthy controls. This process of remediation of 
negative biases in emotional processing has been termed ‘normalisation’. Specifically, 
double-blind randomised controlled studies in healthy volunteers show that acute and 
short-term (7-day) administration of serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) and 
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noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor antidepressants (citalopram, reboxetine, duloxetine, 
agomelatine and mirtazapine) reduce negative emotional processing compared to 
placebo treatment (Arnone et al. 2009; Harmer et al. 2003, 2004, 2008, 2011b). These 
antidepressants were found to increase the perception of ambiguous faces as happy 
and the recall of positive self-referent words in both healthy volunteers (Harmer et al., 
2003a; Harmer et al., 2003b; Harmer et al., 2004) and depressed patients (Harmer et 
al., 2009c; Walsh et al., 2017) compared to placebo. An important observation is that 
the mechanism of the placebo response is not the same as the drug response, as 
placebo treatment does not affect emotional bias compared to a non-treatment group 
(Huneke et al., 2017). 
Such behavioural changes are also associated with altered patterns of neural response. 
The amygdala over activity seen in depression to negative affective stimuli (Victor et 
al., 2010) is normalised (i.e. reduced) after one-week antidepressant treatment 
(Godlewska et al., 2012) and a similar reduction in amygdala response has been found 
in healthy volunteers early in treatment (i.e. after a single dose and 7 day regimen with 
SSRIs andNRIs) (Del-Ben et al., 2005; Harmer et al., 2006; Norbury et al., 2007; 
Murphy et al., 2009a; Rawlings et al., 2010; Windischberger et al., 2010). Importantly, 
changes in emotional processing biases and their neural correlates occur independently 
from changes in subjective mood (Harmer et al., 2009b). This suggests a direct effect 
of antidepressant drug treatment rather than a secondary consequence of changes in 
mood and affect. Thus, a cognitive neuropsychological model of antidepressant drug 
action (Harmer and Cowen 2013; Harmer, Goodwin and Cowen, 2009) postulates that 
antidepressants may act to restore the balance between positive and negative 
emotional processing early in treatment, prior to mood improvement (Harmer and 
Cowen, 2013; Harmer et al., 2009a; Pringle et al., 2011; Roiser et al., 2012).  
Indeed, early changes in the perception and neural response to happy faces during 
antidepressant treatment is associated with subsequent improvement in clinical 
symptoms (i.e. predict later clinical response) (Godlewska et al., 2016; Shiroma et al., 
2014; Tranter et al., 2009). For example, depressed patients who respond to six week 
escitalopram treatment show a greater reduction in neural response during the 
processing of negative versus positive facial expressions early (7 days) in 
antidepressant treatment (Godlewska et al., 2016). Moreover, early changes in 
affective processing are maintained during long-term treatment, with depressed 
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patients showing reduced responses in the amygdala and ACC to negative stimuli and 
increased responses to happy faces (Fu et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2004; Ma, 2015).  
In order to explain the translation of rapid change in negative bias by antidepressants 
into clinical response, Harmer and colleagues suggest the following mechanism. 
Positive re-biasing of non-conscious processes by antidepressants may lead to changes 
in how stressors, life events and interpersonal interactions are managed and 
remembered. This process may involve re-learning a range of emotional associations, 
which would inevitably involve time and experience of life in the context of new 
processing biases. In line with this view, the association between early change in 
positive processing and a decrease in depression severity is moderated by 
interpersonal factors (perceived level of social support) (Shiroma et al., 2014).  
In summary, the cognitive neuropsychological model of antidepressant action suggests 
that antidepressant drugs have ‘bottom-up’ effects on emotional processing which 
become translated into improved mood and conscious appraisal over time and with 
exposure to a real-world environment (Figure 1.15). This model raises interesting 
questions about whether therapeutic efficacy could be improved by pharmacological 
agents and psychological treatments that target key neural mechanisms or 
‘biomarkers’ in depression. Indeed, it provides the opportunity for psychological-
pharmacological combination strategies (e.g. introducing specific behavioural 
experiments at a time in which the individual may be most responsive to re-learning 
biases), rather than putting two rational treatments together. Put simply, this approach 
provides an experimental medicine model to generate specific predictions about 
treatment development (i.e. “rational treatment advances”), which are vital for 
psychiatric diseases where treatment options are limited and unsatisfactory like in 
depression
 
(DePaulo, 2006).  
The testability of the model is a thus a key advantage, and a number of questions 
remain unanswered. There is a need to further characterise how antidepressants 
working on different neurotransmitter systems impact upon affective processing and 
predict clinical response in larger samples. This may have implications for 
stratified/personalised medicine, where treatment is tailored towards the predominant 
symptomatology for an individual MDD patient (Korte et al., 2015). Further work is 
also needed into how interpersonal environment leads to changes in strategic 
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processing, perhaps by studies using ecological monitoring of everyday experiences. A 
more pressing challenge for the model is to characterise how changes in negative bias 
are related to plasticity. It is currently difficult to examine the inter-dependence and 
time scale of changes in plasticity and bias in the same individual because of the 
absence of reliable neural plasticity markers in vivo in humans. Thus, Harmer and 
colleagues suggest that the development of animal models of emotional bias, (which 
show similar antidepressant drug effects to human studies) will be necessary for 




Figure 1.15. The cognitive neuropsychological theory of antidepressant drug action. 
Taken from Harmer et al., (2017) with permission. This approach demonstrates how 
psychopharmacology, neurobiological, psychological and environmental factors can 
be integrated in the examination of antidepressants drug action in depression and the 
delayed clinical effects of antidepressants. 
 
 Modulation of reward processing by antidepressants and 1.6.3
dopaminergic agents 
Thus far, I have outlined a contemporary approach for understanding the delay in 
antidepressant drug efficacy in depression focused on the normalisation of 
neurocognitive mechanisms of negative emotional processing. As reviewed in 
Sections 1.1.3.1 and 1.5, reward and penalty processing are other important 
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mechanisms in depression and may be optimal treatment targets. However, there have 
been comparatively fewer studies in humans investigating how pharmacological 
agents with antidepressant properties modify reward systems to date. In the next 
section, I discuss the current evidence for a normalisation response in reward and 
penalty processing (in healthy and depressed samples) with various antidepressant 
medication classes used to treat unipolar and bipolar depression. Given the central role 
of dopamine in the brain’s reward circuit and reward processing (discussed in Section 
1.3 and 1.4), I also review a larger evidence base on dopaminergic modulation of 
reward and penalty processing in healthy and depressed sample populations.  
A literature search (see Appendix A for search terms and strategy) yielded a total of  
44 studies investigating reward and penalty modulation by a variety of antidepressant 
drug classes used to treat depression (Bauer et al., 2007; Cleare et al., 2015). These are 
illustrated in Figure 1.16 and included: selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) 
(citalopram, escitalopram, paroxetine, fluoxetine) (n=11); serotonin and noradrenaline 
reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs) (duloxetine) (n=1); selective noradrenaline reuptake 
inhibitors (NRIs) (reboxetine) (n=1); tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) (imipramine) 
(n=1); dopamine and noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor (DNRIs) (bupropion) (n=4); 
dopamine reuptake inhibitors (amphetamines, methylphenidate, modafinil) (n=20); 
and dopamine antagonists (olanzapine, amisulpride) (n=6). In addition to these seven 
antidepressant drug classes, we examined modulation of reward and penalty 
processing by dopamine challenges. This literature review yielded a total of 52 studies 
across the following drug classes: dopamine antagonists (haloperidol, sulpiride) 
(n=14); dopamine precursor depletion (acute phenylalanine and tyrosine depletion, 
alpha-methyl-para-tyrosine) (n=10); dopamine synthesis enhancement (L-DOPA) 
(n=13); dopamine agonists (bromocriptine, cabergoline, pramipexole) (n=14); 
dopamine metabolism inhibitors (tolcapone) (n=1). As shown in Table 1.8, these 
studies varied by (i) sample type (healthy control sample only, both HC and depressed 
patient groups); (ii) study design (within-subjects cross-over, between-subjects parallel 
design); (iii) medication duration (acute, prolonged); (iv) administration (oral, 
intravenous); (v) task (active and passive task paradigms aimed at probing reward and 
penalty processing, such as the monetary incentive delay (MID) task and 






Figure 1.16. Monoaminergic drugs blocking the serotonin, and/or noradrenaline and 
dopamine transporters. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), serotonin and 
noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors (NRIs), 
dopamine and noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors (NDRIs), dopamine reuptake 
inhibitors (DRIs), and triple reuptake inhibitors (TRIs). * indicate drugs identified in 
the literature search which were used in studies examining the effect of the drug on 
reward and penalty processing in healthy and/or depressed volunteers. Positioning of 











Table 1.8. Overview of the pharmacological studies examining the modulation of reward and penalty processing by (A) different medication classes used to 
treat MDD (Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) (citalopram, escitalopram, paroxetine, fluoxetine); Serotonin and noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors 
(SNRIs) (duloxetine); Selective noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors (NRIs) (reboxetine); Tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) (imipramine); Dopamine and 
noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor (DNRIs) (bupropion); Dopamine reuptake inhibitor (amphetamines, methylphenidate, modafinil); and Dopamine antagonists 
(quetiapine, aripiprazole, risperidone, olanzapine, amisulpride) and (B) dopamine challenges (Dopamine antagonists (haloperidol, sulpiride); Dopamine 
precursor depletion (acute phenylalanine and tyrosine depletion, alpha-methyl-para-tyrosine); Dopamine synthesis enhancement (L-DOPA); Dopamine agonists 
(bromocriptine, cabergoline, pramipexole); Dopamine metabolism inhibitors (tolcapone). *time interval between drug administration and experimental session. 
**significant after correction for multiple comparisons with FWE, FDR, Bonferroni or permutations. Relative to placebo unless otherwise specified. 
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 Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), serotonin and 1.6.3.1
noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), selective noradrenaline 
reuptake inhibitors (NRIs) 
The normalisation of reward-task related processing by antidepressant treatment may 
have a different temporal response when compared to emotion processing 
mechanisms. As described in Section 1.6.2.1, several studies show a normalisation of 
emotional bias with seven day and even acute treatment with SSRIs and nor-
adrenaline reuptake inhibitors (Harmer et al., 2003a; Harmer et al., 2009c; Harmer et 
al., 2004). In contrast, antidepressants seem to exacerbate reward deficits early in 
treatment (Kumar et al., 2008; Marutani et al., 2011; McCabe et al., 2010) prior to 
normalisation following longer-term (two-six week) treatment (Scholl et al., 2017; 
Stoy et al., 2012a; Walsh et al., 2017). For example, acute dose and seven day 
treatment with SSRI paroxetine diminishes brain activity induced by motivation in 
healthy subjects in the globus pallidus, insula, putamen, ACC and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (Abler et al., 2012; Abler et al., 2011; Marutani et al., 2011) and 
hedonic signals in the NAcc (Graf et al., 2016). Three day treatment with SSRI 
citalopram in healthy controls reduces reward-related prediction error signalling in the 
ACC and hippocampus relative to an un-medicated state (Kumar et al., 2008). Seven 
day treatment with SSRI citalopram in healthy controls reduces activation for 
rewarding and aversive stimuli (in the VS and ventromedial OFC to rewarding stimuli 
(chocolate) and in the lateral OFC for aversive stimuli) (McCabe et al., 2010). In a 
similar fashion, McCabe and Mishor (2011) reported reduced connectivity at rest 
between key regions of the reward network (striatal–orbitofrontal cortex connectivity) 
in healthy volunteers following 7-day reboxetine (selective noradrenergic reuptake 
inhibitor, NRI) treatment.  
In contrast, prolonged, two week administration of SSRI citalopram increases neural 
responses to reward anticipation (Stoy et al., 2012a) and neural PE signals during 
reward and effort leaning in VMPFC and ACC; and concomitantly improves 
behavioural measures of reward learning (Scholl et al., 2017; Stoy et al., 2012a). 
Similarly, two week treatment with serotonin and noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor 
(SNRI) duloxetine enhances VS responses to incentive cues in the MID task 
(Ossewaarde et al., 2011). Moreover, improved positive affect in depressed patients 
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after 2 months anti-depressant medication treatment (citalopram) is related to patients’ 
ability to sustain activity in prefrontal-nucleus accumbens circuitry (Heller et al., 
2013). SSRI, NRI and SNRI medication thus seems to enhance neural and behavioural 
signals of reward only after a prolonged period (2+ weeks), and following an initial 
decrease in these signals. 
However, there are exceptions to this pattern. SSRI fluoxetine has shown to attenuate 
neural responses during risky decision making and reward outcome in healthy 
volunteers even after three week intervention (Macoveanu et al., 2014). As there is 
evidence for different trajectories in reward-related antidepressant response for healthy 
and depressed subjects (e.g. Walsh et al., 2017), it will be important to replicate this in 
a sample including both groups. Indeed, without similar studies in patients, 
extrapolating to the clinical domain needs to be done with caution. This is because 
patient and control groups will most likely be starting from different baselines (both in 
terms of aberrant disease processes and evidence that long-term treatment changes the 
dynamics of the neurotransmitter systems (Goto and Grace, 2007)), which would 
likely influence BOLD signal. Finally, it is important to note that reward-related 
cortico-striatal connectivity predicts symptom change. A more normative pattern of 
ACC-caudate connectivity during reward and penalty processing prior to 12 week 
escitalopram treatment is associated with greater improvement in symptoms 12 weeks 
later (Admon et al., 2015a). 
Moreover, it is logical to consider how antidepressants with different mechanisms of 
action at the receptor level (serotonergic, dopaminergic, noradrenergic) affect the 
behavioural and neural correlates of reward processing at different timescales. Indeed, 
it has been suggested that antidepressants with an effect on the dopamine reward 
system may be more efficacious at improving reward-related deficits and suited to 
treat apathy and anhedonia (Argyropoulos and Nutt, 2013; Nutt et al., 2007). 
 Dopamine Reuptake Inhibitors: Bupropion, amphetamines, 1.6.3.2
methylphenidate, modafinil 
Dopamine reuptake inhibitors increase dopamine transmission by blocking the action 
of the dopamine transporter (DAT) during dopamine reuptake in the synapse (Melega 
et al., 1995). When dopamine is blocked from re-entering the pre-synaptic neuron, the 
142 
 
results is an increased extra-cellular concentration of dopamine which is available for 
transmission to the post-synapse (Oswald et al., 2015).  
Bupropion is one of the few antidepressants that prevent the reuptake of dopamine (in 
addition to noradrenaline) (i.e. dopamine and noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor, DNRI) 
(Dwoskin et al., 2006; Stahl et al., 2004). It shows a similar temporal profile to SSRIs 
in terms of normalisation of behavioural responses to reward. Compared to placebo, a 
single dose of bupropion had unexpected detrimental effects on reward processing in 
healthy volunteers (Walsh et al., submitted). Similarly, bupropion exacerbated reward 
deficits in depressed individuals, with a significant decrease in the likelihood of 
choosing high-probability wins between baseline and week two. However, by week 
six, bupropion was found to normalise reward processing to healthy control levels 
(Walsh et al., 2017). At the neural level, however, bupropion differs to SSRIs in that it 
increases neural responses to rewards early in treatment. After seven days, bupropion 
already enhances fronto-striatal responses to erotic images (Abler et al., 2011) and to 
anticipation, effort and consummation of reward and aversion (Dean et al., 2016). Yet, 
there were no treatment effects on behavioural and subjective reports of pleasantness, 
wanting and intensity for positive and aversive stimuli (Dean et al., 2016). This may 
suggest that increased neural activity to reward and aversion after seven days does not 
necessarily become the subject of conscious awareness (McCabe et al., 2010). 
Although it is not possible to directly compare results for the SSRI and DNRI 
antidepressant studies, due to differences in passive (McCabe et al., 2010) versus 
active tasks (Dean et al., 2016) respectively, the results suggest that drugs with 
different neurotransmitter targets interact with reward and aversion differently. The 
findings that the neuropsychological effects of bupropion on reward and aversion 
occur very early, before changes in mood or behaviour, is consistent with the 
neuropsychological model of antidepressant action (Harmer and Cowen, 2013). 
However, studies with larger sample sizes and in depressed patients (to avoid ceiling 
effects), over a longer period of time are required to strengthen these preliminary 
findings.  
Amphetamines, methylphenidate and modafinil are DA reuptake inhibitors that are no 
longer or less commonly used for the treatment of MDD. Indeed, amphetamine has 
been associated with increased susceptibility for addictive behaviours, driven by 
increased concentrations of striatal dopamine (Vaughan and Foster, 2013). Thus, in 
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reward processing, a number of studies have reported enhanced caudate activation 
during reward anticipation (O'Daly et al., 2014) and increased place preference (Childs 
and de Wit, 2013) (however also see Knutson et al., (2004) and discussion below). 
Recently FDA-approved wakefulness-promoting modafinil (200 mg) was shown to 
increase the subjective effort score for monetary gains in the MID task (Funayama et 
al., 2014). A study with metamphetamine (20mg) also found an increase of preference 
for the context in which the drug was administered, and this was unrelated to 
subjective drug effects. This suggests that metamphetmaine has specific effects on 
reward processing without altering general mood, as has been observed for bupropion 
(Mayo et al., 2013). However, this study was only completed in a healthy control 
sample. There was only one study completed in depressed individuals with an IAPS 
task (which consists of rating a set of validated pictures containing neutral, positive, 
and negative images of humans, animals, and objects) (Tremblay et al., 2005). Dextro-
amphetamine lead to MDD subjects having a hypersensitive response to the rewarding 
effects of dextroamphetamine (two-fold increase) relative to healthy controls 
(Tremblay et al., 2005).  
This is similar to a study in rodents which investigated the ability of drugs that block 
dopamine transport (DAT), norepinephrine transport (NET), and serotonin transport 
(SERT) to modulate work output in rats responding on a test of effort-related decision 
making (a progressive ratio (PR)/chow feeding choice task) (Yohn et al., 2016a; Yohn 
et al., 2016b). Rats choose between working for a preferred food by lever pressing on 
a PR schedule versus obtaining a less preferred lab chow that is freely available in the 
chamber. Acute and repeated administration of DAT inhibitor GBR12909 shifted 
choice behaviour, increasing measures of PR lever pressing and decreasing chow 
intake. In contrast, SSRI fluoxetine and noradrenaline inhibitors desipramine and 
atomoxetine failed to increase lever pressing output, and actually decreased it at higher 
doses. Moreover, the increased selection of the high effort instrumental activity under 
the DAT inhibitor was related to elevated extracellular dopamine levels in the NAcc 
core, whilst fluoxetine, desipramine and atomoxetine decreased extracellular 
dopamine. The same group also investigated how different classes of antidepressants 
reverse the effects of tetrabenazine, which produces depressive symptoms in humans 
and biases effort-based decision making toward low effort/low reward options versus 
high effort/high reward options (Yohn et al., 2016a). In rats, the effort-related effects 
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of tetrabenazine were attenuated by DNRI bupropion, whilst SSRI fluoxetine and NRI 
desipramine failed to reverse the effects of tetrabenazine, with higher doses leading to 
further behavioural impairments. Thus, medications working on dopamine 
transmission seem to be effective at increasing choices for high effort/high reward 
options and are consistent with the hypothesis that drugs that enhance dopamine may 
be affective in treating anhedonia and depression.   
There are however some findings which are counterintuitive to this proposal. The 
same study that found increased behavioural responses to reward in depressed patients 
on dextro-amphetamine, also showed negative (rather than increased) neural BOLD 
responses in the caudate, putamen and prefrontal OFC to rewards (Tremblay et al., 
2005). The physiological mechanisms of negative BOLD signals are thought to be 
induced by reduced cerebral blood flow (i.e. active neuronal inhibition and decreased 
cortical excitability) (Shmuel et al., 2002; Stefanovic et al., 2004). Interestingly, other 
studies with methylphenidate (30 mg and 40 mg dose) have also found decreases in 
the typical effect of reward on brain function during rewarded trials (Dodds et al., 
2008; Marquand et al., 2011). This could be explained by the discrimination between 
rewarded and unrewarded processes being reduced on drug (amphetamine). 
Dextroamphetamine and methylphenidate may increase tonic dopamine release to a 
level that dampens the transient phasic burst firing that encodes reward. This provides 
a context in which the phasic signals that mark rewarding stimuli are ’drowned’ out 
and do not appreciably change the BOLD signal (Grace, 1991; Grace, 2016). Another 
speculative explanation for these results is an inverted U-shape effect of dopamine 
dosing on reward coding. Unfortunately, the pharmacological imaging studies of 
bupropion administration were only conducted after pro-longed administration. Thus, 
acute administration of bupropion in conjunction with neuroimaging is required to 
examine the overlap of findings between bupropion and other drugs within this class 
of dopamine reuptake inhibitor (DRIs).   
In summary, the evidence thus far points to a dissociation in the temporal effects of 
antidepressants on emotional and reward processing, and also the need to consider 
how antidepressants with different mechanisms of action at the receptor level 
(dopaminergic, noradrenergic, serotonergic), may affect the behavioural and neural-
correlates of reward processing at different timescales. The evidence suggests that an 
acute or seven day dose of agents acting on dopamine receptors (e.g. bupropion) is 
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sufficient to enhance neural signals to reward but not behaviour or learning (Dean et 
al., 2016; Walsh et al., 2017); whilst SSRIs enhance neural and behavioural signals of 
reward after a prolonged period (2+ weeks). 
As outlined in Section 1.1.5.2, clinical guidelines for the pharmacological treatment of 
MDD, not only include SSRIs, SNRIs, NRIs and DNRIs, but also augmentation or 
combination treatment with dopamine antagonists when an individual does not 
respond to first-line treatment. First-line augmentation treatments include quetiapine 
and aripiprazole, and second-line treatments include risperidone and olanzapine. 
Therefore, I will now review evidence for the modulation of reward and penalty 
function by dopamine antagonists. Critically, dopamine antagonists can be split into 
two categories. First generation or typical antipsychotics are prototypical D2 
antagonists, such as haloperidol, which are not used in MDD treatment. Second 
generation or typical antipsychotics, have a broader receptor binding profile, including 
greater noradrenergic and serotonergic action (e.g. amisulpride, olanzapine, 
quetiapine, lurasidone) and are used in treatment of depression. In the next section, I 
present experimental evidence of dopamine antagonist modulation of reward 
(cognitive and neural) in healthy volunteers and depressed individuals. I discuss 
limitations and considerations for the interpretations of neuropharmacology research 
on reward processing.  
 
 Dopamine antagonists: olanzapine, amisulpride, haloperidol, 1.6.3.3
sulpiride 
Dopamine antagonists blocks dopamine receptors by receptor antagonism and 
therefore interfere with dopamine neurotransmission ((Boissier and Pagny, 1960). 
There are very few studies investigating the modulation of reward and penalty 
processing by antidepressant D2 antagonists (amisulpride n=5, olanzapine n=1, 
aripiprazole n=1), and the majority of the studies have been completed in typical 
antipsychotic haloperidol (n=8).  
Beginning with D2 antagonists with antidepressant properties, acute olanzapine 
administration (5 mg) does not blunt overall VS reward-related activity, but rather 
equalises the assignment of salience (i.e. reduces activation differences) between high, 
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low and not-rewarded trials (Abler et al., 2007). Behavioural effects included reduced 
reaction time acceleration for high rewards. In contrast, one week olanzapine treatment 
in healthy volunteers increased BOLD response during both anticipation of rewarding 
tastes and reward receipt in the striatum and ACC. The differences in these results 
could reflect different doses, length of treatment, or task paradigms, as the experience 
of a primary reward is clearly different to the indirect reward of money (a secondary 
reward) in the MID task (Sescousse et al., 2013). Further studies with olanzapine are 
required as the study by Abler et al., (2007) used a very small sample size (n=8) that is 
less than that needed for reliable group comparison in fMRI (Thirion et al., 2007).  
The findings in amisulpride are more robust, due to the greater number of studies and 
variety of doses used. There seems to be a dissociation in effects on reward for low 
(<200 mg) versus high (>400 mg) doses of acute amisulpride administration. Kahnt et 
al., (2015) found that amisulpride at low doses (200 mg) increased OFC pattern 
distinction between reward and no reward. At the same dose, amisulpride also 
increased the ability to select the better of two high rewards in a reward learning task 
and this was accompanied by increased activity in the striatum during prediction errors 
and the ventromedial PFC during tracking of learnt value (Jocham et al., 2011). Only 
one study directly examined response to dopamine antagonists in depressed patients, 
thereby uniting three components: investigating reward and penalty modulation by 
dopamine antagonists in depression. Admon et al., (2017) showed that a single low 
dose of the amisulpride (50 mg) normalised reward processing by increasing reward-
related striatal activation and corticostriatal connectivity in depressed individuals, 
without increasing reward learning. These findings suggest that low dose amisulpride 
predominantly increases reward coding. Moreover, they raise the intriguing possibility 
that dopamine antagonists—some of which are efficacious antidepressants—may exert 
their effects via reward signal normalisation. In contrast, at a double dose (400 mg), 
amisulpride has been shown to decrease both approach and avoidance learning as well 
as reward- and aversive-related striatal PEs (Jocham et al., 2014).  
Therefore, an affinity-based model (also discussed in DA agonists in Section 1.6.3.4), 
could be applied here to understand the observed association between low dose D2 
antagonist and higher reward coding and between high dose and attenuated reward 
coding. Specifically, presynaptic D2 receptors have higher affinity to dopamine than 
post-synaptic D2 receptors and would be occupied first at low doses (Frank and 
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O'Reilly, 2006b). Predominant blockade of presynaptic autoreceptors at low doses 
could subsequently lead to amplification of dopamine phasic release (also described as 
a shift of the tonic versus phasic balance towards phasic activity (Dreyer et al., 2010). 
However, as is the case for dopamine agonists, this dose-dependent rationale of D2 
receptor antagonism on reward processing needs further evidence. There is a clear 
need for studies using varying doses of dopamine antagonists on phasic versus tonic 
dopamine firing and release to understand the pre-synaptic actions of dopamine 
antagonists.  
For haloperidol there are mixed findings. Some studies report blunted behavioural and 
neural correlates of reward processing with 2 mg haloperidol (Pleger et al., 2009a), 
whereas other studies found no significant effects with similar doses (Oei et al., 2012a; 
Pine et al., 2010; Zack and Poulos, 2007)or even increased learning from rewards 
(Frank and O'Reilly, 2006a). A study by Bolstad et al., (2015) specifically examined 
the effects of acute dose haloperidol (versus aripiprazole and placebo) in an aversive 
conditioning task with aversive and neutral events presented as sounds. Haloperidol 
led to a reduction in aversive versus neutral event avoidance (relative to placebo). In 
other words, participants on haloperidol were not able to actively avoid more aversive 
trials, whilst these aversive events were successfully avoided in aripiprazole and 
placebo groups. Accordingly, activity in the VS (aversive>neutral) was reduced in the 
haloperidol group compared to the placebo group. The aripiprazole group showed 
task-related activations intermediate of haloperidol and placebo. These findings 
support the role of dopamine in mediating the motivational salience of environmental 
stimuli, with haloperidol yielding stronger inhibition of mesolimbic activity than 
aripiprazole and thus inducing indifference to salient stimuli (Bolstad et al., 2015). 
For sulpiride a complex scenario can also be found. Two studies demonstrate 
reductions in choices for reward-representing stimuli (Eisenegger et al., 2014) and 
reductions in VS and ACC activation to sight and taste of a primary reward 
(chocolate) stimuli and of the lateral OFC to aversive stimuli (McCabe et al., 2011) 
with 400 mg sulpiride . On the contrary, another study using the same dose 
demonstrated increased reward learning versus penalty-related learning alongside an 
increase in striatal activation to rewards (van der Schaaf et al., 2014). A review paper 
of sulpiride suggested inter-individual variability could have driven differences in 
these studies (Martins et al., 2017). 
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Taken together, there is a complex picture of the effects of D2 anatgonism on reward 
and penalty processing. The effects may depend on (i) pre-versus post-synaptic 
effects, which is related to (ii) drug dose and (iii) inter-individual variation (e.g. 
genetic variation which affects availability of dopamine receptors and regulators 
(DAT, COMT) that influence dopamine concentration and signaling. This may be 
complicated further by the fact that there is little knowledge about the function of 
phasic DA release in prefrontal regions. Indeed, we must be aware of the regional 
(frontal versus striatal) differences in dopamine receptor distribution and signaling 
pathways. For example, the medial PFC receives less dopamine projections 
(Descarries et al., 1987), has lower tonic levels of DA, and shows less dopamine 
reuptake transporter relative to the striatum (Bassareo and DiChiara, 1997; Sesack et 
al., 1998). Thus, these differences are likely to lead to differential effects of the same 
pharmacological agent at these regions (Hernaus and Mehta, 2016). 
Beyond D2 receptors, it is necessary to acknowledge that some of these drug effects 
may me mediated by activity at adrenergic and serotonin neurotransmitter systems. 
Indeed, animal studies suggest that the antidepressant effects of atypical antipsychotics 
are related to their affinity and activity at 5-HT receptors (Ishibashi et al., 2010; 
Yatham et al., 2005). Based on electrophysiological recordings and imaging studies in 
rodents and primates, serotonergic neurons have been shown to directly impact upon 
reward (and predominantly aversive) processing (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cohen et 
al., 2015; Hayashi et al., 2015; Inaba et al., 2013; Li et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2014). This 
can also be likened to the effects of SSRI agents to rewards and penalties in Section 
1.6.3.1 above (Scholl et al., 2017). Indeed, cortical regions which form part of the 
incentive-based learning network, such as the OFC and ACC have high densities of 5-
HT (1A and 2A) receptors (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Macoveanu, 2014). Moreover, 
ascending serotonergic systems show a similar innervation pattern to dopamine and in 
addition to the overlapping anatomical organisation of these neurotransmitter systems, 
there is evidence of their interaction at a functional level (Briand et al., 2007). For 
example, 5-HT2C receptors generally tonically inhibit DA release whilst the majority 
of 5-HT receptor types (5-HT1A, 5-HT2A, 5-HT3, 5-HT4) stimulate dopamine release in 
the NAcc via excitatory influence on the VTA.  
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 Dopamine agonists: bromocriptine, cabergoline, pramipexole 1.6.3.4
Dopamine agonists activate dopamine receptors and have a relative specificity for 
dopamine D2-like receptors (binding to both pre-synaptic autoreceptors and 
postsynaptic receptor). As with the dopamine antagonist literature, it seems that 
dopamine agonists have mixed effects on reward processing which may be related to 
its complex effects on the dopaminergic system that are dependent on dose (high 
versus low) and a combination of pre- and post-synaptic effects. 
It seems that bromocriptine (1.25 mg) increases reward-based learning (Cools et al., 
2009). However, this effect was only significant in individuals with low dopamine 
synthesis capacity, and bromocriptine decreased reward learning in high dopamine 
synthesis capacity subjects. In a similar way, pramipexole (0.5mg) increased 
performance and striatal activation to reward anticipation in a MID task, only in a 
genotype that predisposes an individual to fewer dopamine binding sites (Noble et al., 
1991). Again, cabergoline (1.5 mg) increased learning rate and also OFC and striatal 
activation in this genotype only in a reversal learning task (Cohen et al., 2007). There 
may be two possible explanations for this finding. First, subjects with reduced synaptic 
dopamine levels or receptor density would be expected to have a greater number of 
available binding sites or a lower baseline tonic signalling, thus supporting a larger 
impact of tonic D2 receptor activation by dopamine agonists (Martins et al., 2017). 
However, this view is opposed by observations that dopamine agonists have higher 
affinity for presynaptic autoreceptor D2 isoforms than post-synaptic receptors (Usiello 
et al., 2000). Thus, a second explanation is that at low doses, these drugs may have 
largely inhibitory effects. According to this view, dopamine agonists enhance 
activation of presynaptic D2 autoreceptors in dopamine releasing neurons through 
auto-regulation. This may counter-act the post-synaptic effects and diminish dopamine 
release in individuals with higher D2 receptor availability (Martins et al., 2017).  
In line with this notion, lower doses of cabergoline (1.25 mg) and prampixole 
decreased reinforcement learning following the presentation of rewarding outcomes 
(Frank and O'Reilly, 2006b) and decreased choice bias towards stimuli most predictive 
of reward (Pizzagalli et al., 2008a). It therefore seems that these results are in line with 
pre-synaptic effects at D2 receptors and inhibition of dopamine transmission at low 
doses via regulatory feedback. Remarkably however, similar doses of these drugs 
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simultaneously increased aversive value of punishing outcome (Cavanagh et al., 2014) 
and feed-back-related negativity (FNR) ERP signal (Santesso et al., 2009). This 
pattern of results is thus similar to the findings reviewed with L-DOPA and APTD, in 
which the same dopamine manipulation led to opposite effects on reward versus 
penalties. Surprisingly, the authors do not suggest potential mechanisms underlying 
this effect; however, one possibility is that effects on other neurotransmitter systems 
(e.g. adrenergic or serotonergic) could mediate these distinct neurobehavioural effects.  
 
 Dopamine precursor depletion: acute phenylalanine and tyrosine 1.6.3.5
depletion, alpha-methyl-para-tyrosine 
With the acute phenylalanine and tyrosine depletion method (APTD), individuals 
drink a mixture of amino acids which are deficient in phenylalanine and tyrosine. The 
result of APTD is that it reduces plasma levels of phenylalanine and tyrosine and 
dopamine release in striatum (Leyton et al., 2000; Roiser et al., 2005).  
In line with reduced dopamine availability, the behavioural effects of APTD in healthy 
volunteers include reduced contentment, reduced betting rate in a reward decision-
making task and increased apathy (McLean et al., 2004a). This is paralleled with 
disrupted reward- and punishment-based learning or expected value (McLean et al., 
2004a). This pattern of APTD-induced disturbances in processing of reward and 
punishments in healthy volunteers mirrors that previously reported in currently 
depressed patients (Murphy et al., 2003) and thus APTD has been used as a 
behavioural model of depression (Leyton et al., 2000). Indeed, individuals with a 
history of depression seem to be more sensitive to dopamine depletion than healthy 
controls, leading to more pronounced ATPD-induced changes in behaviour. Whereas 
APTD led to reduced risk-taking decision making in remitted MDD individuals 
(Roiser et al., 2005), APTD did not cause healthy controls to bet less overall, rather, to 
increase bets more slowly (McLean et al., 2004b). In accordance with findings at the 
behavioural level, neuroimaging studies have found that APTD decreases activity in 
the caudate and NAcc activation during reward anticipation (Bjork 2014). 
In some studies it is interesting that the same effect of DA depletion leads to 
differential effects on rewards versus penalties (i.e. differential effect on valences). 
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APTD increased learning rate from negative outcomes in a probabilistic selection task 
(Cox et al., 2015) and shifted sensitivity from rewards to punishment so that  there was 
an increased learning from punishments, but not rewards in a reversal learning task 
(Robinson et al., 2010). However, in the latter study, this effect was only found in 
females. This is an interesting finding and may point to the gender bias typical in 
MDD (see Section 1.1.2) as well as highlighting the importance of including gender as 
a covariate in studies examining pharmacological modulation of dopamine on reward.  
Another important consideration is that the effect of APTD on reward processing is 
moderated by genetic variability in catechol-o-methy-ltransferase (COMT) Val158Met 
genotype. Homozygotes of 158Val have relatively lower levels of dopamine than 
158Met carriers (Chen et al., 2004; Saville et al., 2014). Whereas APTD increased 
immediate bias for reward in 158Val homozygotes, it had the opposite effect on 
158Met carriers. Thus, inter-individual differences in dopamine baseline levels are 
important to address.  
Taken together, there seems to be a strong consensus that decreases in dopamine 
availability by APTD leads to reduced responses to rewards, yet it may also increase 
penalty-related processing. Behavioural findings are supported with expected 
reductions in striatal BOLD activity during reward tasks.  
 Dopamine synthesis enhancement (L-DOPA) 1.6.3.6
In contrast to APTD, L-DOPA has quite the opposite effect and PET studies in 
humans have shown that L-DOPA increases striatal dopamine synthesis (Black et al., 
2015). Indeed, effects of APTD on diminished reward processing are reversed by 
previous administration of L-DOPA (Leyton et al., 2007).  
The majority of behavioural studies using 100-150 mg doses of L-DOPA have shown 
that it is associated with increased learning rate (Chowdhury et al., 2013b), increased 
performance in instrumental tasks involving monetary gains (Pessiglione et al., 2006) 
and increased propensity for risky decisions in trials involving potential gains 
(Beierholm et al., 2013; Rutledge et al., 2015). Two studies however showed that the 
same dose of L-DOPA had no effect on reward processing (Apitz and Bunzeck, 2014; 
Wittmann and D'Esposito, 2015). This result could be related to a number of factors, 
such as ceiling effects, low statistical power or variable responses due to baseline 
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states of dopamine. This is another illustration of how using pharmacological 
manipulation in conjunction with genotype variability may be a way to characterise 
the dopamine dose-response curve more carefully. 
Even without behavioural effects, acute L-DOPA does enhance neural representations 
of reward (a pattern which has also been shown with SSRI, DRI and SNRI drug 
classes). An increase in striatal and midbrain VTA activations has been demonstrated 
during the anticipation phase (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012) and in the NAcc and ACC 
during the consummation phase (Oei et al., 2012b). This was in the opposite direction 
to D2 antagonist haloperidol (3 mg) during subliminal presentation of sexual stimuli 
(Oei et al., 2012b). One study found that L-DOPA (100 mg) enhanced striatal activity 
for punishment, but not reward cues (Wittmann and D'Esposito, 2015). Given that this 
result unlikely reflects an ineffective dose, it could be that there was enhanced overall 
cue salience in punishment relative to reward trials. In terms of prediction error, L-
DOPA increased bilateral VS and putamen activation for both reward and penalty-
related PEs relative to dopamine antagonist haloperidol (Pessiglione et al., 2006). 
These results suggested that dopamine availability drives PE-based neural coding in 
the human brain.   
A final and key consideration when taking together the results of L-DOPA 
manipulations on reward processing is that it is also the precursor of other 
catecholamines such as noradrenaline. Thus, an important question is to what extent 
the effects in the L-DOPA studies described above are attributable to dopamine versus 
noradrenaline. Future studies that account for L-DOPA’s effect on noradrenaline 
levels are needed.  
 
 Limitations and recommendations for reward neuropharmacology 1.6.3.7
research 
A placebo controlled design with healthy controls facilities the interpretation of drug 
effects on reward and penalty processing, whilst minimising potential confounds. The 
evidence reviewed is generally of high quality, however, pharmacological 
manipulation of reward and penalty processing still faces a variety of methodological 
challenges. These can impinge upon mechanistic models and translation from animal 
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to human models. The main challenges and suggested solutions are summarised in 
Table 1.9.  In addition to the listed issues, another important consideration is the 
effects that pharmacological agents can have on cerebral blood flow (CBF), described 
below. 
Effects on cerebral blood flow and considerations for functional imaging of 
pharmacological effects 
The formation of the BOLD signal is described in detail in Imaging Methods Section 
2.1.2. In brief, the basic principle is that brain activity is linked to metabolic activity in 
the brain and indicated by changes in blood oxygen. Specifically, the haemodynamic 
response (HDR), (i.e. the increase in oxygen-rich blood delivery to active brain areas) 
underlies the BOLD contrast, and the magnetic properties of oxyhaemoglobin and 
deoxyhaemoglobin increase and decrease the MR signal respectively (Thulborn et al., 
1982). This series of events is referred to as neurovascular coupling and is the 
assumption that relates BOLD signal to putative underlying neural activity. In 
pharmacological fMRI, BOLD signal could change by either direct effects of the drug 
on neural activity or via non-specific effects on cerebral metabolic activity or on the 
vasculature itself (Iannetti and Wise, 2007; Wise and Tracey, 2006b). These potential 
effects are illustrated in Figure 1.17. The neuronal response (left) is of interest, yet it 
may be masked by drug or disease influences on signalling or vascular response. In 
rows 4 and 5, the BOLD response is confounded by these factors, and in rows 2 and 3, 






Figure 1.17. Potential confounds for the generation of BOLD fMRI signal. Taken 
from Iannetti and Wise, (2007) with permission.  
Effects of dopamine antagonists on CBF 
An increasing number of studies have employed MRI modality arterial spin labelling 
(ASL) in order to assess quantitative changes in cerebral blood flow induced by 
dopamine antagonists (Detre et al., 2012; Handley et al., 2013). The methods and 
principles of ASL are described in detail in Imaging Methods Section 2.1.2.7, 
however, in brief; ASL is an instrument to assess the effects in vivo of 
psychopharmacological medication on brain perfusion (regional cerebral blood flow 
(rCBF). Unlike perfusion techniques in PET, that require the invasive infusion of 
radioactively labelled contrast agents, MR-based ASL uses radio frequencies and 
magnetic field gradient pulses to magnetically label blood (or ‘arterial spins’). This 
allows the non-invasive quantification of local perfusion in the brain, with greater 
spatial and temporal resolution and applicability than PET (Detre et al., 2012; Detre 
and Wang, 2002). Indeed, ASL techniques may be more easily integrated in a within 
subjects crossover study design (as the one used in this thesis) due to their radiation-
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free properties, presenting no issue of exposure (Detre and Wang, 2002). Moreover, 
several test-retest studies have shown that ASL perfusion measurements are highly 
reproducible across minutes, hours, days and weeks (Chen et al., 2010; Floyd et al., 
2003; Parkes et al., 2004).  
Although several studies have examined the effects of acute and long-term 
administration of dopamine antagonists in schizophrenia (Goozee et al., 2014), 
comparatively fewer (n=6) have examined changes in CBF in healthy volunteers 
(Fernandez-Seara et al., 2011; Goldman et al., 1996; Goozee et al., 2014; Handley et 
al., 2013; Mehta et al., 2003; Michels et al., 2016; Viviani et al., 2013).  A robust and 
consistent finding is that single dose of dopamine antagonists have potent effects in 
increasing striatal blood flow in healthy samples (Fernandez-Seara et al., 2011; 
Goldman et al., 1996; Goozee et al., 2014; Handley et al., 2013; Mehta et al., 2003; 
Michels et al., 2016; Viviani et al., 2013). Handley and colleagues (2012) used ASL to 
investigate the effects of single dose haloperidol (3 mg) or aripiprazole (10 mg) on 
rCBF in a placebo-controlled, repeated measures design in healthy males. Both drugs 
significantly increased rCBF in the putamen and ACC relative to placebo, whilst 
aripiprazole was also associated with rCBF decreases in posterior cingulate, superior 
frontal and superior parietal areas. Another study examined the effects of acute 10 mg 
metoclopramide using ASL (Fernandez-Seara et al., 2011). They also found 
significant increases in perfusion in the striatum (particularly the putamen), as well as 
the thalamus. Decreases in perfusion were found in the insula and anterior temporal 
lobe. A recent study used a randomised crossover, placeco-controlled design in 25 
healthy adults to examine acute dose quetiapine (DA antagonist) and pramipexole 
(dopamine agonist) on resting CBF (Michels et al., 2016). Relative to placebo, 
quetiapine enhanced CBF in the putamen and caudate nucleus, as well as the 
supplementary motor area, insular and prefrontal cortex, whilst reducing perfusion in 
occipital and cerebellar cortex. In a similar fashion, pramipexole increased CBF in the 
caudate nucleus and putamen, with reduction in thalamus, cerebellum and visual areas. 
Taken together, there seems to be common dopaminergic effects of dopamine 
antagonists in striatal regions, but also differences in prefrontal, insular and cingulate 
regions. This could stem from the different receptor profiles of the drugs, which is 
discussed in detail below. 
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Potential mechanisms underlying increases in striatal CBF 
The mechanisms by which dopamine antagonist medications lead to alterations in 
rCBF remain unclear, although some suggestions have been formulated. The concept 
of neurovascular coupling suggests that rCBF reflects metabolism whereby regions of 
increased post-synaptic activity require more blood oxygen supply, and perfusion is 
modulated in order to meet this demand (Logothetis et al., 2001; Logothetis and 
Pfeuffer, 2004; Logothetis and Wandell, 2004). These haemodynamic processes may 
reflect synaptic processes rather than spiking activity, with postsynaptic metabolism 
making the greatest contribution (Lauritzen, 2001). Given that most dopamine 
antagonists have a common (high) affinity and antagonism to D2 receptors, it follows 
that changes occur in areas most densely populated with D2 receptors, such as the 
striatum (Goozee et al., 2014). Indeed, dopamine D2 receptors are primarily found in 
OFC, and insular cortical areas, in the striatum (caudate putamen, nucleus accumbens, 
globus pallidum) the central amygdala, and in the midbrain (substantia nigra and 
ventral tegmental area) (Ott et al., 2014; Rosenkranz and Grace, 2002). Antagonism in 
striatal D2 receptors would be expected to change neurotransmitter turn over and 
subsequently alter metabolism and perfusion. It has been proposed that rCBF increases 
reflect increased presynaptic synthesis of dopamine and dopamine release as a result 
of decreased negative feedback via autoreceptors. A possible interpretation is that 
blockade of D2 receptors in the striatum potentially results in disinhibition of D2 
receptor containing medium spiny neurons (Fernandez-Seara et al., 2011). In contrast, 
the observed decreases in rCBF in frontal and temporal regions by some D2 antagonist 
drugs (Handley et al., 2013) could reflect either excitatory or inhibitory down-stream 
effects from striatal regions (Goozee et al., 2014).  
However, CBF may also be influenced by the effects on astrocytes (glial cells that also 
modulate blood flow requirements by dilation or constriction of arterioles) and the 
drug’s activity at other receptors (Attwell, et al., 2010). For example, D3 receptors are 
within the same family as D2 receptors and are located on astroglial cells (Choi et al., 
2006), which regulate regional blood flow. There is evidence that D3 agonists can 
cause vasoconstriction by binding to these sites. Thus, as some antipsychotic drugs 
have affinity for D3 receptors (Girgis et al., 2015; Stahl, 2013), D3 antagonism could 
potentially lead to vasodilation and increases in CBF.  
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The picture is complicated further by the fact that other neurotransmitters have effects 
on vascular receptors. Several of the dopamine antagonists with antidepressant 
properties (e.g. quetiapine, amisulpride) also have affinity for serotonergic receptors. 
There is evidence that serotonin binds to receptors on the vasculature as well as 
astrocytes, thereby causing vasoconstrictive effects (Cohen et al., 1996). Moreover, in 
the study by Michels and collegue (2016), mentioned above, the authors suggested that 
quetiapine’s effects on reducing CBF in occipital cortex could be related to 5-HT1A 
and 2A receptors in these regions. In sum, the different patterns of rCBF modulation by 
the dopamine antagonists reviewed could reflect how their varying receptor affinity 
profiles alter (i) disinhibition of D2 receptors (densely populated in the striatum), (ii) 
astroglials, and (iii) serotonin receptors (densely populated in cortical regions).  
Taken together, drugs with broad receptor profiles could have highly variable effects 
on underlying vasculature, thereby altering baseline CBF, interfering with 
neurovascular coupling and the interpretation of a drug on BOLD signal. To ensure 
that BOLD signal changes are not a result of disturbed neurovascular coupling 
integrity, different methods can be applied. For example, it is possible to use imaging 
modalities such as arterial spin labelling (see Section 2.1.2.7 for more details), to 
quantify changes in CBF which are not confounded by changes in cerebral blood 
volume (CBV) or cerebral metabolic rate of oxygen (CMRO2) (Wise and Tracey, 
2006a). Despite ASL having lower signal-to-noise ratio then BOLD (Jahng et al., 
2005) and less brain coverage (Wang et al., 2011a; Wang et al., 2004; Wang et al., 
2003), it has excellent test-re-test reliability (Wang et al., 2011b) and is sensitive to 
slow changes in CBF which are commonly reported with drug administration (Aguirre 
and Detre, 2012; Aguirre et al., 2005). Several studies have now controlled for global 
and regional changes in CBF at rest when analysing BOLD data and this is a vital step 
towards understanding if the effects of a drug are indeed neuronal. For dopamine 
antagonists, it seems particularly important to control for changes in baseline striatal 
blood flow in the analysis of BOLD data. An even better approach, which some 
groups are beginning to develop, is the collection of task-related ASL and BOLD 
simultaneously. Although, parallel imaging is still not optimal for deep brain 
structures such as the striatum due to a loss of signal-to-noise ratio with double-echo 
sequences (Ivanov et al., 2017). Other methods have also been addressed, such as the 
use of control tasks, including a placebo condition and assessing vascular reactivity 
158 
 
via breath holds. Whilst it is common for studies to address these issues, it is rare that 
more than one of these factors is considered in a single study.  
In spite of these challenges, pharmacological manipulation is an invaluable tool to 
improve cause-effect based models of reward and penalty processing.  
 
Table 1.9. Limitations and potential recommendations for future 
neuropsychopharmacology research on reward and penalty processing in healthy 





Difficulty in making predictions and 
interpretations of drug effects as there is 
a low availability of safe and licensed 
drugs targeting specific enzymes or 
receptors. This makes it difficult to 
differentiate the role and contribution of 
each type of receptor in reward and 
penalty processing 
 
Further testing for approval of more 
specifically targeted drugs (dopamine in 
particular).  
Unclear assumptions of pre- and post-
synaptic action, in relation to specific 
doses; potential sources of noise or 
confounding (e.g. neuropsychological 
and genotypic inter-individual 
differences that are related to baseline 
differences in dopamine 
receptors/reuptake and bioavailability of 
enzymes that degrade dopamine) which 
affect the dynamics of drug response 
(Wichers et al., 2008).  
 
Factors known to vary dopamine baseline 
levels should be controlled when assessing 
response to dopaminergic modulation (e.g. 
sex, menstrual cycle (Dreher et al., 2007; 
Jacobs and D'Esposito, 2011), genetic 
variants (catechol-O-methyl transferase 
(COMT) Val(158)Met polymorphism, 
MET/MET, VAL/VAL, VAL/MET 
(Wichers et al., 2008)). More knowledge 
about individual genetic and biological 
variation in association with reward 
processing may add to the process of 
prediction and improvement of treatment 
response to antidepressant medication. 
Quantitative measures of dopamine 
baseline levels (e.g. PET neuroimaging, 
eye-blink rate) (Jongkees and Colzato, 
2016).  
 
Unequal number of studies investigating 
reward processing relative to penalty 
processing and difficulty in comparing 
between tasks (e.g. phase, feedback 
modality, performance-contingent 
feedback, contrasts of interest). 
 
More studies investigating penalty-related 
processing and use of standardised tasks 
e.g. MID and contrasts of interest(Knutson 
et al., 2001).  
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Difficulty in differentiating the effects 
of pharmacological challenges on 
phasic, tonic or both modes of dopamine 
release as well as the interaction 
between these processes. 
Potential use of computational simulation 
of the cortico-striatal network in order to 
create mechanistic predictions about the 
effect of the drug on synaptic signalling, 
auto-receptor, auto-regulatory mechanisms. 
Examining drugs with different 
mechanisms of action (at the receptor level) 
in the same paradigm/framework.  
Need for interdisciplinary 
pharmacogenetics-psychophysiological-
neuroimaging-behavioural approaches.  
 
Effects of drugs on cerebral blood flow 
which may compromise the reliability 
and interpretation in BOLD fMRI 
studies. 
Acquire quantitative measures of changes 
in CBF (utilising ASL, PET) (Alsop et al., 
2015; Detre et al., 2012; Detre and Wang, 
2002; Detre et al., 2009). Use of control 
tasks to assess the drug’s non-specific 
effects on the haemodynamic response (e.g. 
breath-hold, hypercapnic BOLD 




 Other interventions: psychological, combined psycho-1.6.3.8
pharmacological and brain-targeted.  
In addition to pharmacological modulation of reward, there are a small selection of 
studies which have investigated how psychological and brain-based interventions alter 
the behavioural and neural correlates of reward and penalty processing in healthy and 
depressed individuals.  The results of a comprehensive literature review are presented 
in Table 1.10 and include psychological interventions (Behavioural Activation (BA) 
(n=5), Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) (n=3), Mindfulness Based Cognitive 
Therapy (n-1), Mental Imagery (n=1), and combined psychological and 
pharmacological treatment (n=1). A detailed explanation of the principles, theory and 
implementation of BA and CBT interventions can be found in Section 1.1.5.2, and 
brief descriptions of the interventions used in the studies reviewed are provided in the 
caption of Table 1.10. Whilst four studies examined the ability of baseline reward 
processing to predict clinical outcomes (Burkhouse et al., 2016; Carl et al., 2016b; 
Vrieze et al., 2013b; Walsh et al., 2016), another set of studies completed experimental 
sessions at two time points to examine pre-to-post changes in behaviour, neural 
activity and depressive symptom improvement (Dichter et al., 2009; Linke and Wessa, 
2017; Mori et al., 2016b; Straub et al., 2015). I will begin by summarising the studies 
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which predicted response to treatment from baseline (i.e. T1 only) reward processing 
measures.  
A key theme among these studies is whether a more normative pattern of reward-
related responding (i.e. more similar to healthy controls) or whether a more divergent 
neural pattern to controls at baseline predicts greater improvement in clinical 
symptoms post-treatment. Carl et al., (2016) demonstrated that at a behavioural level, 
patients who exhibited faster responses to obtain rewards fared better after treatment. 
This suggests that BA may be an effective treatment for patients with relatively 
preserved hedonic responses or capacity to anticipate incentives. Similar results were 
found at a neural level, as patients with a more normative pattern (greater sustained 
activation in the ACC from MID task run 1 to run 2) were more responsive to 
treatment (Carl et al., 2016b). The ACC is critically involved in controlling social 
approach-avoidance behaviours (Challis and Berton, 2015) as well as detecting the 
significance or incentive salience of external stimuli (Phan et al., 2005). Thus, capacity 
to sustain ACC activation in the face of rewards may be an important predictor of 
response to a therapeutic approach that specifically targets motivationally salient 
aspects of the environment. A similar finding has also been reported using a brain-
based intervention and changes in resting-state functional connectivity between key 
regions of the brain’s reward network. Twenty sessions of MRI-guided repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex showed 
that MDD patients who responded to treatment had greater pre-treatment VTA-NAcc-
vmPFC connectivity at rest compared to non-responders (Downar et al., 2014). 
However, as both these studies only used measures at one time point (T1), post-
treatment neuroimaging is required to evaluate whether the same brain regions that are 
predictive of treatment response are those that show recovery of functioning after 
treatment.  
The majority of studies suggest that patients with greater deficits in reward processing 
may be better candidates for BA, CBT and combined psycho-pharmacological 
treatment (Burkhouse et al., 2016; Rice et al., 2015; Vrieze et al., 2013b; Walsh et al., 
2016). At a behavioural level, reduced pre-treatment reward learning predicted/ 
increased odds for persisting MDD diagnosis at 8 weeks (odds ratio = 7.84), after 
controlling for depressive and anxious symptoms at baseline (Vrieze et al., 2013b). 
Rice et al., (2015) showed that lower reward seeking at baseline was associated with 
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greater decline in depressive symptoms pre-to-post intervention with CBT with a 
focus on increasing reward processing, and CBT with a focus on reducing negative 
beliefs. An EEG study showed that patients with a reduced RewP at baseline (i.e. more 
different to HC) were more likely to respond to treatment (greater pre-to-post CBT 
reduction in depressive symptoms) among individuals with comorbid depression-
anxiety but not in the anxiety only group (Burkhouse et al., 2016). Another study used 
a similar analysis framework to Carl et al (2016) by evaluating sustained activity, 
however this time with a focus on fronto-striatal functional connectivity (i.e. taking 
into account the network nature of the reward system) (Walsh et al., 2016). The 
majority of findings showed that a more divergent pattern of pre-treatment fronto-
striatal connectivity during reward anticipation and outcome was associated with 
superior MDD treatment response to BA. Thus, as a key component of CBT and BA is 
to increase engagement with valued behaviour (Dimidjian et al., 2011), it could be that 
these therapies function particularly well for individuals with greater deficits in 
reward-related fronto-striatal connectivity. BA in particular, may be effective in 
normalising deficits associated with anticipatory processes, effort valuation and 
decision-making to initiate goal-directed behaviour. This highlights the potential of 
personalised interventions for MDD. That is, individuals with greater alterations in 
connectivity and capacity to sustain connectivity in the brain’s reward network may be 
better suited for interventions that target reward network functioning and related 
behaviours, whilst other interventions may be more affective to patients with different 
neural connectivity patterns. To evaluate this framework, larger-scale studies which 
assess patient responses to several kinds of treatment modalities are needed. 
Moreover, if both perspectives are taken into consideration (i.e. more normative vs. 
more divergent neural patterns) it may be that there is an optimal threshold for 
response to treatment, in which patients must display deficits, but also some 
preservation of reward function to allow for the optimal remediation of such deficits.  
Another important theme that emerged from the review is temporality, or the 
conceptualisation of hedonic capacity in MDD as a decreased capacity to sustain 
response to rewards over time (Heller et al., 2013; Pizzagalli et al., 2008c). In support 
of this framework, two studies examined changes in reward-related neural activity 
across two runs of the MID task (i.e. sustained activation) as well as aggregating 
across the two runs (i.e. global responses) (Carl et al., 2016b; Walsh et al., 2016). 
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These studies demonstrated that the MDD group experienced a significant decrease in 
NAcc activation during reward outcomes (Carl et al., 2016b) and fronto-striatal 
connectivity during reward anticipation and outcome (Walsh et al., 2016) from the 
first to the second task run relative to healthy controls. There was greater sensitivity in 
predicting clinical response to treatment in MDD patients when examining patterns of 
neural attenuation compared to global values (Walsh et al., 2016). This suggests the 
importance of examining temporal changes in neutral activity as an MDD 
endophenotype that is relevant for predicting antidepressant response. With reference 
to the previous discussion, it is interesting to note that the majority of findings (which 
took into account brain activation over time), showed that patients whose brain 
connectivity patterns were more divergent than controls responded better to treatment 
(see Table 1.10 for details).  
The most valuable studies are those which completed experimental sessions at two 
time points and could thereby examine pre-to-post intervention changes (Dichter et al., 
2009; Linke and Wessa, 2017; Mori et al., 2016b; Straub et al., 2015). A study in 
adolescents with subthreshold depressive (sD) symptoms found that a significant 
reduction in depressive symptoms with 5-7 weeks of BA was paralleled by increased 
activity in the ventrolateral PFC and angular gyrus during loss anticipation, whereas 
this was not the case in the healthy control group (Mori et al., 2016b). Given the role 
of the vlPFC in inhibitive control of negative emotions and cognitions (Payer et al., 
2012), the authors suggested that this finding may reflect an improved ability of sD 
individuals to regulate negative emotions using cognitive strategies post-treatment.  
In contrast, the neuroimaging studies by Dichter et al., (2009) and Straub et al., (2015) 
used behavioural paradigms that did not assess penalty-related processing and 
exclusively assessed reactions to rewarding stimuli. After a longer period of 15 weeks 
BA therapy, MDD patients showed increased paracingulate gyrus activity during 
reward selection, and increased activity in the caudate nucleus, cingulate gyrus and 
insula during reward anticipation. A normalisation of striatal activity during reward 
anticipation is consistent with preclinical and clinical models of MDD and anhedonia 
that implicate dysregulation of the mesostriatal pathway in the pathophysiology of 
MDD (Anisman et al., 1979; Nestler and Carlezon, 2006; Treadway et al., 2012). It is 
also consistent with the framework that the mechanisms of action of various 
antidepressant interventions are to improve motivational striatal functioning 
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(Argyropoulos and Nutt, 2013; Halaris et al., 1975; Nestler, 1998). However, as in 
Mori et al., (2016), the neural findings were not supported by significant changes in 
task-related behavioural responses to rewards. Thus, BA results in recovery of 
function in brain regions related to processing of rewards without a change in 
behavioural performance. A lack of change in behaviour may reflect the fact that the 
tasks used are more sensitive to neural activation than to behavioural performance 
(Knutson et al., 2008). This is in line with other studies reporting no baseline 
differences in task-related behavioural performance between MDD and healthy 
volunteers (Knutson et al., 2008; Stoy et al., 2012a). Another explanation could be 
lack of power to detect a difference due to the small sample size, or, perhaps pro-
longed treatment is required for motor-related changes in RT and accuracy, unlike 
subjective ratings of self-evaluated motivation. Indeed, performance-based measures 
provide more objective measures than self-report because they allow for the 
measurement of cognitive biases or alterations that may not be open to introspection 
(Harmer et al., 2009c; Rawal et al., 2013). Moreover, the use of performance-based 
measurements reduces the chance that the associations with depression are due to 
shared method variance. This can occur when the same individual rates a risk factor 
(e.g. cognitive bias) and an outcome (e.g. clinical symptoms). 
Interestingly, two studies demonstrated a reduction in frontal (OFC, subgenual ACC), 
striatal (caudate nucleus) and/or limbic (amygdala, hippocampus) regions during 
reward feedback post BA intervention in MDD patients relative to healthy volunteers 
(Dichter et al., 2009) and waitlist MDD group (Straub et al., 2015). The decrease in 
caudate activation after BA in the MDD group (in alignment with symptom 
improvement) is somewhat counterintuitive and bears replication. The authors suggest 
that this result could stem from the mismatch of the caudate’s role in learning cue-
outcome contingencies and that win outcomes were not directly contingent on 
behavioural performance in the wheel of fortune task. In response to missed win 
outcomes, BA increased activation in the OFC, a region involved in the affective 
evaluation of rewards, motivation, decision-making and processing violations of 
expectancies (Dichter et al., 2009). Thus, it could be that pre-treatment MDD patients 
do not expect positive outcomes, with BA inducing a change in reward expectancy 
such that a missed win post-treatment violates their expectancies to a greater degree, 
reflected by greater OFC activation relative to pre-treatment (Dichter et al., 2009). 
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Improvements in depressive symptoms was strongly correlated with changes in 
sgACC activation and individual expressions of pre-CBT treatment sgACC activation 
predicted individual therapeutic responses relative to a MDD waiting condition 
(Straub et al., 2015). These findings are in line with previous reports (albeit using 
emotional stimuli as opposed to monetary rewards) of linear-load response activity in 
the ACC and greater response to CBT treatment. In sum, activation of fronto-striatal 
regions, commonly reported as relevant in depression (Zhang et al., 2013), changed 
with amelioration of depressive symptoms.  
There were two behavioural studies in healthy controls investigating pre-to-post 
changes in reward approach across CBT-r (with a focus on reward processing), CBT-
nb (with a  focus on reducing negative beliefs), MBCT (Rice et al., 2015) and a 
rewarding mental imagery intervention (Linke and Wessa, 2017). Rice and colleagues 
showed that the only intervention explicitly focused on enhancing attention and 
sensitivity to reward (CBT-r), was associated with a post-intervention decrease in 
depressive symptoms and increase in reward seeking behaviour in the Cambridge 
gambling task (versus CBT-nb and MBCT). Moreover, degree of change in reward 
seeking was associated with improvement in depressive symptoms and this association 
differed significantly to the comparison group. Baseline reward seeking behaviour also 
moderated depressive symptoms change. Thus, the results suggest that reward-seeking 
may be the basis for symptoms change in the course of a treatment which emphasises 
on identifying and focusing on positive events and memories and rational reward-
seeking behaviour. The implication is that incorporating reward-related activities into 
prevention programs may enhance efficacy. However, this interpretation must be 
acknowledged in the context that this study was a non-randomised design and this 
limits the ability to make causal inferences due to the potential of differences on key 
confounders across groups. Moreover an interesting avenue for further work is 
whether CBT with a focus on reducing reactivity to negative events in general (as 
opposed to negative self-beliefs) would lead to changes in sensitivity to loss responses 
in a behavioural task.  
The behavioural study using a mental imagery intervention similarly showed that an 
improvement in depressive symptoms (NB: in a healthy control sample) was 
accompanied by increased wanting, reward sensitivity, faster approach to positive 
edibles and activities in the mental imagery group relative to the wait condition at 
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follow-up (Linke and Wessa, 2017). A neural mechanism underlying these 
behavioural changes could be understood by the findings of Sulzer and colleges 
(Sulzer et al., 2013). They used a healthy control sample to show that mental imagery 
of sexual and romantic scenes increased activity in the substantia nigra and ventral 
tegmental area (SN/VTA). This suggests that rewarding imagery is a robust method of 
SN/VTA self- (endogenous) up-regulation. Moreover, subjects who received veridical 
neurofeedback about activity in the VTA, improved their ability to up-regulate 
SN/VTA, co-activated other dopaminergic regions (NAcc, caudate, hippocampus), and 
showed increased connectivity along the nigrostriatal pathway (VTA-caudate, VTA-
putamen) at rest compared to control subjects who received sham feedback. Given that 
BOLD activity in these areas has been previously correlated to dopamine levels using 
positron emission tomography (Dubol et al., 2017a; Schott et al., 2008), BOLD signal 
increases may reflect firing of dopaminergic neurons. Further research should address 
longer-term behavioural and neural consequences of mental imagery interventions 
within the same research framework as strategies for persistent regulation could have 
useful applications for the treatment of depression. As these studies were completed in 
healthy control samples only, it will also be important to examine effects in MDD, as 
individuals with diminished reward reactivity prior to treatment may have more room 
for improvement.  
With reference to the previous discussion on reward and penalty modulation by 
antidepressant medications, it is important to highlight that 7 of 8 interventions studies 
reviewed here recruited un-medicated MDD patients. This is a key advantage as it 
avoids medication confounds in the interpretability of the psychological intervention 
findings. However, the results of these studies must be considered within the context 
of their limitations (see Table 1.10). A number of studies did not have an 
untreated/non-intervention comparison group (e.g. placebo, waitlist, psychoeducation-
only control group), or other treatment group. It is therefore unknown whether 
functional brain changes in the MDD group were due to intervention or to other 
variables, such as spontaneous improvement of symptoms over time; or specific to the 
intervention type as opposed to psychotherapy in general. Moreover, from the reward-
based intervention literature I have reviewed, all studies examined pre-to-post 
treatment changes, but not intermediate steps or ‘early-on-in-treatment’ changes. 
Harmer and colleagues have shown that early changes in the perception and neural 
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response to positive social stimuli with antidepressant medication treatment is related 
to subsequent improvement in depression severity (Godlewska et al., 2016; Shiroma et 
al., 2014; Tranter et al., 2009). Indeed, a classification-based data analysis 
demonstrated that if an early change in positive processing is not seen with 
antidepressant drug treatment, patients have little chance of responding to this later in 
the treatment course (Tranter et al., 2009). Therefore, to examine whether reward 
processing changes using psychological interventions align with Harmer’s model of 
pharmacological interventions (Harmer et al., 2009a), it would be useful to conduct 
longitudinal studies examining reward processing at baseline (pre-treatment), early in 
treatment, post-treatment, and 3-6 month follow-up. A greater conceptual issue, 
especially with regards to the CBT interventions, is the broad number of therapeutic 
components and techniques covered in treatment. Thus, it is not clear what the active 
component for successful treatment response and normalisation of neuropsychological 
responses to reward is. To this end, one can appreciate the relative simplicity and 
specificity of findings, and greater experimental control in an acute pharmacological 




Table 1.10. Overview of intervention studies examining the modulation of reward and penalty processing by (i) Behavioural Activation Treatment 
for Depression (BA or BATD) (ii) Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) (iii) Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) (iv) Mental 
Imagery (v) Combined, non-standardised psycho-pharmacological treatment. BATD sessions: series of structured units that (a) educate patients 
about MDD and provide a rationale for the treatment approach; (b) assess and monitor baseline activity levels; (c) develop individualised goals 
according to patients’ values and initiate a multi-layered plan to achieve these goals; and (d) monitor, support, and reward accomplishing 
behavioural goals. CBT sessions: psychoeducation; strategies to reduce negative beliefs (cognitive restructuring); behavioural procedures (e.g. 
exposure to fears, behavioural activation); self-esteem enhancement; problem solving; emotion-regulation; acute crisis management; and relapse 
prevention. CBT with reward processing (Rice et al., 2015): CBT with a focus on identifying and focusing on positive events and memories in 
addition to decision making training. CBT to reduce negative self-beliefs (Rice et al., 2015): CBT with focus on identifying, evaluating and 
challenging negative thoughts. MBCT: increasing awareness and acceptance of bodily sensations, thoughts and feelings. Mental imagery 
sessions: imagining positive emotions, affirmative thoughts, and pleasurable sensations associated with positive food and activities. 
*Experimental session at baseline/pre-treatment (T1) or both pre-treatment and post-treatment (both T1 and T2). ** Time interval between 
intervention and experimental session. ***Significant after correction for multiple comparisons with FWE, FDR, Bonferroni or permutations. 
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 Interim summary 1.6.3.9
In summary, this section has reviewed how various interventions (pharmacological, 
psychological, and brain-based interventions), normalise neurocognitive mechanisms 
of reward and penalty processing in depression. I have outlined evidence in favour of a 
cognitive neuropsychological model of antidepressant action (Harmer et al., 2009b) in 
the normalisation of negative emotional biases and reward processing. The evidence 
suggests that an acute or seven day dose of agents acting on dopamine receptors (e.g. 
amisuplride and bupropion) is sufficient to enhance neural signals to reward but not 
behaviour or learning; whilst SSRIs enhance neural and behavioural signals of reward 
after a prolonged period. It is important to understand the temporal effects of 
antidepressants on reward processing as it may have implications for the use of 
antidepressants in targeting anhedonia early versus late in treatment. This has 
implications for how antidepressants may enhance PE (e.g as in (Graf et al., 2016; 
Scholl et al., 2017), and be used to improve reward-related learning to enhance the 
effectiveness of psychological treatment such as behavioural activation. 
Given that dopamine plays an important part in the symptoms of anhedonia (Wise, 
2008) and D2 antagonists have been traditionally seen as relatively ineffective at 
treating this symptom dimension (or even proposed to exacerbate it) (Danna and 
Elmer, 2010; Mizrahi et al., 2007; Wise, 2008), it is counterintuitive that some low 
doses of dopamine antagonists potentiate striatal responses. Indeed, there is a complex 
picture for the effects of D2 anatgonism and agonism on reward and penalty 
processing. The effects may depend on (i) pre-versus post-synaptic effects, which is 
related to (ii) drug dose and (iii) inter-individual variation (e.g. genetic variation which 
affects availability of dopamine receptors and regulators (DAT, COMT) that influence 
dopamine concentration and signaling. Another consideration is that many of the 
‘dopaminergic drugs’ which I reviewed have a broader pharmacological profile, acting 
on serotonin and other systems, and this may also be a source of variation. 
Nevertheless, pharmacological manipulation of the dopamine system is valuable for 
improving the cause-effect based models of reward and penalty processing.  
 
The neural correlates of pre-treatment reward processing seem to predict response to 
both pharmacological and psychological interventions in depressed samples. However, 
there is a need to examine whether patients who show the greatest resolution of 
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reward/penalty processing early in treatment are more likely to respond with continued 
treatment, thereby aligning with Harmer’s model. There are few studies examining the 
normalisation of reward, and especially, penalty-related neural responses by 
psychological (BA and CBT) therapies. However, the evidence thus far points to an 
association between symptom improvement and normalisation of anticipatory 
responses. Further longitudinal imaging studies are needed, using appropriate 
comparison groups (e.g. healthy control, alternative therapies) to elucidate the time-
scale of normalisation responses at different phases of reward processing (e.g. do 
responses to reward outcomes normalise before responses to reward anticipation?).  
It is also important to note the inherent challenges in the comparison of reward and 
penalty processing across interventions. Although an attempt has been made to 
summarise the trends, one must consider various factors that limit the ability to make 
direct comparisons between studies results: (i) sample type (healthy control sample 
only, both HC and depressed patient groups); (ii) study design and control condition 
(within-subjects cross-over, between-subjects parallel design, placebo-controlled); (iii) 
medication duration (acute, prolonged); (iv) administration (oral, intravenous); (v) task 
(active versus passive, phase, valence, contrasts of interest). Nevertheless, the studies 
reviewed incorporate well-validated behavioural and neural assessments of reward 
(and to a lesser degree) penalty mechanisms. These designs allow the elements altered 
by an intervention to be elucidated and are an essential step in delineating how 
interventions produce effects on symptoms (Kraemer et al., 2002). Indeed, objective 
neural and behavioural measures may be more sensitive and accurate in detecting 
cognitive change than self-report measures (Harmer et al., 2009c; Rawal et al., 2013) 
and are thus used in this thesis. 
Another important consideration is that acute pharmacological intervention designs, as 
used in this thesis, provide greater simplicity and specificity of findings, and greater 
experimental control than long-term pharmaco-psychological interventions. Acute 
experimental medicine studies are also more easily applicable, and less costly than the 
implementation of randomised control trials. Among the pharmacological literature, 
dopamine antagonists show sensitivity to reward system and potential in depression. 
They are particularly interesting candidates with dopamine antagonism (which can 
either increase or decrease striatal dopamine levels) and high affinity for serotonin 5-
HT receptors. However, there is limited evidence in depression and a need for more 
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studies showing modulation of reward, and especially penalty-related function in 
healthy and depressed samples using randomised placebo-controlled designs. Taken 
together, this sets the premise for the investigation in this thesis, which I will continue 





















 Dopamine antagonist: Lurasidone 1.7
Lurasidone, the compound utilised in this study, has high affinity for dopaminergic 
and serotonergic receptors. Lurasidone was selected for this study because it is the 
most recently licensed dopamine antagonist with antidepressant properties and there is 
no information with regards to its effects on brain reward signalling (Goldberg et al., 
2017; Loebel et al., 2014a; Loebel et al., 2014c; Nelson et al., 2015; Nierenberg et al., 
2015; Suppes et al., 2016a; Suppes et al., 2016b). In the sections below I first review 
evidence from randomised controlled trials (RCTs) that lurasidone is an effective 
antidepressant agent and secondly describe how its receptor profile may be associated 
to its antidepressant properties. I then go on to describe the lack of systems-level 
knowledge about lurasidone to date, which sets the premise for the aims and objectives 
of the thesis in Section 1.8.  
 Lurasidone: general information 1.7.1
Lurasidone is a benzisothiazol derivative and has been classified as a second 
generation atypical antipsychotic (SGA or AAP) (Greenberg and Citrome, 2017; 
Ishibashi et al., 2010). It has received regulatory approval for the treatment of 
schizophrenia in the US, Canada, the EU, Switzerland, and Australia, and also for 
bipolar depression in the US and Canada (Greenberg and Citrome, 2017). As shown in 
Figure 1.18, lurasidone has a particular pharmacological profile.  In addition to its 
principal antagonist activity at dopamine D2 and serotonin 5-HT2A receptors, 
lurasidone has distinctive 5-HT7 antagonistic activity and displays partial agonism at 
5-HT1A receptors, as well as modest antagonism at noradrenergic α2A and α2C 
receptors. Lurasidone is devoid of antihistaminic and anticholinergic activities. In 
Section 1.7.3 below, I go on to describe how this profile may be related to its 
antidepressant activity and side effects.  Lurasidone is administered once daily within 
the range of 40–160 mg/day for schizophrenia and 20–120 mg/day for bipolar 
depression, and its pharmacokinetic profile requires administration with food (Fornaro 




Figure 1.18. Lurasidone's receptor binding profile. 
  
 Lurasidone’s antidepressant efficacy: Evidence from randomised 1.7.2
control trials.  
There have been several randomised control trials (RCTs) to evaluate lurasidone’s 
efficacy in adults with bipolar depression as well as depression with and without 
mixed features. Patients with a major depressive episode were randomly assigned to 
receive six weeks of double-blind treatment with one of two flexible dose ranges of 
lurasidone (20–60 mg) (n = 166) or 80–120 mg/day (n = 169) or placebo (n=170) 
(Loebel et al., 2014b). Both the 20–60 mg/day lurasidone group (p < .0001; effect size 
= 0.51) and the 80–120 mg/day lurasidone group (p <.001; effect size = 0.51) showed 
significantly improved Montgomery-Asberg Depression Scale (MADRS) total scores 
compared with the placebo group. The reduction in depressive symptoms was found 
by the second week of treatment and was maintained after six weeks of treatment 
(Loebel et al., 2014b). Importantly, post-hoc analyses from the same RCT, have also 
found that lurasidone is effective at treating unipolar depression with and without  
mixed features (McIntyre et al., 2015; Suppes et al., 2016b) and not only as 
monotherapy (Loebel et al., 2014b), but also adjunct to classical mood stabilisers 
(Loebel et al., 2014c; Suppes et al., 2016a). A particular advantage of lurasidone is 
that it does not increase susceptibility to weight gain like other antidepressant AAPs 
180 
 
such as quetiapine and olanzapine (Citrome et al., 2014). Taken together, the results of 
double-blind trials indicate that lurasidone demonstrates a favourable benefit/risk ratio 
for the treatment of depression, with ‘single-digit’ Number Needed to treat (NNT) 
(indicating significant efficacy) scores and ‘double-digit’ or higher Number Needed to 
Harm (NNH) scores (indicating high tolerability) (Loebel and Citrome, 2015). 
Indeed, in a recent meta-analysis of short- to medium-term RCTs of 4-16 weeks, for 
pharmacological therapies in depressed adults (Taylor et al., 2014), it was found that 
lurasidone monotherapy yielded similar efficacy to olanzapine, quetiapine, selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI), lithium, and tricyclic antidepressants (TCA). 
Additionally, there was a significant reduction in anxiety symptoms, and improvement 
of patient-rated functional impairment and quality of life. The adjunctive lurasidone 
therapy was well-tolerated and the discontinuation of the medication due to adverse 
effects was comparable to placebo. Table 1.11 summarises data comparing the relative 
efficacy and tolerability of lurasidone to other drugs in the treatment of depression 
(Jaeschke et al., 2016; Taylor et al., 2014).  
The evidence that lurasidone is an effective antidepressant as monotherapy has 
additional translational value as many individuals with depression are treated with 
several pharmacological interventions at once (McIntyre et al., 2013). This is the case 
even when monotherapy is the most adequate first-line approach (Fornaro et al., 
2016), and evidence that polypharmacy may have detrimental effects on overall 
treatment adherence (Fornaro et al., 2015). Future RCTs need the inclusion of active 
compound alternatives, such as fixed versus standard dose head-to-head comparisons 
of lurasidone to quetiapine and olanzapine. Moreover, long-term double-blind 







Table 1.11. Relative efficacy and tolerability of lurasidone to other drugs for bipolar 
depression. Taken from Jaeschke et al., (2016) with permission. 
Outcome #1: Primary efficacy (change in scores on the MADRS or HAM-D) 













• Olanzapine + fluoxetine 
• placebo 
– 
Outcome #2: Primary tolerability (switch to mania) 













• Olanzapine + fluoxetine 
– 
Outcome #3: Secondary efficacy (response) 













• Olanzapine + fluoxetine 
– 
Outcome #4: Tolerability (withdrawal) 










• Olanzapine + fluoxetine 




 Linking the pharmacological profile of lurasidone to 1.7.3
antidepressant mechanism of action and side effects  
There have been several animal studies in lurasidone, linking its action at various 
receptors to its potential psychological effects (summarised in Figure 1.18). Indeed, 
Ishibashi et al., (2010) used behavioural experiments and animal models of depression 
and anxiety in rats to show that lurasidone demonstrates potent anxiolytic-like and 
antidepressant-like activity, with a low propensity for motoric or extrapyramidal 
symptom side effects. The olfactory bulbectomy model was used to investigate the 
antidepressant-like effects of lurasidone. Specifically, rodents had an operation that 
disrupted the limbic-hypothalamic axis and led to behavioural changes, of which many 
resemble changes seen in depressed patients. In this test, lurasidone showed similar 
antidepressant effects to the tricyclic antidepressant imipramine by significantly 
reducing the number of lines crossed in an enclosed space (Ishibashi et al., 2010). In 
an animal model of anxiety (social interaction test), lurasidone significantly prolonged 
the time spent in social interaction compared with the control group.  
Dopaminergic activity may play a major role in anti-depressant effects, (Brugue and 
Vieta, 2007), both by lurasidone’s direct activity at D2 receptors and indirectly through 
the effects that serotonergic receptors have on dopamine release.  
First, lurasidone has a loose D2 postsynaptic occupancy (fast dissociation time) 
compared to alternative antipsychotics and this feature may make lurasidone an 
optimal drug for treating mood disturbances (Brugue and Vieta, 2007). Indeed, in line 
with the framework of Juckel et al (2006), FGAs
3
, such as haloperidol, worsen 
negative symptoms such as amotivation and apathy by additional suppression of DA 
activity. In contrast, SGAs (e.g. quetiapine, olanzapine, lurasidone) are proposed to 
improve negative symptoms by virtue of their comparatively reduced blockade of D2 
receptors and faster rate of dissociation from D2 receptors (Stahl, 2013) (although 
                                                 
3
 Within this discussion it is important to note that the field has largely moved away from the 
FGA/SGA distinction because (i) a broad two level categorisation may be overly simplistic as 
within these groups there is a marked difference in their receptor profiles and (ii) a focus on 




lower occupancy may be an artefact of the fast dissociation). Thus, SGAs may provide 
a sufficient and permanent input of striatal dopamine to maintain drive and affective 
responsivity. Experimental evidence in support of this theory has come from the 
effects of both antipsychotic drug classes on striatal response in the MID task (Juckel, 
2016; Juckel et al., 2006). A more ecologically valid study assessed positive and 
negative affect in the daily life of patients taking antipsychotic medication classified as 
loose (olanzapine; n=35) or tight (haloperidol, risperidone; n=74) binding, based on 
the drug's dissociation at the D2 receptor (Lataster et al., 2011). The study found a 
significant three-way interaction between binding group (loose vs tight), D2 receptor 
occupancy estimates and experience of positive and negative affect in daily life. 
Specifically, higher levels of estimated D2 receptor occupancy was related to 
decreased feelings of positive affect and increased feelings of negative affect, whilst 
for loose-binding-agent users, this association was not significant. These findings 
suggest that lurasidone’s mood stabilising effects could, in part, be mediated by 
allowing sufficient dopamine availability by faster rate of dissociation from D2 
receptors. 
A second consideration is that dopamine levels may be maintained by the effects that 
serotonergic receptors have on dopamine release. Indeed, as part of Juckel et al.’s 
framework, it was also suggested that SGAs’ increased 5-HT affinity (with 
antagonism of 5-HT2A receptors increasing striatal DA release) also promotes 
sufficient dopamine availability. The role of 5-HT in increasing dopamine release has 
been shown experimentally with lurasidone. Specifically, Huang et al., (2012) tested 
whether lurasidone’s 5-HT1A partial agonism and/or 5-HT7 antagonism, contributed to 
the ability of lurasidone to enhance dopamine release. They showed that lurasidone, 
like other atypical antipsychotics, produced a dose-dependent increase in DA efflux in 
the prefrontal cortex, hippocampus and NAcc of rats. In addition, a 5-HT1A receptor 
antagonist partially blocked the lurasidone-induced dopamine efflux, whereas a 5-
HT1A agonist and a 5-HT7 receptor antagonist potentiated the effect of lurasidone to 
increase DA efflux, especially in the prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest that 5-
HT1A receptor agonism and affinity to 5-HT7 is involved in the effect of lurasidone on 
dopamine efflux, and this could form part of its actions on mood and cognition 
improvement (Huang et al., 2012). In a similar way, 5-HT2A receptors are present on 
presynaptic dopamine neurons, and blockade of these receptors increases dopamine 
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release (Yatham et al., 2005). Lurasidone, like other AAPs blocks 5-HT2A receptors 
and this is expected to increase dopamine levels, as has been found previously with 
olanzapine and quetiapine (Ichikawa et al., 2002; Koch et al., 2004). 
Beyond dopamine, anti-depressant effects may also be mediated directly via activity at 
serotonergic  5-HT7, 5-HT1A, 5-HT2A, and noradrenaline α2C receptors (Brugue and 
Vieta, 2007; Fornaro et al., 2017; Fountoulakis et al., 2015; Yatham et al., 2005). For 
example, 5-HT7 knock-out mice show antidepressant-like behaviour and selective 5-
HT7 antagonists show antidepressant-like action by decreasing immobility time in the 
tail suspension and forced swim test (models of depression) (Wesolowska et al., 
2006). It has been suggested that 5-HT1A activation mediates the effects of SSRIs on 
neurogenesis which is considered to underlie antidepressant-like effects with pro-
longed SSRI administration (Santarelli et al., 2003). As mentioned above, lurasidone 
has high affinity for 5-HT7 and 5-HT2A receptors (antagonist), and moderate binding 
affinity to 5-HT1A (partial agonist) and α2C (antagonist), and as these receptors are 
involved in depression (Brugue and Vieta, 2007), they may contribute to the effects of 
lurasidone in animal models of depression.  
Last of all, lurasidone’s low affinity for histamine H1 and muscarinic M1 receptors is 
proposed to underlie lurasdione’s minimal central nervous system (CNS) depressant 
side effects such as sedation and somnolence as well as reduced risk of weight gain 
and cardiovascular side effects (Ishibashi et al., 2010). The higher tolerability and a 
lower risk of unpleasant side effects with lurasidone is particularly pronounced when 
compared with other agents (e.g. olanzapine) that have major impacts on metabolic 
syndrome and weight gain, especially in youth (Ketter et al., 2011; Correll et al., 
2010). In this manner, it is important to not overlook the indirect effects that a more 
tolerable drug, such as lurasidone, can have on mood in longer-term treatment 
regimens (Brugue and Vieta, 2007). 
Taken together, there seems to be a complex interaction between the major 
neurotransmitter systems without a single target being either necessary or sufficient to 
elicit an antidepressant effect (Fountoulakis et al., 2015), and lurasidone may work at 




 Lurasidone: Further work needed to understand antidepressant 1.7.4
action at a systems level 
Despite the neurochemical theories of lurasidone’s antidepressant mechanism of 
action, there is not a unified systems-level investigation of lurasidone’s mechanism of 
action in humans. Indeed, to date, there have been no pharmacoimaging studies 
investigating the modulation of neurocognitive mechanisms by lurasidone. As 
discussed in Section 1.1.3 and 1.5, reward and penalty processing are central to 
depressive disorders and thus this thesis was interested in utilising a 
neuropsychological framework to investigate the modulation of reward and penalty 
systems by lurasidone. The research approach, main aims and objectives of this thesis 






























 Research Approach: Aims and Objectives 1.8
In the introductory chapter of the thesis, I have reviewed the current state of evidence 
regarding depression, reward/penalty processing and dopamine antagonists. While 
many neuroimaging studies address two elements (e.g.  depression and reward; 
depression and dopamine antagonists; reward and dopamine antagonists), there are 
few experimentally controlled study designs to date which have examined these three 
elements in unison: using dopaminergic drugs to probe the association between neural 
reward signalling and depression. Figure 1.19 summarises these matters schematically 
and highlights the gaps in the existing literature that this thesis aims to address. Below, 
I summarise the main arguments that lead to the conception of this study, before 
presenting the specific aims and hypotheses. 
 Summary of main rational for this thesis’ research approach  1.8.1
MDD is a common, recurrent and disabling mental illness which is poorly treated by 
currently prescribed drug therapies. Many individuals with MDD do not respond to 
available antidepressant drugs, and patients that do respond can experience side effects 
and a delay in several weeks before a therapeutic effect is observed. Often multiple 
treatment cycles with different drugs are required in order to identify an effective 
therapy.  The discovery of treatment tools that target putative mechanisms of illness in 
depression – such as hyposensitivity to rewarding and hypersensitivity to aversive 
events - is thus a clinical priority.  
As discussed in Section 1.5, there is a now a rich literature examining the brain 
correlates of reward and penalty-related processing deficits in depression and this 
association meets Bradford-Hill Causality criteria (Hill, 1965) for: (i) specificity (ii) 
plausibility (iii) biological gradient and (iv) temporality. Yet, the field requires further 
experimental evidence (i.e. interventions which show results consistent with the 
association), as this would provide the next important step to establishing the role of 
neuropsychological reward and penalty processing as a causal event in depressive 
illness (Hill, 1965; Höfler, 2005). 
Previous studies have successfully used experimental intervention designs to test 
whether acute dose anti-depressants modify brain processes implicated in depression 
(Section 1.6) (Arnone et al., 2009; Godlewska et al., 2012; Harmer et al., 2017; 
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Harmer et al., 2009a; Harmer et al., 2003b; Harmer et al., 2009c; McCabe et al., 2010; 
Murphy et al., 2009; Norbury et al., 2007; Rawlings et al., 2010; Scholl et al., 2017). 
Since a direct link has been found between reduced mid-brain transporter density and 
neural activity during reward processing within the mesolimbic pathway in healthy 
and depressed human participants (Dubol et al., 2017b), dopaminergic compounds 
may provide a promising way to manipulate fronto-striatal reward pathways 
(Chowdhury et al., 2013a; Harmer et al., 2017; Jocham et al., 2011; McCabe et al., 
2010; Pessiglione et al., 2005; Vrieze et al., 2013a).  
Surprisingly, however, very few studies have used dopaminergic drugs to probe the 
association between neural reward signalling and depression. Recently, Admon et al., 
(2017) showed that a single-dose of the dopamine receptor antagonist amisulpride 
normalised reward processing by increasing reward-related striatal activation and 
corticostratial connectivity in depressed individuals. This effect is thought to result 
from transient increases in dopamine signalling at low amisulpride doses (Admon et 
al., 2017; Schoemaker et al., 1997). Strengthening of striatal functioning through 
dopamine antagonists has been shown before in healthy volunteers (Handley et al., 
2013; Mehta et al., 2003) and is presumed to occur through presynaptic D2/D3 
autoreceptor blockade (Fernandez-Seara et al., 2011; Goozee et al., 2014).  
It may seem counterintuitive that some antipsychotics are antidepressant given that D2 
antagonism (a central feature of all antipsychotics) is known to suppress reward-
related striatal activation, for example, with haloperidol (Oei et al., 2012b; Pessiglione 
et al., 2006; Pleger et al., 2009b). However, olanzapine (Tohen et al., 2014; Tohen et 
al., 2003), quetiapine (Suppes et al., 2014; Suttajit et al., 2014) and lurasidone (Loebel 
et al., 2014a; Loebel et al., 2014c; Nelson et al., 2015; Suppes et al., 2016b), which are 
efficacious antidepressants, differ from haloperidol in their broader profile, including 
greater serotonergic action. Indeed, blockade of serotonergic 5-HT receptors (5-HT1A, 
5-HT2A, 5-HT7) stimulates striatal dopamine release and in addition to this, 
serotonergic neurons directly impact upon reward (and predominantly aversive) 
processing (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cohen et al., 2015; Hayashi et al., 2015; Huang 
et al., 2012; Inaba et al., 2013; Li et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2014).  However, there are 
few studies that have assessed modulation of loss anticipation and feedback with 
antidepressant drugs. The evidence thus far points to a pattern of blunting of aversive 
events with acute administration of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) 
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(Macoveanu, 2014; Macoveanu et al., 2014; Macoveanu et al., 2013; McCabe et al., 
2010), but crucially also with D2 antagonists that have anti-depressant properties 
(amisulpride (Admon et al., 2017) and aripiprazole (Bolstad et al., 2015).  
These findings raise the intriguing possibility that dopamine antagonists with 
antidepressant properties may exert their effects via  reward  and/or penalty signal 
normalisation.  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effect of a novel dopaminergic agent
4
, 
lurasidone, on a fronto-striatal-limbic network implicated in reward and penalty 
processing and prediction error in depression. In doing so, this thesis aims to extend 
preliminary findings that dopamine antagonists may exert their effects via reward or 
penalty signal normalisation in depressed individuals (Admon et al., 2017). 
Lurasidone was selected because it is the most recently licensed dopamine antagonist 
with antidepressant properties and there is no information with regards to its effects on 
brain reward signalling (Goldberg et al., 2017; Loebel et al., 2014a; Loebel et al., 
2014c; Nelson et al., 2015; Nierenberg et al., 2015; Suppes et al., 2016a; Suppes et al., 
2016b).  Therefore, as this is the first fMRI study of lurasidone in humans to date, this 
thesis aims to further our knowledge about lurasidone’s potential antidepressant 
mechanism of action and this information may in turn help to develop and refine new 
treatment targets. In other words, using an experimental medicine design such as the 
one used in this study, could help identify relevant compounds which could then be 
tested further in using longer-term follow up, or a new target for engagement in future 
drug development studies. On a broader scale, this thesis aims to contribute to what is 
called ‘rational treatment advances’ for psychiatric disorders based upon 
pathophysiologic and etiological processes.   
To summarise, this thesis probes the association between neural reward/penalty 
signalling and depression using a dopaminergic agent and aims to (i) further our 
                                                 
4
 For the purpose of the thesis, I will use the term ‘dopaminergic agent’ to refer to 
pharmacological agents that transiently increase or decrease dopamine signalling. I prefer the 
term ‘dopaminergic agent’ to ‘antipsychotics’ or ‘dopamine antagonists’ because of the varied 
effects these agents have on dopamine levels through post-and pre-synaptic antagonism. 
Indeed, the term ‘dopamine antagonist’ may be misleading when low doses of, for example, 
amisulpride, in fact increase dopamine signalling through presynaptic autoreceptor blockade, 




understanding of the (causal) involvement of reward and penalty mechanisms in 
depression (ii) elucidate the antidepressant-mechanism of action of lurasidone; and 
(iii) define clear therapeutic targets.  
In order to probe the association between neural reward/penalty signalling and 
depression, we utilise an acute dose of 20 mg lurasidone and a randomised, placebo-
controlled cross-over study with BOLD fMRI during a reward task and arterial spin 
labelling imaging at rest acquired on two separate occasions per individual. 
Approximately half of the participants (n=22) were randomly selected to receive 
lurasidone on the first visit and the placebo on the second, and the other participants 
(n=21) received placebo on the first visit and lurasidone on the second visit. A one-
week washout period was used to avoid carry-over effects, based on the reported 18h 
half-life of lurasidone 40 mg (Sunovion, 2013). A detailed description of the study 
design can be found in Methods Section 3.3. Since symptoms of MDD fall on a 
continuous dimension (Angst et al., 2000; Ayuso-Mateos et al., 2010), we recruited 
subjects across the range of depression severity, including healthy volunteers (n=20), 
as well as people meeting subthreshold (n=9) and full-criteria MDD (n=11). This 
research approach is in line with the Research Domain Criteria framework (Morris and 
Cuthbert, 2012) (e.g. as in (Stringaris et al., 2015b) where symptom levels are related 
to the brain measurements). It also does justice to findings concerning the genetic 
underpinnings of common mental illness (Plomin et al., 2009) as well as current 
approaches to understanding neural system perturbation in a dimensional way 
(Matthews and Hampshire, 2016). To rule out any confounding medication effects 
(Kumar et al., 2008; Laidi and Houenou, 2016), all subjects were medication-naïve. 
The benefits of this approach to recruitment are discussed in the Methods Section 
3.1.1. By utilising research strategies such as randomisation and experimental 
manipulation in combination with two fMRI techniques, we aim to overcome several 
of the limitations of correlational studies in drawing causal inferences about brain-





Figure 1.19. Rationale for the 
experimental study presented in this 
thesis based on the literature reviewed 
in the introduction. Diagram shows a 
brief description of the current state of 
evidence regarding depression, 
reward/penalty processing, prediction 
error and dopamine antagonists and 
relevant gaps in the literature are 
provided alongside the main aim and 
objective of this study (see text for 
more details). Rectangles represent a 
summary of study findings which have 
addressed two elements (e.g.  Violet: 
Depression and reward; Green: 
Depression and Dopamine antagonists; 
Orange: Reward and Dopamine 
antagonists). The triangle represents 
study findings which have examined 
these three elements in unison and 
highlights the gap in existing literature 




This thesis examines three hypotheses for the effect of lurasidone on (1) neural 
correlates of reward and penalty processing and (2) reward and penalty-related 
prediction error signal and (3) cerebral blood flow in depression.  
We investigate reward and penalty processing because responses to positive and 
negative contexts contribute mutually to depression course (Rottenberg et al., 2002). 
Depression is characterised by hyporeactivity to reward (Admon et al., 2015a; Forbes 
et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2010; Gotlib et al., 2010a; Keren et al., 2018; Knutson et al., 
2008; Luking et al., 2016c; Olino et al., 2014; Pizzagalli et al., 2009a; Rzepa et al., 
2017; Segarra et al., 2016; Sharp et al., 2014) and hyperactivity to aversive stimuli  
(Admon et al., 2015a; Engelmann et al., 2017; Gotlib et al., 2010b; Luking et al., 
2016b), and thus an antidepressant effect could be brought about by increasing reward, 
decreasing salience to negative events, or, both simultaneously. Given the relative 
paucity of literature on processing of losses (Keren et al., 2018 in press), our study is 
designed to interrogate both anticipation and feedback of rewards and penalties. 
Broadly speaking, we hypothesise a normalisation of fronto-striatal reward and/or 
penalty function and prediction error following acute-dose administration in 
depression. We anticipate that subjects scoring high on depression will show a 
baseline difference in fronto-striatal activity which will be reverted by acute-dose 
lurasidone. Moreover, we seek to address a key concern in pharmacoimaging studies, 
namely that shifts in global or regional CBF could underlie changes observed in 
BOLD fMRI signal. We therefore also use ASL, an imaging modality that allows the 
quantification of cerebral blood flow at rest, to disentangle global and regional CBF 
changes from BOLD fMRI signal. The hypotheses are described in detail below and 
summarised in Table 1.12. 
Hypothesis 1: Neural Correlates of Reward and Penalty processing. 
This study used the monetary incentive delay (MID) task in conjunction with fMRI to 
assess anticipatory vs. consummatory phases of reward and penalty processing (see 
Methods Section 3.5 for a detailed description of the task). As a result, four 
hypotheses were formulated for the effect of medication and depression severity on the 
anticipation of reward and penalties ((i) Reward Anticipation (ii) Penalty 
Anticipation), and the feedback of reward and penalties ((iii) Reward Outcome (iv) 
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Penalty Outcome). Specific predictions are outlined below and are underpinned by the 
following broad hypothesis: If altered neural activity during reward processing is a key 
mechanism for depression, then lurasidone’s antidepressant effects may involve 
normalising activity in the brain’s reward network. This implies a baseline difference 
dependent on depression severity (i.e. a significant difference in neural activation 
between high and low depression severity groups on placebo, which is normalised by 
lurasidone). Moreover, we predicted that these changes would be apparent within the 
first few hours of the drug dose because previous studies have shown that single-dose 
administration of antidepressants (Harmer, O'Sullivan, et al., 2009; Murphy, Norbury, 
O'Sullivan, Cowen, and Harmer, 2009) and dopamine antagonists (Admon et al., 2017; 
Handley et al., 2013) is sufficient to detect changes in neural activity in patients as 
well as healthy volunteers. 
Hypothesis 1a: Reward Anticipation  
With reference to the literature review on reward and penalty processing abnormalities 
in depression (see Section 1.5.5.1), one would expect a normalisation response to be 
characterised by a potentiation of striatal reward anticipation signals in depressed 
individuals. Indeed, this direction of response, albeit not statistically significant, was 
found using a single dose of dopamine antagonist amisulpride in depressed and 
healthy individuals (Admon et al., 2017). However, other studies using dopamine 
antagonists in healthy controls have demonstrated either no change with olanzapine 
(Abler et al., 2007) or blunted responses with haloperidol or higher doses of 
amisulpride (Pessiglione et al., 2006). Given that we used a low dose of lurasidone, 
and it has a more similar binding profile to SGAs olanazpaine and amisulpride, than 
FGA haloperidol, we hypothesised that lurasidone will increase striatal activation 
during reward anticipation. In line with the results of other intervention studies 
(Burkhouse et al., 2016; Rice et al., 2015; Vrieze et al., 2013b; Walsh et al., 2016), we 
predicted that these effects will be most pronounced in individuals with higher 
depressive symptoms and anhedonia (i.e. more discrepant neural pattern to controls at 





Hypothesis 1b: Penalty Anticipation 
In contrast to reward anticipation, the direction of a normalisation response for 
penalty-related anticipation in depression is less clear. This is attributable to the 
mixed findings of the literature review with some studies showing blunted (Rzepa et 
al., 2017; Schiller et al., 2013; Stoy et al., 2012a; Ubl et al., 2015a) and others, 
increased (McCabe et al., 2009; McCabe et al., 2012) responses to penalty cues in 
depressed relative to healthy control subjects. Similarly, treatment studies have shown 
that whilst acute amisulpride administration (Admon et al., 2017) and six week 
escitalopram treatment (Stoy et al., 2012) significantly increase striatal responses to 
penalty cues in depressed individuals; seven day reboxetine and citalopram treatment 
decrease neural responses to aversive stimuli in OFC and insula, relative to placebo 
(McCabe et al., 2010). Therefore, an exploratory, non-directional hypothesis was 
formulated for brain regions that are commonly recruited during loss-related 
processing (Bartra et al., 2013; Engelmann et al., 2017; Gotlib et al., 2010a). We 
hypothesised that lurasidone will alter (increase or decrease) the penalty-related 
anticipation signal in ACC, anterior insula, amygdala and striatal regions and that 
these effects will be greatest in individuals with higher depressive symptoms.  
Hypothesis 1c: Reward Outcome 
A prominent finding of the literature review was the association between depression, 
consummatory anhedonia, and blunted striatal responses to reward outcomes (Admon 
et al., 2015a; Forbes et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2010; Gotlib et al., 2010b; Hagele et 
al., 2015; Knutson et al., 2008; Pizzagalli et al., 2009a; Segarra et al., 2016; Sharp et 
al., 2014; Yang et al., 2016). A normalisation response would thus constitute an 
increase in striatal activity to positive feedback in depressed individuals. Indeed, acute 
amisulpride administration has been shown to significantly increase reward-related 
striatal activation in MDD (Admon et al., 2017). On the basis of this converging 
evidence, we hypothesised that lurasidone will increase the reward feedback signal in 
the ventral striatum, namely the caudate, putamen and NAcc. Moreover, it was 
predicted that these effects will be most pronounced in individuals with higher 




Hypothesis 1d: Penalty Outcome 
As discussed in Section 1.5.5.2, heightened sensitivity to negative outcomes in 
depression may be reflected by elevated loss-related signals in the ACC, anterior 
insula, and striatum (Admon et al., 2015a; Engelmann et al., 2017; Gotlib et al., 
2010b; Luking et al., 2016b). Thus, the expected direction of a normalisation response 
would be to reduce activity in these regions to a level comparable of healthy control 
subjects. There are few studies which have investigated modulation of penalties by 
pharamcological compounds. However, those which have investigated this showed 
that acute high doses (400 mg) of amisulpride reduce aversive PEs in the striatum 
(Jocham et al., 2014), and low doses show a (non-statistically significant) pattern of 
reducing striatal responses to penalty outcomes in depressed individuals, relative to 
placebo (Admon et al., 2017). Seven day treatment with SSRI citalopram in healthy 
controls reduces activation for aversive stimuli in the lateral OFC (McCabe et al., 
2010). In line with this notion, we hypothesised that lurasidone will reduce the 
penalty-related feedback signal in the ACC, anterior insula and ventral striatum.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Reward and Penalty-related Prediction Error Signal 
This thesis addresses how lurasidone influences prediction error (PE) encoding in 
depression, which is of relevance since reward-related PE signals are attenuated in 
depression (Ubl et al., 2015a) and contribute to the severity of anhedonia (Gradin et 
al., 2011).  The effect of dopamine antagonists on the neural correlates of reward and 
penalty prediction error in depression has not been previously investigated; hence this 
part of the study was largely exploratory. The modulation of striatal PE signals is 
strongly associated with behavioural learning and improvement of future decisions 
(Pessiglione et al., 2006), both of which are essential features in the context of 
psychotherapy. PE trumps reward magnitude as a parameter of decision making and 
influences subjective mood fluctuations (Rutledge et al., 2014) over and above 
expected or received reward. This makes the PE a potentially important treatment 
parameter.  
To assess the effects of lurasidone on reward and penalty-related PE, an approach that 
emphasises the prediction error framework was used, as has been done previously for 
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the MID task (Graf et al., 2016; Staudinger et al., 2009). As discussed in Section 1.4.3 
and 1.5.5.3, reward-related PEs are predominantly encoded in the ventral striatum, 
caudate, putamen, OFC and ACC (Gradin et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2008; Rothkirch 
et al., 2017; Ubl et al., 2015a) . Loss-related PE signals are principally encoded in the 
ventral striatum, insula, ACC, thalamus and amygdala (Garrison et al., 2013; 
Pessiglione et al., 2006; Yacubian et al., 2006).  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Reward-related Prediction Error 
The majority of studies in the literature review demonstrated reduced encoding of 
reward-related PE in several regions of the fronto-striatal-limbic reward circuit in 
depression; with the degree of signal reduction correlating with syndrome and 
anhedonia severity (Gradin et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2008; Rothkirch et al., 2017; Ubl 
et al., 2015a). Acute pharmacologically induced dopaminergic enhancements increase 
reward-related striatal activity and improve reward learning relative to placebo 
(Chowdhury et al., 2013a; Jocham et al., 2011; Pessiglione et al., 2006). If the low 
dose of lurasidone used in this study transiently increases dopamine release via 
autoreceptor blockade
5
 (Admon et al., 2017; Schoemaker et al., 1997), we can expect 
that lurasidone will increase prediction error signal for reward in regions of the brain’s 
reward network (ACC, OFC, amygdala, VS), and that these effects would be greatest 
in individuals with more severe depressive symptoms. However, if lurasidone’s D2 
antagonism reduces dopamine availability then we can expect the opposite pattern, as 
has been found with high doses of amisulpride (Jocham et al., 2014) and haloperidol 
(Pessiglione et al., 2006). Therefore, an exploratory, non-directional hypothesis was 
formulated and we hypothesised that lurasidone will alter (increase or decrease) the 
                                                 
5
 We do not know unequivocally how lurasidone affects the different components of 
dopaminergic function in humans, for example with regard to tonic versus phasic firing, or D1 
versus D2 receptors. Therefore, although we predict that lurasidone will modify PE-related 
fronto-striatal responses at the systems-level, we have to be cautious about inferring the 




reward-related PE signal in the striatum, ACC and OFC and that these effects will be 
greatest in individuals with higher depressive symptoms.  
Hypothesis 2b: Penalty-related Prediction Error 
In contrast to reward-related PE, the direction of a normalisation response for penalty-
related PE in depression is less clear. This is attributable to the relative paucity of 
research linking penalty-related PEs to depression/pharmacological interventions and 
the mixed findings of the studies reviewed. Whilst there is some evidence of enhanced 
encoding of penalty-related PE in the ventral striatum  in depression relative to healthy 
volunteers (Ubl et al., 2015), there is also evidence of no group differences in penalty-
related PE encoding in the striatum and insula (Rothkirch et al., 2017). Unlike reward-
related PE, acute pharmacologically induced dopaminergic enhancements and 
administration of dopamine antagonist, haloperidol, have not had a significant effect 
on loss-related PE encoding (Pessiglione et al., 2006). Whilst acute dose (400 mg) 
amisulpride reduces aversive PEs (Jocham et al., 2014), longer term (2 week) 
exposure to SSRI citalopram enhances aversive PE signals in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex and ACC relative to placebo treatment (Scholl et al., 2017). In 
response to the limited literature, an exploratory, non-directional hypothesis was 
formulated for brain regions that are commonly recruited during loss-related PE 
processing. We hypothesised that lurasidone will alter the penalty-related PE signal in 
ACC, insula, amygdala and striatal regions and that these effects will be greatest in 
individuals with higher depressive symptoms. 
Hypothesis 3: Sensitivity Analyses 
The aim of the final hypothesis was to test the sensitivity or ‘fine-tune’ the predicted 
outcomes of hypotheses (1) and (2). 
First, we hypothesised that lurasidone’s effects on reward and penalty processing in 
depression would not be confounded by comorbid anxiety symptoms (continuous 
measures of anxiety (total score on the anxiety subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983)). This prediction was formulated on the 
basis of neuroimaging evidence that reward alterations are present in anxiety, albeit in 
an opposite direction to the alterations seen in depression  (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Forbes et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2006; Guyer et al., 2012; Guyer et al., 2006; 
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Helfinstein et al., 2011; Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Therefore, we predicted that co-
varying for anxiety will not impact upon lurasidone’s effect on reward/penalty 
processing in depressed individuals.  
Second, we predicted that sedation scores, as indexed by a Visual Analogue Scale 
(Herbert et al., 1976), would not significantly increase following lurasidone 
administration and would not impact upon the relationship between medication, 
depression and the neural correlates of reward/penalty processing. In other words, we 
predicted that any effects of a low, single dose of lurasidone (20 mg) on behavioural 
and neural responses to rewards or penalties would not be secondary to an alteration in 
somnolence, alertness or tranquillity. This hypothesis was informed by evidence that 
lurasidone (80 mg) reduces day-time sleepiness to a similar level as a placebo-treated 
group and evidence that lurasidone has milder somnolence side-effects when 
compared to other atypical antipsychotic medications (e.g. quetiapine) over a six-week 
period (Citrome et al., 2014; Loebel et al., 2014c). 
Third, previous studies have shown that dopamine antagonists (FGA and SGAs) 
potently increase striatal cerebral blood flow at rest (Goozee et al., 2014; Handley et 
al., 2013; Lahti et al., 2003; Lahti et al., 2005). Increases in blood flow following 
antipsychotic administration may be related to increased neuronal metabolism in 
striatal areas due to the large density of D2 receptors (Goozee et al., 2014). Blockade 
of D2 receptors in the striatum may potentially result in disinhibition of D2 receptor-
containing medium spiny neurons and increased dopamine signalling (Fernandez-
Seara et al., 2011). On the basis of these findings, we hypothesised that lurasidone 
would increase striatal cerebral blood flow in all participants relative to placebo. In 
addition, we predicted that the fMRI BOLD analyses (Hypotheses 1 and 2) would 
remain unchanged when controlling for the predicted increases in regional and global 
cerebral blood flow (CBF) under lurasidone at baseline. Controlling for global and 
regional CBF changes in the analysis of BOLD fMRI data represent an important step 
towards identifying if the effects of the drug administered are indeed neuronal. In this 
study, quantitative measures of baseline CBF were measured using Arterial Spin 







Hypothesis Predicted pattern of response based on the literature  
1a. Reward 
Anticipation 
Lurasidone will increase 
striatal activation during 
reward anticipation and 
these effects will be most 
pronounced in 
individuals with higher 
depressive symptoms and 
anticipatory anhedonia. 
 
1b. Penalty Anticipation 
Lurasidone will alter the 
penalty-related 
anticipation signal in 
ACC, anterior insula, 
amygdala and striatal 
regions and these effects 
will be greatest in 
individuals with higher 











Table 1.12. A summary of the three hypotheses tested in this thesis for the effect of lurasidone 
on (1) neural correlates of reward and penalty processing, (2) reward and penalty-related 
prediction error signal in depression and (3) cerebral blood flow. For hypotheses 1a-2b, we 
predict a baseline difference dependent on depression severity (i.e. significant difference in 




Hypothesis Predicted pattern of response based on the literature  
1c. Reward Outcome 
Lurasidone will increase 
the reward feedback 
signal in the ventral 
striatum, namely the 
caudate, putamen and 
NAcc. These effects will 
be most pronounced in 





1d. Penalty Outcome 
Lurasidone will reduce 
the penalty-related 
feedback signal in the 
VS, ACC and insula. 
These effects will be 
most pronounced in 






Lurasidone will alter 
(increase or decrease) 
the reward-related PE 
signal in frontal, striatal 
and limbic regions: VS, 
OFC, ACC. These 
effects will be most 
pronounced in 
















Hypothesis Predicted pattern of response based on the literature  
2b. Penalty-related 
Prediction Error 
Lurasidone will alter the 
penalty-related PE signal 
in ACC, insula, 
amygdala and striatal 
regions and that these 
effects will be greatest in 








3c. Cerebral Blood 
Flow 
Lurasidone will increase 
striatal cerebral blood 
flow in all participants 
















 Imaging Methods  Chapter 2 -
There are a basic set of principles which underlie the success of magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI). In this section, I give an overview of these essential facts to provide 
an understanding of how this technique is applied to imaging the brain. Different 
function MRI (fMRI) methods, including Blood-oxygen-Level-Dependent (BOLD) 
and Arterial Spin Labelling (ASL) imaging will be summarised as well as a 
description of how these are used in conjunction with cognitive tasks and 
pharmacological administration. 
 Magnetic resonance imaging 2.1
 Principles of MRI 2.1.1
Hydrogen is the third most abundant element in the human body, thereby making it a 
useful marker for medical imaging. MRI relies on the on the way that the components 
of the hydrogen nuclei (protons) in water react to the magnetic field created by a 
superconductive magnet. In other words, the signal in MRI comes from the 
magnetisation of hydrogen protons in the body. Each proton has a small magnetic 
moment, or 'spin' and when a non-external magnetic field is present the magnetic 
dipole moments are randomly oriented. However, in the main magnetic field of the 
scanner, named B0, the net magnetisation of the spins aligns with B0 which defines the 
direction of the positive z-axis. At this stage the protons are in in a relatively 
organised, low energy state. 
Energy generated by a radiotransmitter, referred to as a radiofrequency pulse, excites 
the spin system and leads the net magnetisation to move into the transverse plane (see 
Figure 2.1). Thus, the protons shift into a high energy state and this excitation pulse 
also brings the spins into phase, resulting in a strong net magnetisation in the 
transverse plane, which is what induces the signal. Once the radiofrequency pulse is 
discontinued, excitation stops and the hydrogen nuclei relax (return) to their original 
state. Specifically, two types of relaxation occur: the net magnetisation returns to the 
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z-axis (T1 relaxation) and the spins dephase causing the net transverse magnetisation 
to decrease (T2 relaxation) (see Figure 2.1) (McRobbie et al., 2006).  
This change in magnetisation is called the “Free Induction Decay” and comprises the 
MR signal, which can be detected by radiofrequency coils tuned to the Larmor 
Frequency. Differences in the amount of signal from different tissues is what leads to 
contrast. Tissues such as white matter (WM), grey matter (GM) and cerebrospinal 
fluid (CSF) each have different intensity curves for T1 and T2 relaxation and these 
curves are characterised by the time constants, T1 and T2, (i.e. the time it takes for 
63% of the magnetisation to recover or decay) (Westbrook, 2009). For example, as 
CSF is formed mostly of water, it has the highest concentration of hydrogen and thus 
more spins contributing to the net magnetisation (Blink, 2004). The location of the 
signal can be determined by modulating the local magnetic field (and therefore the 
resonant frequency of the hydrogen nuclei) by applying magnetic field gradients. 
These vary linearly along three orthogonal planes (x, y and z axes) and are frequently 
referred to as the slice-selection, frequency encoding and phase encoding gradients. 
The order of magnetic gradient superpositions and the radiofrequency pulses used to 
create MR images is called the pulse sequence. Structural MRI images are created by 
reconstructing the signal obtained from the water molecules in the brain into an image. 
This is done using a mathematical process called a Fast Fourier Transform. The MRI 










Figure 2.1. A. Excitation. Adapted from Westbrook (2009). B. T1 relaxation. Adapted 




 Principles of fMRI 2.1.2
Brain activity can be defined as the signalling activity of neurons (ie. action potential 
spiking) and the integrative activity between neurons. However this is difficult to 
measure directly and non-invasively. Thus blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) 
contrast in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is used to draw conclusions 
about brain activity in response to manipulations of sensory, cognitive and behavioural 
conditions. The basic assumption being that brain activity is linked to metabolic 
activity in the brain and indicated by changes in blood oxygen. Specifically, the 
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haemodynamic response (HDR), (i.e. the increase in oxygen-rich blood delivery to 
active brain areas) underlies the BOLD contrast, and the magnetic properties of 
oxyhaemoglobin and deoxyhaemoglobin increase and decrease the MR signal 
respectively (Thulborn et al,, 1982). In this next section, I outline BOLD signal 
generation in greater detail, followed by a discussion of whether BOLD contrast 
correlates with neural activity; is as a result of energy consumption; is unified across 
brain areas and individuals and applications of BOLD fMRI. Indeed, as BOLD fMRI 
is the neuroimaging method used in this thesis, it is important to understand the 
underlying assumptions of this signal generation and its limits. 
 HDR and BOLD contrast 2.1.2.1
The HDR is the main assumption for why BOLD contrast is often taken as a surrogate 
of brain activity. It is firstly important to understand how the HDR affects BOLD 
contrast. BOLD contrast is not a quantitative measure and its amplitude depends on 
the mismatch between cerebral blood flow (CBF), cerebral blood volume (CBV), 
blood oxygen supply and oxygen and glucose metabolism. Whilst oxyhaemoglobin in 
red blood cells is diamagnetic, deoxyhaemoglobin is paramagnetic due to its unpaired 
electrons (Ogawa et al., 1990; Pauling, 1936). The latter reduces T2* dephasing time 
and BOLD signal (Figure 2.2) in gradient echo images (Thulborn et al, 1982). When 
cerebral blood flow (CBF) increases, somewhat counter intuitively, neuronal activity 
decreases the concentration of deoxyhaemoglobin in the venous space (Figure 2.2) 
thereby increasing BOLD signal intensity by 1-3%. 
 
 (A)      (B)  
Figure 2.2. Rats breathing (A) 100% oxygen versus rats breathing (B) 21% oxygen 
(normal air) to manipulate blood oxygen level. Rats breathing normal air have less 
signal along the blood vessels in the cortex, indicating increased levels of 
deoxygenated haemoglobin (Ogawa et al., 1990). Adapted from Heuttel et al., (2009) 





Figure 2.3. Illustration that when neurons are active there is a decrease in the ratio of 
deoxyhaemoglobin to oxyhaemoglobin. Adapted from Huettel et al., (2009) with 
permission.  
 
The underlying features of the HDR must be evaluated in order to understand whether 
the relation between the BOLD signal and the underlying neural activity is qualified.  
 Does an increase in CBF, and thus BOLD contrast, correlate with 2.1.2.2
neural activity? 
The first assumption to be addressed is whether neural activity contributes to the 
generation of the HDR and thus BOLD contrast. This has been investigated by using a 
combination of BOLD contrast imaging and intra-cortical recordings. Despite early 
studies suggesting a quantitative relationship between the action potential spike rate of 
neurons and the HDR (Rees et al., 2000), it is now agreed that BOLD contrast is more 
indicative of synaptic activity (Logothetis and Pfeuffer, 2004). Logothetis et al., 
(2001) showed that an increase in local field potentials (LFPs) (i.e. cooperative 
activity between neural populations) gave a significantly better estimate of a positive 
BOLD signal than the increase in spiking output of neural populations. Specifically, 
LFPs in the visual cortex and the BOLD response remained elevated throughout the 
duration of a visual stimulus, whilst the spiking output of neural populations did not. 
Indeed, a decrease in LFPs is also correlated with a negative BOLD response, which is 
thought to be indicative of inhibitory signals (Boorman et al., 2010). Therefore, if the 
definition of brain activity encompasses both LFPs and spiking output, the BOLD 




The limit of its accuracy is that both inhibitory and excitatory signals contribute to the 
BOLD contrast, whilst within a neuron these signals may cancel out (Huettel et al., 
2009).  Moreover, the temporal and spatial specificity of the HDR is problematic as its 
peak occurs approximately 4-6 seconds after stimulus onset (Chen et al., 2011) and the 
BOLD effect occurs in an area larger than the focus of neuronal activity (Iadecola et 
al., 1997). When also considering that a typical fMRI voxel (3x3x3mm) contains a 
vast capillary network, millions of neurons and billions of synapses (Logothetis, 2002) 
the power of the BOLD signal to effectively signal neural activity at the anatomical 
level diminishes. 
Given that these limits are inherent of the HDR, they are often overlooked and a 
favourable view is that positive and negative BOLD signals do correlate with LFPs. 
The next question is whether it is accurate to assume that energy utilisation by active 
neurons causes an increase in CBF and BOLD signal. 
 Are CBF and BOLD signal changes directly driven by energy 2.1.2.3
consumption from neural activity? 
Indeed, it was initially assumed that this was the case (Attwell and Iadecola, 2002). 
Due to the low stores of glycogen in the brain, energy is supplied by glucose and 
oxygen in the blood (Clarke and Sokoloff, 1994). Importantly, oxygen is required to 
break down glucose into ATP, the energy currency of neurons (Sokoloff et al., 1977). 
As expected, several experiments using a deoxyglucose method revealed a coupling 
between regional cerebral activation, CBF and glucose consumption with a correlation 
coefficient of r > 0.95 (p < 0.001) (Sokoloff, 1977). It was generally assumed that the 
HDR was driven by energy consumed in the repolarisation of the neural membrane 
(Jueptner and Weiller, 1995). Hoge and colleagues (1999) also demonstrated a linear 
correlation between CBF and oxygen consumption in activated cortical regions. 
However, these correlations do not signify that CBF is directly driven by energy 
consumption and thus oxygen delivery.  
Indeed, there is evidence that CBF and energy consumption can be dissociated and can 
be seen as occurring in parallel with one another rather than one being a cause of the 
other (Attwell and Iadecola, 2002). A ‘feed-forward’ mechanism of oxygen delivery in 
the blood can account for the increase in CBF, and thus BOLD contrast, irrespective of 
falling oxygen levels from neuronal activity. It has been proposed that an 
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overabundance of oxygen delivery maintains an adequate oxygen tension gradient 
(Kassissia et al., 1995) so that oxygen readily diffuses through the endothelium of 
capillaries to mitochondria (Devor et al., 2011). In particular, HDRs seem to be driven 
by neurotransmitter-related signalling (Attwell et al., 2010). When neurons release 
glutamate (Fergus and Lee, 1997), neurons stimulate the synthesis of substances used 
in vasodilation, such as nitric oxide synthase (NOS) (Meng et al., 1995) which 
subsequently increase blood flow (Figure 2.4). Therefore, contrary to assumptions that 
CBF and BOLD contrast changes result directly from energy consumption, it seems 
that BOLD contrast is more indicative of synaptic activity which is correlated with but 
not triggered by energy consumption.  
  Are changes in blood flow only controlled by neurons?  2.1.2.4
Astrocytes are glial cells that also modulate blood flow requirements by dilation or 
constriction of arterioles. The release of glutamate leads to astrocytes releasing 
arachidonic acid and three types of metabolite which dilate vessels (Figure 2.4). 
Astrocytes also release potassium ions (K+) (Caesar et al., 1999) for vasodilation. 
Moreover, Peppiatt et al., (2006) found that structures called pericytes regulate blood 
flow in response to changes in neural activity, whereby noradrenaline leads to 
pericytes contracting capillaries and glutamate leads to pericytes dilating capillaries. 
There are thus structures, other than neurons that control CBF. Nevertheless, the 








Figure 2.4. The role of astrocytes and neurons in the regulation of CBF via the release 
of vasodilating substances initiated by glutamate. Taken from Attwell et al., (2010) 
with permission. 
 
  Can CBF, and thus BOLD signal, increase irrespective of neural 2.1.2.5
activity? 
There is converging evidence that CBF-oxygen metabolism coupling is significantly 
lower in subcortical than cortical regions (Ances et al., 2008) and that vascular density 
properties change according to the function of a region (Gur et al., 2009). Variability 
in these physiological parameters across the brain can lead to different BOLD contrast 
signals irrespective of the level of brain activity. Nevertheless, BOLD response can be 
compared across participants for the same task and same brain region (Kim et al., 
2000). Researchers must however first be aware that factors such as age, tumours and 
certain drugs (Rombouts et al., 2007) can change blood flow in ways unrelated to 
neural activity. A calibrated BOLD method, in which baseline physiological factors 
are taken into account, (Ances et al., 2008) and measurements of the ‘Resting Brain 
State’ (Fox and Raichle, 2007) may be able to resolve complexities in the 
interpretation of intersubject BOLD signals. However, both approaches have various 
assumptions about the cascade of physiological events occurring in the HDR that 
remain to be resolved (Blockley et al., 2013).  
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 Applications of BOLD fMRI 2.1.2.6
 
Functional MRI (fMRI) has emerged as the most extensively used method in clinical 
research as it enables us to locate changes in cerebral activity that have been elicited 
either experimentally or determined by illness. Thus, the combination of in vivo 
structural and functional MRI has fuelled the investigation of the ‘neural correlates’ or 
‘biomarkers’ of various disorders of the brain by comparing the location and degree of 
functional changes in patients relative to appropriate control groups or between 
treatment groups.  
General Linear Model  
Mass-univariate analysis (ie. voxel-by-voxel analysis) is a dominant method and is 
based on the General Linear Model (GLM). The GLM constructs a statistical model 
for each voxel in the brain by relating a single continuous dependent variable to one or 
more continuous or categorical independent variables (ie. regressors). 
Inherent of the voxel-wise statistical analysis are the pre-processing steps: 
normalisation and smoothing. Normalisation ensures that spatial locations match to the 
same anatomical structures across subjects so that for each voxel in the standardised 
space, statistics of different groups can be completed. Moreover, as mass-univariate 
analysis is based on linear regressors and assumes that the underlying distributions are 
Gaussian, smoothing is required to make the data and residuals normally distributed, 
thus increasing the legitimacy of parametric tests (Lao et al., 2004). These pre-
processing procedures are explained in greater detail in Methods Section 3.8.2. 
Using mass-univariate analysis for fMRI data involves the construction of a first and 
second level GLM. It is best explained with reference to the GLM equation that can be 
expressed in matrix notation as follows. 
    𝑌    =      𝑋 .  𝛽    +     𝜀 Equation 1. 
 




The first level analysis is run separately on each subject and is used to build a model 
of the predicted BOLD response to the task, such that Y is the BOLD signal at various 
time points at a single voxel (Poldrack et al., 2011). X is the design matrix, containing 
the components that explain the observed data and for each voxel including: (i) BOLD 
timing information such as the onset (O
m
j) and duration (D
m
j) vectors (ii) the 
haemodynamic response function (HRF) describing the expected BOLD response 
shape over time and (iii) other ‘uninteresting’ regressors such as the realignment 
parameters for head motion (Huettel et al., 2009). The betas (β) are the parameters and 
define the contribution of each component of the design matrix to the observed data Y. 
Finally, ε is the error or residuals which represents the difference between the 
observed data, Y, and that predicted by the model, Xβ. Importantly, mass-univariate 
analysis packages such as SPM (Statistical Parametric Mapping) provide highly 
sophisticated methods to model the shape and magnitude of the HRF as accurately as 
possible. 
Second level GLM combines the single subject estimates to enable group level 
analysis, such that Y is the activation for the task for each subject. As subjects are 
treated as random effects in the model, the resultant ‘random effect’ GLM is an 
efficient approach for making inferences about the population from which subjects 
were drawn. 
Outputs and hypothesis testing 
The output of independent statistical tests at every brain voxel is a statistical 
parametric map (SPM) (Friston et al., 1994) which shows regions with statistically 
significant differences between experimental conditions (Figure 2.5). In other words 
the outputted brain maps are locationist and non-connectionist signifying that they are 
both simple and interpretable (Brammer, 2009). SPMs of univariate statistical 
measures allow us to investigate (i) whether one group has a regionally higher value of 
a particular neuroimaging measure (such as tissue density, brain activity or blood 
flow) compared to another group; (ii) whether this measure correlates with an 
experimental variable, such as test-score or disease severity; and (iii) interactions 
between these effects of interest. Therefore, GLM is a flexible framework which 
enables the execution of different analyses including one-sample t-tests, two-sample t-
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tests, paired t-tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA).  
 
Figure 2.5. Data flow in mass-univariate analysis in an fMRI experiment with two 
tasks. Taken from Brammer, (2009) with permission. 
Limitations of the mass-univariate analysis approach 
Mass-univariate analysis has its limits. The large number of independent tests (i.e. one 




 voxels) (Habeck et al., 2008), means 
that strict mechanisms, namely ‘random field theory’, are needed to correct for 
multiple comparisons and reduce Type I errors (Poldrack et al., 2011). This ‘curse of 
multiple comparisons’ renders mass-univariate analyses less sensitive to detect small 
changes across distributed systems (Nichols and Hayasaka 2003). Indeed, there have 
been replication difficulties regarding focal changes in heterogeneous psychiatric 
illnesses such as depression where wide-scale changes in brain structure and function 
are implicated. This raises a key doubt in the analysis method itself: are we correcting 
away true effects of interest in the data? 
Furthermore, a lack of inter-voxel interaction analysis widely ignores current scientific 
knowledge about the connectivity and the network-like nature of brain activity in 
healthy and pathological circumstances (Brammer, 2009). Regions activated in one 
group relative to another can be expected to overlap in most regions and unlike 
machine learning, GLM does not have a method to integrate these statistics into an 
overall prediction. Thus, it cannot provide information at the subject-level, which in 
clinical applications, is what we are generally interested in. 
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Thus, an increasingly common method is to explore functional connectivity of brain 
regions of interest. This investigates temporal correlations in BOLD signal change 
across regions, either during tasks (e.g. using psychophysiological interaction analysis 
(PPI) to explore whether the correlation in activity in distant brain regions differs 
across psychological contexts; O’Reilly et al., 2012) or at rest (resting state fMRI).  
FMRI versus other imaging modalities 
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the general strengths and limitations of various 
imaging modalities. Functional MRI has superior spatial and temporal resolution 
compared to other prominent functional neuroimaging techniques (such as positron 
emission tomography [PET]) and does not require injection of radiological materials. 
However, as described in Section 2.1.2, there are issues concerning the temporal and 
spatial accuracy of images from fMRI, given the time delay in the production and 
subsequent measurement of deoxygenated blood and that the MR signal is more 
pronounces in draining veins from activated regions ( due to low deoxyhaemoglobin 
levels). Instead, perfusion imaging, which I will describe in more detail below, may be 
a better localiser of neuronal activity as the signal is more specific to capillaries than 
BOLD. Also, BOLD is sensitive to potentially confounding signals deriving from head 
motion, respiration and cardiac activity. 
In summary, the BOLD signal depends on the interplay between numerous 
physiological factors such as rates of glucose and oxygen metabolism, cerebral blood 
volume, cerebral blood flow and neuronal specific events.  Although studies have 
shown that changes in BOLD signal are proportional to changes in neuronal activity, 
BOLD remains a surrogate measure as it relies on processes indirectly related to the 
underlying neurophysiology. Nevertheless, BOLD imaging has led to numerous fMRI 
studies that have deepened our understanding of the neural correlates of various 
neurocognitive functions and disorders.  
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Advantages Disadvantages Applications  
Blood flow, and metabolic correlates of neural activity 
BOLD fMRI 3-4 3-10 
Good spatial resolution, non-
invasive, measures activity in 
cortical and sub-cortical 
structures, repeatable 
Immobilisation, loud, stimulus-
dependent technique, non-magnetic 
equipment, signal loss artefacts (eg. 
at OFC) 
Localising brain activity,  resting state-





As above, quantitative measures 
(ml/100g/min) 
As above, however without 
susceptibility artefacts at OFC. 
Localising brain activity, resting state-






Quantitative values with arterial 
sampling 
Radioactivity, invasive, poor 
temporal resolution, limited amount 
of scans, expensive.  
Localising brain activity 
Electrical activity of neurons 
 
EEG/MEG <2 0.001 
Excellent temporal resolution, 
high patient comfort, suitable for 
youth 
Poor spatial resolution (inverse 
problem), inaccurate measures of 
subcortical activity 
Detecting temporal sequences 
Single or multi-unit 
electrophysiology 
0.01-1 0.01 Direct measure Invasive  Detecting temporal sequences 
 











1.5-12 60-1000 Measure of neurochemistry 
Radioactivity, invasive, poor 
temporal resolution, limited 
amount of scans 
Detecting neurochemistry 
MR Spectroscopy 10 10-100 
Measure of relative chemical 
concentrations 
Immobilisation, loud 








Indications of white matter tracts, 
integrity and connectivity 
Mathematical reconstruction of 
fibres, limited by crossing fibres, 
susceptible to noise artefacts 








Temporary lesions to assess 
causation 
Poor sham/control condition, 
loud, risk of seizure 




 Arterial Spin Labelling (ASL) 2.1.2.7
In contrast to the BOLD signal, arterial spin labelling (ASL) provides an absolute 
measure of perfusion (regional cerebral blood flow) and may therefore represent a 
physiologically specific marker of brain function. 
In ASL, arterial blood is magnetically labelled using radiofrequency pulses, a process 
that achieves similar results to positron emission tomography (PET), but is free of 
ionising radiation and is entirely non-invasive. Specifically, an external 
radiofrequency pulse is applied in the region of the carotid arteries, in order to achieve 
total inversion of the arterial input to the brain. In the pulse sequence used in this 
study, inversion was achieved using the method known as “pseudo-continuous ASL”, 
introduced by Alsop (Dai et al, 2008).  The “post-labelling delay” is a delay imposed 
to allow sufficient labelled arterial magnetisation to enter the brain volume and 
disperse through the arterial network to eventually reach the tissue capillaries. The 
delay time is made sufficiently long in order to make sure that most of the labelled 
spins reside only in the capillary domain.  At this time, a whole brain image is 
acquired as fast as possible. Two, whole brain images are acquired (one with arterial 
blood labelling as described above) and the second non-labelled image is acquired 
after a double-inversion of the arterial blood in order to match the labelled scan as 
closely as possible without sensitivity to regional cerebral blood flow. If the labelled 
image is subtracted from the non-labelled one, the voxel-wise difference values are 
proportional to the volume of arterial blood that flows into each volume element 
during the post-labelling delay. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6. Arterial Spin 
Labelling. Protons in arterial blood are magnetically tagged by radiofrequency pulses. 
Labelled and non-labelling conditions are subtracted to obtain difference images, and 
these are averaged to create a map of intensities proportional to cerebral blood flow. 
Taken from Wolf and Detre (2007) with permission.Using a reference image and an 
appropriate mathematical model, the voxel-wise difference values are converted to a 
whole brain map of Cerebral Blood Flow (CBF) in traditional physiological units of 
ml blood/100gm tissue/min (Dai et al, 2011). The continuous pair-wise subtraction of 





Figure 2.6. Arterial Spin Labelling. Protons in arterial blood are magnetically tagged 
by radiofrequency pulses. Labelled and non-labelling conditions are subtracted to 
obtain difference images, and these are averaged to create a map of intensities 
proportional to cerebral blood flow. Taken from Wolf and Detre (2007) with 
permission.   
This thesis utilised both BOLD and ASL, as these two functional imaging modalities 
complement each other and therefore provide key information on neuronal activity as 
well as vascular coupling. A summary of the main characteristics of each method is 






Table 2.2. Comparison between fMRI imaging techniques BOLD and ASL perfusion. 








Contrast parameter T2* 
 
T1 
Spatial specificity Venules and draining veins 
 
Capillaries, arterioles 
Typical signal change 0.5-5% 
 
<1% 










>2 with high task 




Inter-subject variability High 
 
Low 
Imaging coverage Whole brain 
 
Part or most of brain 
cortex 


























 Methods: Study Design and Analysis Chapter 3 -
The data included in this thesis are derived from one study which focuses on the 
modulatory effects of acute lurasidone administration on cerebral blood flow at rest, 
resting-state fMRI and task-related contexts. As the following experimental results 
sections contain data for cerebral blood flow and reward processing, this chapter will 
detail the elements of the study which are relevant for these analyses. I address general 
issues of methodology, subject selection, study design and procedure, with additional 
information given within each proceeding section as appropriate.  
 Participants 3.1
 
Forty-three participants (28 female, 15 male) were recruited from the community 
using the research volunteer recruitment webpage at King’s College London, social 
media and posters at university psychological/counselling services across London.  
We recruited medication-naïve subjects across the range of depression severity 
(Beck’s Depression Inventory –II score range: 0-43), including healthy volunteers, as 
well as people meeting full-criteria for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). We used 
this approach because symptoms of MDD are known to fall on a continuum (Angst et 
al., 2000; Ayuso-Mateos et al., 2010) and this allows us to assess the role of symptom 
level in reward processing on and off lurasidone (see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 in the 
Results Chapter).  Further justification of this continuous-sample recruitment strategy 
is provided in Section 3.1.1 below. Inclusion criteria restricted recruitment to right-
handed individuals 18-25 years of age with no contraindications to MRI, no serious 
medical conditions and no lifetime substance dependence. General exclusion criteria 
included having a current or previously diagnosed psychiatric disorder, except 
depression or comorbid depression-anxiety disorder, having one or more immediate 
family members with a history of schizophrenia, autism or bipolar disorder, and, a 
history of pharmacological treatment for a psychiatric disorder or any such current 
treatment, contraindications to MRI (e.g., metal implants, pacemakers, claustrophobia 
etc.), a serious or unstable medical illness (e.g. diabetes, cardiovascular, respiratory, 
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endocrine, neurologic or hematologic disease), history of gastrointestinal, hepatic, or 
renal disease or other condition known to interfere with absorption, distribution, 
metabolism or excretion of medications, history of seizures, acute illness two weeks 
before the start of the study (screening and dosing), pregnancy, clinically significant 
abnormalities in Full Blood Count (FBC) and Liver Function tests (LFT), use of 
prescribed medication in the 3 weeks prior to enrolment or non-prescription 
medication (other than 1g paracetamol/24 hours) or herbal preparations in the previous 
seven days, receipt of another new chemical entity in the four months before dosing, 
or participation in another study within three months before the start of the present 
study, (or within one month for a non-invasive methodology study where no drugs 
were given), blood or needle phobia, lifetime substance dependence, being a cigarette 
smoker (including e-cigarettes), positive urine drug test (benzoylecgonine, d-
amphetamines, d-methamphetamines, THC, morphine) and having taken illicit drugs 
(six months), alcohol (24 hours), caffeine (six hours), or nicotine (four hours) before 
scanning. To avoid craving effects, we recruited participants who were non-smokers 
and consumed less than three cups of coffee per day.  
The flow chart illustrating the recruitment process is shown in Figure 3.1. Of the 280+ 
potential volunteers who responded to advertisements, 67 were invited for further 
screening at an assessment appointment. Of these, 44 volunteers met inclusion criteria 
for the study and 43 of 44 participants completed the study, thereby giving a retention 




Figure 3.1. Flow chart illustrating the recruitment process. 
 
Given that all participants completed the Mini International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview version 6.0.0 (M.I.N.I) (Sheehan et al., 1998), we also examined the 
convergence between continuous BDI-II scores and depression diagnoses as assessed 
by psychiatric interview (see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 in the Results Chapter). Using 
the M.I.N.I, individuals were included in a subthreshold depression group if they self-
reported having experienced, in the past two weeks, at least three depressive 
symptoms including at least one core symptom (abnormally depressed, irritable mood, 
or loss of interest) and two or more other DSM-IV depressive symptoms, without 
fulfilling criteria for MDD in terms of duration, symptom number, or significant 
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impact on functioning (Lewinsohn et al., 2000). MDD was diagnosed if the individual 
self-reported having experienced at least five depressive symptoms including at least 
one core symptom (abnormally depressed or loss of interest) most of the day, nearly 
every day for the past two weeks, with significant functional impairment. Comorbid 
simple phobia, panic and agoraphobia, social anxiety disorder and generalised anxiety 
disorder were allowed. MINI interview scores and diagnoses were reviewed by a 
consultant psychiatrist.  
Participants received £230 in compensation for attending the assessment appointment 
and both scanning visits, in addition to their winnings from the fMRI Monetary 
Incentive Delay Task. All participants provided written informed consent, as approved 
by the Ethics Subcommittee of Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research (RESC 
reference number: PNM/13/14-122). 
 
 Justification of recruitment strategy 3.1.1
 Spectrum of depression and anhedonia scores: 3.1.1.1
We recruited medication-naïve subjects across the range of depression severity, 
including healthy volunteers, as well as people meeting full-criteria for MDD (see 
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 in the Results chapter for depression and anhedonia 
symptom score distribution in the sample). This research approach is in line with the 
Research Domain Criteria framework (Morris and Cuthbert, 2012) (e.g. as in 
(Stringaris et al., 2015b) where symptom levels are related to the brain measurements). 
It also does justice to findings concerning the genetic underpinnings of common 
mental illness (Plomin et al., 2009) as well as current approaches to understanding 
neural system perturbation in a dimensional way (Matthews and Hampshire, 2016). 
This is an important consideration as common psychiatric disorders, typically 
conceptualised as categories, can be interpreted as lying at extremes of quantitative 
dimensions (Caspi et al., 2014; Plomin et al., 2009). For example, youth with 
subthreshold depression (sD) are known to be at very high-risk (67%) of developing 
major depression in adulthood (Cuijpers et al., 2005; Klein et al., 2013). A study of 
three large adolescent and adult community samples (n = 3003) showed that increasing 
levels of depressive symptoms are associated with increasing levels of psychosocial 
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dysfunction and psychiatric morbidity (Lewinsohn et al., 2000). Moreover, youth with 
subthreshold depression show comparable levels of psychiatric morbidity, functional 
impairment, and suicidal thoughts compared to youth with MDD (Balazs et al., 2013; 
Bertha and Balazs, 2013; Wesselhoeft et al., 2013). The shared phenomenology and 
outcomes in youth MDD and sD, although with sD being a somewhat milder version 
(Rapaport et al., 2002) suggest that depression may be best conceptualised as a 
continuum of severity (i.e. a dimensional view) (Angst et al., 2000; Ayuso-Mateos et 
al., 2010).  
Indeed, Stringaris et al., (2016) showed that alterations in the brain’s reward network 
operate as a mechanism across the spectrum of risk for depression in a community 
sample of adolescents. The results showed a graded significant decrease in ventral 
striatal activation during reward anticipation across healthy control, sD and MDD 
groups. Moreover, low ventral striatum activation was associated with anhedonia and 
predicted transition to depression in previously healthy adolescents at 2-year follow-
up. Specifically, a 1-point decrease in standardised ventral striatum activation 
increased the probability of future subthreshold depression by 20% and clinical 
depression by 35%, even when accounting for depressive symptoms at baseline. 
In summary, by recruiting young people across the spectrum of depression scores we 
can relate dimensional changes in reward-related neural activity during lurasidone 
administration to depression severity.  
 Medication-naïve volunteers: 3.1.1.2
Recruiting medication-naive volunteers allows us to test for effects associated with 
depression unconfounded by the effects of medication. In neuroimaging studies with 
medicated patients, it is unclear to what extent the medication status might have had 
an impact on reported blunting of reward-related neural activity in depression. As 
reviewed in Section 1.6.3.7, antidepressant drugs targeting serotonergic, adrenergic 
and dopaminergic systems can lead to alterations in resting blood flow as well as 
neurocognitive mechanisms. For example, there is evidence that selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) reduce striatal and anterior insula responses to 
motivational and affective information (Kumar et al., 2008; McCabe et al., 2010) and 
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impact learning from feedback (Herzallah et al., 2013). Several studies report 
diminished striatal reward- or prediction error-related activations following 
administration of antipsychotic medications compared to placebo (Abler et al., 2007; 
Menon et al., 2007b; Pessiglione et al., 2006), or in medicated versus un-medicated 
patients (Worbe et al., 2011). Moreover, recent meta-analytic evidence demonstrates 
that long-term antipsychotic treatment contributes to structural brain changes (Fusar-
Poli et al., 2013; Vita et al., 2015). Thus, the inclusion of medication-naïve 
participants avoids the confounding effects of both acute and chronic medication 
exposure on neural responses to reward and the brain structures that support reward 
function.  
 Self-report Questionnaires  3.2
 Questionnaires measuring Depression Severity, Anhedonia and 3.2.1
Anxiety 
Depression and anhedonia scores were assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory 
II  (Beck et al., 1996), the Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS) (Snaith et al., 
1995) and the Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale (DARS) (Rizvi et al., 2015) 
respectively. These are shown in Appendix B.  
The BDI-II is a 21-question multiple-choice self-report inventory. Respondents use a 
four-point Likert scale to indicate how far each item applies to their experiences in the 
past week. The range of possible scores is 0–63 (Beck et al., 1961).  The instrument 
has robust psychometric properties and is one of the one of the most widely used 
psychometric tests for measuring the severity of depression  among both adults and 
adolescents in depression research (Wang and Gorenstein, 2013).  
The SHAPS is considered the gold-standard for assessing self-report measures of 
anhedonia in clinical research (Rizvi et al., 2016). Several studies have shown that it is 
highly reliable in terms of internal consistency and test-retest stability (Franken et al., 
2007; Leventhal et al., 2006; Nakonezny et al., 2015). For a scale to effectively 
evaluate a construct (construct validity), it should not be related to other overlapping 
but different constructs, such as mood and irritability-related items and anxiety in the 
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context of MDD (i.e. divergent validity), whilst retaining a correlation with similar 
constructs (i.e. convergent validity) (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). The SHAPS 
demonstrates good convergent and discriminant validity because it correlates with 
depression severity and functioning, but does not correlate with measures of anxiety 
(Leventhal et al., 2006; Nakonezny et al., 2010; Nakonezny et al., 2015). The SHAPS 
is a 14-item, 4-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). It focuses 
exclusively on consummatory pleasure for both primary (e.g. food) and secondary 
(e.g. money) rewards across several domains (e.g. food/drink, social interactions, 
achievement and sensory experience) (Snaith et al., 1995). Factor analysis of the 
SHAPS revealed a unitary structure that primarily loaded onto hedonic capacity 
(Leventhal et al., 2006; Nakonezny et al., 2010; Nakonezny et al., 2015). The SHAPS 
questionnaire measures state anhedonia (“last two days”), which may be more 
beneficial in capturing information in the context of a depressive episode, as opposed 
to other scales which measure anhedonia “in general” (i.e. anhedonia as a personality 
trait) (Rizvi et al., 2015).  Indeed, the SHAPS has shown the ability to measure acute 
changes in anhedonia (Lally et al., 2014; Martinotti et al., 2012; Willner et al., 2005). 
The DARS is a ‘second-generation’ anhedonia questionnaire consisting of 17-items 
using a 5-point Likert sale. Unlike the SHAPS’ unitary construct, the DARS evaluates 
interest, motivation, effort and pleasure across four domains (hobbies, social activities, 
food/drink, and sensory experience). The reliability and validity of the DARS has been 
tested in community samples, healthy controls and MDD (Rizvi et al., 2015). The 
scale shows good internal consistency reliability with a Cronbach-α ranging from 
0.92-0.96 for the total DARS score and 0.75-0.92 for the subscales. The DARS shows 
good convergent validity with the SHAPS and divergent validity with depression 
scores (Rizvi et al., 2015).  
The DARS scale has four main advantages or additions when compared to the SHAPS 
scale. First, it has a component structure based on reward type, (hobbies, social 
activities, food/drink, and sensory experience). It may therefore be useful for 
determining whether deficits in reward processing are dependent on one reward type, 
over and above another. Second, the scale was designed to increase scale 
generalisability while maintaining specificity. Respondents provide their own 
examples of rewarding experiences (generalisability) across the four domains 
(retaining item specificity). By tapping into the subjective nature of what respondents 
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find rewarding, the scale may also function to capture events or activities that elicit 
stronger hedonic responses. Third, it evaluates different facets of reward processing 
(interest, motivation, effort, and enjoyment of reward) within each domain. This is an 
important consideration given emerging evidence that partially dissociable 
neurobiological systems support different aspects of reward processing (Der-Avakian 
and Markou, 2012). Forth, the DARS evaluates interest in the time frame of “right 
now” which enables repeat testing that can aid in assessing the stability of anhedonia 
over time. However, it must be noted that further research is required to examine the 
test-retest reliability of the DARS. For the aforementioned reasons, both the SHAPS 
and DARS questionnaires were used to assess anhedonia in the current study.  
Participants also completed additional questionnaires to assess mood, anxiety and 
irritability: Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (MFQ) (Angold et al., 1995), Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) and the Affective 
Reactivity Scale (ARI) (Stringaris et al., 2012).  
The HADS is a fourteen item scale in which seven of the items relate to anxiety and 
seven relate to depression (see Appendix B). Participants responded on a 4-point 
Likert scale. The HADS has been utilised extensively over the last thirty years (Coyne 
and van Sonderen, 2012), however, a recent review showed considerable 
inconsistency in the latent structure of the HADS (Cosco et al., 2012). It was 
concluded that the HADS may not be a dependable means of differentiating anxiety 
and depression for the purposes of assessing the absolute or relative levels of these 
variables (Bjelland et al., 2002; Coyne and van Sonderen, 2012). Considering these 
limitations, in this study we completed a more in-depth assessment of depression and 
anxiety by administering the MINI.  
 Questionnaires measuring subjective effects of lurasidone. 3.2.2
Since lurasidone like other atypical antipsychotics, has the potential to increase 
sedation (Citrome et al., 2014; Loebel et al., 2014d), the possibility arises that any 
effects of lurasidone on behavioural/neural responses to rewards or penalties are 
secondary to an alteration in somnolence, alertness or tranquillity. Therefore, 
subjective effects of lurasidone were captured using the Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) 
(Herbert et al., 1976) and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S) (Spielberger et al., 
1970), designed for rapid assessment of sedation and state anxiety respectively. 
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Details for this analysis can be found in Section 3.8.6. We assessed subjective effects 
of lurasidone at three time points (see Figure 3.3): 
1. Pre-medication: outside the scanner, approximately 10 minutes prior to the 
medication administration and 180 minutes prior to the scan. 
 
2. Pre-scan (peak-of-medication effect): outside the scanner, approximately 170 
minutes after medication administration and 10 minutes prior to the start of the 
scan. 
 
3. Post-scan: outside the scanner, approximately 280 minutes after medication 
administration and 10 minutes following cessation of the scanning session. 
 
Both questionnaires required respondents to indicate how they were feeling in the 
present moment and are shown in Appendix B. The VAS consists of 16 item scales 
(100mm lines) to measure mood and subjective well-being and can be summarised 
into two factors (Alertness and Tranquillity) (Bond et al., 1974a, b; Herbert et al., 
1976). Participants were instructed to mark with a cross point on each line which 
corresponded best to how they were feeling at that time (e.g. from Alert-Drowsy; 
Calm-Excited; Lethargic-Energetic). We calculated unweighted factor scores (Factor 1 
(Alertness) and Factor 2 (Tranquillity) based on the analyses of Herbert et al., (1976).   
The STAI-S, which measures situational anxiety, includes 20 items and respondents 
indicated the intensity of the feeling on a 1 to 4 Likert scale from ‘not at all’ through 
‘somewhat’, ‘moderately so’ to ‘very much so’. Both the VAS and STAI-S scales 
include reverse items.  
 Study Design and Rationale 3.3
This study was a pharmacological MRI study using a double-blind, randomised, 
placebo-controlled, crossover design in forty-three young volunteers (Figure 3.3). 
Double-blind randomised placebo-controlled designs are considered one of the most 
suitable designs to arrive at causal inferences (Cartwright, 1989).  
Blinding: The term blinding refers to keeping participants, investigators and analysts 
unaware of an assigned intervention so that they cannot be influenced by that 
knowledge. Double-blind refers to two levels of blinding; at the level of the participant 
and at the level of the investigator. A participant who is unaware of which treatment is 
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given is less likely to have biased psychological or physical response to the 
intervention (e.g. favourable expectations) and more likely to comply with the study 
regimen (Schulz et al., 2002; Schulz and Grimes, 2002). Blinding investigators at all 
stages of the study (recruitment, data collection, and data analysis) makes it less likely 
that they will transfer their inclinations or attitudes to the participants, to differentially 
adjust doses, to differentially withdraw participants or be biased in their analytical 
methods (Nosworthy et al., 2001; Schulz and Grimes, 2002; Wolf, 1950). The goal of 
blinding is thus to increase objective assessment and improve the reliability of 
research results. I remained blind throughout data analysis and un-blinding only 
occurred at the stage of second-level analyses.  
Randomisation: Randomisation was completed by a researcher unaffiliated with the 
research project. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two sequences 
of treatments. As this study was done in collaboration with the National Pharmacy at 
the Maudsley Hospital, the randomisation list was passed to the pharmacy for 
dispensing. 
Placebo-controlled: To be able to comment on the effect of lurasidone on 
neurocognitive mechanisms, there needs to be a comparison group, and thus placebo 
represents the control. The placebo was ascorbic acid 50 mg tablets. Both the 
lurasidone pill and placebo were encased in an opaque red size 01 capsule so that both 
treatments looked identical across both visits. 
Crossover: The crossover design has been used widely in cognitive pharmacological 
investigations (e.g. (Bossong et al., 2012; Doyle et al., 2013; Elliott et al., 1997b). The 
crossover design signifies that each participant is randomly assigned to a sequence of 
treatments. The neurocognitive performance of each participant is measured twice, 
once following the administration of the acute drug, lurasidone, and once following 
the administration of a placebo. As shown in Figure 3.2, approximately half of the 
participants (n=22) received lurasidone on the first visit and the placebo on the second 
(lurasidone-placebo), and the other participants (n=21) received placebo on the first 
visit and lurasidone on the second visit (placebo-lurasidone). As illustrated in Figure 
3.3, a one-week washout period avoids carry-over effects, and is based on the reported 
18h half-life of lurasidone 40mg (Sunovion, 2013). 
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The crossover design has some advantages when compared to an equivalent parallel 
design in which subjects are randomly assigned to either a drug group or a placebo 
group and measures of interest are compared between the two groups. The influence of 
confounding covariates (i.e. non-specific individual differences such as intelligence 
and task engagement) is eliminated in the within-subject design as each crossover 
subject serves as their own control. The within-subject design affords higher statistical 
power than a parallel design and requires fewer subjects (Cox and Cochran, 1957). 
Increased statistical power stems from (i) minimising subject variance, and therefore 
reducing the overall random error, and (ii) increasing the drug variance. In other 
words, the drug variance is orthogonal to the subject variance and therefore not 
confounded by this. Moreover, the crossover design can uncover 
psychopharmacological effects of a drug which may otherwise remain undetected in a 
between-subjects design. For example, a drug may enhance performance on novel 
tasks but impair previously established performance (Elliott et al., 1997b), and reveal 
effects that are dependent upon baseline performance (Kimberg et al., 1997).  
 MEDICATION CONIDTION 
 PLACEBO LURASIDONE 
VISIT 1 Group 1  
 
Group 2  
VISIT 2  Group 2  Group 1  
 
Figure 3.2. The crossover design. Participants are randomly assigned to group 1 or 
group 2. In this study, group 1 received placebo on the first visit and lurasidone on the 
second visit (placebo-lurasidone), whilst group 2 received lurasidone on the first visit 
and the placebo on the second (lurasidone-placebo).  
 
Single-dose (acute) administration combined with imaging: This approach has been 
used successfully before (Admon et al., 2017; Handley et al., 2013; Rock et al., 2013) 
and avoids sedation over long periods. Acute pharmacological intervention designs, as 
used in this thesis, provide greater simplicity and specificity of findings, and greater 
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experimental control than long-term pharmaco-psychological interventions (please 
refer to Introduction Section 1.6.3.7 for an in-depth discussion). Acute experimental 
medicine studies are also more easily applicable, and less costly than the 
implementation of randomised control trials. Single-dose studies offer a time frame to 
investigate the immediate effects of pharmacological agents that target key neural 
mechanisms or ‘biomarkers’ in depression. Studies utilising acute-dose (Harmer et al., 
2003a; Harmer et al., 2003b) and short-term treatment (Arnone et al., 2009; 
Godlewska et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2009; Norbury et al., 2007) have been crucial 
for the development of a cognitive neuropsychological model of antidepressant drug 
action (Harmer et al., 2009a) (please refer to Introduction Section 1.6.2). It postulates 
that antidepressant drugs have early ‘bottom-up’ effects on emotional processing 
which become translated into improved mood and conscious appraisal over time and 
with exposure to a real-world environment. This study harnesses the potential of a 
single-dose research strategy to examine the acute effects of lurasidone on blood flow 
and reward processing.  
Arterial Spin Labelling (ASL) and blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) fMRI: 
The effects of lurasidone on regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) were investigated 
using arterial spin labelling (ASL) and the effects of lurasidone on neural mechanisms 
were investigated using BOLD fMRI.  Introduction Section 1.6.3.7 and Imaging 
Methods Section 2.1.2.7 provides an in-depth discussion of the benefits of combined 
ASL-BOLD imaging in pharmacological MRI (phMRI), and Imaging Methods 
Section 2.1.2 details the principles of each method. In brief, in phMRI, BOLD signal 
changes could be induced through either direct effects of the drug on neuronal activity 
or through non-specific effects on cerebral metabolic activity or underlying 
vasculature (Wise, 2006; Wise and Tracey, 2006a). ASL provides an absolute 
quantitative measurement of CBF, which is not confounded by changes in cerebral 
blood volume (CBV) or cerebral metabolic rate of oxygen (CMRO2) (Detre et al., 
2012; Detre and Wang, 2002; Detre et al., 2009). Several test-retest studies (including 
one ASL reproducibility study from the scanner used in this study) (Hodkinson et al., 
2013) have shown that ASL perfusion measurements are highly reproducible across 
minutes, hours, days and weeks (Chen et al., 2010; Floyd et al., 2003; Parkes et al., 
2004). These characteristics make ASL an ideal tool for phMRI for studying both 
intravenous and oral drug action as well as understanding drug effects on baseline 
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brain function (Wang et al., 2011a). Indeed, controlling for global and regional CBF 
changes in the analysis of BOLD fMRI data represent an important step towards 
identifying if the effects of the drug administered are indeed neuronal. In this study, 
quantitative measures of baseline CBF were measured using ASL before the 
participants completed the reward task. This scan order was selected to avoid carry-








BDI-II = Beck’s Depression Inventory II (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996); MFQ = Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (Angold et al., 1995); HADS = Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983); SHAPS = Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (Snaith, Hamilton, Morley, Humayan, Hargreaves, & Trigwell, 1995); DARS =  
Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale (Rizvi et al., 2015); ARI = Affective Reactivity Scale (Stringaris et al, 2012); EHI = Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; NART= National 
Adult Reading Test (Nelson & Willison, 1991); LTE= The List of Threatening Experiences (Brugha et al., 1985); BFI = The Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999); 
M.I.N.I = Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview version 6.0.0 (M.I.N.I) (Sheehan et al., 1998); VAS = Visual Analogue Scale (Herbert, Johns, & Doré, 1976); STAI = 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). 
Figure 3.3. Procedure and timeline for a study 
investigating the effect of lurasidone on reward and 
penalty processing. Elements of the thesis are 
highlighted in bold. 
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 Procedure  3.4
Figure 3.3 provides a comprehensive summary of the study procedure and timeline. 
Prospective candidates first completed on-line questionnaires to assess mood, 
irritability, anxiety and anhedonia: (Beck’s Depression Inventory II (BDI-II) (Beck, 
Steer, Ball, and Ranieri, 1996), Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
(Zigmond and Snaith, 1983), Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (MFQ) (Angold et al., 
1995), Affective Reactivity Scale (ARI) (Stringaris et al, 2012), Snaith-Hamilton 
Pleasure Scale (SHAPS) (Snaith, Hamilton, Morley, Humayan, Hargreaves, and 
Trigwell, 1995) and the Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale (DARS) (Rizvi et al., 
2015)). These questionnaires were completed at the initial stages of the study in order 
to recruit young people from the community across a spectrum of depression and 
anhedonia scores. On the basis of BDI-II and SHAPS scores, prospective candidates 
were selected to participate in a telephone interview to briefly assess relevant 
psychiatric, medical and neurological history. Participants who were eligible following 
this screening procedure were invited to the assessment appointment (see Figure 3.1).  
At the assessment appointment, participants first completed a pre-MRI safety 
screening. Participants then completed questionnaires to assess handedness 
(Edinburgh Handedness Inventory, IQ (National Adult Reading Test (Nelson and 
Willison, 1991), stressful life events (The List of Threatening Experiences (LTE; 
Brugha et al., 1985) and personality traits (The Big Five Inventory (John and 
Srivastava, 1999)). This was followed by the Mini International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview version 6.0.0 (M.I.N.I) (Sheehan et al., 1998) which assessed past and 
present mental health disorders. Participants’ height, weight, heart rate, blood pressure 
and electrocardiogram (ECG, 12-lead) were measured by the experimenter and blood 
samples (for Full Blood Count and Liver Function Tests) were taken by a study 
physician. Participants also completed saliva and blood samples in the case of 
genotyping of 9 SNPs to cover 5-HT1A, 5-HT6 and 5-HT7 (implicated in the 
mechanism of action of lurasidone) and ribonucleic acid RNA extraction. Samples 
were stored under the Biomedical research Centre Mental Health Biobank Project 
(reference number: 09/H0606/84, HTA license number: 12293). Participants provided 
a urine sample for drug testing and for pregnancy testing in female participants. 
Participants were guided through the scanning procedure in a mock scanner and 
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completed training for three fMRI tasks. This was done to familiarise themselves with 
the scanning environment and to reduce the potential for drop out. Participants 
practised each task for 7 minutes, which is half the amount of time of the full task 
length. The criteria for successful practise included rapid responding to win, loss and 
neutral cues of the task. Seven minutes was considered a sufficient amount of time for 
participants to learn that their RT responses are tracked (see Section 3.5 for task 
details). The assessment appointment was completed up to one month prior to the 
scanning sessions. 
If participants fulfilled the inclusion criteria after the assessment appointment, they 
were invited to take part in two scan days (Figure 3.3). Participants were randomised 
into one of two drug administration orders: placebo-lurasidone (placebo at visit one 
and lurasidone at visit two), or lurasidone-placebo (lurasidone at visit one and placebo 
at visit two). Both scan days followed the same schedule (Figure 3.3). On arrival at the 
imaging centre, participants had their heart rate and blood pressure measured to ensure 
that they were medically fit to undergo subsequent procedures. Participants also filled 
in two brief questionnaires to measure sedation (Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) 
(Herbert et al., 1976) and state-anxiety (State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et 
al., 1970)). Next, the experimenter administered a capsule of either lurasidone (20 mg) 
or placebo. This dose was selected to minimise post-synaptic D2 blockade (la Fougere 
et al., 2005), as in similar studies of related medications (Admon et al., 2017). 
Moreover, the 20 mg dose is the minimal effective dose for bipolar depression (Loebel 
and Citrome, 2015; Loebel et al., 2014b; Loebel et al., 2014c; Nelson et al., 2015; 
Suppes et al., 2016a; Suppes et al., 2016b). Given the pharmokinetic profile of 
lurasidone, the pill was consumed, followed by a 350 calorie meal (Greenberg and 
Citrome, 2017). Peak plasma levels of lurasidone are reached at approximately 3 hours 
after tablet ingestion and the plasma half-life is 18hours (Sunovion, 2013). In order to 
align the study assessments with peak plasma levels, the MRI scan took place 3 hours 
after tablet consumption (Figure 3.3). Prior to the MRI scan, two hours 45 minutes 
after drug administration, the experimenter measured the participant’s heart rate and 
blood pressure again, and the participant completed the VAS and STAI questionnaires. 
The scan lasted approximately 1.5 hours and included structural scans, Arterial Spin 
Labelling (ASL), Multi-echo Resting State fMRI (RS-FMRI) scan and a functional 
scan acquisition while completing the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) Task, the Stop 
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Signal Task (SST) and an Implicit Emotion Processing Task. This thesis focuses on 
the fMRI analysis of ASL and the MID task. After the scan, and approximately 4.5 
hours after drug administration, the experimenter assessed the participants’ heart rate 
and blood pressure, the VAS/STAI questionnaires were completed and an ECG was 
collected. Participants then completed subjective ratings of the emotional intensity of 
face stimuli which were presented during the implicit emotion processing task in the 
scanner. Participants were paid in cash for their winnings from the MID task and were 
discharged. Thus, each scanning visit involved a stay of approximately five hours at 





Figure 3.4. Study Day Protocol. ASL= Arterial Spin Labelling; RS-FMRI = Resting-state fMRI; MID = Monetary Incentive Delay task; 





 FMRI Task: Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task:  3.5
The Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task used in the present study was an adaptation 
of the task from Knutson et al., (2001). The task can be considered as a cued reaction 
time test for which the symbolic cues signal the possibility of winning or losing 
money. Performance effects of varying incentive levels can confound the 
interpretation of task-related brain activations, and are minimised by emphasising the 
need for response speed on all trials and by using a tracking procedure that maintains 
performance at approximately 66% (Knutson et al., 2001). The task used in the current 
study had these two elements. 
Each trial consisted of anticipation, response, and feedback. During the anticipation 
phase, participants were presented with one of three cue shapes (cue, 250 ms) denoting 
the type of reward that could be attained by a correct response (Figure 3.5). After a 
variable anticipation interval (3,800–4,150 ms), the target (white square) appeared on 
the centre of the screen. Participants were instructed to respond to the target as quickly 
as possible by pressing a button with their right index finger. Using a tracking 
algorithm
6
, task difficulty (i.e. the duration of the target appearance) was adapted to 
the performance of the subject, such that performance would be successful (reaction 
within the interval that the target was shown on screen) on approximately 66% of 
trials. The starting time the target stayed on the screen for was 400 ms and 
subsequently the time the target was present varied from trial to trial in 10 ms steps 
(150–500 ms). Responses made during the anticipation period and responses less than 
100 ms were considered as "premature presses". The maximum response duration was 
700 ms and reaction times greater than 700 ms were not recorded. A variable delay 
(blank screen) appeared after the target presentation and before feedback. 
                                                 
6
 The tracking algorithm is: the number of successful trials / trials completed. If the 
number of successful trials is below the target ratio of 66, then 10 ms is added to the 
target window time of the current trial to make the trial easier. If the number of 
successful trials is above the target ratio of 66, it reduces the target window time of the 




Following the response, feedback was given (1,450 ms), indicating how much money 
was won or lost during the trial and the total money earned during the task. As shown 
in Figure 3.5, the striped circle symbol denoted a ‘win trial’. Participants received £1 
for a successful response (‘win’), and £0 for an unsuccessful response (‘missed win’). 
The striped square symbol denoted a ‘loss trial’. Following a successful response, 
participants avoided losing £1 (‘avoided loss’), and lost £1 if their reaction was outside 
the target response window (‘loss’). The triangle symbol denoted a ‘neutral trial’ in 
which outcomes were not contingent on making a response within the target response 
window. Participants did not gain or lose money and their earnings remained £0, 
regardless of a successful or unsuccessful response. The screen went blank after the 
feedback for a variable delay (2950 ms-3300 ms) to take each trial to 9500 ms in 
length.  
In addition to the ‘Neutral’, ‘Win’ and ‘Loss’ trials, in which a motor response was 
required (i.e. ‘active trials’), the task included passive trials in which no motor 
response was required. An ‘X’ cue was presented on screen (250 ms), followed by a 
blank screen (4000 ms) (trial length: 4250 ms). The rationale for including a passive 
condition is to pilot an alternative baseline condition to the ‘neutral cue’. Participants 
are presented with a symbol which requires no motor response, and it may be possible 
to separate out the neurocognitive processes underlying ‘the preparation of a motor 
response’ from ‘the anticipation of a reward’. 
‘Neutral’, ‘Win’, ‘Loss’ and ‘Passive’ conditions were randomised throughout the task 
(13 trials each, summing up to 39 9500 ms ‘active trials’ and 13 4250 ms ‘passive 
trials’ in total). Task running time was 7 minutes 10 seconds. Participants completed 
two runs of the task at the placebo visit and the lurasidone visit to ensure that there 
were a sufficient number of trials (26 trials) per condition for analysis (recommended 
number of trials for neuroimaging analysis = 22+) (Poldrack et al., 2011) and to reduce 
boredom effects. Thus, four task playlists were created (two task playlists per visit), in 
which ‘Neutral’, ‘Win’, ‘Loss’ and ‘Passive’ conditions were randomised throughout. 
There was a short pause between the two runs of the task. 
At the assessment appointment (first visit), participants learnt the meanings of the four 
symbol cues and completed a practice session of the MID task in a mock scanner for 
approximately 7 minutes. Participants were asked to recall the meaning of each 
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symbol prior to each scanning session and the need for response speed on all trials was 
emphasised by the experimenter. Participants received their winnings in cash at the 
end of the task. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), blood oxygen-level dependent 
(BOLD)-responses were measured during reward anticipation and reward feedback. 
This study is focused on the contrasts: (i): No-incentive Anticipation: anticipation 
neutral>baseline (ii) Reward Anticipation: anticipation win>baseline or anticipation 
win>anticipation neutral (ii) Penalty Anticipation: anticipation loss>baseline or 
anticipation loss>anticipation neutral (iv) Reward Outcome: feedback win>missed win 
(v) Penalty Outcome: feedback loss>avoided loss. 
The MID task has been extensively used and robustly activates a fronto-striatal-limbic 
network (see meta-analyses: Bartra et al., 2013; Diekhof et al., 2012; Kerestes et al., 
2014). Plichta et al., (2012) showed that the MID task evokes robust activation in the 
ventral straitum with high effect sizes of VS-mean summary values (ES: 0.96-1.43) 
and excellent group-level activation reliability at the whole brain level and within 
target ROIs (intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC): 0.94). Moreover, within-subject 
reliability of ROI-mean amplitudes across sessions was fair to good for the MID task 
(ICCs = 0.56-0.62), thereby suggesting that the task is suited for within-subject 
designs (Plichta et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2014). 
The task was programmed in Visual Studio 2008 and the images were back-projected.  




Figure 3.5. Outline of the stages and the timeline of the Monetary Incentive Delay 
(MID) task used during functional imaging. 
 
 Image Acquisition 3.6
Magnetic resonance data were acquired on a 3Tesla MR750 GE system (General 
Electric) MR scanner with a 12-channel head coil at the Centre for Neuroimaging 
Sciences, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience (IoPPN), King’s 
College London. 
 Structural image acquisition 3.6.1
High-resolution T1-weighted sagittal ADNI GO images were acquired [TR = 7.3ms; 
TE = minimum full; FOV = 270mm; matrix = 256x256mm; 1.2mm slice 
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thickness; 200 slices]. T2 images were acquired using FRFSE-XL forced recovery 
fast spin echo [TR = 4380ms; TE = 60.0ms; FOV = 240mm; matrix frequency 320, 
zipped to 512 phase 256; slice thickness 1.2mm with 0mm spacing; 72 slices]. The T1 
and T2 images were used in pre-processing. 
 Arterial Spin Labelling  3.6.2
In Arterial Spin Labelling (ASL), the MR signal of water in arterial blood is 
selectively inverted using an external radiofrequency pulse applied in the region of the 
carotid arteries, in order to achieve total inversion of the arterial input to the brain. In 
the pulse sequence used in this study, inversion was achieved using the method known 
as “pseudo-continuous ASL”, introduced by Alsop (Dai et al, 2008).  General 
principles and methods of this method are described in the Imaging Methods Chapter 
2.1.2.7. In this study, labelling of arterial blood was achieved with a 1.5s long RF 
pulse consisting of 1500 Hanning shaped RF pulses of 500us duration, applied in the 
presence of a net field gradient in the direction of flow (the ‘z’axis).  A post-labelling 
delay of 1.5s was used, which included background suppression RF pulses to minimise 
the static tissue signal. Images were acquired using a 3D FSE, multi-shot ‘stack of 
spirals’ protocol, employing 8 spiral arms for each inter-leave and three ‘control-
labelled’ averages. The images had 54 slice locations (3mm thickness, no inter-slice 
gap) and an in-plane resolution of 1mm after transformation to a rectangular grid 
(TE/TR = 11.088/4901ms, flip angle (FA) = 111°). A proton density image volume 
with the same parameters was acquired in order to use as a reference to compute the 
CBF in physiological units. 
 Functional MRI for MID Task 3.6.3
For each subject and at each visit, 216 whole-brain volumes (41 slices with continuous 
descending acquisition aligned to the AC–PC plane) were acquired using an EPI-GE 
sequence [Repetition Time (TR) = 2000ms, Echo Time (TE) = 30ms, flip angle = 75º, 
slice thickness = 3.0 mm, interslice gap = 0.3 mm and matrix size = 64x64mm]. 
Duration of the sequence was 7 minutes 20 seconds.  
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 Behavioural Analysis Approach 3.7
All behavioural analyses were conducted in Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS; SPSS Inc., 2015) version 23. Initial data screening was performed in order to 
ensure that assumptions for parametric analyses were met. Accordingly, exploratory 
analysis and Shapiro-Wilk tests were completed. All behavioural data were found to 
be normally distributed and thus parametric tests were used. 
 MID task performance analysis 3.7.1
Analysing behavioural data during fMRI paradigms is vital, as it provides a context in 
which we can interpret the neurocognitive correlates. For example, if a HC and MDD 
group show similar performance on a task (as assessed by reaction time and accuracy), 
then it suggests that differences in neural activation between HC and MDD groups are 
not confounded by group differences in task difficulty.  
For the MID task, we utilised the following indices to explore task performance at the 
lurasidone and placebo visits: (i) Total Winnings after completing the two task runs, 
(ii) Mean Reaction Time (RT) and (iii) Accuracy for the three cue types (reward, 
penalty and neutral cues). We completed a repeated measures ANCOVA with 
Medication (placebo or lurasidone) and Cue Type (Reward, Penalty, Neutral) as the 
within-subject variables, Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) 
as the between-subject variable, and Depression Severity (total BDI score) as the 
covariate interest for (i) Total Winnings, (ii) Mean Reaction Time (RT) and (iii) 
Accuracy. 
 Subjective ratings analysis 3.7.2
As described in Section 3.2.2, the effects of lurasidone on sedation and state-anxiety 
were measured at three time points: pre-scan, peak-of-drug and post-scan utilising the 
VAS and STAI-S questionnaires respectively. It is important to examine subjective 
ratings to exclude the possibility that any effects of lurasidone on behavioural/neural 
responses to rewards or penalties are secondary to an alteration in somnolence, 
alertness or tranquillity. This analysis is described in more detail in Section 3.8.6 
(alongside the other ‘sensitivity’ analyses).  
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 FMRI Analysis Approach 3.8
The following sections will focus on the analysis techniques employed in this thesis. 
All analyses were applied within the framework of the Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM, Functional Imaging Laboratory, University College London, London UK, 
version 12 - www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and its associated toolboxes in Matlab version 
number: 9.1.0.441655 (R2016b) and the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS; SPSS Inc., 2015) version 23. In order to generate statisitical maps of the 
changes in perfusion of brain activity, the data must first go through various temporal 
and spatial preprocessing steps to correct for anatomical differences between sbjects, 
or artefacts such as motion. The steps involved in preprocessing are described in the 
following section. 
 Pre-processing of ASL data 3.8.1
Spatial normalisation of the CBF maps was achieved using Automated Software for 
ASL Processing (ASAP; (Mato Abad et al., 2016)). This pipeline employs the 
Statistical Parametric Mapping suite (SPM, version 12). First, CBF maps were co-
registered with a T1-weighted anatomical image after coarse alignment of the origin of 
both images. Unified segmentation of the T1-weighted image normalised this image to 
the MNI space and was used to produce a ‘brain-only’ binary mask which was 
multiplied by the co-registered rCBF map to produce an image free of extra-cerebral 
artefacts. The spatial transformation matrix was applied to the clean CBF images. CBF 
maps were then smoothed using an 8x8x8mm kernel. 
 Pre-processing of BOLD fMRI data 3.8.2
FMRI data were preprocessed and quality-assured using SPM12. This consisted of 
reorientation to the AC-PC line, slice timing correction, motion correction (Friston et 
al., 1996), multi-channel segmentation and co-registration to each participant’s 
structural image. The ‘normalise: estimate & write’ function within SPM12 was used, 
with the Montreal Neurological Institute template (MNI152). Smoothing was 
completed using a Gaussian kernel of 4mm Full-Width Half Maximum (FWHM). 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the steps of preprocessing and further description of each step is 
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provided below. Each preprocessing step was performed at a single-subject level, in 
the same manner for all participants. 
Frist, reorientation involved setting the origin (coordinate 0,0,0 in the x,y,z axes) to 
the same location in each T1 and T2 structural image and the functional images. This 
is used as a point of reference for the preprocesing steps that follow and in this study 
the origin was set to the Anterior commissure/posterior commissure line.  
Second, segmentation involves separating the structural (T1 image) into the different 
tissue classes using Gaussian probability distributions (created by the International 
Consortium for Brain Mapping) (Ashburner et al., 2014). Specifically, each voxel has 
an intensity value, and this has a certain probability of being in the intensity range for 
one of six tissue classes: grey matter, white matter, cerebrospinal fluid, bone, soft 
tissue and air/background. In this study we used multi-channel segmentation because 
the combined information from both T1 and T2 images facilitates segmentation in 
difficult regions (towards the top and back of the head) (Poldrack et al., 2011). To do 
this, the reoriented T2-weighted image was co-registered (estimate and write) to the 
T1-weighted image to ensure that both images had common dimensions. Then all the 
T1 images were put into one channel and all the T2 images into the other (in the same 
order) and segmentation was run.  
Third, the slice timing correction step corrects for the temporal differences across 
slices that were acquired in one imaging volume (over one Repetition Time (TR)). 
Thus, slice timing correction allows the model to fit the data in the same way at all 
points (i.e. to permit the use of a single haemodynamic response function (Poldrack et 
al., 2011). This re-interpolates the data so that the signal at each slice is as it would 
have been if it had been sampled at the same time as a reference slice, typically the 
slice acquired halfway through one TR (T2/2) (Henson et al., 1999). In our study, the 
images were acquired using a continuous descending order of acquisition, and the 
middle slice was used as the reference slice. We used sinc interpolation which uses 
more distant data points to calculate the new value compared to linear interpolation, 
and therefore smooths the data less (Ashburner et al., 2014). 
Forth, realignment (or intra-subject registration of functional images) involves 
aligning each image in the functional time series to each other to control for any slight 
movement during the fMRI scan. This utilises a six parameter rigid body 
244 
 
transformation, composed of the 3 translations and 3 rotations along the x,y and z 
axes. A least squares approach is implemented by SPM such that mages are aligned by 
minimising the mean square error from one volume to the next. The output of the 
realignment is a text file for each session which is later inputted into the first-level 
design matrix as nuisance regressors, for that specific session and subject. 
Fifth, coregistration is a within-subject between-modality registration step (i.e. intra-
subject registration of functional and structural images). FMRI data have low spatial 
resolution, and thus to improve accuracy when inferring anatomical locations, the 
functional images are registered with the higher-resolution structural (T1-weighted) 
images. The co-registration was performed using non-rigid as well as rigid body 
transformations. As structural and functional images have different contrast, alignment 
is completed by maximising a quantity reflecting shared spatial information between 
the images, called the normalised mutual information. Indeed, the images are also 
smoothed slightly in order to make the cost function (mutual information) and to 
lessen the chance of local minima. In this step, images are aligned by minimising the 
mean square error from one volume to the next.  
The sixth step of preprocessing is spatial normalisation. This step involves inter-
subject registration of co-registered functional images to a standard space.  In order to 
compare the structure or function of the brain across different individuals, the 
assumption of anatomical correspondence must be met. Anatomical correspondence 
means that a specific region in one person will be in the exact same location in the 
brain of another person. It is important to note that differences in the size and shape of 
individual’s brains signify that perfect anatomical correspondence is not likely. Thus, 
the goal is to reduce anatomical variability and this involves each subject’s high 
resolution structural scan (which is in ‘native, unaltered space’) to be warped using a 
combination of affine and non-linear transformations, to a ‘standard space’. The 
standard space is a standardised atlas space or brain template with an associated 
coordinate system (e.g. Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain). In this study, 
the template image was the ‘spm/12/toolbox/OldNorm/EPI.nii’ image with Affine 
regularisation to the ICBM space template (i.e. MNI) and resampling to 2x2x2 voxel 
dimensions. The mean resliced image was the source, so for each individual, 
deformations were calculated from their mean to the template and then those 
deformations were applied to all other images. We chose this approach as it gave 
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superior alignment (as assessed by visual inspection of 4D files in Mango Multi-image 
Analysis Software (http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/mango.html)) compared to a two-step 
spatial normalisation approach using DARTEL tools (Diffeomorphic Anatomical 
Registration using Exponentiated Lie Algebra; Ashburner, 2007).  
The final step in preprocessing involves spatial smoothing of the images. Although 
this step reduces spatial resolution, it is completed for the following reasons: (i) to 
minimise anatomical differences between subjects following the normalisation 
procedures; (ii) to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for signal which extends 
over larger areas by removing high frequencies; and (iii) to ensure that the data 
conforms to the assumptions of Gaussian Random Field theory that is used by SPM to 
correct for the multiple comparisons across all voxels within the brain (see Section 
3.8.5) (Ashburner et al., 2014; Poldrack et al., 2011). The amount of smoothness 
applied, commonly between 4-12mm, is described by the full-width half maximum 
(FWHM). In this thesis, a FWHM of 4mm was chosen for the BOLD data as is 
recommended for analyses using small Regions of Interest (ROIs), such as the 
Nucleus Accumbens or amygdala. Please refer to Section 3.8.4.1 for further details. 
 
 Statistical modelling: First (single-subject) Level Analysis 3.8.3
Following preprocessing, single-subject data is analysed separately before being 
combined at the group level (Figure 3.6). As statistical analysis of the fMRI data is 
primarily performed at the single-voxel level, it is referred to as mass-univariate 
analysis. The aim is to create a map of voxels where the timeseries fluctuations follow 
the experimental design. This is achieved using a general linear model (GLM) 
approach, as described in detail in the Imaging Methods Section 2.1.2.6, and attempts 
to fit the observed task data to a predicted BOLD response.  
 First Level Model of the MID task 3.8.3.1
The anticipation, target and feedback periods are the main modelled components of 
the MID task and were defined as in Figure 3.5. The BOLD (Blood oxygenated level 
dependent) signal was modelled with a canonical hemodynamic response function that 
was convolved with the onset times of task regressors to compute parameter estimates 
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using the general linear model (GLM) at the single-subject level. The general linear 
model included nine task-related regressors: passive condition, three anticipation cues 
(neutral, win, loss) and five outcomes (with [win outcome following win cue], missed 
win [no-change outcome following a win cue], loss [penalty outcome following a loss 
cue], avoided loss [no-change outcome following a loss cue] and neutral outcome [no-
change outcome following a neutral/no-incentive cue]).  As there were two runs of the 
MID task per visit, the first-level model was set-up as four consecutive sessions, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.5. High-pass temporal filtering (128 second cut-off) was used to 
remove low-frequency artefacts and an autoregressive function (AR(1)) was used to 
correct for the likely autocorrelated nature of the residuals (i.e. error) following model 
fitting. Estimated movement parameters were added to the design matrix. These 
included six rigid-body movement parameters, a regressor accounting for frame-wise 
displacement (i.e. the 3D movement from volume 1-2,2-3 etc.), and additional binary 
regressors to indicate image volumes with spikes greater than 1mm, and images either 
side of the spike (i.e. motion scrubbing and padding). Movement analyses showed that 
the maximum number of volumes lost for spikes greater than 1mm was 9% (19 of 216 
volumes) and all sessions were included. A repeated measures ANCOVA with two 
within-subject factors: Movement (number of spikes or total movement) and 
Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and Depression Severity (total BDI score) as the 
covariate of interest, showed that there were no significant Medication-Movement or 
Depression Severity-by-Movement, or Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-
Movement interactions.  Based on this analysis, no subjects were excluded due to 
movement differences. After parameter estimation under restricted maximum 
likelihood, linear contrasts of parameter estimates were generated for the following 
first-level contrasts of interest: (i): No-incentive Anticipation: anticipation 
neutral>baseline (ii) Reward Anticipation: anticipation win>baseline (ii) Penalty 
Anticipation: anticipation loss>baseline (iv) Reward Outcome: feedback win>missed 
win (v) Penalty Outcome: feedback loss>avoided loss. These contrasts were taken 
forward to whole-brain exploratory group-level random effects analyses described in 
section 3.8.4.1. 
Overall, the aim of the first level analysis is to create an accurate model which best 
reflects the observed BOLD fMRI time course, thereby minimising the amount of 
unexplained signal across the voxels in the brain. Indeed, it is important to include all 
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necessary regressors which are assumed to contribute to the model and exclude 
regressors that are unrelated to the signal as they can ‘water down’ the model by 
reducing the degrees of freedom. We used a model which differed to that used in the 
important study by Admon et al., (2017). Therefore we compared and considered three 
different approaches and this is detailed in Appendix C. While the models differed we 
found that significant whole-brain level results remained the same across the three 






Figure 3.6. An illustrative overview of the pre-processing, first-level and second-level analysis pipeline for the MID task analysis in SPM. 
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 Modelling Prediction Error  3.8.3.2
For the Prediction Error analyses, a second single-subject model was generated. This 
included four regressors of interest (anticipation phase for all conditions, all gain and 
all loss outcomes combined, and the neutral condition as 0th order regressors) and 
motion regressors. For each outcome regressor (wins and penalties), a respective first 
order parameter was included, modelling win- and penalty-related outcomes in a 
parametric linear trend by using PE values as parameter inputs (Abler et al., 2006). 
This analysis is based on a prior MID analysis (Staudinger et al., 2009). Importantly, 
there were equal numbers of each type of trial within each outcome (i.e. an equal 
proportion of win outcome to miss win outcome and loss outcome to avoided loss 
outcome) (See Results Section 4.2). The parametric modulation regressor was mean-
corrected by SPM to be orthogonal to the main outcome regressor. 
The Prediction Error was calculated as follows: 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝐸𝑉) = 𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑋 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 Equation 2. 
 




Win cues were ascribed a magnitude of +1, whilst penalty cues were ascribed a 
magnitude of -1. Neutral cues were ascribed a magnitude of 0.  
This thesis explores three models that attempt to address different ways in which a 
participant estimates whether they will receive money or not at any given time point. 
The first, Fixed PE model, used a probability that was set at a fixed value for every 
trial, (66% for win cues and 34% for penalty cues) in accordance with the tracking 
algorithm of the MID task.  This probability was also chosen on the basis that 
participants would be (at least) implicitly aware of the success rate when starting the 
task on the scan day, following their training on the task at the assessment 
appointment. As shown in Table 3.1, the Fixed PE model uses three different PE 




Table 3.1. Calculation of Prediction Error using a fixed probability of 66% for win 
cues and 34% for penalty cues on every trial. 
Outcome Prediction Error (PE) calculation: PE = Outcome – EV 
Reward/Win Outcome 1 – (1 x 0.66) = 0.34 
Missed Win 0 – (1 x 0.66) = -0.66 
Penalty/Loss Outcome -1 – (-1 x 0.34) = -0.66 
Avoided Loss Outcome  0 – (-1 x 0.34) = 0.34 
Neutral Outcome 0 – (0 x 0.66) = 0 
 
 
However, one could argue that a fixed probability has limited ecological validity as it 
does not capture the dynamic nature and updating of prediction values in real-time. To 
address this issue, a second and third Dynamic PE model was created using a moving 
average window. In the second Dynamic PE model for all cues combined, the 
probability was calculated taking into account the success rate of the past five trials 
(win, penalty and neutral trials combined). For example, if the hit (hit=1) and miss 
(miss =0) series for trials t-5 to t-1 were [0 0 1 0 1], the expected value (EV) for win 
trial t would be 1*(0+0+1+0+1)/5=0.4 (see Equation 2). At the start of the task, the 
expected success probability was set at 66% for win cues and 34% for penalty cues, in 
accordance with the tracking algorithm of the MID task.  
In the third model, Dynamic PE model for reward and penalty cues separately, the 
probability was calculated using a dynamic approach and taking into account the 
success rate of the past three trials for win and penalty cues separately. For example, 
if the hit (hit=1) and miss (miss =0) series for win trials wt-3 to wt-1 were [0 1 1], the 
expected value for win trial wt would be 1*(0+1+1)/3=0.66. If the hit (hit=1) and miss 
(miss =0) series for penalty trials pt-3 to pt-1 were [0 0 1], the expected value for 
penalty trial pt would be 1*(0+0+1)/3=0.33. As above, at the start of the task, the 
expected success probability was set at 66% for win cues and 34% for penalty cues. A 
moving average window of the previous three trials was used because, in a sample of 
seven trials (which is the average span of working memory), there are likely to be 
three win trials, in which the participant is tracking the expected value. The 
justification for separating win and penalty cues is that participants receive 
instructions separately for win and loss trials. A counter argument for separating win 
and penalty trials is that participants calculate RPE on a trial-by-trial basis, and the EV 
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would therefore be formed as an integration of both win and penalty trial information. 
For this reason, both models were investigated, and all three types of RPE modelling 
underwent the same group-level analyses described in Section 3.8.4.1.  
 Statistical modelling: Second (group) Level Analysis 3.8.4
 FMRI statistical analysis:  3.8.4.1
Anticipation and outcome phases of the MID task 
In this section, I begin by describing the brain regions (ROIs) chosen for the main 
contrasts of interest from the MID task. I then detail the statistical models we used to 
test hypotheses for reward and penalty anticipation (1a, 1b), outcome (1c, 1d), and, 
prediction error (2a, 2b). As depression is associated with differential fronto-striatal 
abnormalities in response to anticipation versus receipt of monetary outcomes 
(Pizzagalli et al., 2009a), statistical analyses were separately conducted for the cue and 
outcome phases of the task. 
Region of Interest Analyses and Contrasts of interest 
To test a priori hypotheses (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b) regarding fronto-striatal responses 
to the anticipation and outcome of reward and penalty, a region-of-interest (ROI) 
analysis was conducted. Mean activations were extracted from seven bilateral 
anatomical masks of the caudate, putamen, nucleus accumbens (NAcc), orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula and amygdala for each 
participant for the following contrasts of interest: (i): No-incentive Anticipation: 
anticipation neutral>baseline (ii) Reward Anticipation: anticipation win>baseline (ii) 
Penalty Anticipation: anticipation loss>baseline (iv) Reward Outcome: feedback 
win>missed win (v) Penalty Outcome: feedback loss>avoided loss. This analytic 
approach has been used previously (Admon et al., 2017) and mitigates possible 
spillover effects of cue type on the neural responses to outcomes. Masks were 
collapsed across hemispheres because hemispheric effects on task activation were 
nonsignificant (all p values >.05) and because of the high correlation between 
hemispheric ROIs. To avoid circular analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009), whole 
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regions from atlas toolboxes in SPM12 were used (See Figure 3.7) as opposed to 
defining clusters from the whole brain analysis itself. These ROIs were chosen in 
accordance with meta-analytical findings of the neural correlates of reward and 
penalty processing (Bartra et al., 2013; Diekhof et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013) and 
prediction error (Garrison et al., 2013).  
It is important to note the implicit assumptions of building ROIs. The use of small, 
boundary-defined regions, such as the amygdala and NAcc, assumes excellent 
coregistration and normalisation. For this reason, we applied two different co-
registration and normalisation approaches
7
 to the data and used the method with 
superior alignment (Approach 2), as assessed by visual inspection of 4D files in 
Mango Multi-image Analysis Software (http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/mango.html). 
Moreover, all ROIs were combined with the SPM probabilistic grey matter mask 
(thresholded at 0.20) to ensure any areas extending into non-grey matter areas such as 
CSF were removed. 
Test of Hypothesis 1: Neural correlates of reward and penalty processing. 
Test of Hypothesis 1a: Reward Anticipation. Lurasidone will increase striatal 
activation during reward anticipation and these effects will be most pronounced in 
individuals with higher depressive symptoms and anhedonia. 
In order to test this hypothesis for normlaisation of reward during the anticipation 
phase of the task by lurasidone, a repeated-measures ANCOVA was performed for 
each of the seven ROIs. The factors included: Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and 
Anticipation Cue (neutral, win, loss) as within-subject variables, Medication Order as 
the between-subject factor, and Depression Severity (total BDI score) as the covariate 
of interest. Evidence in support of hypothesis 1a would be captured by a Medication-
by-Depression Severity-by-Anticipation Cue interaction, with post-hoc analyses 
                                                 
7
 Approach 1 using DARTEL tools (Diffeomorphic Anatomical Registration using Exponentiated Lie 
Algebra; Ashburner, 2007): Multi-channel segmentation and co-registration to each participant’s 
structural image. A two-step spatial normalization approach was completed in SPM using DARTEL 
tools. It involved warping the coregistered images to the study-specific template (i.e. the average brain 
of all participants’ data) generated using DARTEL and then normalizing the template onto the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI-152) template). 




demonstrating this three-way interaction effect specifically for reward cues. The 
threshold for statistical significance is described in Section 3.8.5. In terms of a 
graphical display, this continuous analysis should show that the difference between 
striatal neural activity under lurasidone and placebo during reward anticipation is 
positively correlated with depression severity.  
Given that the cardinal symptom of anhedonia in depression best maps onto the 
anticipatory phase of reward processing (Treadway and Zald, 2011), we also examined 
whether there were any significant three way interactions with continuous scores of 
anhedonia, which could otherwise be concealed with the use of total scores in 
depression severity (which combine together low mood and other symptoms of 
depression, such as sleep and irritability disturbances). This was assessed by including 
total scores from the SHAPS and DARS anhedonia questionnaires as covariates of 
interest. 
This ‘omnibus’ analysis, in which all anticipation cues were placed in the same model, 
allowed us to control for the number of contrasts compared. We expected to find no 
effect of Medication Order.  
Test of Hypothesis 1b: Penalty Anticipation. Lurasidone will alter the penalty-
related anticipation signal in ACC, anterior insula, amygdala and striatal regions 
and these effects will be greatest in individuals with higher depressive symptoms. 
The same ‘omnibus model’ as above was used to test hypothesis 2b. Evidence in 
support of hypothesis 1b would be captured by a Medication-by-Depression Severity-
by-Anticipation Cue interaction, with post-hoc analyses demonstrating this three-way 
interaction effect specifically for penalty cues. As this hypothesis is non-directional, 
the continuous analysis could show that the difference between neural activity under 
lurasidone and placebo during reward anticipation is either positively or negatively 
correlated with depression severity. 
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Test of Hypothesis 1c: Reward Outcome. Lurasidone will increase the reward 
feedback signal in the ventral striatum, namely the caudate, putamen and NAcc. 
These effects will be most pronounced in individuals with higher depressive 
symptoms. 
Primary continuous analyses: using continuous depression symptoms scores 
These primary analyses were conducted with depression measured as a continuous 
variable. To test hypothesis 1c regarding normalisation of reward outcome stage 
responses, we conducted a repeated measures ANCOVA for each ROI. This included 
the factors: Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and Outcome Type (reward, penalty) as 
within-subject variables, Medication Order as the between-subject factor, and 
Depression Severity (total BDI-II score) as the covariate of interest. We predicted that 
normalisation responses in depressed individuals on lurasidone would be captured by a 
Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Outcome Type interaction, with post-hoc 
analyses demonstrating this three-way interaction effect specifically for reward 
outcomes. When visualising the results of this continuous analysis, it should show that 
the difference between neural activity under lurasidone and placebo during reward 
anticipation is positively correlated with depression severity. 
As is the case for the statistical tests during the anticipation stages of the task, the 
‘omnibus’ analysis, in which reward and penalty outcomes are placed in the same 
model, allows us to control for the number of contrasts compared. We expected to find 
no effect of Medication Order.  
As consummatory anhedonia, defined as the lack of pleasure in activities or 
experiences that used to be pleasant (Treadway and Zald, 2011), best maps onto this 
reward outcome stage, we also examined whether there were any significant three way 
interactions with continuous scores of anhedonia. This was assessed by a repeated 
measures ANCOVA for brain responses to Reward Outcomes with factors: Medication 
(placebo, lurasidone) as within-subject variables, Medication Order as the between-




Test of Hypothesis 1d: Penalty Outcome. Lurasidone will reduce the penalty-
related feedback signal in the VS, ACC and insula. These effects will be most 
pronounced in individuals with higher depressive symptoms. 
The same ‘omnibus model’ as above was used to test the hypothesis that lurasidone 
will reduce the penalty-related outcome signal as a function of depression severity. 
Evidence in support of hypothesis 2d would be captured by a Medication-by-
Depression Severity-by-Outcome Type interaction, with post-hoc analyses 
demonstrating this three-way interaction effect specifically for penalty outcome. When 
visualising the results of this continuous analysis, it should show that the difference 
between neural activity under lurasidone and placebo during penalty outcome is 
negatively correlated with depression severity. 
Secondary categorical analyses: using BDI-II cut-off scores 
As mentioned above, all primary analyses above were conducted using a continuous 
measure of depression (BDI-II). To complement our dimensional analyses, we also 
examined our hypothesis regarding normalisation of responses using categorical 
groups in a repeated measures ANOVA model. We used severity cut-off scores for the 
BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996; Krefetz et al., 2002; Kumar et al., 2002) to compare 
individuals with low depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16 (normal-mild 
mood disturbance), n=24) to individuals with high depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II 
score: 17-43 (borderline- severe depression), n=18) on placebo and lurasidone 
(Ambrosini et al., 1991; Barrera and Garrisonjones, 1988; Canals et al., 2001; Marton 
et al., 1991; Strober et al., 1981; Whitaker et al., 1990). If our results would be 
replicated using categorical groups, we would expect a significant Medication-by-





Figure 3.7. Anatomical masks: Location of anatomically defined masks for the 
Caudate (turquoise), Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) (yellow), and Putamen (maroon), 
Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC) (red), Insula (Green), Amygdala (Indigo), Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex (ACC) (Blue). The Caudate, putamen, Insula and ACC ROIs were 
formed from the AAL atlas in SPM. The OFC ROI was formed using Brodmann Area 
13 and the NAcc from the IBASPM71 atlas in SPM12. 
FMRI Whole-brain analysis for anticipation and outcome phases 
The first aim of the whole brain analysis was to test whether the task elicited the 
expected pattern of activation during reward and penalty anticipation and outcome. 
(outside the effect of the drug) (Knutson et al., 2001). Thus, whole brain analyses of 
the entire sample treated as a single group (n=84) were conducted for each condition 
relative to baseline on placebo (i.e., Reward Cue, Penalty Cue, Reward Outcome and 
Penalty Outcome). This analysis was completed to test whether the task elicited the 
expected pattern of activation (Knutson et al., 2001). Thresholding and statistical 























Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
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The second aim of the whole brain analysis was to model the effects of lurasidone and 
depression status beyond the fronto-striatal network targeted in the ROI analyses. 
Within-subject contrasts were calculated at the first-level for each participant 
(placebo>lurasidone) and carried forward for a whole brain independent samples t-test 
at second level with Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) as the 
between subject factor and Depression Severity as the covariate of interest. The 
independent samples t-test was conducted separately for the responses to: (i): No-
incentive Anticipation: anticipation neutral>baseline (ii) Reward Anticipation: 
anticipation win>baseline (ii) Penalty Anticipation: anticipation loss>baseline (iv) 
Reward Outcome: feedback win>missed win (v) Penalty Outcome: feedback 
loss>avoided loss. 
Thus, the analytical framework for ROI and whole-brain analyses has been described 
for the anticipation and outcome phases of the task. Next, I will outline the contrasts of 
interest for the PE analyses which were used to test hypotheses 3b and 3c across the 
three types of PE models.   
Test of Hypothesis 2: Reward and penalty-related Prediction Error. 
To test the hypothesis of a restitution of the encoding of PE signaling in individuals 
with greater depression severity under lurasidone a region-of-interest (ROI) analysis 
was conducted. Mean activations were extracted from seven bilateral anatomical 
masks of the caudate, putamen, NAcc, OFC, ACC, insula and amygdala for each 
participant for the contrasts of interest ‘(win- or penalty-related) prediction error 
>baseline’. This approach has been utilised previously (Staudinger et al., 2009; Ubl et 
al., 2015a) and these values were entered into a repeated measures ANCOVA which I 
describe below. The analyses were completed for all three types of PE model: Fixed 
PE model, Reward and Penalty PE combined model and the Reward and Penalty cues 
separate model.  
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Test of Hypothesis 2a: Reward-related Prediction Error. Lurasidone will alter 
(increase or decrease) the reward-related PE signal in the striatum, OFC and ACC. 
These effects will be most pronounced in individuals with higher depressive 
symptoms.  
As in the analyses of anticipation and outcome, the analysis of PE utilised an omnibus 
approach in which both reward and penalty-related PEs were entered into the same 
model to control for the number of contrasts. To test the non-directional hypothesis 2a, 
we used a repeated measures ANCOVA, where the within-subject variables included 
Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and PE Type (Reward PE, Penalty PE), the between-
subject factor included Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) 
and Depression Severity (total BDI score) score was the covariate of interest. Evidence 
in favor of an alteration in reward-related PE encoding would be demonstrated by a 
significant Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-PE Type interaction. Specifically, 
post-hoc analyses should show a Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Reward PE 
interaction whereby the difference in reward PE encoding under lurasidone and 
placebo is either positively or negatively correlated with depression severity. We 
expected no effect of Medication Order. Again, statistical significance and 
thresholding is described in Section 3.8.5.  
Test of Hypothesis 2b: Penalty-related Prediction Error. Lurasidone will alter 
(increase or decrease) the penalty-related PE signal in frontal, striatal and limbic 
regions:  VS, ACC, amygdala and insula. These effects will be most pronounced in 
individuals with higher depressive symptoms.  
The same ‘omnibus model’ as above was used to test the hypothesis that lurasidone 
will reduce the penalty-related PE signal as a function of depression severity. 
Evidence in support of hypothesis 2b would be captured by a Medication-by-
Depression Severity-by-PE Type interaction, with post-hoc analyses demonstrating 
this three-way interaction effect specifically for penalty-related PE. When visualised 
in a graphical format, the continuous analysis should show that the difference in 




FMRI Whole-brain analysis for PE 
In addition to the ROI analyses of PE, we conducted a whole-brain analysis to 
determine which ROIs (caudate, putamen, NAcc, OFC, ACC, insula and amygdala) 
encode win- and penalty-related PE. This was done for the whole sample across both 
drugs.These ROIs were chosen as they have previously shown to encode reward- and 
penalty-related PE (Rothkirch et al., 2017; Ubl et al., 2015b).  
 Thresholding and statistical Inference 3.8.5
 ROI analysis statistical threshold 3.8.5.1
For behavioural and ROI analyses, all statistical tests used were two-tailed with a 
value of p<.05 to denote a significant difference between means. In the case of 
multiple (seven) ROI comparisons, a Bonferroni correction was made in order to 
control the Type I error rate (i.e. rejection of a true null hypothesis). Thus, statistical 
significance was set at p<.007 (0.05/7 = 0.007) for the ROI analyses.  
 Whole-brain analysis statistical threshold 3.8.5.2
As detailed in Section 2.1.2.6, the outcome for second level analyses is statistical 
parametric maps (SPMs) composed of T (or Z) values assigned to every voxel in the 
brain. Before obtaining these maps it is vital to define an appropriate threshold such 
that any score which exceeds that threshold has only a small probability of occurring 
by chance, and can be said to be significantly activated. The large number of 





(Habeck et al., 2008), means that there is a ‘multiple comparison problem’. In standard 
statistical theory, the Type I error rate is set at α = 5%, so that the likelihood of 
obtaining a ‘significant’ result and incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis would 
occur at a rate of 1 in 20. However, in a statistical map of 120,000 voxels, there will be 
approximately 6000 voxels activaterd by chance without correction for multiple 
comparisons.  
A standard way to correct for this family wise error is the bonferoni correction, 
whereby the α level is divided by the number of univariate tests completed  (see ROI 
analysis correction above) and this requires that all tests are independent from 
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eachother. However, this is not the case in an fMRI image (due to spatial 
correalations), and also a bonferoni correction would lead to a very conservative 
threshold, thereby increasing the Type II error rate.  
Thus, fMRI uilises the principles of Gaussian random field theory (RFT) which allows 
the selection of a correcteion threshold whilst simultaneously considering the spatial 
correlations or smoothness in fMRI data (Asby, 2011). In brief, this approach assumes 
normality and smoothness in which the greater the smoothness of the image, the less 
conservative a correction is as the number of resels (resolution elements) decreases. 
The number of resels is equal to the number of voxels in the image divided by the size 
(in voxels) of one resel. However, the number of resels does not reflect the number of 
independent observations in the data. Thus, RFT utilises an equation called the Euler 
characteristic (EC), which uses the number of resels to give the probability of a 
suprathreshold intensity peak. The EC asseses the topology of the data and can be 
defined as the number of activation ‘blobs’ present after a certain T threshold is set. 
When the EEC is between 0 and 1, it is equivalent to the probability of having at least 
one peak above the threshold under the null hypothesis. An EC value of 0.05 is used 
and a T value that gives an EC value of below 0.05 (which is the corrected FWE α 
level in SPM) implies that the likelihood that one or more clusters are present at this 
threshold is below 0.05.  
Examining each voxel individually to select out those that exceed this threshold is 
known as voxel-level inference (i.e. a voxel is significant if its p-value is below the set 
α level).  This is shown in Figure 3.8 and is a very specific level of inference that is 
useful if one is interested in localised brain activations. In contrast, cluster-level 
inference defines the significane of a region by taking into account the number of 
contiguously actiated voxels in a particular area. A cluster-forming threshold is set, 
with contiguous voxels above this threshold then being assessed on a second threshold 
based on the cluster’s size. RFT allows for the calculation of the expected number and 
size of clusters in a data set, and thus the neuroimaging programme SPM reports both 
voxel and cluster level statistics. The latter cluster-based thresholding is most often 





Figure 3.8. Voxel-level (A) versus cluster-level (B) inference. In A, two voxels exceed 
peak-threshold u. In B, a cluster-forming threshold defines clusters, and one cluster of 
12 voxels exceeds height-threshold uc. None of the voxels are significant alone, but 
together they comprise a significant cluster. Adapted from Poldrack et al. (2011) with 
permission. 
 
Importantly, cluster correction relies on the assumption that fMRI data has a constant 
spatial smoothness over the brain and that the spatial autocorrelation is normally 
distributed. However, a recent study by Eklund et al., (2016) showed that for a 
nominal familywise error rate of 5%, parametric statistical methods are shown to be 
invalid for clusterwise inference as the spatial autocorrelation function does not follow 
the assumed Gaussian shape. Mainly due tot the faulty assumption that the noise 
spatial autocorrelation function is a gaussian shape, cluster-based thresholding in SPM 
produces a false positive rate of up to 25% in an event-related design with 8mm 
smoothing. By comparison, parametric statistical methods are conservative for voxel-
wise inference and can increase the chance of Type-II errors. 
The best alternative correction methods are permutation testing (a non-parametric 
method) and the use of 3DClustSim in Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI 
software) (Cox, 1996), since a ‘bug’ in the software has been fixed (May 2015) (Cox 
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et al., 2017). 3DClustSim generates a 3D grid of independent and identically 
distributed N(0,1) random deviates. It smoothes them to the level estimated from the 
residuals of the fMRI data model at the individual level. It then carries out voxelwise 
thresholding, and the last step of clustering determines the rate at which contiguous 
blobs or ‘clumps’ of different sizes occur at the various voxelwise thresholds (.05, .01, 
.001) (https://afni.nimh.nih.gov/pub/dist/doc/program_help/3dClustSim.html). For 
example, in our study, whole brain images could be cluster corrected to p<.050, (by 
being required to exceed an extent of 116 continuous voxels), to p<.010 (by being 
required to exceed an extent of 167 continuous voxels), or to p<.001 (by being 
required to exceed an extent of 261 continuous voxels). In line with previous studies, 
we chose the first option (Gong et al., 2017). Specifically, for the MID task whole 
brain analyses, results were reviewed with an initial voxel threshold of p<.001 and 
cluster corrected to p<.05 by being required to exceed an extent of 116 continuous 
voxels, as determined by AFNI’s 3DClustSim (Cox et al., 2016; Eklund et al., 2016a). 
For the ASL whole-brain analyses, statistical significance was set using a conservative 
threshold of p<.05 at the peak voxel-level corrected for multiple comparisons (i.e. 
Family-wise Error (FWE) corrected) (Friston et al., 1994; Eklund et al., 2016). This is 
because 3DClustSim cannot be applied to the ASL data using the assumptions of 
fMRI data. 
For all comparisons, brain locations were reported as x, y, and z coordinates in 
Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) space and Wake Forest University (WFU) 
PickAtlas was used to identify brain regions. 
 Test of Hypothesis 3: Sensitivity analyses. 3.8.6
Test of Hypothesis 3a. Lurasidone’s effects on reward and penalty processing in 
depression will not be confounded by comorbid anxiety disorders. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we first tested for an association between dimensional 
anxiety scores and brain activation. If there were to be no association, then there 
would be no need to include it as a covariate in the depression severity ANCOVA 




However, if a significant association were to be found, the next step would be to 
repeat all ROI analyses (repeated measures ANCOVA’s for hypotheses 1a-2b) with 
the following covariates: (i) continuous measures of anxiety (total anxiety score on the 
HADS); and (ii) current comorbid anxiety disorders (diagnosed using the M.I.N.I and 
dummy-coded). This analysis approach has been used previously to account for the 
potential effects of anxiety (Admon et al., 2017; Forbes et al., 2009; Pizzagalli et al., 
2009b).  Evidence in favour of this hypothesis would mean that adding the anxiety 
covariates would not influence the pattern or significance of the Medication-by-
Depression Severity- by- Reward/Penalty processing interaction, thereby indicating 
that the findings are not driven by current anxiety diagnosis or severity. 
Test of Hypothesis 3b. Lurasidone’s effects on reward and penalty processing in 
depression will not be confounded by self-reported changes in sedation or state-
anxiety scores. 
As described in Section 3.2.2, the effects of lurasidone on sedation and state-anxiety 
were measured at three time points: pre-scan, peak-of-drug and post-scan utilising the 
VAS and STAI-S questionnaires respectively.  
VAS and STAI-S data were analysed using a repeated measures ANCOVA with 
Medication (placebo or lurasidone) as the within-subject variable, Medication Order 
(placebo-lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) as the between-subject variable, and 
Depression Severity (total BDI score) as the covariate interest. Specifically, we 
examined the effect of Medication, Medication Order and Depression Severity on the 
change in Sedation ratings (total Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) scores) and State-
anxiety ratings (total STAI score) from pre-drug administration (Measure 1) to peak-
of-drug (Measure 2). Evidence in favour of hypothesis 4c would be shown by non-
significant main effects and interactions (i.e. lurasidone would not increase self-
reported sedation or state-anxiety scores relative to placebo). We also completed an 
additional analysis of the VAS in which the 16 scales of the VAS were reduced to two 
summary factors of Alertness and Tranquillity (Herbert et al., 1976) (see Methods 
Section 3.2.2). The change in Alertness and Tranquillity ratings from pre-drug to 





Test of Hypothesis 3c. Cerebral Blood flow. Lurasidone will increase striatal 
cerebral blood flow in all participants relative to placebo. Lurasidone’s effects on 
reward and penalty processing in depression will not be confounded by baseline 
shifts in regional and global cerebral blood flow (CBF). 
To test for statistical significant changes in resting CBF, a paired-sample t-test 
compared the whole-brain CBF maps collected after administration of lurasidone 
against those acquired after placebo in the whole sample (n=43). Next, quantitative 
measures of global CBF and striatal CBF were extracted for each participant after 
placebo and lurasidone using the MarsBaR toolbox (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net; 
Brett, Anton, Valabregue, and Poline, 2002). In SPSS, a repeated-measures ANCOVA 
was performed for global and striatal CBF with the following factors: Medication 
(placebo, lurasidone) as the within-subject variable, Medication Order (placebo-
lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) as the between-subject factor, and Depression Severity 
(total BDI score) as the covariate of interest. Evidence in favour of hypothesis 3c 
would be demonstrated by (i) whole-brain analysis: a statistically significant increase 
in CBF relative to placebo (p<.050 at the peak voxel level corrected for multiple 
comparisons; see Section 3.8.5 for justification of thresholding and statistical 
inference) and (ii) ROI analyses: a significant Medication - by- striatal CBF 
interaction (p<.050). 
To test if changes in baseline cerebral blood flow were related to the BOLD findings, 
the change in global and regional CBF between the lurasidone and placebo visits was 
entered as covariates in all ROI BOLD fMRI analyses. Evidence in favour of 
hypothesis 3c would be shown by the fMRI BOLD results remaining unchanged when 
controlling for the predicted increases in regional and global cerebral blood flow 







 Results Chapter 4 -
In the Results chapter of this thesis, I begin by summarising the participant 
characteristics and the behavioural results of the study which include performance data 
of the Monetary Incentive Delay Task. These analyses are important to set the 
framework for understanding the neuroimaging findings. I then examine the results for 
the three hypotheses tested in this thesis for the effect of lurasidone on (1) neural 
correlates of reward and penalty processing and (2) reward and penalty-related 
prediction error signal and (3) cerebral blood flow (CBF) in depression (see Table 1.12 
in Introduction Section 1.8.2 and Figure 4.1 below). I then evaluate the robustness of 
these findings by completing a host of sensitivity analyses to ensure that lurasidone’s 
effects on reward and penalty processing in depression are not be confounded by 
anxiety, self-reported changes in sedation or state-anxiety scores from pre-drug 
administration (Measure 1) to peak-of-drug (Measure 2) and baseline shifts in regional 








 Participant characteristics 4.1
 Depressive symptoms and characteristics  4.1.1
Before examining the behavioural and neuroimaging results, it is useful to have an 
overview of the participant characteristics in the study sample.  
 
As detailed in Methods Section 3.8.4.1, all analyses were completed using continuous 
measures in depression severity. Table 4.1 provides demographic and clinical 
information for the entire sample (n=43). However, for the purpose of visualising 
complex interactions in the analyses below (e.g. Medication-by-Depression Severity-
Behaviour/Brain data), we also used depression severity cut-off scores from the 
Beck’s Depression Inventory-II (Beck et al., 1996; Krefetz et al., 2002; Kumar et al., 
2002): individuals with low depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16 (normal-
mild mood disturbance), n=24) versus high depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 
17-43 (borderline-severe depression), n=18) (Ambrosini et al., 1991; Barrera and 
Garrisonjones, 1988; Canals et al., 2001; Marton et al., 1991; Strober et al., 1981; 
Whitaker et al., 1990). Thus, Table 4.2 provides demographic and clinical 
characteristics of recruited participants according to these depression severity cut-off 
scores. When the sample is split into low and high depression severity groups, they 
differ significantly in depression scores (BDI-II (t(39)= 8.58, p <.001) and HADS 
Depression Score (t(41)=10.64, p <.001)), in anhedonia scores (SHAPS (t(39)=6.69, p 
<.001) and DARS (t(41)=10.64, p <.001) scales) and in anxiety symptoms (HADS 
Anxiety Score (t(41)=8.00, p <.001)). 
 
Given that all participants completed the Mini International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview version 6.0.0 (M.I.N.I) (Sheehan et al., 1998), we also examined the 
convergence between continuous BDI-II scores and depression diagnoses as assessed 
by psychiatric interview (Please refer to Methods Section 3.1 for details of diagnostic 
criteria for subthreshold and MDD). As shown in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2, the same 
individuals who scored highly on the BDI-II also could be diagnosed as having 
subthreshold or full-criteria MDD. This suggests that the BDI-II scale is a good 




Figure 4.3 shows the spread of anhedonia scores in the sample. Individuals with higher 
depression severity had higher self-reported anhedonia, however, when assessing 
subthreshold and MDD diagnoses across continuous anhedonia scores, some 
individuals with subthreshold depression had higher anhedonia scores than some 
individuals with MDD. This is not unusual as MDD is a heterogeneous disorder and 




Figure 4.2. Histogram showing the frequency of Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI-
II) Total Scores in the sample organized by (A) Depression severity cut-off scores 
from the Beck’s Depression Inventory-II:  individuals with low depressive symptoms 
(Total BDI-II score: 0-16 (normal-mild mood disturbance), n=24) versus high 
depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 17-43 (borderline-severe depression), 
n=18); (B) Diagnosis as assessed by the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
version 6.0.0 (M.I.N.I): (Healthy: n=24, Subthreshold Depression: n=7, Major 
Depressive Disorder: n=11). The positive skew in the distribution of BDI-II scores in 
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our sample is consistent with studies completed in the general population (n=1250) 




Figure 4.3. Histogram showing the frequency of Anhedonia Scores in the sample as 
measured by the Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS) organized by (A) 
Depression severity cut-off scores from the Beck’s Depression Inventory-II:  
individuals with low depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16 (normal-mild 
mood disturbance), n=24) versus high depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 17-43 
(borderline-severe depression), n=18); (B) Diagnosis as assessed by the Mini 
International Neuropsychiatric Interview version 6.0.0 (M.I.N.I): (Healthy: n=24, 










Table 4.1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of participants in a study 




















Age (years) 21.83 2.05 (18-25) 
Beck Depression Inventory – II 13.89 12.83 (0-43) 
Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale 12.18 8.49 (0-29) 
Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale 28.99 22.74 (0-77) 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale  
(Depression score) 
4.68 4.85(0-15) 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale  
(Anxiety score) 
7.00 5.86(0-21) 
 N % 
Female 28 65.12 
Caucasian 36 83.72 
Current subthreshold depression 7 16.28 
Current MDD 11 25.58 
Lifetime MDD 15 34.88 
Lifetime MDD and Current subthreshold 
depression 
5 16.28 
Lifetime MDD and Current MDD 10 23.26 
Current comorbid anxiety disorders 10 23.26 
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Table 4.2. Demographic and clinical characteristics of recruited participants according 
to depression severity cut-off scores from the Beck’s Depression Inventory-II: 
individuals with low depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16 (normal-mild 
mood disturbance), n=24) versus high depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 17-43 
(borderline-severe depression), n=18). This table shows the convergence between 
BDI-II scores and depression diagnoses as assessed by the Mini International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview version 6.0.0 (M.I.N.I) (Sheehan et al., 1998). 
Characteristic High Depression 









SD Mean SD T-test (dof)  
Age (years) 
 
21.33 2.43 22.32 1.65 1.70(41) .096 
Beck Depression 
Inventory – II 
 








48.55 18.65 13.86 12.19 -7.13(39) <.001 
Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale  
(Depression score) 
 
8.80 3.47 0.78 0.95 -10.64(41) <.001 




11.75 4.82 2.91 2.07 -8.00(41) <.001 
 N % N % χ2    
 
 
Female 13 72.22 15 62.50 .000 .988 
Caucasian 15 83.33 20 83.33 .380 .538 
Current subthreshold 
depression 
7 38.88 0 0.00   
Current MDD 11 61.11 0 0.00   
Lifetime MDD 15 83.33 2 8.33   
Lifetime MDD and 
Current subthreshold 
depression 
5  27.77 0 0.00   
Lifetime MDD and 
Current MDD 
10 55.55 0 0.00   
Current comorbid anxiety 
disorders 
10  55.55 0 0.00   
Individuals with  
 a
 High Depression Severity (Total BDI-II score: 17-43 (borderline- severe depression), 
n=18) and
 b
 Low Depression Severity (Total BDI-II score: 0-16 (normal-mild mood disturbance), n=24) 
according to depression severity cut-off scores for the BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996; Krefetz et al., 2002; 
Kumar et al., 2002). 
All participants were right-handed, per inclusion criteria. MDD: Major Depressive Disorder. 
Subthreshold and current and lifetime MDD and Anxiety Disorders diagnosed by the Mini International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview version 6.0.0 (M.I.N.I) (Sheehan et al., 1998).  
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 Behavioural results from the Monetary Incentive Delay 4.2
task  
Performance in the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task was assessed according to 
five parameters: (i) No Responses (ii) Premature Responses (iii) Total Winnings, (iv) 
Mean Reaction Time (RT) and (v) Accuracy for the three cue types: reward, penalty 
and neutral (no-incentive). A repeated measures ANCOVA with Medication (placebo 
or lurasidone) and Cue Type (Reward, Penalty, Neutral) as the within-subject 
variables, Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) as the between-
subject variable, and Depression Severity (total BDI score) as the covariate interest 
was completed for (i) No Responses (ii) Premature Responses (iii) Total Winnings, 
(iv) Mean Reaction Time (RT) and (v) Accuracy. Performance data are presented in 
Table 4.3.  
 Adherence to task 4.2.1
 Response Rate 4.2.1.1
We first examined response rate, (defined as a button press within the entire 700 ms 
response window), across each trial type (reward, penalty and neutral cues) and for 
each treatment session to ensure that data was only included from participants who 
were actively and appropriately engaged in the task. We found that one participant 
(with low depression severity) failed to make a button response to neutral cues on one 
run of the MID task at the placebo visit. This reduction in response rate can be seen for 
participant 6 in Figure 4.4. Thus, this participant was excluded from behavioural and 
subsequent neuroimaging analyses, as their inclusion would invalidate RT and 
accuracy data as a result of their non-adherence to the task. The remaining participants 
had high response rates, with the maximum number of no responses on any full run of 
the MID task being 7 of 104 trials (thus giving a 93.3% response rate) (Figure 4.4). 
This suggests that across all sessions, participants maintained engagement throughout 
the duration of the task.  
 
We also examined response rate between reward, penalty and neutral cues. We found 
a significant Cue Type-by-Number of No Responses interaction (F(2,78)=13.19, 
p>.001), with no interactions with Medication or three-way interactions (all p values > 
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.050). Post-hoc tests showed that the effect of cue type was due to a higher number of 
no responses to neutral cues relative to either reward cues (p =.001) or penalty cues (p 




Figure 4.4. Response rate and total winnings across placebo and lurasidone visits 
according to depression severity cut-off scores from the Beck’s Depression Inventory-
II:  individuals with (A) low depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16 (normal-
mild mood disturbance), n=25) versus (B) high depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II 
score: 17-43 (borderline-severe depression), n=18). 
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 Premature responses  4.2.1.2
We also examined the number of trials in which the RTs were less than 100 ms (i.e. 
premature responses). Responses greater than 700 ms (i.e. late responses) were not 
recorded as this exceeded the maximum response target window (see Figure 3.5 of the 
MID task in Methods Section 3.5). There was a low overall rate of premature 
responses for both drug sessions (mean number of trials with premature responses: 
placebo: 1.52%, SD: 2.39; lurasidone: mean: 1.05%, SD: 1.84). However, we found a 
significant Cue Type-by-Number of Premature Responses interaction (F(2,80)=4.78, 
p=.011). Post-hoc tests showed that the effect of cue type was due to a higher number 
of premature responses to penalty cues relative to neutral cues (F(1,40)=9.76, p=.003), 
but not relative to reward cues (F(1,40)=3.61, p=.065). This perhaps suggests greater 
readiness to respond rapidly when there is the prospect of losing money relative to a 
no-incentive cue.  
 
Interestingly, we also found a Medication-by-Cue Type -by-Number of Premature 
Responses interaction (F(2,80)=4.04, p=.021). This indicates that medication had 
different effects on the number of premature responses depending on the cue type. To 
break down this interaction, contrasts were performed comparing reward and penalty 
cues to neutral cues (the baseline) and reward to penalty cues for lurasidone compared 
to placebo. These revealed significant interactions when comparing penalty cues to 
neutral cues for lurasidone compared to placebo (F(1,40)=4.54, p=.039), and reward 
cues to penalty cues (F(1,40)=7.24, p=.010) but not when comparing reward cues to 
neutral cues (F(1,40)=0.01, p=.913). As shown in the interaction graph in Figure 4.5, 
this reflects that premature responses are lower on lurasidone compared to placebo and 
that the increase in premature responses compared to neutral trials is reduced by 
lurasidone. This was not the case for reward versus neutral trials. This fits with 
lurasione making participants less loss averse, even though the numer of premature 
responses was quite low. There were no significant interactions with depression 
severity or medication order (all p > .050). Overall, this suggests that lurasidone 
reduced the number of premature anticipatory responses to a target, following the 
display of a penalty cue, regardless of depressive symptom severity. Although 
lurasidone had this effect on premature responses, it did not alter mean RTs, as 
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described in Section 4.2.3. The premature responses (<100 ms) were subsequently 
excluded from the mean RT calculation, but still included in the accuracy calculations.  
 
Figure 4.5.Graph illustrating the Cue Type-by- Medication-by-Number of Premature 
Responses interaction.  
 
 Total Winnings 4.2.2
As shown in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4, the total winnings, across the two runs of the 
MID task were similar between lurasidone and placebo across the whole sample (Total 
Winnings and Medication (F(1,40)=0.03, p=.847)), with a mean of £18 being won 
under both medications. The ANCOVA also revealed no significant interactions 
between Total Winnings and Depression Severity (F(1,40)=0.72, p=.403) or Total 










Table 4.3. Performance data of the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task, split by 
Medication. 
 




 Placebo a  
 
Lurasidone b  
 
F value  P value 
Total Winnings, (£) 17.98(4.42) 17.70(4.51) 0.05 .463 
Success, %     
Overall 59.24(6.09) 59.15(5.86) 0.11 .740 
Neutral trials 47.05(8.91) 47.85(9.01) 0.58 .452 
Win Trials 68.25(9.27) 67.71(9.94) 0.45 .506 
Loss trials 62.43(10.08) 61.90(11.07) 0.24 .624 
Reaction time, ms     
Neutral Outcome  269.70(26.78) 275.70(27.79) 0.17 .681 
Missed Neutral Outcome 319.40(50.43) 335.70(59.13) 0.20 .659 
Reward/Win Outcome 253.00(21.75) 259.80(25.38) 0.31 .580 
Missed Win Outcome 273.10(52.23) 292.60(51.67) 3.98 .054 
Penalty/Loss Outcome 269.80(46.12) 293.60(55.59) 0.00 .960 
Avoided Loss Outcome 249.60(23.19) 253.90(23.22) 0.05 .824 
Change c in Sedation -26.19(141.42) -85.07(151.40) 1.18 .284 
Change c in State-Anxiety 0.52(4.88) -0.95(3.78) 3.64 .064 
a
 Individuals with Low Depression Severity (BDI scores <16) and High Depression Severity (BDI 
scores ≥17) on Placebo. 
b
 Individuals with Low Depression Severity (BDI scores <16) and High Depression Severity (BDI 
scores ≥17) on Lurasidone. 
c
 Change score from pre-drug administration (Measure 1) to peak-of-drug (Measure 2), 
approximately three hours after drug administration. 
A repeated measures ANCOVA with Medication (placebo or lurasidone) as the within-subject 
variable, Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) as the between subject 
variable and Depression Severity (total BDI score) as the covariate interest was completed for (i) 
Total Winnings, (ii) Accuracy and (iii) Mean Reaction Time (RT) to the target on win, neutral and 
loss trials.  
 
 Mean reaction Time 4.2.3
Analysis of mean RT revealed a Cue Type-by-Mean RT interaction (F(2,74)=55.39, 
p>.001), with no interactions with Medication or three-way interactions (all p values > 
.050). The effect of cue type was driven by longer reaction time to neutral cues 
relative to either reward cues (p < .001) or penalty cues (p < .001). This reflects 
motivated responding on reward and penalty trials versus neutral trials across the 
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entire sample. The same pattern remained when separating the sample into groups 
using medication type and BDI median split (Low Depression Severity: BDI scores 0-
16; High Depression severity: BDI scores >17).  
 
 Accuracy 4.2.4
Analysis of accuracy showed a significant Cue Type-by-Accuracy interaction 
(F(2,80)=55.39, p>.001), with no interactions with Medication or three-way 
interactions (all p values > .050). Post-hoc tests showed that the effect of cue type was 
due to lower accuracy to neutral cues relative to either reward cues (p < .001) or 
penalty cues (p < .001). The groups also did not differ in the percentage of reward 
trials ending in gains or the percentage of loss trials ending in penalties (i.e. Outcome 
Frequency). This result is of particular importance for the RPE analyses described in 
Section 4.3.8 because it suggests that the probabilities calculated for the tracker were 
accurate. Specifically, a mixed-effects ANOVA with Outcome Type (Win, No-Win, 
Loss, No-Loss, No Change) and Medication (placebo, lurasidone) as within-subject 
variables, Medication Order as a between-subject variable, and Depression Severity as 
the covariate of interest, revealed only a main effect of Outcome Type (F(2,80)= 
39.06, p < .001). Post-hoc contrasts showed that this main effect was due to a higher 
frequency of Win relative to Missed Win outcomes following a reward cue (p < .001), 
and a higher frequency for Avoided Loss relative to Loss following the penalty cue (p 
< .001). These results are consistent with the task tracker which intends to ensure 
approximately 66% successful trials – Win or Avoided Loss – for all participants. The 
analyses of the reaction time and accuracy (outcome frequency), suggest that the 
BOLD fMRI findings were not confounded by group differences in task difficulty.  
 
 Summary of behavioural results 4.2.5
Overall, analysis of behavioural performance on the MID task showed that there was 
good task adherence (high reponse rate and low number of premature responses) 
across the entire sample, albeit one participant. We found that relative to placebo, 
lurasidone reduced the number of premature responses to penalty cues relative to 
neutral cues. However, there were no significant effects of medication on reward and 
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penalty processing performance (total winnings, RTs and Accuracy). Instead, we 
found an effect of cue type on RT and accuracy such that there were faster and more 
accurate responses to reward and penalty cues relative to no-incentive cues. 
 BOLD fMRI results of the MID task 4.3
To test a priori hypotheses (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b) regarding fronto-striatal responses 
to the anticipation and outcome of reward and penalty, we utilised a region-of-interest 
(ROI) analysis. These regions included the caudate, putamen, nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula and 
amygdala. For all the analyses below we predicted that task-related activations to 
rewards and penalties would be modulated by medication and depressive symptoms. I 
begin by exploring the results of the anticipatory phase before describing the 
neuroimaging results for the outcome phase of the task. Before embarking on drug and 
depression effects, it is important to mention that analysis of the main effects of the 
task showed activations as expected and these whole-brain results are detailed in 
Section 4.3.7.  
 Anticipation Phase 4.3.1
A repeated-measures ANCOVA was performed for each of the seven ROIs. The 
factors included: Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and Anticipation Cue (neutral, win, 
loss) as within-subject variables, Medication Order as the between-subject factor, and 
Depression Severity (total BDI score) as the covariate of interest. We controlled for 
the number of experimental contrasts by including all cue types in the model (i.e. an 
‘omnibus’ model).  
 
 Test of Hypothesis 1a: Reward Anticipation. Lurasidone will 4.3.2
increase striatal activation during reward anticipation and these effects 
will be most pronounced in individuals with higher depressive symptoms 
and anhedonia. 
In contrast to the hypothesis, there were no significant Medication-by-Depression 
interactions in the anticipation phase of the task. Instead, the repeated measures 
ANCOVA revealed a significant Medication-by-Anticipation Cue interaction in the 
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ACC (F(2,72)=8.16, p=.001) and caudate (F(2,72)=7.78, p=.001). Contrary to 
expectations, post-hoc tests show that lurasidone reduced neural activity to win cues 
versus placebo, and increased responses for neutral cues in the ACC (F(1,37)=7.03, 
p=.012) and caudate (F(1,37)=7.58, p=.009) (see Figure 4.6). The Medication-by-
Anticipation Cue interaction fell short of significance in the NAcc (F(2,72)=4.90, 
p=.010), OFC (F(2,72)=3.94, p=.024) and amygdala (F(2,72)=3.85, p=.026) after 
Bonferroni corrections for multiple ROI comparisons (statistical significance set at 
p<.007).  
Given that the cardinal symptom of anhedonia in depression best maps onto the 
anticipatory phase of reward processing (Treadway and Zald, 2011), we also examined 
whether there were any significant three way interactions with continuous scores of 
anhedonia, which could otherwise be concealed with the use total depression severity 
scores which combine various symptoms of depression. This was assessed by 
including total scores from the SHAPS and DARS anhedonia questionnaires as 
covariates of interest. 
In this analysis, we also did not find a modulation of reward-related anticipatory 
responses by lurasidone in individuals with more severe scores. The same Medication-
by-Anticipation Cue results as above were found, with lurasidone reducing neural 
activity to win cues versus placebo, and increasing responses for neutral cues in the 
ACC (F(1,37)=6.90, p=.013) and caudate (F(1,37)=10.71, p=.002). 
 
 Test of Hypothesis 1b: Penalty Anticipation. Lurasidone will alter 4.3.3
the penalty-related anticipation signal in ACC, anterior insula, amygdala 
and striatal regions and these effects will be greatest in individuals with 
higher depressive symptoms. 
As described above, the omnibus model did not reveal that lurasidone’s strongest 
effects occurred in individuals with higher depressive symptoms. The analyses did 
however show that lurasidone reduced neural activity to penalty cues versus placebo, 
and increased responses for neutral cues in the ACC (F(1,37)=6.86, p=.013) and 
caudate (F(1,37)=5.32, p=.027) across the entire sample (i.e. regardless of depressive 





Figure 4.6. Medication-by-Anticipation Cue interaction in (A) caudate (F(2,72)=7.78, 
p=.001) and (B) ACC (F(2,72)=8.16, p=.001). Lurasidone reduced neural activity to 
Reward and Penalty cues versus placebo, and increased responses for neutral cues in 
the caudate and ACC.  
 
 Outcome Phase 4.3.4
The outcome phase of the task involved participants receiving feedback about their 
performance on that particular trial and their cumulative total winnings.  
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 Primary continuous analyses: using continuous depression 4.3.4.1
symptoms scores 
These primary analyses were conducted with depression measured as a continuous 
variable. In order to test (hypothesis 1c) that lurasidone would increase activation to 
reward outcomes and (hypothesis 1d) decrease responses to penalties in depressed 
individuals, we conducted a repeated-measures ANCOVA. We controlled for the 
number of experimental contrasts by including both types of outcome (reward and 
penalty) in the model (i.e. an ‘omnibus’ model). Specifically, Medication (placebo, 
lurasidone) and Outcome Type (Reward Outcome versus Penalty Outcome) were the 
within-subject variables, Medication Order was the between-subject factor, and 
Depression Severity (total BDI-II score) was the covariate of interest (n=40). Two 
participants were excluded from this analysis for the following reasons (i) one (high 
depression severity) participant had ACC and NAcc mean activation values that were 
greater than three standard deviations from the group mean for the Reward Outcome 
contrast and (ii) one (low depression severity) participant had ACC mean activation 
values that were greater than three standard deviations from the group mean for the 
Penalty Outcome contrast. (However, see Section 4.3.5 for analyses in which these 
participants are included).  
 
Unlike the anticipation phase of the task, in the outcome phase, the repeated measures 
ANCOVA revealed a significant Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Outcome 
Type interaction in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (F(1,37)=8.10, p=.007), after 
passing Bonferroni adjustment for seven multiple ROI comparisons. The interaction 
fell short of Bonferroni-adjusted significance in the NAcc (F(1,37)=3.98, p=.044), 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (F(1,37)=4.47, p=.041) and Insula (F(1,37)=4.90, p=.033). 
There were no significant interactions with Medication Order (all p values > .050). 
 
To understand the significant three-way interaction, we conducted two repeated-
measures ANCOVAs for Reward Outcome (n=41) and Penalty Outcome separately 




 Test of Hypothesis 1c: Reward Outcome. Lurasidone will increase the 4.3.4.2
reward feedback signal in the ventral striatum, namely the caudate, 
putamen and NAcc. These effects will be most pronounced in individuals 
with higher depressive symptoms and consummatory anhedonia. 
When we examined the Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Reward Outcome 
interaction across the seven ROIs we found that lurasidone had its strongest effect of 
increasing responses to reward outcomes in individuals with high depression severity.  
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 demonstrate that under placebo, individuals with higher 
depressive symptoms had attenuated ACC and NAcc activity during positive 
feedback. In contrast, under lurasidone, the same individuals had increased reward-
related ACC and NAcc activity. Despite the clarity of this trend in the interaction 
graph below, the trend fell short of Bonferroni-adjusted significance in the Nucleus 






Figure 4.7. NACC response during Reward Outcome across continuous depression 





Figure 4.8. ACC response during Reward Outcome across continuous depression 
scores under lurasidone and placebo.  
 
 Secondary categorical analyses: using BDI-II cut-off scores 4.3.4.3
Complementing the primary (continuous variable) analyses, we sought to replicate our 
results using categorical analyses. A repeated-measures ANOVA with Medication 
(placebo, lurasidone) and Outcome Type (Reward Outcome versus Penalty Outcome) 
as the within-subject variables and Depression Group (low (BDI-II score: 0-16) versus 
high (BDI-II score: 17-43) depressive symptoms) and Medication Order as the 
between-subject factors (n=40), revealed a significant Medication-by-Depression 
Group-by-Outcome Type interaction in the ACC (F(1,38)=8.68, p=.005). However, 
this was not significant in the NAcc following Bonferroni correction (F(1,38)=5.48, 
p=.025). 
 
Again, to understand the significant three-way interaction, we conducted two repeated-
measures ANOVAs for Reward Outcome (n=41) and Penalty Outcome separately 





This revealed that the Medication-by-Depression Group-by-Reward Outcome 
interaction in the NAcc (F(1,38)=6.63, p=.014) and ACC  (F(1,38)=5.06, p=.031) that 
fell short of significance after Bonferroni correction. Nevertheless, for visualisation 
purposes, Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 illustrate these findings using depression severity 
cut-off scores from the BDI-II and post-hoc tests using BDI-II cut-off scores as a 
grouping variable.  
 
These post-hoc t-tests showed that participants with high depressive symptoms 
receiving lurasidone had significantly greater NAcc activation to Reward Outcomes 
than participants with low depressive symptoms receiving lurasidone (t(38)=2.49, 
p=.017). Figure 4.9 shows that participants with high depressive symptoms receiving 
lurasidone had greater NAcc activation to Reward Outcomes than participants with 
high depressive symptoms receiving placebo and participants with low depressive 
symptoms receiving placebo, however these differences were not statistically 
significant. For ACC activation during reward outcome, post-hoc t-tests using BDI-II 
cut-off scores as a grouping variable demonstrated that lurasidone potentiated ACC 
activation in participants with high depression severity relative to placebo (t(16)=2.44, 
p=.027). There was also a significant difference between individuals low and high in 








Figure 4.9. Nucleus Accumbens (NAcc) Response to Reward Outcomes (Win>Missed 
Win). Depression severity cut-off scores from the Beck’s Depression Inventory-II, 
with individuals with low depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16, n=24) 
versus high depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 17-43, n=18). Bars represent 
Standard Error.  
 
Figure 4.10. ACC response to Reward Outcomes (Win>Missed Win). Depression 
severity cut-off scores from the Beck’s Depression Inventory-II, with individuals with 
low depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16, n=24) versus high depressive 




 Continuous analyses: using continuous anhedonia scores 4.3.4.4
We also examined whether there were any significant three way interactions with 
continuous scores of anhedonia, which could otherwise be concealed with the use of 
total depression severity scores, which combine various symptoms of depression. This 
was assessed with a repeated-measures ANCOVA for Reward Outcome
8
 with the 
inclusion of continuous anhedonia scores (SHAPS or DARS total score) as the 
covariate of interest. We found a modulation of reward-related outcome responses in 
the NAcc by lurasidone in individuals with more severe anhedonia scores as captured 
by the SHAPS: (F(1,35)=7.93, p=.007; passes Bonferroni correction); but not the  
DARS: F(1,35)=5.73, p=.022). Figure 4.11 shows that under lurasidone, individuals 
with higher anhedonia scores had greater NAcc activity during reward outcomes. 
However, this trend was not found under placebo. 
 
Figure 4.11. NAcc response during Reward Outcome across continuous anhedonia 
scores under lurasidone and placebo. 
 
                                                 
8
 Unlike the analyses with depression severity, we did not use an omnibus model for the 
anhedonia analyses (i.e. using a within-subject variable Outcome Type (Reward outcome, 
penalty outcome), because our hypothesis for anhedonia was specific to positive feedback.  
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 Test of Hypothesis 1d: Penalty Outcome. Lurasidone will reduce the 4.3.4.5
penalty-related feedback signal in the VS, ACC and insula. These effects 
will be most pronounced in individuals with higher depressive 
symptoms. 
 Primary continuous analyses: using continuous depression 4.3.4.6
symptoms scores 
As described in Section 4.3.4.1, the repeated measures ‘omnibus’ ANCOVA revealed 
a significant Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Outcome Type interaction in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (F(1,37)=8.10, p=.007). In this section we sought to 
understand this interaction by conducting a repeated-measures ANCOVA for Penalty 
Outcome separately.  
 
These analyses revealed a significant Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Penalty 
Outcome interaction in the ACC (F(1,38)=11.98, p=.001). Figure 4.12 demonstrates 
that under placebo, individuals with higher depressive symptoms had greater ACC 
activity during penalty outcomes. However, this trend was not found under lurasidone. 
Put simply, brain activity to penalties in the ACC in individuals with elevated 
depression scores under lurasidone, but not placebo, resembles brain activity of 
individuals with low depressive symptoms. In keeping with this result, we found that 
ΔACC (the difference between neural activity under lurasidone and placebo) was 
negatively correlated with depression severity. Figure 4.13 illustrates the finding that 
the absolute difference in neural activity between lurasidone and placebo increased as 






Figure 4.12.Facet plot illustrating ACC response during Penalty Outcome across 
continuous depression scores under lurasidone and placebo. Dashed vertical line 
denotes depression severity cut-off score on the Beck’s Depression Inventory-II.  
 
 
Figure 4.13. Intra-individual change in penalty-related ACC activity (the difference 





A similar pattern of results, namely a signal normalisation, was found in the OFC 
(F(1,37)=4.94, p=.032), but the interaction fell short of significance after Bonferroni 
adjustment.  
 
Although anhedonia was not hypothesised to be associated with penalty outcomes, for 
the sake of a comprehensive overview, we completed an exploratory analysis with a 
repeated-measures ANCOVA for Penalty Outcome with the inclusion of continuous 
anhedonia scores (SHAPS or DARS total score) as the covariate of interest. We found 
no significant main effects or interactions (all p values > .050). 
 
 Secondary categorical analyses: using BDI-II cut-off scores 4.3.4.7
Complementing the primary (continuous variable) analyses, we sought to replicate our 
results using categorical analyses. As described in Section 4.3.4.1, the repeated 
measures ‘omnibus’ ANOVA revealed a significant, revealed a significant 
Medication-by-Depression Group-by-Outcome Type interaction in the ACC 
(F(1,38)=8.68, p=.005). In this section we sought to understand this interaction by 
conducting a repeated-measures ANOVA for Penalty Outcome separately.  
 
This revealed that the Medication-by-Depression Group-by-Penalty Outcome 
interaction was significant in the ACC  (F(1,37)=8.15, p=.007). Figure 4.14 illustrates 
these findings using BDI-II cut-off scores, with individuals with low depressive 
symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16, n=24) versus high depressive symptoms (Total 
BDI-II score: 17-43, n=18). Post-hoc t-tests showed that participants with high 
depressive symptoms receiving placebo had significantly greater ACC activation to 
Penalty Outcomes than participants with high depressive symptoms receiving 
lurasidone (t(19)=2.17, p=.043), and participants with low depressive symptoms 
receiving placebo (t(37)=2.32, p=.026). There was no significant difference between 
individuals with high BDI-II scores on lurasidone and individuals with low BDI-II 
scores on placebo (t(37)=0.48, p=.634). Together, these findings indicate that brain 
activity to penalties in the ACC in individuals with elevated depression scores under 





Figure 4.14. Box Plot illustrating ACC Response to Penalty Outcomes (Loss>Avoided 
Loss). Depression severity cut-off scores from the Beck’s Depression Inventory-II, 
with individuals with low depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16, n=24) 
versus high depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 17-43, n=18). 
 
 Sensitivity analysis: Inclusion of outliers (two subjects) 4.3.5
All analyses for responses to outcomes were repeated including the two participants 
with outlier values and all results remained the same. First, including outlier values in 
the repeated measures ANCOVA (n=42 instead of n=40), did not change the pattern or 
significance of the Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Outcome Type interaction 
in the ACC, OFC and insula, according to the Bonferroni-corrected significance 
threshold (p<.007): ACC (F(1,39)=12.99, p=.001), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
(F(1,39)=4.51, p=.040) and Insula (F(1,39)=4.75, p=.035). Second, the pattern or 
significance of the Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Penalty Outcome 
interaction in the ACC and OFC remained the same (without outlier: ACC 
(F(1,38)=11.98, p=.001); OFC (F(1,37)=4.94, p=.032); with outlier: ACC 
(F(1,39)=13.69, p=.001) OFC (F(1,39)=6.83, p=.013)). Third, the Medication-by-
Depression Severity-by-Reward Outcome interaction did not change (without outlier: 
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the NAcc (F(1,38)=4.87, p=.033) and ACC (F(1,37)=5.92, p=.020); with outlier: 
NAcc (F(1,39)=5.65, p=.022) and ACC (F(1,39)=7.32, p=.010). 
 
 Summary of outcome phase results 4.3.6
To summarise, across reward and penalty outcomes, lurasidone had its strongest effect 
of increasing responses to reward outcomes and decreasing responses to penalty 
outcomes in individuals with high depression severity (Figures 4.9 to 4.13). This 
pattern was statistically significant for penalty outcomes in the ACC, but fell short of 
significance for reward outcomes in the ACC and NAcc. Instead, we found a 
significant effect of medication on reward outcomes with respect to anhedonia 
symptoms. We found that lurasidone significantly increased NAcc activation in 
individuals with higher symptoms of anhedonia. The pattern and significance of all 
these results remained when the outliers were included in the analysis.  
 
Table 4.4. Summary of continuous and categorical analyses for reward and penalty 
outcomes. Results surviving Bonferroni correction for multiple ROI comparisons 




 FMRI Whole-brain analysis for anticipation and outcome phases 4.3.7
The aim of the whole brain analysis was to (i) test whether the task elicited the 
expected pattern of activation during reward and penalty anticipation and outcome 
(outside the effect of the drug) (Knutson et al., 2001) and (ii) model the effects of 
lurasidone and depression status beyond the fronto-striatal network targeted in the ROI 
analyses. 
For the first aim, we found that whole-brain analyses across the entire sample on 
placebo (n= 42) in response to anticipation and receipt of monetary rewards and 
penalties revealed the expected pattern of activation (Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16). 
Specifically, in response to reward anticipation and penalty anticipation, robust 
activation was observed across six common clusters including the striatum, ACC, 
cerebellum, precentral gyrus and motor preparation regions such as the supplementary 
motor area (cluster corrected to p<.050 by being required to exceed an extent of 626 
and 614 continuous voxels for reward and penalty anticipation respectively, as 
determined by AFNI’s 3DClustSim (Cox et al., 2017; Eklund et al., 2016b). 
Anticipation of rewards activated more dorsal regions of the caudate, whilst 
anticipation of penalties was more localised to the nucleus accumbens (ventral 
portion). Moreover, anticipation of losses additionally activated the insula and a 





Figure 4.15. Whole-brain analyses across the entire sample on placebo (n= 42) in 
response to anticipation of rewards (top) and penalties (bottom). Reward anticipation 
elicited robust activation in the caudate (extending into NAcc and putamen), 
supplementary motor area, cerebellum, precentral gyrus and ACC. Penalty anticipation 
was associated with significant increases in activation in the NAcc, cerebellum, 
supplementary motor area, cerebellum, precentral gyrus, insula, ACC and amygdala. 
Cluster corrected to p<.050 by being required to exceed an extent of 626 and 614 
contiguous voxels for reward and penalty anticipation respectively, as determined by 
AFNI’s 3dClustSim (Cox et al., 2017; Eklund et al., 2016b). The image above is 
FWE-corrected to p<.001 for visualisation purposes. Bar represents T-values.  
 
In response to receipt of monetary rewards participants exhibited significantly 
increased activity in bilateral ACC (cluster corrected to p<.050 by being required to 
exceed an extent of 56 continuous voxels in 3DClustSim). Penalty feedback activated 
an extended right lateralised cluster from the medial frontal gyrus to the frontal 
inferior orbital and middle temporal gyrus (cluster corrected to p<.050 by being 





Figure 4.16. Whole-brain analyses across the entire sample on placebo (n= 42) in 
response to feedback of monetary rewards (top) and penalties (bottom). For 
visualisation purposes the image above is p<.001 (uncorrected). Bar represents T-
values. 
 
Overall, task-specific responses for reward/loss anticipation and outcome in the whole 
sample revealed the typical pattern usually observed in reward tasks including all 
ROIs which are known to be involved in the processing of reward and penalties 
(Pizzagalli et al., 2009a; Smoski et al., 2008; Ubl et al., 2015a). 
Second, we used an independent samples t-test to explore the effects of lurasidone and 
depression status beyond the fronto-striatal network targeted in the analyses with the 
seven ROIs. The independent samples t-test demonstrated that there were no 
significant clusters or voxels for the interaction of Medication, Medication Order and 
all contrasts of interest. There were no significant associations between Medication 
and Depression Severity for the contrasts: (i) anticipation neutral>baseline (ii) 
anticipation win>baseline (iii) anticipation loss>baseline and (iv) feedback 
win>missed win. Using an un-corrected threshold, a cluster of 64 voxels in the ACC 
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(x=2,y=34,z=6, t=4.34, p=.046) showed a positive correlation between depression 
severity and the contrast ‘feedback loss>avoided loss’ (placebo > lurasidone). 
However, this cluster did not survive the formal correction.  
 
 Prediction error  4.3.8
 
We next assessed the relationship between reward and penalty-related PE encoding 
and how these interacted with medication and depression severity. As explained in 
Methods Section 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.4.2, this analysis involved a repeated measures 
ANCOVA, where the within-subject variables included both types of PE (PE Type: 
Reward PE, Penalty PE) and Medication (placebo, lurasidone), the between-subject 
factor included Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) and 
Depression Severity (total BDI score) score was the covariate of interest. We tested 
this in the three models (i) Fixed PE Model; (ii) Dynamic PE model for all cues 
combined; (iii) Dynamic PE model for wins and penalty cues separately (please see 
Methods Section 3.8.3.2 for model descriptions).  
 
Across all three PE models we did not find any significant Medication-by-Depression 
Severity-by-PE Type interactions according to the Bonferroni correction (Fixed PE 
Model: amygdala, (F(1,38)=7.04, p=.012); Dynamic PE model for all cues combined: 
amygdala, (F(1,38)=6.58, p=.015); Dynamic PE model for wins and penalty cues 
separately: amygdala, (F(1,38)=5.25, p=.028)). 
The reward and penalty PE may not be symmetrical because the action required in the 
reward condition is an approach behaviour for gain and in the penalty condition it is 
approach behaviour for loss avoidance. Thus, the PE for reward trials and penalty 
trials may not be equivalent. We therefore examined reward and penalty-related PE in 
separate ANCOVA models. 
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 Test of Hypothesis 2a: Reward-related Prediction Error. 4.3.9
Lurasidone will alter (increase or decrease) the reward-related PE 
signal in the striatum, OFC and ACC. These effects will be most 
pronounced in individuals with higher depressive symptoms.  
When we completed the ANCOVA for Reward-related PE, we found a significant 
Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Reward PE interaction in the amygdala for the 
Fixed PE model only (F(1,37)=11.94, p=.001). This is plotted in Figure 4.17 and 
shows that that under lurasidone, individuals with higher depressive symptoms had 




Figure 4.17. Encoding of win-related PE in the amygdala in the Fixed PE model 
 
As mentioned above, there were no significant three-way interactions for the two 
dynamic models once the Bonferroni adjustment was applied: Dynamic PE model for 
all cues combined: OFC, F(1,38)=5.21, p=.028; Insula, F(1,38)=4.39, p=.043) and 
Dynamic PE model for wins and penalty cues separately: Amygdala, F(1,38)=7.59, 
p=.009; ACC, F(1,38)=6.07, p=.018; Insula, F(1,38)=6.43, p=.016; OFC, 
F(1,38)=6.42, p=.016; and Putamen, F(1,38)=6.83, p=.013.  
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 Test of Hypothesis 2b: Penalty-related Prediction Error. 4.3.10
Lurasidone will alter (increase or decrease) the penalty-related PE 
signal in frontal, striatal and limbic regions:  VS, ACC, amygdala and 
insula. These effects will be most pronounced in individuals with higher 
depressive symptoms.  
We next examined penalty-related encoding, and found again, that the only significant 
results for an alteration in PE encoding as a function of drug and depression severity, 
was in the ACC for the Fixed PE model. As illustrated in Figure 4.18, individuals with 
higher depressive symptoms under placebo had higher (more negative) encoding of 
penalty PEs in the ACC and this trend was not found under lurasidone. Put simply, 
encoding of penalty-related PE in the ACC of individuals with elevated depression 
scores under lurasidone, but not placebo, resembled brain activity of individuals with 
low depressive symptoms.  
 
 
Figure 4.18. Encoding of penalty-related PE in the ACC in the Fixed PE model 
 
In comparison to the Fixed PE model, the dynamic models did not show the same 
result, with a non-significant interaction in the amygdala for the Dynamic PE model 
for all cues combined (Amygdala, F(1,38)=5.01, p=.032), and no significant findings 
in the Dynamic PE model for wins and penalty cues separately.  
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We also completed an exploratory analysis to test the association between PE and 
anhedonia. This analysis was completed with the aim to elaborate on the findings for 
hypothesis 1c (significant increases in NAcc signalling to positive feedback with 
increasing anhedonia). We aimed to address the question: is lurasidone boosting 
pleasure experience or reward-related encoding in individuals with elevated 
anhedonia. The latter explanation would be supported by a signiciant Medication-by-
reward-related PE-anhedonia severity interaction in the NAcc. However, a repeated-
measures ANCOVA for reward and penalty-related PE with the inclusion of 
continuous anhedonia scores (SHAPS or DARS total score) as the covariate of interest 
showed no significant main effects or interactions (all p values > .050) across all three 
types of PE model.  
 
 Summary of Prediction Error results 4.3.11
To summarise, we found support for an alteration in reward-related PE encoding in the 
amygdala and penalty-related PE encoding in the ACC in only one of the three PE 
models, namely, the Fixed PE model. The other models did not show alteration in PE 
encoding after Bonferroni correction for multiple ROI comparisons (see Table 4.5). 
The pattern of results was one in which reward-related PE encoding (in the amygdala) 
remained equal across the range of depression severity, with lurasidone having 
opposite effects on encoding in subjects with lower versus higher depressive 
symptoms. On the contrary, encoding of penalty-related PE in the ACC of individuals 
with elevated depression scores under lurasidone, but not placebo, resembled brain 
activity of individuals with low depressive symptoms. This ‘normalisation’ effect 





Table 4.5. Summary of Medication-by Depression Severity-by-PE results used to test 
hypotheses 2a and 2b. Results surviving Bonferroni correction for multiple ROI 





 Brain regions encoding PE: further ROI and whole brain analyses 4.3.12
We also conducted a ROI (small volume correction) analysis in SPM for each ROI 
separately to determine which ROIs (caudate, putamen, NAcc, OFC, ACC, insula and 
amygdala) encoded win- and penalty-related PE. This was done for the whole sample 
across both drugs across the three models. 
 
As shown in Table 4.6, we found that the three types of PE model showed good 
overlap in terms of the brain regions encoding reward and penalty-related PE. The 
regions encoding reward-related PE in the Fixed PE model included the striatum 
(bilateral caudate, putamen and NAcc), ACC and amygdala. In comparison, penalty-
related PE was also encoded in the OFC, but not in the ACC. The Dynamic PE model 
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for all cues combined seems to be the most sensitive model as it had the most number 
of regions encoding reward and penalty-related PE: striatum, ACC, amygdala, OFC 
and insula. For the Dynamic PE model for wins and penalty cues separately, the 
striatum and OFC encoded both reward and penalty PEs, whilst the insula and 
amygdala were only associated with loss-related PEs. An unexpected result across all 
three models was that whilst reward-related PE was encoded in the ACC, there was no 
evidence of penalty-related PE in the ACC.  
 
 
Table 4.6. Regions of Interest (small volume correction) showing reward (n=80) and 
penalty-related (n=84) prediction error encoding in the entire sample on lurasidone 
and placebo.  





 x y z T score p-value
 b
 
Fixed PE Model 
 
     
Reward-related PE      
Right Caudate 14 14 -6 6.8 <.001 
 21 6 21 4.79 .002 
 20 2 23 4.74 .002 
 20 -6 24 4.65 .003 
 20 18 17 3.97 .022 
 20 23 14 3.88 .029 
 21 26 11 3.77 .040 
Left Caudate -14 15 -8 6.71 <.001 
 -15 15 -3 6.22 <.001 
 -11 24 0 4.55 .004 
 -18 6 23 5.44 <.001 
 -21 -20 24 4.47 .005 
 -18 21 12 3.9 .027 
Right Putamen 21 12 -8 7.38 <.001 
 15 14 -6 6.81 <.001 
 27 3 9 4.27 0.009 
 27 -8 12 4.10 0.015 
Left Putamen -17 11 -9 7.53 <.001 
Right Nucleus Accumbens 18 6 -12 5.21 <.001 
 14 8 -8 4.54 <.001 
 8 8 -8 3.34 .014 
Left Nucleus Accumbens -15 6 -11 5.85 <.001 
 -15 8 -8 5.44 <.001 
Right Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
3 35 12 
4.57 
.004 
 3 47 2 3.96 .027 
 5 42 -3 3.95 .028 
301 
 
 8 32 -2 3.88 .034 
 -5 41 5 3.82 .040 
Left Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
-5 54 0 6.21 .001 
 -8 48 -5 6.04 .001 
 -6 42 -6 5.07 .014 
Right Amygdala 24 2 -12 3.93 .007 
 20 5 -17 3.32 .040 
Penalty-related PE      
Right Caudate 17 15 -6 6.55 <.001 
 21 2 23 5.55 <.001 
 21 18 17 5.11 .001 
 21 12 18 5.01 .001 
 20 23 14 4.84 .001 
 21 26 11 4.36 .007 
 23 21 3 3.97 .024 
Left Caudate -15 15 -8 6.85 <.001 
 -15 15 -3 4.96 .001 
 -14 9 23 5.73 <.001 
 -20 3 21 5.57 <.001 
 -12 23 11 5.03 .001 
 -17 23 14 4.73 .002 
 -14 20 14 4.57 .004 
 -21 -15 24 4.48 .005 
 -20 -24 23 4.11 .016 
 -18 -8 24 3.87 .032 
Right Putamen 23 14 -6 7.82 <.001 
 29 3 0 6.27 <.001 
 27 2 8 6.26 <.001 
 30 -9 2 6.01 <.001 
Left Putamen -23 12 -5 8.15 <.001 
 -24 3 9 6.48 <.001 
 -27 -5 8 6.1 <.001 
 -29 -12 6 5.87 <.001 
Right Nucleus Accumbens 17 6 -11 5.34 <.001 
 14 8 -8 3.62 .006 
Left Nucleus Accumbens -17 6 -2 6.03 <.001 
 -15 8 -8 5.04 <.001 
Right Orbital Frontal 
Cortex 
32 -39 18 4.31 .014 
 36 -39 20 4.00 .037 
Right Amygdala 29 0 -12 4.34 .002 
 24 2 -12 3.94 .007 
Left Amygdala -24 0 -12 3.87 .009 
Dynamic PE model for all 
cues combined 
 
     
Reward-related PE      
Right Caudate 16 12 -12 5.29 <.001 
 16 16 -10 5.07 .001 
 10 20 -8 4.04 .023 
302 
 
 20 4 20 4.6 .004 
 20 -8 24 4.17 .016 
 20 24 10 4.06 .022 
Left Caudate -18 20 8 4.28 .011 
 -20 2 22 4.22 .014 
 -18 12 16 4.31 .010 
 -12 14 -12 3.89 .036 
Right Putamen 20 14 -10 6.20 <.001 
 28 -14 10 4.13 .018 
Left Putamen -20 14 -10 5.32 <.001 
 -20 18 8 4.17 .016 
Right Nucleus Accumbens 16 12 -14 5.56 <.001 
Left Nucleus Accumbens -16 10 -14 503 <.001 
Right Orbital Frontal 
Cortex 
18 14 -16 6.32 <.001 
 32 -38 20 3.98 .045 
Left Orbital Frontal Cortex -16 14 -16 6.30 <.001 
Right Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
10 34 2 4.00 .032 
Left Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
-2 54 -2 5.29 <.001 
 -4 42 2 4.63 .004 
 -6 48 -4 4.11 .023 
Left Insula -24 10 -18 4.88 .003 
Right Amygdala 20 6 -18 5.72 <.001 
Left Amygdala -24 4 -18 4.74 .001 
Penalty-related PE      
Right Caudate 20 2 22 5.26 <.001 
 18 24 12 4.72 .002 
 20 18 16 4.28 .010 
 18 14 20 4.26 .011 
 20 26 6 4.18 .014 
 14 14 -12 3.91 .032 
Left Caudate -16 6 22 5.38 <.001 
 -20 -14 24 5.01 .001 
 -18 -6 24 4.45 .006 
 -12 22 10 5.15 .001 
 -16 26 4 4.25 .011 
Right Putamen 24 12 -10 5.3 <.001 
 28 4 -8 5.02 .001 
 30 0 -2 4.83 .002 
 28 -6 8 4.72 .002 
 30 -6 -2 4.46 .006 
Left Putamen -26 6 -6 4.86 .002 
 -24 10 -10 4.85 .002 
 -28 -12 2 4.71 .003 
 -24 2 10 4.59 .004 
 -26 6 2 4.58 .004 
 -28 -8 8 4.54 .005 
Right Nucleus Accumbens 12 12 -14 5.13 <.001 
Left Nucleus Accumbens -16 10 -14 4.68 <.001 
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Right Orbital Frontal 
Cortex 
18 14 -16 5.18 .001 
Left Orbital Frontal Cortex -18 14 -14 5.07 .001 
Left Insula -26 8 -14 4.47 .010 
 -24 10 -18 3.96 .050 
Right Amygdala 28 0 -12 4.57 .001 
 22 6 -18 4.42 .002 
Left Amygdala -26 2 -16 4.43 .002 
Dynamic PE model for 
wins and penalty cues 
separately 
 
     
Reward-related PE      
Right Caudate 20 22 2 4.14 .018 
Left Caudate -18 22 6 4.07 .023 
 -16 20 -4 3.94 .033 
 -12 24 -4 3.79 .050 
 -18 6 22 3.92 .035 
Right Putamen 22 16 -8 4.48 .006 
 26 8 2 4.27 .012 
 24 12 -2 4.2 .016 
 20 18 2 3.86 .042 
Left Putamen -20 16 -8 4.49 .006 
 -18 20 -4 4.22 .015 
Right Nucleus Accumbens 16 14 -12 3.69 0.007 
 12 12 -14 3.45 0.013 
Right Orbital Frontal 
Cortex 
18 14 -16 
4.59 
.006 
Left Orbital Frontal Cortex -18 14 -16 4.00 .043 
      
Right Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
10 34 
0 4.41 .010 
 0 34 8 4.23 .017 
Left Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
-4 40 
2 4.68 .004 
 -6 54 -2 4.08 .027 
 -6 48 -4 3.88 .048 
Penalty-related PE 20 2 22 4.99 .001 
Right Caudate 18 20 14 4.42 .006 
 20 22 -4 4.46 .005 
Left Caudate -18 6 20 4.91 .001 
 -20 -18 24 4.75 .002 
 -12 22 8 3.95 .026 
 -16 26 2 3.84 .037 
Right Putamen 30 -4 2 6.13 <.001 
 24 14 -6 5.94 <.001 
 30 0 -10 5.27 <.001 
Left Putamen -28 -12 2 6.04 <.001 
 -26 4 2 5.79 <.001 
 -24 16 -8 5.04 .001 
Right Nucleus Accumbens -16 10 -14 4.45 <.001 
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Left Nucleus Accumbens 16 12 -14 3.5 .010 
Right Orbital Frontal 
Cortex 
18 14 -14 4.12 .025 
Left Orbital Frontal Cortex -18 14 -16 4.71 .003 
Left Insula -26 8 -14 4.69 .004 
Right Amygdala 30 -2 -12 4.99 <.001 
Left Amygdala  -26 -2 -12 4.32 .002 
 -26 2 -16 4.27 .003 
a Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates.  
b Significance at p<.05 (family-wise error-corrected for anatomical region of interest). 
Region of Interests (ROIs) tested: Bilateral caudate, putamen, nucleus accumbens 





In addition to the ROI analyses of PE, we conducted a whole-brain analysis for the 
whole sample across both drugs (84 scans). The results are displayed in Figure 4.19 to 







Figure 4.19. Whole-brain analyses showing regions of the brain that significantly 
encode reward (top) and penalty (bottom) related PE in the whole sample across 
placebo and lurasidone (n=84 scans) using the Fixed PE Model. Regions significantly 
encoding reward-related PE include R putamen, R lingual, bilateral frontal superior 
cortex, and bilateral occipital cortex. Regions significantly associated with penalty-
related PE include bilateral putamen, lingual gyrus and precentral gyrus. Cluster 
corrected to p<.050 by being required to exceed an extent of 567 and 742 contiguous 
voxels for reward and penalty PE respectively, as determined by AFNI’s 3dClustSim 







Figure 4.20. Whole-brain analyses showing regions of the brain that significantly 
encode reward (top) and penalty (bottom) related PE in the whole sample across 
placebo and lurasidone (n=84 scans) using the Dynamic PE model for all cues 
combined. Regions significantly encoding reward-related PE include posterior OFC, 
cingulate, occipital cortex, frontal superior cortex, hippocampus, caudate and medial 
PFC. Regions significantly associated with penalty-related PE include caudate, lingual 
gyrus, rectus and precuneus. Cluster corrected to p<.050 by being required to exceed 
an extent of 301 and 430 contiguous voxels for reward and penalty PE respectively, as 







Figure 4.21. Whole-brain analyses showing regions of the brain that significantly 
encode reward (top) and penalty (bottom) related PE in the whole sample across 
placebo and lurasidone (n=84 scans) using the Dynamic PE model for wins and 
penalty cues separately. Regions significantly encoding reward-related PE include 
middle frontal cortex, calcerine, caudate, rectus, posterior OFC. Regions significantly 
associated with penalty-related PE include calcarine, bilateral putamen, R middle 
frontal cortex and R precentral cortex. Cluster corrected to p<.050 by being required to 
exceed an extent of 175 and 206 contiguous voxels for reward and penalty PE 
respectively, as determined by AFNI’s 3dClustSim (Cox et al., 2017; Eklund et al., 







 Tests to validate the PE models 4.3.13
We completed additional analyses on the PE model to examine whether the penalty-
related PE could be differentiated from the ACC activity during the error related trials 
(i.e. penalty feedback) per se. Indeed, a common issue for studies investigating the 
neural coding of PEs is the inherent correlation between PE trajectories and outcome 
magnitudes (Chowdhury et al., 2013a). This bears the risk that neural PE signals might 
be largely driven by the outcome magnitude alone. To address this issue, we correlated 
the extracted values from the ACC ROI for Penalty feedback (‘feedback loss>avoid 
loss’) and Penalty-related PE (penalty PE > baseline). They were highly correlated 
(r=-.98, p<.001 for both drugs across subjects) in the Fixed PE model and also 
significantly correlated in the Dynamic PE model for all cues combined. However, this 
was not the case for the other dynamic PE model. 
Table 4.7. Correlation between extracted values from the ACC ROI for Penalty 
feedback (‘feedback loss>avoid loss’) and Penalty-related PE (penalty PE > baseline) 
across the three PE models: Fixed PE Model, Dynamic PE model for all cues 
combined, Dynamic PE model for wins and penalty cues separately.  
 
Fixed PE model 
Dynamic PE model for 
all cues combined 
Dynamic PE model for 



























































We next correlated the penalty feedback regressor with the penalty PE regressor within 
subject across the fixed and dynamic PE models. As shown in Table 4.8 below, there 
were no significant correlations, and this remained when we combined runs 1 + 2 of 
the MID tasks for each drug (lurasidone run 1+2, placebo runs 1+2). Thus, collinearty 
was not an issue in any of the models. However, the result seemed odd given that both 
regressors were convolved with the HRF and we would therefore expect them to have 
a higher correlation than r=0.004.  
Table 4.8. Correlation between penalty feedback regressor and penalty PE regressor in 
one subject across the fixed and dynamic PE models. 
 
In order to understand why these regressors were not correlated, we plotted the 
regressors for the Fixed PE model and the moving average (Dynamic) PE model. 
 Correlation between 
penalty feedback 
regressor and penalty 
PE regressor 
Fixed PE Model  Dynamic PE models 
 
placebo MID run 1 
  
r=-0.004, p=.949 r=-0.002, p=.971 
placebo MID run 2  
  
r=-0.004, p=.957 r=0.002, p=.975 
lurasidone MID run 1 
  
r=-0.002, p=.980 r=0.001, p=.986 
lurasidone MID run 2 
  




Figure 4.22. Plots showing correlations and anti-correlations between penalty 
feedback regressor and the Penalty-related PE regressor (parametric modulator) in one 
subject for the Fixed and Dynamic PE models.  
 
The correlations may have be low between the feedback and parametric modulator PE 
regressor because, while the time series for errors is a simple event, the PE regressors 
are correlated (with the loss related) on some trials and anti-correlated at other time 
points. Thus, the dips in the red line cancel out the peaks in the blue line.  
Taken together, the analyses above suggest that the PE signalling cannot be reliably 




 Sensitivity Analyses 4.4
The aim of these final set of analyses was to test the sensitivity or ‘fine-tune’ the 
predicted outcomes of hypotheses (1) and (2). This section thus aims to rule out a 
scenario in which the significant results described above are confounded by (a) 
comorbid anxiety symptoms; (b) self-reported changes in sedation and/or state-anxiety 
scores and (c) the predicted increase in  baseline regional (striatal)  CBF or shifts in 
global CBF under lurasidone relative to placebo in all participants.  
 
 Test of Hypothesis 3a. Lurasidone’s effects on reward and penalty 4.4.1
processing in depression will not be confounded by comorbid anxiety 
disorders. 
In order to test this hypothesis, we first tested for an association between dimensional 
anxiety scores and brain activation. If there were to be no association, then there 
would be no need to include it as a covariate in the depression severity ANCOVA 
models used in hypotheses 1a-2b above (as recommended by Miller and Chapman 
2001).  
A repeated measures ANCOVA was completed for the anticipation phase (Cue Type 
(Reward, Penalty, Neutral)) and outcome phase (Outcome Type (Reward Outcome 
versus Penalty Outcome)) of the task with Medication (placebo or lurasidone) as the 
within-subject factor, Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) as 
the between-subject factor; and Anxiety Severity (total anxiety score from the HADS) 
as the covariate of interest. There were no significant associations between brain 
activity and anxiety and no significant interactions between Medication, Anxiety 
Severity and Anticipation cue in the ACC (F(2,74)=0.01, p=.995), Caudate 
(F(2,74)=0.32, p=.727), Putamen (F(2,74)=0.58, p=.944), Amygdala (F(2,74)=0.64,  
p=.938), OFC (F(2,74)=0.05,  p=.995), NAcc (F(2,74)=1.09, p=.341), and Insula ROIs 
(F(2,74)=0.13, p=.987). There were also no significant three way interactions between 
Medication, Anxiety Severity and Outcome Type in the ACC (F(1,37)=5.92,  p=.020), 
Amygdala (F(1,37)=0.59,  p=.449), OFC (F(1,37)=1.02,  p=.319), Caudate 
(F(1,37)=2.82,  p=.101), Putamen (F(1,37)=5.92, p=.020), NAcc (F(1,37)=0.08,  
p=.931) and Insula ROIs (F(1,37)=3.27,  p=.079) after Bonferroni correction for 
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multiple (seven) ROI comparisons. Therefore, anxiety severity was not included as a 
covariate in the ANCOVA model with depression severity (Miller and Chapman, 
2001). 
 
 Test of Hypothesis 3b. Lurasidone’s effects on reward and penalty 4.4.2
processing in depression will not be confounded by self-reported 
changes in sedation or state-anxiety scores. 
As described in Section 3.2.2, the effects of lurasidone on sedation and state-anxiety 
were measured at three time points: pre-scan, peak-of-drug and post-scan utilising the 
VAS and STAI-S questionnaires respectively.  It is important to examine subjective 
ratings to exclude the possibility that any effects of lurasidone on behavioural/neural 
responses to rewards or penalties are secondary to an alteration in somnolence, 
alertness or tranquillity. 
Thus, we examined the effect of Medication, Medication Order and Depression 
Severity on the change in Sedation ratings (Total Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) 
scores) and State-anxiety ratings (total STAI score) from pre-drug administration 
(Measure 1) to peak-of-drug (Measure 2). The change scores for these measures are 
shown in Table 4.3, Figure 4.23 and Figure 4.24. The repeated measures ANCOVA 
revealed that the interactions between Medication and State-anxiety (F(1,37)=0.14,  
p=.708) and interactions between Medication and Sedation ratings (F(1,40)=0.20,  
p=.658) were non-significant. There were no significant interactions with Medication 
Order (all p values > 0.05). Three way interactions between Medication, Depression 
Severity and Sedation (F(1,40)=1.34,  p=.253), and, Medication, Depression Severity 
and State-anxiety (F(1,40)=0.04,  p=.480) were also non-significant. These results 
suggest that lurasidone did not lead to a significant change in sedation or state anxiety 
relative to placebo over a period of three hours, and that this was consistent across the 




Figure 4.23. Effect of medication on State Anxiety Scores (STAI-S) by depression 
severity cut-off scores from the Beck’s Depression Inventory-II:  individuals with low 
depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 0-16 (normal-mild mood disturbance), 
n=24) versus high depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II score: 17-43 (borderline-severe 
depression), n=18). The higher the score, the more anxious the participant felt. Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
 
We then completed an additional analysis of the VAS in which the 16 scales of the 
VAS were reduced to two summary factors of Alertness and Tranquillity (Herbert et 
al., 1976) (see Methods Section 3.2.2 and Figure 4.24). The change in Alertness and 
Tranquillity ratings from pre-drug to peak-of-drug were then entered into the same 
repeated measures ANCOVA described above. For the alertness factor, we found no 
significant effect of Medication (F(1,40)=0.12,  p=.727), Medication Order 
(F(1,40)=1.15,  p=.289) or any interactions between these factors and Depression 
Severity. For the tranquillity factor, we also found no significant effect of Medication 
(F(1,40)=0.20,  p=.660), Medication Order (F(1,40)=1.57,  p=.217) or any interactions 





Figure 4.24. Effect of medication on the Visual Analogue Scale separated by 
Alertness and Tranquillity and depression severity cut-off scores from the Beck’s 
Depression Inventory-II:  individuals with low depressive symptoms (Total BDI-II 
score: 0-16 (normal-mild mood disturbance), n=24) versus high depressive symptoms 
(Total BDI-II score: 17-43 (borderline-severe depression), n=18). The higher the 
score, the more alert/tranquil the participant felt. Error bars represent the standard 
error of the mean.  
 
Overall, we found no evidence that an acute dose of lurasidone alters subjective 
ratings of state anxiety, overall sedation scores, nor its subcomponent factors of 
alertness and tranquillity. Therefore, there was no need to include subjective ratings as 
a covariate in the depression severity ANCOVA models used in hypotheses 1a-2b 
above (as recommended by Miller and Chapman 2001).  
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 Test of Hypothesis 3c. Cerebral Blood flow. Lurasidone will increase 4.4.3
striatal cerebral blood flow in all participants relative to placebo. 
Lurasidone’s effects on reward and penalty processing in depression will 
not be confounded by baseline shifts in regional and global cerebral 
blood flow (CBF). 
In order to examine whether lurasidone increases resting CBF, a paired-sample t-test 
compared the whole-brain CBF maps collected after administration of lurasidone 
against those acquired after placebo in the whole sample (n=43). As shown in Figure 
4.25, a paired-samples t-test across the whole-brain showed that lurasidone increased 
CBF in bilateral putamen. These results was very robust as increases in CBF in the 
putamen were significant at the peak level whole-brain analyses, FWE-corrected (left 
putamen x= -26, y= -4, z= 2, t= 6.15: p=.002, right putamen x= 28, y= -2, z= 2, t= 
5.50: p=.015), which is a conservative threshold (Eklund et al., 2016a). Significant 
increases in blood flow were not observed in any frontal brain regions.   
 
 
Figure 4.25. Increased cerebral blood flow in bilateral putamen for lurasidone relative 
to placebo during rest in the whole sample (n=43). Significant at the peak level whole-
brain analyses, FWE-corrected (left putamen x= -26, y= -4, z= 2, t= 6.15: p=.002, right 




Average global mean CBF values (ml/100g/min) in grey matter for lurasidone were: 
44.65 +/- 1.17; and for placebo were: 44.36 +/- 1.14; the average mean CBF values in 
the putamen under lurasidone were: 65.11 +/- 1.52; and under placebo were: 59.72 +/- 
1.33; and the maximum CBF values in the putamen under lurasidone were: 75.82 +/- 
1.67; and on placebo were: 70.01 +/- 1.62. These are displayed in Figure 4.26. 
 
We next tested whether these global and striatal CBF values were related to depressive 
symptoms. Quantitative measures of mean global CBF and putamen CBF were 
extracted for each participant after placebo and lurasidone and entered into a repeated 
measures ANCOVA with the following factors: Medication (placebo, lurasidone) as 
the within-subject variable, Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, lurasidone-
placebo) as the between-subject factor, and Depression Severity (total BDI score) as 
the covariate of interest. The repeated measures ANCOVA revealed that the extracted 
global and striatal CBF values were not related to Depression Severity (F=0.02, df=1, 
40, p=.903), Medication Order (F=0.44, df=1, 40, p=.903), or any three-way 
interactions with these respective factors (F=0.01, df=1, 40, p=.952); (F=1.10, df=1, 
40, p=.300). Therefore, lurasidone increased striatal CBF regardless of depressive 






Figure 4.26. Mean (A) global and (B) regional (putamen) cerebral blood flow in grey 
matter across the entire sample (n=43) in relation to continuous depressive total 
symptom scores on the Beck’s depression Inventory (BDI-II).  
 
In order to ensure that the BOLD results in the ACC were independent of changes in 
underlying CBF, we tested the effects of acute lurasidone administration on global and 
regional blood flow. As shown in Figure 4.25 above, lurasidone increased CBF in 
bilateral putamen relative to placebo during rest in the whole sample (n=43) but 
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significant increases in blood flow were not observed in the ACC. The change in CBF 
values for each of the seven ROIs were extracted and used as covariates for the same 
region in the fMRI BOLD analyses. This did not lead to any changes in the results: 
non-significant results remained non-significant and significant results remained 
significant. In particular, the Medication-by-Depression Severity-by-Outcome Type 
interaction in the ACC (F(1,36)=8.13, p=.007) (Hypothesis 1d in Section 4.3.4 above). 
Moreover, we correlated the difference between BOLD responses to reward/penalty 
outcomes on placebo versus lurasidone with the change in global and regional CBF 
between the lurasidone and placebo visits. The rationale was that if BOLD signal 
changes were due to CBF changes, then the two changes should be correlated. We 
found that these global (r=0.06, p=.749) and regional putamen (r=0.22, p=.199) and 
ACC (r=0.18, p=.306) CBF values were not correlated with reward and penalty-related 
BOLD signal changes in the ACC. This suggested that the ‘main’ effect of lurasidone 
on CBF did not relate to the changes in signal on the task or the altered baseline was 





















 Discussion Chapter 5 -
This thesis examined three hypotheses for the effect of lurasidone on (1) neural 
correlates of reward and penalty processing and (2) reward and penalty-related 
prediction error signal and (3) cerebral blood flow (CBF) in depression. 
 
Depression is characterised by hyporeactivity to reward (Admon et al., 2015a; Forbes 
et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2010; Gotlib et al., 2010a; Knutson et al., 2008; Luking et 
al., 2016c; Olino et al., 2014; Pizzagalli et al., 2009b; Rzepa et al., 2017; Segarra et al., 
2016; Sharp et al., 2014) and hyperactivity to penalties (Admon et al., 2015a; 
Engelmann et al., 2017; Gotlib et al., 2010b; Luking et al., 2016b), and thus an 
antidepressant effect could be brought about by increasing reward, decreasing salience 
to negative events, or, both simultaneously. Given the relative paucity of literature on 
processing of losses, this thesis was designed to interrogate both anticipation and 
feedback of rewards and penalties. Broadly speaking, we hypothesised a normalisation 
of fronto-striatal reward and penalty function and prediction error following acute-
dose administration in depression. We anticipated that participants scoring high on 
depression would show a baseline difference in fronto-striatal activity which would be 
reverted by acute-dose lurasidone. Moreover, we sought to address a key concern in 
pharmacoimaging studies, namely that shifts in global or regional CBF could underlie 
changes observed in BOLD fMRI signal. We therefore also used ASL, an imaging 
modality that allows the quantification of cerebral blood flow at rest, to disentangle 
global and regional CBF changes from BOLD fMRI signal. As such, this was the first 
investigation examining the acute effects of lurasidone in the human brain (across a 
spectrum of depression severity), on a well-validated neuroimaging reward task, 





 Summary of results: effects of lurasidone on reward and 5.1
penalty outcomes, prediction error and cerebral blood 
flow 
The results and how they relate to their respective hypotheses is summarised in Table 
5.1. In this thesis, I compared the effects of lurasidone and placebo on neural 
responding to reward and penalties and CBF in medication-naïve young-adult subjects 
across the range of depression severity.  
During the anticipation phase of the task we did not find evidence in favour of 
hypothesis 1a and 1b as there were no significant three-way interactions with 
depression severity and medication. Instead, we unexpectedly found a Medication-by-
Anticipation Cue interaction such that lurasidone reduced responses to win and loss 
cues versus placebo, and potentiated responses for neutral cues in the ACC and 
caudate across the entire sample (i.e. regardless of depression and anhedonia severity).  
In contrast, we found support for hypothesis 1d (lurasidone will reduce the penalty-
related feedback signal. These effects will be most pronounced in individuals with 
higher depressive symptoms). Brain activity in the ACC to Penalty Outcomes in 
individuals with high symptoms of depression under lurasidone, but not placebo, 
resembled brain activity of individuals with low symptoms of depression. Specifically, 
lurasidone reduced ACC signalling to negative feedback in young people with 
elevated depressive symptoms. We found an opposite pattern of signal normalisation 
for Reward Outcomes in the ACC and NAcc. Lurasidone enhanced ACC and NAcc 
signalling to positive feedback in depressed individuals, however, this pattern did not 
remain significant after stringent correction for multiple ROI comparisons. Instead, we 
found that lurasidone significantly increased NAcc activation in individuals with 
higher symptoms of anhedonia as captured by the SHAPS anhedonia questionnaire. 
Thus, we found partial support for hypothesis 1c (lurasidone will increase the reward 
feedback signal in the caudate, putamen and NAcc. These effects will be most 
pronounced in individuals with higher depressive symptoms and consumatory 
anhedonia). We did not find any three-way interactions in the whole brain analyses 
(i.e. beyond the hypothesised regions). All the ROI results remained when the outliers 
were included in the analysis.  
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For the prediction error analyses, we found statistically significant support for an 
alteration in reward-related PE encoding (hypothesis 2a) in the amygdala and penalty-
related PE encoding (hypothesis 2b) in the ACC in one of the three PE models, 
namely, the Fixed PE model. The other dynamic models did not show statistically 
significant alterations in PE encoding after Bonferroni correction for multiple ROI 
comparisons. The ‘normalisation’ effect in the Fixed PE model for penalty–related PE 
encoding in the ACC seemed to be a mirror of the results found for ACC activation to 
penalty outcomes. 
We found evidence in favour of all three sensitivity analyses (hypotheses 3a,3b, and 
3c), First, there was no association between continuous anxiety severity measures and 
lurasidone’s effects on reward/penalty anticipation and outcome. Second, we found no 
evidence that an acute dose of lurasidone alters subjective ratings of state anxiety, 
overall sedation scores, nor its subcomponent factors of alertness and tranquillity. 
Third, we demonstrated that lurasidone significantly increased CBF in the striatum 
(namely the putamen) in all participants relative to placebo. Increased regional blood 
flow in the putamen under lurasidone, and changes in global blood flow did not drive 
the BOLD MID findings. Taken together, the sensitivity analyses confirmed that 
anxiety, self-reported changes in sedation and state anxiety, and baseline shifts in CBF 
did not confound lurasidone’s effects on reward and penalty processing in depression. 
We also completed another set of analyses, which were not directly linked to our 
hypotheses, but nevertheless provided a foundation for validating the results of our 
hypotheses. In terms of behavioural performance on the MID task, we found good task 
adherence (high response rate and low number of premature responses) in all but one 
participant. We found that relative to placebo, lurasidone reduced the number of 
premature responses to penalty cues relative to neutral cues. However, there were no 
significant effects of medication on reward and penalty processing performance (total 
winnings, RTs and Accuracy). Instead, we found an effect of cue type on RT and 
accuracy such that there were faster and more accurate responses to reward and 
penalty cues relative to no-incentive cues. This suggests that the BOLD fMRI findings 
were not confounded by group differences in task performance. For the whole-brain 
analyses, we found that the MID task activated commonly reported regions of the 
brain during reward and penalty anticipation and outcome on placebo across the entire 
sample. We also showed that reward and penalty-related prediction errors were 
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encoded in the majority of our fronto-striatal-limbic ROIs. However, when validating 
the PE models we found that PE signalling could not be relaibaly distinguished from 
outcome magnitudes. Lastly, we showed that there were no significant effects of 
medication or depression severity on head movements in the scanner and no subjects 
were excluded due to movement differences. 
Taken together, an acute dose of lurasidone normalises (reduces) neural ACC 
responses to negative outcomes and penalty-related PE, without modification of 
behaviour in individuals with elevated depressive symptoms. Lurasidone also 
normalises (increases) striatal (NAcc) responses to positive feedback as a function of 
increasing anhedonia severity. These results provide evidence for abnormalities in 
neural reward-penalty systems in depression and highlight the potential of targeted 
pharmacological treatments to normalise penalty and reward-related processing in 





Table 5.1. Summary of the main hypotheses tested in this thesis with reference to the statistical models employed for testing the hypotheses, main 
results, and whether these hypotheses were supported. 
 
Hypothesis Test of hypothesis  Result from this study Hypothesis 
supported? 
Hypothesis 1a. Reward 
Anticipation. Lurasidone 
will increase striatal 
activation during reward 
anticipation and these effects 
will be most pronounced in 
individuals with higher 
depressive symptoms and 
anhedonia. 
ROI: (caudate, putamen,  NAcc, OFC, ACC, 
insula, amygdala) 
 
Omnibus model: Repeated-measures ANCOVA. 
Factors: Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and 
Anticipation Cue (neutral, win, loss) as within-
subject variables, Medication Order as the 
between-subject factor, and Depression Severity 
(total BDI score) OR Anhedonia Severity (total 




No significant interactions of anticipation cue with 
depression severity, anhedonia severity or 
medication. 
 
Medication-by-Anticipation Cue interaction such that 
lurasidone reduced responses to win and loss cues 
versus placebo, and increased responses for neutral 
cues in the ACC and caudate across the entire sample 




Hypothesis 1b. Penalty 
Anticipation. Lurasidone 
will alter the penalty-related 
anticipation signal in ACC, 
anterior insula, amygdala 
and striatal regions and 
these effects will be greatest 
in individuals with higher 
depressive symptoms. 
 
As above (but no test with anhedonia severity) No significant interactions of anticipation cue with 
depression severity or medication. 
 
No. 
Hypothesis 1c. Reward 
Outcome. Lurasidone will 
increase the reward 
Primary (continuous analyses) 
 
Omnibus model: Repeated measures ANCOVA 
Primary (continuous analyses) 
 





feedback signal in the 
ventral striatum, namely the 
caudate, putamen and NAcc. 
These effects will be most 
pronounced in individuals 
with higher depressive 
symptoms. 
for each ROI. This included the factors: 
Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and Outcome 
Type (reward, penalty) as within-subject variables, 
Medication Order as the between-subject factor, 
and Depression Severity (total BDI-II score) as 
the covariate of interest. 
 
Repeated measures ANCOVA for brain 
responses to Reward Outcomes with factors: 
Medication (placebo, lurasidone) as within-
subject variables, Medication Order as the 
between-subject factor, and Depression Severity 
(total BDI-II score) or Anhedonia Severity 
(SHAPS or DARS total score) as the covariate of 
interest. 
 
Secondary (categorical analyses) 
 
Omnibus model: Repeated-measures ANOVA 
with Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and 
Outcome Type (Reward Outcome versus Penalty 
Outcome) as the within-subject variables and 
Depression Group (low (BDI-II score: 0-16) 
versus high (BDI-II score: 17-43) depressive 
symptoms) and Medication Order as the between-
subject factors.  
 
Repeated measures ANOVA for brain 




and NAcc responses to Reward Outcomes in 
individuals with high depression severity, however, 
this pattern did not remain significant after stringent 
correction for multiple ROI comparisons. 
 
Lurasidone significantly increased NAcc activation 










Secondary (categorical analyses) 
 
Medication-by-Depression Group-by-Reward 
Outcome interaction in the NAcc and ACC fell short 
of significance after Bonferroni correction. 
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Hypothesis 1d. Penalty 
Outcome. Lurasidone will 
reduce the penalty-related 
feedback signal in the VS, 
ACC and insula. These 
effects will be most 
pronounced in individuals 
with higher depressive 
symptoms. 
Primary (continuous analyses) 
 
Omnibus model: Repeated measures ANCOVA 
for each ROI. This included the factors: 
Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and Outcome 
Type (reward, penalty) as within-subject variables, 
Medication Order as the between-subject factor, 
and Depression Severity (total BDI-II score) as 
the covariate of interest. 
 
Repeated measures ANCOVA for brain 
responses to Penalty Outcomes with factors: 
Medication (placebo, lurasidone) as within-
subject variables, Medication Order as the 
between-subject factor, and Depression Severity 
(total BDI-II score). 
 
 
Secondary (categorical analyses) 
Omnibus model: Repeated-measures ANOVA 
(as above).  
Primary (continuous analyses) 
 
Lurasidone had its strongest effect of decreasing 
ACC responses to Penalty Outcomes in individuals 














Secondary (categorical analyses) 
Medication-by-Depression Group-by-Penalty 
Outcome interaction was significant in the ACC. 
Post-hoc t-tests showed that brain activity to 
penalties in the ACC in individuals with elevated 
depression scores under lurasidone, but not placebo, 




related Prediction Error. 
Lurasidone will alter 
(increase or decrease) the 
reward-related PE signal in 
the striatum, OFC and ACC. 
Omnibus model: repeated measures ANCOVA, 
where the within-subject variables included 
Medication (placebo, lurasidone) and PE Type 
(Reward PE, Penalty PE), the between-subject 
factor included Medication Order (placebo-
lurasidone, lurasidone-placebo) and Depression 
Fixed PE model: Under lurasidone, individuals with 
higher depressive symptoms had stronger reward PE 
encoding in the amygdala. However, this trend was 
not found under placebo. 
 






These effects will be most 
pronounced in individuals 







Severity (total BDI score) score was the covariate 
of interest. 
 
ANCOVA for reward and penalty PE separately 
for all three types of PE model: Fixed PE model, 
Dynamic PE model for all cues combined and the 
Dynamic PE model for wins and penalty cues 
separately. 
correction for the Dynamic PE model for all cues 
combined and the Dynamic PE model for wins and 
penalty cues separately. 
Hypothesis 2b. Penalty-
related Prediction Error. 
Lurasidone will alter 
(increase or decrease)  the 
penalty-related PE signal in 
frontal, striatal and limbic 
regions:  VS, ACC, 
amygdala and insula. These 
effects will be most 
pronounced in individuals 
with higher depressive 
symptoms. 
As above. Fixed PE model: Individuals with higher depressive 
symptoms under placebo had higher (more negative) 
encoding of penalty PEs in the ACC and this trend 
was not found under lurasidone. 
 
No significant results following Bonferroni 
correction for the Dynamic PE model for all cues 
combined and the Dynamic PE model for wins and 





Hypothesis 3a.  
Lurasidone’s effects on 
reward and penalty 
processing in depression will 
not be confounded by 
comorbid anxiety disorders. 
Tested for an association between dimensional 
anxiety scores and brain activation. If there were 
to be no association, then there would be no need 
to include it as a covariate in the depression 
severity ANCOVA models used in hypotheses 1a-
2b above 
 
No significant associations between brain activity 
and anxiety and no significant interactions between 
Medication, Anxiety Severity and Anticipation 




Lurasidone’s effects on 
reward and penalty 
processing in depression will 
VAS and STAI-S change scores (pre-drug to 
peak-of-drug) entered into a repeated measures 
ANCOVA with Medication (placebo or 
lurasidone) as the within-subject variable, 
No evidence that an acute dose of lurasidone alters 
subjective ratings of state anxiety, overall sedation 





not be confounded by self-
reported changes in sedation 
or state-anxiety scores. 
Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, 
lurasidone-placebo) as the between-subject 
variable, and Depression Severity (total BDI 
score) as the covariate interest. 
 
Hypothesis 3c.  
Cerebral Blood Flow. 
Lurasidone will increase 
striatal cerebral blood flow 
in all participants relative to 
placebo. Lurasidone’s effects 
on reward and penalty 
processing in depression will 
not be confounded by 
baseline shifts in regional 
and global cerebral blood 
flow (CBF). 
Whole brain: paired-sample t-test (lurasidone 
versus placebo) in whole sample (n=43). 
 
ROI: repeated-measures ANCOVA for global 
and striatal CBF factors: Medication (placebo, 
lurasidone) as the within-subject variable, 
Medication Order (placebo-lurasidone, 
lurasidone-placebo) as the between-subject factor, 
and Depression Severity (total BDI score) as the 
covariate of interest. 
 
 
Global and regional CBF between the lurasidone 
and placebo visits was entered as covariates in all 
ROI BOLD fMRI analyses (hypotheses 1a-2b). 
 
Difference between BOLD responses to 
reward/penalty outcomes on placebo versus 
lurasidone correlated with the change in global 
and regional CBF between the lurasidone and 
placebo visits. 
Lurasidone increased cerebral blood flow in the 
striatum (namely the putamen) in all participants 











No significant change in results when global and 
regional CBF used as covariates.  
 
 
Global and regional putamen and ACC CBF values 
were not correlated with reward and penalty-related 




 Discussion of behavioural findings  5.2
Consistent with prior reports on adults with MDD, we did not find differences in 
behavioural performance as a function of depression severity thereby suggesting that 
the neural findings on group differences cannot be dismissed as artefacts related to a 
differing task performance (Admon et al., 2017). This is in line with findings from the 
literature review in Introduction Section 1.6 that the empirical association between 
brain and behaviour findings in reward processing in depression often do not overlap. 
Whereas many purely behavioural studies report a significant relationship between 
reward processing and depression (Henriques and Davidson, 2000; Henriques et al., 
1994; Pizzagalli et al., 2008b; Vrieze et al., 2013b), very few neuroimaging studies 
demonstrate aberrations in depression that span the three levels of explanation: brain 
circuit, task behaviour, and clinical symptom (Keren et al., 2018, in press). This may 
be linked to the fact that many of the tasks used to study reward processing, notably 
the MID, are far from ideal for capturing behavioural effects (Lutz and Widmer, 
2014). Developing tasks that can overcome such shortcomings will be important. 
Nevertheless, we did find that relative to placebo, lurasidone reduced the number of 
premature responses to penalty cues relative to neutral cues. This finding is in line 
with the neuroimaging results for penalty outcomes (discussed below) and fits with the 
idea of lurasidone making people less loss averse. However, this must be considered in 
light of the number of premature responses being quite low (floor effect).  
 
Moreover, the absence of significant medication effects on reaction time may suggest 
that there were no sedative and thus motoric slowing effects of lurasidone. Indeed, this 
corresponds to the findings that lurasidone had no significant effects on subjective 
reports of mood, anxiety or sedation which could be explained by lurasidone’s low 
affinity for histamine H1 and muscarinic M1 receptors (Ishibashi et al., 2010; Sanford 
and Dhillon, 2015). Another possibility is that the study did not have enough power to 
detect subjective or behavioural changes. However, as this study used similar scales 
and sample sizes to previous studies with acute pharmacological administration (see 
Literature Review Table 1.8 in Section 1.6), it could be that the reduced neural activity 
to penalties after lurasidone treatment does not necessarily become the subject of 
conscious awareness, although it could still presumably influence behaviour. In other 
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words, the neuropsychological effects of lurasidone could occur very early, whilst 
changes in behaviour may not be apparent with an acute dose. This would fit with 
other studies (Table 1.8), showing a lack of change in behavioural responses 
following, for example, acute administration of amisulpride in depressed and healthy 
volunteers (Admon et al., 2017). This could also potentially correspond to a cognitive 
neuropsychological model of antidepressant drug action, described in further detail in 
Section 5.6.1 below (Harmer et al., 2009b). However, whether lurasidone might affect 
these processes in studies with larger sample sizes of MDD patients and over a longer 
period of time remains to be elucidated. 
 
 Anticipation results discussion 5.3
Our results of attenuated responses in the ACC and caudate across cue valences can be 
likened to the effects of SSRI agents and dopamine antagonist olanzapine (Abler et al., 
2007). Acute dose and seven-day treatment with SSRI paroxetine diminished brain 
activity induced by motivation in healthy subjects in the globus pallidus, insula, 
putamen, ACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Abler et al., 2012; Abler et al., 
2011; Marutani et al., 2011). Treatment with the SSRI citalopram in healthy controls 
reduced activation for rewarding and aversive stimuli (in the VS and ventromedial 
OFC to rewarding stimuli (chocolate) and in the lateral OFC for aversive stimuli) 
(McCabe et al., 2010). Thus, lurasidone, like SSRIs may induce a general dampening 
of the salience of reward and penalty cues.  
It may seem paradoxical that lurasidone reduced neural responses during reward 
anticipation, since depression, and in particular-anhedonia, is related to blunted 
responses during reward anticipation (Arrondo et al., 2015; Hagele et al., 2015; 
Luking et al., 2016c; Olino et al., 2014; Smoski et al., 2009; Stoy et al., 2012a). In this 
context, we may expect that drugs with known antidepressant properties normalise 
responses by potentiating striatal activity to reward anticipation. Indeed, this was the 
basis for hypothesis 1a, and is coherent with findings of potentiated striatal responses 
with acute (low dose) amisulpride (Admon et al., 2017). However, opposite responses 
(and in line with our findings) (Hawkins et al., 2018, in press) have also been found 
with higher doses of dopamine antagonists (Jocham et al., 2014). Thus, an affinity-
based model (discussed in Section 1.6.3.4), could be applied here to understand the 
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observed association between low dose D2 antagonist and higher reward coding and 
between high dose and attenuated reward coding. Specifically, presynaptic D2 
receptors have higher affinity to dopamine than post-synaptic D2 receptors and would 
be occupied first at low doses (Frank and O'Reilly, 2006a). Predominant blockade of 
presynaptic autoreceptors at low doses could subsequently lead to amplification of 
dopamine phasic release (also described as a shift of the tonic versus phasic balance 
towards phasic activity (Dreyer et al., 2010). There is a clear need for studies using 
varying doses of dopamine antagonists on phasic versus tonic dopamine firing and 
release to understand the pre-synaptic actions of dopamine antagonists. I provide 
further explanation of how synaptic mechanisms may explain this blunting of 
anticipatory signals in Section 5.6.2 below.  
 
Another possibility is that anticipatory blunting reflects a temporal issue. 
Antidepressants seem to exacerbate reward deficits early in treatment (Kumar et al., 
2008; Marutani et al., 2011; McCabe et al., 2010) prior to normalisation following 
longer-term (two-six week) treatment (Scholl et al., 2017; Stoy et al., 2012a; Walsh et 
al., 2017). Again, further testing would be required to fit this explanation to lurasidone 
(i.e. increasing anticipation of rewards with more chronic exposure to the drug). 
Although speculative, it could be the case that the findings fit a behavioural activation 
model of the antidepressant mechanism of action of lurasidone in which 
consummatory pleasure must first be experienced, and with time, anticipation 
increases for rewarding events. 
 
 Discussion of findings from the outcome phase 5.4
 Reward Outcome 5.4.1
 Reduced reward-related NAcc activity and depressive symptoms on 5.4.1.1
placebo 
Before turning to a discussion of hypotheses 1c (i.e. the association between neural 
correlates of reward outcomes, medication and depression/anhedonia), it is useful to 
comment on the results seen on placebo alone. We found that NAcc activity to reward 
outcomes was negatively correlated with depression and anhedonia severity  on 
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placebo. Thus, our findings are in line with prior research that implicates blunted 
NAcc responses to positive experiences with increasing depression severity and 
anhedonia both for instrumental tasks (Pizzagalli et al., 2009b; Steele et al., 2007) and 
passive tasks (McCabe et al., 2009). As this association has previously been found 
using passive tasks (i.e. experience of primary rewards with no learning stimulus-
response component), it provides support for the notion that neural activity during the 
outcome phase could reflect direct responses to the outcome (experience of pleasure or 
value). However, the dominant model of striatal dopamine activity is that the salience 
or anticipatory activity predicts the outcome in cued-reward tasks (Schultz et al., 
1997). In this context, any blunting in anticipatory processing or reduction in salience 
of cues (associated with depressive illness), could also affect outcome processing. 
Accordingly, blunted striatal activation to reward outcomes could indicate weaker 
perceived action-outcome relationship and/or weaker responses to unpredictable 
rewards in depression.  
 Association between reward-related NAcc activity, medication and 5.4.1.2
depression/anhedonia  
With respect to the hypothesis 1c, we found a significant increase in NAcc signalling 
to positive feedback with increasing anhedonia but not depression severity, after 
stringent correction for multiple ROI comparisons. Importantly, this significant result 
was found only with the SHAPs questionnaire, and not the DARS anhedonia 
questionnaire. The SHAPS is concerned with consummatory anhedonia, and factor 
analysis of the SHAPS in other studies has demonstrated that it primarily loads onto 
hedonic capacity (Leventhal et al., 2006; Nakonezny et al., 2010; Nakonezny et al., 
2015). In contrast, the DARS total score which was used in the analyses pooled 
anticipatory and consummatory anhedonia scores. Thus, it may be that the SHAPS 
scores better map onto this stage of reward processing. The lack of a significant 
normalisation result using broader anhedonia definitions and depression severity 
(BDI-II) (which includes other symptoms such as low mood and sleep problems) may 
suggest a ‘dilution’ in specificity and power to detect an effect. Moreover, our result 
may support a growing evidence for the conceptualisation of anhedonia as a dual 
construct: motivational anhedonia (deficit in motivation and effort expenditure) and 
consummatory anhedonia (deficit in pleasure experience), with the results of our study 
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concerning the latter (Treadway, 2016; Treadway et al., 2012; Treadway and Zald, 
2011). 
This leads on to the next question which concerns what an increase in striatal activity 
to reward outcomes could actually represent: is lurasidone boosting pleasure 
experience or reward-related encoding in individuals with elevated anhedonia? As 
reviewed in the introduction (Section 1.4 and 1.5), the outcome phase is a complex 
period in which multiple processes occur simultaneously. These include the response 
to the outcome itself (including information about its pleasurability or value), 
evaluation against expectation (i.e. a PE), integration into memory and preparation for 
the next trial.  
Anhedonia has previously been associated with reduced hedonic capacity and 
diminished reward learning in probabilistic reward tasks relative to those with low 
anhedonic symptoms (Pizzagalli et al., 2008c; Vrieze et al., 2013b). Therefore, at a 
conceptual level it is plausible that lurasidone could be affecting both processes in 
individuals with elevated anhedonic symptoms. The differential effect of lurasidone on 
reward anticipation (attenuation) and outcome (potentiation) calls to mind the 
Schultzian PE model of dopaminergic activity (Schultz, 1998; Schultz, 2016; Schultz 
et al., 1997). An interpretation in line with this model would be that lurasidone reduces 
anticipatory encoding which would subsequently lead to increased reactivity to 
outcomes. However, there were unexpectedly no significant results for reward-related 
PE in the NAcc and in fact, none of the ROIs showed an association between reward-
related PE activation and increasing depression/anhedonia severity. Thus, an increase 
in NAcc activity to reward outcomes by lurasidone could reflect a potentiation of 
subjective pleasure experience or value in individuals with higher anhedonia scores. 
This would be predicted to be associated with increased opioid receptor activity, but 
dopamine is known to have an excitatory effect on opioid-induced reward (Cook et al., 
1999).  How lurasidone, a dopamine antagonist would affect opioid-mediated 
experiential processes during the feedback phase is not known (Berridge and 




 Penalty Outcomes 5.4.2
 Elevated penalty-related ACC activity and depressive symptoms on 5.4.2.1
placebo 
Participants with higher depression severity on placebo showed greater ACC response 
to negative feedback. This is congruent with evidence of heightened sensitivity to 
negative outcomes in depression and its association to elevated loss-related signals in 
the ACC, and connected regions such as the anterior insula and striatum (Admon et al, 
2015; Engelmann et al, 2017; Gotlib et al, 2010a; Luking et al, 2016a; Quevedo et al, 
2017). Indeed, Admon et al ., (2015) showed increased caudate-ACC connectivity 
during penalties and suggested that this could represent a neural mechanism for the 
abnormally increased representation of negative feedback upon the completion of an 
(unsuccessful) action in MDD (Admon et al., 2015a). In particular, it has been 
postulated that increased ACC activity in depressed individuals to loss outcomes 
reflects biased stimuli representations that mediate choice behaviour, including 
preferential attention, planning and self-referential processing towards losses (Gotlib 
et al, 2010a; Grimm et al, 2009; Sylvester et al, 2003).  
 Association between penalty-related ACC activity, medication and 5.4.2.2
depression/anhedonia  
Our findings are consistent with the notion that acute dose anti-depressants can have 
an effect on brain processes implicated in depression (Harmer et al., 2017). The effects 
of penalty-related signal normalisation by lurasidone were localised to the ACC, a 
region that integrates diverse striatal and prefrontal functions (Haber and Knutson, 
2010). For example, the ACC and ventral striatum (VS) show functional connectivity 
at rest (Pan et al, 2017) and input from the ACC to the VS allows for flexible 
deployment and adaptation of behaviour to changing circumstances (Alexander and 
Brown, 2011; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016; Holroyd and 
Yeung, 2012; Shahnazian and Holroyd, 2017; Umemoto and Holroyd, 2016; Walsh 
and Anderson, 2012; Walton et al, 2007). Electrophysiological (EEG) studies have 
shown that the Feedback Negativity (FRN), an event–related potential which indicates 
the early appraisal of feedback and appears larger following the presentation of 
negative feedback, has its origins in the ACC (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Hajcak 
et al, 2005; Holroyd et al, 2002; Holroyd et al, 2004; Yeung et al, 2005). Specifically, 
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an FRN signal may be generated as ACC neurons shift from encoding expected to 
actual outcomes (i.e. a PE signal) (Hyman et al, 2017). This raises a similar question 
to the one discussed in the reward outcomes section above: is lurasidone attenuating 
the experiences associated with negative feedback (e.g. disappointment, self-
referential processing towards losses) or reducing penalty-related (expectation-
outcome) encoding in individuals with elevated depressive symptoms? For this, it is 
useful to refer to the prediction error findings in Section 5.4.3 below.  
With reference to other acute pharmacological intervention studies, neural blunting of 
aversive responses parallels studies using SSRIs (McCabe et al., 2010). Indeed, SSRI 
treatment is associated with an experience of emotional constraint in which the 
emotional responses to both pleasurable and aversive experiences are diminished, or 
the salience of both rewarding and aversive stimuli is lost (Opbroek et al., 2002; Price 
et al., 2009; Zald and Depue, 2001). This has shown to be associated with 
experimental studies in animals and humans indicating that serotonin pathways exert 
an inhibitory influence over neural systems mediating positive and negative affective 
processes (Zald and Depue, 2001). Thus, SSRIs may be clinically useful in disorders 
characterised by painful and disabling negative affect (Arroll et al., 2009; Nutt et al., 
2007); but this needs to be balanced against their inhibitory effects on the neural 
responses to reward.  This stands in contrast to the findings in our study in which there 
was not a ‘general constraint’ of emotional responses, as there was also a (non-
significant) trend for increased responses to reward outcomes with lurasidone in 
individuals with high depressive symptoms. The non-significant trend in our study 
may reflect low power rather than a spurious finding (this explanation is strengthened 
by the fact that this trend was found in several other brain regions too) and a 
significant relationship was found with anhedonia severity. Indeed, if this result were 
to be found in larger sample, one could argue that lurasidone has an optimal profile by 
increasing responses to rewards and reducing response to negative outcomes.  
 
 Reward and penalty-related PE results 5.4.3
Hypothesis 2a was supported by the finding that individuals with higher depressive 
symptoms under placebo had higher (more negative) encoding of penalty PEs in the 
ACC and this trend was not found under lurasidone. This ‘normalisation’ effect seems 
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to be a mirror of the results found for ACC activation to penalty outcomes (hypothesis 
1d). At first glance, this would suggest that lurasidone’s effects on penalty outcomes 
can be understood in the context of medication-induced reduction of penalty-related 
(expectation-outcome) encoding in individuals with elevated depressive symptoms. 
However, the analyses we did to examine whether PE signalling could be reliably 
distinguished from outcome magnitudes suggest that this conclusion is not justified. 
The high correlations between the PE and feedback outcomes precluded a meaningful 
decomposition of the PE signal into its underlying constituents (as has been suggested 
previously, Chowdhury et al., (2013)). Thus, while the goal of the PE analyses was to 
investigate acute modulation of PE signaling in MDD by lurasidone, it should be noted 
that with respect to reward and penalty processing, the results of the group analyses 
cannot be unambiguously related to neural coding of PEs. Instead, the results may 
partly reflect the neural processing of reward and penalty outcomes and this means 
that the results of the Fixed PE model need to be interpreted with caution. Indeed, it is 
also worth reiterating that the MID task design itself is not a learning task as the 
contingencies were known prior to the data collection from the training. However, 
other notable approaches to studying PE, (e.g. Rutledge et al., 2014; 2017), also don’t 
employ a learning task. In this context, the probabilities lead to uncertainty and the PE 
effects could relate to uncertainty. For this reason, we also cannot be sure that 
lurasidone affected the learning signal. The fixed PE model suggests that the learning 
signal may well be affected in a different task design that emphasised the learning of 
the contingencies, but here it is not possible to clearly separate learning from the 
probabilistic contingencies. The two Dynamic PE models certainly help here to 
emphasise the conclusion about learning over probabilistic contingencies, however no 
significant findings were found with these models. Nevertheless, the direction and size 
of the effect was similar across models.  
Future analyses could use a more thorough framework (such as that used by Rothkirch 
et al., (2017)) in order to distinguish the neural coding of PEs from the neural 
responses to outcome magnitude with certainty. In line with Behrens et al., (2008) and 
Chowdhury et al., (2013), the neural PE signal should be accompanied by the neural 
signature of the two PE constituents: actual and expected outcome (the difference 
between these two components forms the PE). According to this framework, neural 
responses at the onset of the monetary outcome phase should have a positive 
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correlation with the actual outcome and a negative correlation with the expected 
outcome for reward-related PEs (and vice versa for penalty-related PEs). Using this 
approach, Rothkirch et al., showed that expected values and actual outcome 
magnitudes had differential relationships between anhedonia levels and neural 
responses in the VS and mOFC (Rothkirch et al., 2017). Specifically, actual outcome 
correlated negatively with anhedonia severity in the VS and mOFC, whereas expected 
value demonstrated no correlation with the VS and a positive correlation with OFC 
neural responses. Thus, the latter findings show that a change in computing the 
difference between expected and actual outcome (i.e. PE), had a role in anhedonia 
severity. Although this study could not differentiate PE responses in the VS and 
mOFC from responses to outcome magnitude, they showed a differential relationship 
between neural responses to expected and actual outcomes in the mOFC and 
anhedonia severity. This result would have not been found using a simple contrast of 
reward versus neutral outcomes.   
It is also important to mention the changes in reward PE in the amygdala. The 
amygdala has dopamine innervations and receives a dense projection from the striatum 
(Haber and Knutson, 2010), and has previously shown to be sensitive to DA 
modulation during reward processing in heathy volunteers (Murray, 2007a; O’Daly et 
al., 2014; Russo and Nestler, 2013; Tye et al., 2010a). An unexpected finding was that 
on lurasidone, individuals with higher depressive symptoms had stronger reward PE 
encoding in the amygdala, with this trend not being found under placebo. This result is 
unique to all the other trends in the thesis because there were no baseline differences 
in reward-related PE encoding between individuals low and high on depressive 
symptoms on placebo, and thus no possibility for a ‘normalisation’ effect by 
lurasidone. Instead, it seems that lurasidone had opposite effects on reward PE 
encoding in low (reward PE attenuation) versus high (reward PE potentiation) 
depression severity participants. Perhaps inter-individual baseline differences in 
dopamine receptor availability and binding potential between low and high depression 
severity subjects could account for differential effects following a pharmacological 
challenge but not on placebo (Sheline et al., 2004; Suhara et al., 1992; Yatham et al., 




 Association with continuous anxiety severity 5.5
This thesis also addressed the potentially confounding effect of comorbidity which has 
not received much attention in previous studies. This is an important consideration 
given that it is firmly established that depression often co-occurs with other 
internalising symptoms (i.e. heterotypic comorbidity) (Caron and Rutter, 1991; 
Angold et al., 1999) and lurasidone has anxiolytic as well as antidepressant properties 
(Ishibashi et al., 2010). In line with the sensitivity analyses (hypothesis 3a), we found 
no association between continuous anxiety severity measures and lurasidone’s effects 
on reward/penalty anticipation and outcome. In the context of our results, this suggests 
that the impact of lurasidone on reward and penalty outcome in individuals with 
elevated depressive symptoms is robust.  
Our findings differ to the few studies which have examined co-occuring anxiety 
symptoms in depressed samples. For example, anxiety symptoms have been associated 
with higher activation in orbital frontal and ventral striatal regions during reward 
processing (Bar-Haim, et al., 2009; Forbes et al., 2006; Guyer et al., 2006), albeit not 
with the MID reward paradigm. Other studies have shown that co-varying for anxiety 
symptoms does not impact upon brain activity-depression associations and that 
activation patterns do not differ for MDD adults with (N=14) or without (N=16) 
comorbid anxiety (Forbes et al., 2009; Pizzagalli et al., 2009). There is still insufficient 
evidence for how anxiety relates to changes in frontal regions during penalty 
processing, and in the context of pahramcological challenges. Thus, with respect to 
anxiety symptoms, this study only provides preliminary evidence and needs further 






 Potential antidepressant mechanism of action of 5.6
lurasidone 
 Neuropsychological level of explanation 5.6.1
 
In an attempt to explain lurasidone’s potential mechanism of action, we can refer to 
different levels of explanation: system or synaptic level and I will begin with the 
former. A potential mechanism of beneficial antidepressant drug action of lurasidone 
could consist of reducing neural activation to feedback of negative events. This initial 
change may lead to a cascade of processes ultimately leading to improved mood. 
However, it must be noted that this proposal is highly speculative and further research, 
e.g. alleviation of depression through lurasidone intervention targeting the ACC, is 
required for establishing its role as a causal event.  
In the context of the neuropsychological model of antidepressant action (Harmer et 
al., 2009a), it could be that lurasidone promotes reduced reactivity and biases to 
negative events and may therefore lead to changes in how stressors, life events and 
interpersonal interactions are managed and remembered. In line with a behavioural 
activation model (Dimidjian et al., 2011; Lewinsohn and Amenson, 1978), these early 
neurocognitive changes may promote reduced aversive-avoidant behaviours in patients 
with depression and greater reinforcement for healthy behaviour. In line with a 
learned helplessness model, a reduction in ‘catastrophic responses’ to perceived 
failure (Elliott et al., 1997a; Elliott et al., 1996) could reinstall a perceived sense of 
control and prevent a cycle of learned helplessness. Over time, the cumulative effect 
of neuropsychological and behavioural changes may culminate in improved mood. 
In addition to an effect on negative feedback, and in line with the discussion in Section 
5.4.2.2, lurasidone may increase experiences of reward, but only in individuals with 
elevated anheondia symptoms. In line with a behavioural activation model, increased 
hedonic capacity could reinstall motivation to engage in positive activities. Testing of 
this hypothesis would require a longitudinal neuroimaging study of lurasidone.  
In sum, the translation of rapid change in penalty processing by lurasidone into 
improved mood and conscious appraisal, may involve time, exposure to a real-world 
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environment and re-learning stimulus-response associations in the context of reduced 
processing biases and PEs to negative events and enhanced experiences of pleasure. 
With these findings in mind it would be interesting to complete a study as in Wichers 
et al., (2009). Through experience sampling methods, they showed that it was 
antidepressant-induced increases in rewarding experiences, and not reductions in 
penalty or stress-sensitivity that distinguished responders to non-responders to 
treatment (TCA imipramine). Thus, it may be positive emotions, such as contentment, 
happiness, that offer resilience. In line with this, sustained activation in the ACC 
during reward outcomes predicted response to psychotherapy; patients with greater 
sustained activation in this region were more responsive to BA treatment (Carl et al., 
2016b). However, whilst Carl et al., used a MID task with ‘missed win outcomes’, 
they did not include penalty outcome, and therefore, it cannot be ruled out that 
responses to penalties may also be important for predicting response to treatment. 
 
 Synaptic mechanism of action 5.6.2
In the previous section I have discussed lurasidone’s effects at the neuropsychological 
level. In this section I attempt to link these effects to potential changes in 
neurotransmitter systems at the receptor level (i.e. how actions at the receptor may 
explain the observed pattern of neuropsychological effects). Indeed, the main putative 
change affected by SGAs is through modulation of neurotransmitter actions, with 
dopamine being a major focus in reward and penalty processing, depression and its 
treatment. Although it must be noted that ascribing the changes seen to one or more 
receptor systems is highly speculative as the precise mechanism by which BOLD 
signal is modulated cannot be determined with fMRI alone (see Box 5.1). 
Nevertheless, the next section attempts to consider potential mechanisms of action 
which could lead to two key results of this study, namely: (i) Why/how could 
lurasidone reduce striatal and ACC activation to anticipation of both wins and 





Box 5.1. Dopaminergic neurons and the BOLD signal. 
 Potential Mechanisms 5.6.2.1
Mechanism 1: Lurasidone’s D2 antagonism reduces dopamine availability 
According to this mechanism, lurasidone’s antagonism at D2 receptors could act to 
block and reduce dopamine release, thereby also attenuating the BOLD signal. This 
mechanism would support our result of reduced BOLD signal to the anticipation of 
win and loss cues in the ACC and caudate, as well as penalty outcomes in the ACC.  
In favour of this, haloperidol, (a typical antipsychotic and a prototypical D2 antagonist) 
reduces reward-related striatal activation during anticipation and decision-making (Oei 
et al., 2012b; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Pleger et al., 2009b). However, lurasidone has a 
loose D2 postsynaptic occupancy and thus a faster dissociation time than FGA 
haloperidol, and to this end, it may be more appropriate to compare it to other SGAs. 
Indeed, atypical antipsychotics with lower and less prolonged occupancy of D2 
receptors and broader receptor binding profiles (e.g. olanzapine and amisulpride), do 
not consistently reduce neural responses during reward anticipation (Abler et al., 
2007), and in fact have shown to potentiate anticipatory responses (Admon et al., 
2017). This leads me on to the second potential mechanism. 
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Mechanism 2: Lurasidone increases dopamine availability via presynaptic 
autoreceptor blockade 
 
Lurasidone may, at low doses, like amisulpride increase striatal dopamine release by 
preferentially blocking presynaptic dopamine autoreceptors. This could lead to one of 
two potential effects on BOLD signal. First, increased availability of dopamine, and 
increased firing of dopaminergic neurons could potentiate BOLD responses during 
anticipation and outcome, as has been found previously with amisulpride (Admon et 
al., 2017). Second, lurasidone may increase presynaptic dopamine availability, which 
may act to increase tonic levels of dopamine. This could in turn decrease the phasic 
firing of dopamine neurons and the sensitivity of the dopamine reward system (Grace 
1991), thereby potentially reducing BOLD signal. For example, Knutson et al., (2004) 
modelled this in healthy volunteers. They showed that administering amphetamine 
caused large releases of striatal dopamine, and subsequently reduced BOLD response 
to reward anticipating cues. As our findings showed reduced ACC BOLD signal to 
penalty outcomes in addition to both anticipation of win and loss cues, the second 
explanation is most fitting. This is important given that these previous studies did not 
explicitly consider the outcome phase. An extensive number of studies by Grace 
(1991, 2016) provide a detailed explanation of the regulation of midbrain dopamine 
neurons and the relationship of phasic and tonic dopamine neuron firing is described 
in further detail in Box 5.2. 
It must be emphasised that these are subcortical models that I am applying to the 
cortical (ACC) results in our study. These models are based on neuronal recordings 
which project to the ACC and microdialysis, usually in the striatum, but as yet, no 
study has measured both simultaneuously and no study has included the ACC. This 
has clear limitations as there are regional (frontal versus striatal) differences in 
dopamine receptor distribution and signaling pathways. These subcortical-cortical 
differences are likely to lead to differential effects of the same pharmacological agent 
at these regions (Hernaus and Mehta, 2016). Therefore, this thesis emphasises the 
importance of expanding the existing research into cortical release, particularly in 
depression models. Nevertheless, the ACC is a region showing the highest corticol DA 
innervation in humans, which is an important consideration for the results of this thesis  








Box 5.2. Tonic and phasic dopamine neuron firing and dopamine release. Figure taken from 




Mechanism 3: Lurasidone’s effects on serotonergic receptors modulates 
dopamine availability 
Lurasidone, like other D2 antagonists with antidepressant efficacy, such as quetiapine, 
have antagonistic activity at 5-HT2A and 5-HT7 receptors and partial agonist activity at 
serotonin 5-HT1A (Horisawa et al., 2013; Ishibashi et al., 2010). Indeed, cortical 
regions which form part on the incentive-based learning network, such as the OFC and 
ACC have high densities of 5-HT (1A and 2A) receptors (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; 
Macoveanu, 2014). This is of particular interest as our findings were localised to the 
ACC. Ascending serotonergic systems show a similar innervation pattern to dopamine 
and in addition to the overlapping anatomical organisation of these neurotransmitter 
systems, there is evidence of their interaction at a functional level (Boureau and 
Dayan, 2011; Briand et al., 2007). This is illustrated in Table 5.2 and the relationship 
between dopamine and serotonin collectively gives rise to a mix of competitive, 
cooperative interactive associations between processing of reward and punishment. 
Before explaining mechanism 3, it is important to describe how serotonergic systems 
can impact upon and regulate dopamine availability (Esposito et al, 2008; Azmitia and 
Segal, 1978; Beart and McDonald, 1982; Herve et al, 1987; Parent, 1981; Geyer et al, 
1976; Egerton et al, 2008; De Deurwaerdere et al, 2004; Higgins and Fletcher, 2003; 
Lavoie and Parent, 1990; Spoont, 1992; Harrison et al, 1997; Nedergaard et al, 1988). 
There are at least fourteen different receptor subtypes for 5-HT (Cooper et al., 2002). 
Whilst 5-HT2C receptors generally tonically inhibit DA release, the majority of 5-HT 
receptor types (5-HT1A, 5-HT2A, 5-HT3, 5-HT4) increase dopamine release in the NAcc 
via excitatory influence on the VTA. Indeed, 5-HT2A receptors are present on 
presynaptic dopamine neurons, and blockade of these receptors increases dopamine 
release (Yatham et al., 2005). Lurasidone, like other AAPs blocks 5-HT2A receptors 
and this is expected to increase dopamine levels (particularly in the cortex), as has 
been found previously with olanzapine and quetiapine (Ichikawa et al., 2002; Koch et 
al., 2004). Animal studies have also shown that AAPs increase dopamine release by 
stimulating 5-HT1A receptors in the prefrontal cortex (Ichikawa et al., 2002). The role 
of 5-HT in increasing dopamine release has been shown experimentally with 
lurasidone. Specifically, Huang et al., (2012) tested whether lurasidone’s 5-HT1A 
partial agonism and/or 5-HT7 antagonism, contributed to the ability of lurasidone to 
enhance dopamine release. They showed that lurasidone, like other atypical 
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antipsychotics, produced a dose-dependent increase in DA efflux in the prefrontal 
cortex, hippocampus and NAcc of rats. In addition, a 5-HT1A receptor antagonist 
partially blocked the lurasidone-induced dopamine efflux, whereas a 5-HT1A agonist 
and a 5-HT7 receptor antagonist potentiated the effect of lurasidone to increase DA 
efflux, especially in the prefrontal cortex. These findings suggest that 5-HT1A receptor 
agonism and affinity to 5-HT7 is involved in the effect of lurasidone on dopamine 
efflux.  
The exact mechanisms by which serotonin regulates dopamine release appears diverse 
and mirrors the complexity of DA regulation itself (Table 5.2). For instance, this 
process could involve changing the bursting behaviour of dopaminergic neurons (Di 
Giovanni et al, 1999), altering the relative balance between regional DA 
concentrations (De Deurwaerdere and Spampinato, 1999), or modulating the 
projections that control DA release (Bortolozzi et al, 2005). Moreover, regulation 
could be conditional on DA being activated, or could be tonic (Leggio et al, 2009b; 
Lucas et al, 2001; Porras et al, 2003; De Deurwaerdere et al, 2005). 
Again, as detailed in mechanism 2 and Box 5.2, an increase in dopamine availability 
(but this time via action at serotonergic receptors primarily in the cortex) could lead to 
one of two potential effects on BOLD signal. First, increased availability of dopamine, 
and increased firing of dopaminergic neurons could potentiate BOLD responses during 
anticipation and outcome, as has been found previously with amisulpride (Admon et 
al., 2017). Second, lurasidone-induced increases in dopamine availability could in turn 
decrease the phasic firing of dopamine neurons and the sensitivity of the dopamine 
reward system (Grace 1991), thereby reducing BOLD signal. The latter is a better fit 
to our findings which showed reduced BOLD signal to both anticipation of win and 







Table 5.2.  Aspects of serotonin function which indicate competition, collaboration or 
neither. Adapted from Boureau et al., (2011). 
Relationship 
between dopamine 
(DA) and serotonin 
5-HT 
Observation 
Opposing -Tonic inhibition of accumbal DA release by 5-HT 
(Hervé et al, 1979, 1981) 
 -5-HT2C receptors inhibit accumbal and striatal DA release. 
(De Deurwaerdère et al, 2004) 
 -DA necessary for active avoidance learning; 5-HT inhibits 
avoidance learning (Beninger, 1989) 
 -DA reduces, 5-HT increases fatigue 
(Davis et al, 2000, Meeusen et al, 2006) 
 -DA involved in appetite (engaging in behaviour); 5-HT 
involved in satiation (ending behaviour) 
(Berridge, 2007, Gruninger et al, 2007) 
 
Collaborating  -Infusion of 5-HT in the nucleus accumbens increases DA 
levels and enhances responding 
(Sasaki-Adams and Kelley, 2001, Parsons and Justice, 1993) 
 -Increased release of both 5-HT and DA in controllable 
punishment (Bland et al, 2003b) 
 -5-HT2A receptor activity linked to increased hyperactivity 
and impulsivity (Fletcher et al, 2002, 2007) 
 -Antidepressant effect of boosting either 5-HT or DA 
(Hirschfeld, 1999, Nutt et al, 2007) 
Neither -Increased 5-HT in uncontrollable punishment  
(Bland et al, 2003b) 
 -Neither DA nor 5-HT necessary for all forms of aversive 
contingency learning (Beninger, 1989) 
 
Mechanism 4: Lurasidone effects on serotonergic receptors directly impacts 
on reward and penalty processing. 
Based on electrophysiological recordings and imaging studies in rodents and primates, 
serotonergic neurons have been shown to directly impact upon reward (and 
predominantly aversive) processing (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Cohen et al., 2015; 
Hayashi et al., 2015; Inaba et al., 2013; Li et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2014) as well as 
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avoidance behaviours (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Crockett et al., 2012). For example, 
5-HT neurons are activated (Grahn et al, 1999; Takase et al, 2004, 2005) and serotonin 
is released (Bland et al, 2003a) in the face of punishment (Lowry, 2002; Abrams et al, 
2004). It is however, not clear from these studies if serotonin has an effect on learning 
as they did not dissociate learning from altered responsiveness to the valence of the 
reinforcing events themselves (Cools et al., 2008). A more recent study addressed this 
issue by explicitly separating neural learning signals from the receipt of outcomes per 
se (Scholl et al., 2017). They demonstrated that two week administration of SSRI 
citalopram enhanced reward and effort learning signals in a widespread brain network, 
including ACC, as well as more robust reward leaning at the behavioural level. Their 
findings suggested that serotonin can modulate the ability to learn via a mechanism 
that is independent of stimulus valence and any increases to reward or effort outcome 
sensitivity per se. 
 
Predictions of future punishment have a more complex effect on behaviour than 
prediction of rewards. This reflects a key difference or asymmetry between reward and 
penalties, where successful responses lead to repeated reward experience but avoided 
experience of penalty. Indeed, in the face of a proximal threat there is a choice of 
response – behavioural inhibition or active avoidance. The MID task simplifies the 
response to penalties, as it requires motivated fast responses on all trials (i.e. active 
avoidance). Whilst the serotonergic system may be more involved in inhibitory 
responses, the dopamine system seems to be more involved in the motivation and 
action responses to move away from the punisher. For example, inhibition of innate 
escape responses has been linked with 5-HT1A (Deakin and Graeff,1991; Misane et al, 
1998), with decreasing 5-HT function facilitating active avoidance, and increasing 5-
HT function impairing active avoidance learning (Archer, 1982; Archer et al, 1982). In 
contrast, accumbal DA release is associated with escape behaviour in response to a 
punisher and DA concentration and the phasic activity of other DA neurons 
(particularly in the meso-cortical pathway) increase in the face of aversion (Iordanova, 
2009; Sorg and Kalivas, 1991; Guarraci and Kapp, 1999; Kiaytkin, 1988; 
Abercrombie et al, 1989; Louilot et al, 1986; Brischoux et al, 2009; Lammel et al, 
2008; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009). Therefore, in the context of our findings, one 
can speculate that lurasidone’s action at 5-HT receptors could enhance 5-HT function, 
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thereby leading to inhibition of responses to salient win and loss cues and reducing 










Figure 5.1. Schematic diagram illustrating four potential pathways in which lurasidone could act at dopamine (DA) D2 and serotonin 5-
HT receptors to elicit the results of this study: reduced striatal and ACC Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent (BOLD) activation to 
anticipation of both wins and losses and reduced responses to loss outcomes. PE= prediction error. Please refer to the text for detailed 
descriptions. BOLD response during outcomes could increase or decrease via two potential mechanisms. Lurasidone-induced increases in 
dopamine availability could reduce phasic DA firing of DA availability, subsequently reduce prediction error encoding, and thus increase 
BOLD response to (unexpected) outcomes in line with a Schultzian model of PE. Alternatively, lurasidone-induces increases in dopamine 
availability could decrease the phasic firing of dopamine neurons and the sensitivity of the dopamine reward system and lead to reduced 





 Summary of mechanisms 5.6.3
To summarise, changes in reward and penalty-related BOLD signal may be mediated 
by (i) direct modulation of tonic and phasic dopamine firing, (ii) indirect modulation 
of dopamine via serotonin or via interneurons or feedback loops involving other 
neurotransmitter systems and/or (iii) direct modulation of serotonergic neuron activity. 
These mechanisms may not necessarily be mutually exclusive and may interact with 
inter-individual and contextual factors that can alter baseline tonic firing, dopamine 
sensitisation and/or extracellular levels of dopamine (see Box 5.3). 
 
 
Box 5.3. Inter-individual and contextual factors that can alter baseline tonic firing, 
dopamine sensitisation and/or extracellular levels of dopamine.  
 
In line with this framework, I suggest that D2 antagonism could primarily lead to 
reduced anticipatory responses (Figure 5.1), and lurasidone’s impact on serotonergic 





justified according to the above discussion. Inter-individual differences in receptor 
availability and binding potential between low and high depression severity subjects 
could account for the findings that lurasidone attenuated response to penalty outcomes 
in individuals with high depression severity only. Indeed, depression is associated with 
baseline differences in availability and function of 5-HT and/or D2 receptors and 
reductions in binding relative to healthy volunteers (Sheline et al., 2004; Suhara et al., 
1992; Yatham et al., 2005; Yatham et al., 1999). Thus, in accordance with previous 
findings that more divergent patterns of reward/penalty processing at baseline are 
associated with greater post-intervention change (Burkhouse et al., 2016; Rice et al., 
2015; Vrieze et al., 2013b; Walsh et al., 2016), it could be that subjects with more 
severe depressive symptoms have more ‘room for improvement’ following lurasidone 
administration.  
 
Another important consideration is the relationship or synchrony between the 
anticipatory and consummatory phases of reward and penalty processing, which I have 
mentioned in previous sections. The dominant model of striatal dopamine activity is 
that the salience or anticipatory activity predicts the outcome in cued-reward tasks 
(Schultz, 2016). In this context, any blunting in anticipatory processing or reduction in 
salience of cues with these drugs, could also affect outcome processing. Thus, beyond 
the interaction of several neurotransmitter systems, there may also be different effects 
of the drug across stages of reward and penalty processing. Indeed, as discussed in 
Introduction Section 1.2, reward and penalties show common and distinct activation 
patterns and the anticipation and consumatory phases of reward and penalty 
processing may be different systems. This supports a situation in which the 
administration of the same pharmacological agent could result in a divergent action of 
these neural systems when probed in the task. This has been shown in several studies 
of pharmacological manipulation of reward and penalty anticipatory and 
consummatory signals (Apitz and Bunzeck, 2014; Cavanagh et al., 2014; Evers et al., 
2017; Wittmann and D'Esposito, 2015). Again, this is speculation, and the primary 





systems. Thus, it seems reasonable that the introduction of a drug that works at several 
receptors at once would have divergent effects.  
 
 
 Cerebral blood flow 5.7
It is notable, that in line with previous studies utilising dopamine antagonists (Goozee 
et al., 2014; Handley et al., 2013; Lahti et al., 2003; Lahti et al., 2005), we show here 
that lurasidone increased striatal cerebral blood flow at rest. Thus, our results add to 
the robust and consistent finding that single dose dopamine antagonists have potent 
effects in increasing striatal blood flow, and our novel finding is that this effect is 
equal across a spectrum of depression severity. Whereas our findings were exclusive 
to the putamen, some studies report significant decreases in perfusion in frontoparietal 
and occipital regions (Handley et al., 2013; Michels et al., 2016) and increases in CBF 
beyond the striatum, such as the supplementary motor area, insular and prefrontal 
cortex (Michels et al., 2016) with dopamine antagonists haloperidol, aripiprazole and 
quetiapine. Our findings are coherent with one study using a single oral dose of 
quetiapine which did not lead to CBF differences in the ACC, even at a liberal 
threshold of p<.005 (uncorrected) (Michels et al., 2016). However, it is worth noting 
that single dose haloperidol (3 mg) and aripiprazole (10 mg) increased rCBF in the 
ACC relative to placebo (Handley et al., 2013). Different patterns of rCBF modulation 
by these dopamine antagonists could reflect how their varying receptor affinity 
profiles alter (i) disinhibition of D2 receptors (densely populated in the striatum) 
(Fernandez-Seara et al., 2011), (ii) astroglials (Attwell, et al., 2010), and (iii) serotonin 
receptors (densely populated in cortical regions) (Cohen et al., 1996). 
Increases in blood flow following antipsychotic lurasidone administration may be 
related to increased neuronal metabolism in striatal areas due to the large density of D2 
receptors (Goozee et al., 2014), with blockade of D2 receptors in the striatum 
potentially resulting in disinhibition of D2 receptor-containing medium spiny neurons 





findings were unchanged after controlling for baseline shifts in global and striatal 
CBF, and highlight the utility of multi-modal fMRI in identifying if the effects of the 
drug administered are indeed neuronal. 
 
 Interpretation of BOLD signal 5.7.1
There are four main points to emphasise for the interpretation of a modulation of 
BOLD changes by lurasidone. First, we must consider the complex nature of the 
BOLD signal representing the ultimate metabolic feed-forward signalling of complex 
circuits (Iannetti and Wise, 2007). As reviewed in the Imaging Methods Section 
(Chapter 2), change in BOLD does not unequivocally signify a similar change in 
direction in the integrative activity of neurons. In pharmacological fMRI, BOLD 
signal could change by either direct effects of the drug on neural activity or via non-
specific effects on cerebral metabolic activity or on the vasculature itself (Iannetti and 
Wise, 2007; Wise and Tracey, 2006b). Thus, there could be convergent and divergent 
actions that lie behind the changes. Second, the fact that this thesis uses lurasidone, a 
drug with multiple targets (Figure 1.18), justifies the use of a technique that measures 
the ‘system level’ effect. This is because our key question is not whether the effects of 
dopamine or serotonin modulation affect reward and penalty processing but whther 
lurasidone affects these. Thus, a systems level approach for pharmacological MRI can 
be compared to other drugs. Third, and following on from this point, the addition of 
ASL significantly helps to narrow the interpretation of BOLD changes by precluding 
baseline changes in blood flow as an explanatory model. Thus, in the absence of non-
specific effects, the most likely interpretation of the BOLD findings in this thesis is 
that lurasidone alters synaptic activity in the brain regions where there was a 
modulation effect (i.e. ACC for penalty outcomes and NAcc for reward outcomes). 
The baseline state as affected by increasing depression symptoms is important; 






 Implications for treatment 5.8
As mentioned throughout this thesis, the research on acute pharmacological 
interventions in reward and penalty processes in depression has direct implications for 
treatment. Experimental designs have the potential to further our understanding of the 
(causal) involvement of reward and penalty mechanisms in depression and define clear 
therapeutic targets. In this section, I discuss how the results from this thesis may 
inform treatment for depression. 
 Measurement of symptoms 5.8.1
Recognition and accurate measurement of emotional symptoms is undoubtedly vital 
for their effective and targeted treatment. The results from our study suggest that 
individuals with a greater number of depressive symptoms will have a stronger 
attenuation or ‘normalisation’ of penalty-related ACC activation when taking 
lurasidone. Individuals with greater alterations in the brain’s reward network may be 
better suited for interventions that target penalty-related functioning and related 
behaviours, whilst other interventions may be more affective to patients with different 
neural activity patterns. However, it is not possible to infer from these results if the 
suppression of an overactive negative salience system is therapeutic, and, longer term 
studies with regular symptom monitoring are needed to ascertain if this is the case. In 
this context, reliable and valid measurement tools are also indispensable for 
monitoring treatment progress and tailoring therapy according to patient profile. This 
concerns both traditional ways of testing treatment effectiveness, by using pre- and 
post-treatment measurement scales to evaluate symptom severity, and alternative 
approaches such as neuroimaging. It may be difficult to investigate the effect of a drug 
on emotional responses in depressed patients as some facets, such as loss of pleasure 
or anhedonia may persist even during clinical remission (Hasler et al., 2004; Hasler 
and Northoff, 2011). Moreover, as shown in this thesis and other studies, there may be 
changes in the neural correlates of reward and penalty processing before conscious 
appraisal or changes in behaviour. Therefore, brain markers may be more sensitive to 





measures of treatment progress (Dichter et al., 2011; Forbes et al., 2010). Moreover, 
neuroimaging may have implications for stratified or personalised medicine, where 
treatment is tailored towards the predominant symptomatology for an individual MDD 
patient (Korte et al., 2015) and to predict response to treatment. Indeed, other 
longitudinal studies have used a classification-based data analysis to demonstrate that 
if an early change in positive processing is not seen with antidepressant drug 
treatment, patients have little chance of responding to this later in the treatment course 
(Tranter et al., 2009). Having access to this information early on could help reduce 
multiple treatment cycles to identify an effective pharmacological therapy.  Moreover, 
assessing pharmacological modulation of reward and penalty processing may help 
strategise combination treatments. In the context of this study, lurasidone reduced 
responses to penalties, but it remains to be determined whether the trend of potentiated 
responses to reward was non-significant because of a lack of power to detect a 
difference or because lurasidone’s mechanism of action does not involve increasing 
responses to rewards further. If the latter explanation were to be the case, then it could 
help inform an optimal treatment strategy, for instance, by introducing a drug that 
promotes reward processing, which could be more beneficial than monotherapy. In a 
similar way, it provides the opportunity for psychological-pharmacological 
combination strategies, rather than putting two rational treatments together. For 
example, treatment could be optimised by introducing specific behavioural 
experiments at a time in which the individual may be most responsive to re-learning 
biases.  
Whilst monitoring the course of treatment it may also be possible to identify early 
unwanted side effects of long-term treatment using neuroimaging methods. For 
example, SSRI treatment is associated with an experience of emotional constraint in 
which the emotional responses to both pleasurable and aversive experiences are 
diminished, or the salience of both rewarding and aversive stimuli is lost (McCabe et 
al., 2010; Opbroek et al., 2002; Price et al., 2009; Zald and Depue, 2001). Moreover, 
modest degrees of emotional blunting may be difficult for individuals to detect or 





emotional blunting by pharmacological treatment and assess if the therapeutic effect is 
in the ‘optimal’ direction of decreased responding to negativity, and increased 
responding to positivity. 
Last of all, ASL appears particularly advantageous for treatment monitoring due to its 
very good test-retest reliability (Detre et al., 2012; Hermes et al., 2007; Hodkinson et 
al., 2013). However, it must be noted with all the above suggestions, that the 
associated costs of MR-techniques currently restrict its use in clinical practice. 
 
 
 Strengths, limitations and future avenues of research 5.9
The present thesis had several methodological and conceptual strengths. First, we 
tested the association between reward/penalty processing and depression using 
randomisation and experimental manipulation, thereby overcoming several of the 
limitations of correlational studies in drawing causal inferences. Indeed, acute 
pharmacological intervention designs, as used in this thesis, provide greater simplicity 
and specificity of findings, and greater experimental control than long-term pharmaco-
psychological interventions. Second, the cross-over, within-subject design affords 
higher statistical power than a parallel design by minimising subject variance as each 
individual acts as their own control, and increasing the drug variance. Third, we 
recruited medication-naïve subjects across the range of depression and anhedonia 
severity, thus avoiding the confound of medication (Abler et al., 2007; Pessiglione et 
al., 2006) and allowing us to assess the role of symptom level in reward processing on 
and off lurasidone. This research approach, which is in line with the Research Domain 
Criteria framework (Morris and Cuthbert, 2012) also does justice to findings 
concerning the genetic underpinnings of common mental illness (Plomin et al., 2009). 
Forth, our study has explored an important part of the literature which is the effects of 





of examining for reward and penalty-related processes which have not been studied in 
conjunction enough. Fifth, our study addressed a key concern in pharmacoimaging 
studies, namely that shifts in global or regional CBF could underlie changes observed 
in BOLD fMRI signal. By using arterial spin labelling, an imaging modality that 
allows the quantification of cerebral blood flow at rest, we could disentangle global 
and regional CBF changes from BOLD fMRI signal.  
 
The thesis also had some conceptual and methodological limitations. 
A potential conceptual issue is that we recruited unipolar patients, however, lurasidone 
has been licensed for use in bipolar depression (despite it also showing efficacy in 
depression with and without mixed features) (Suppes et al., 2016b). Given that bipolar 
depression may be related to a more readily activated striatal system (Satterthwaite et 
al., 2014), and perhaps higher baseline levels of dopamine relative to unipolar 
depression, the neuropsychological effects of lurasidone (D2 antagonism in the 
striatum) in depressed bipolar patients may be different to the pattern found in this 
study which recruited sD and MDD cases. This warrants further investigation. Indeed, 
as excessive dopamine may underlie manic symptoms, it may be advantageous that 
lurasidone blocks D2 receptors in the striatum to dampen dopamine signalling and 
prevent a manic switch. At the same time lurasidone dissociates rapidly from DA D2 
receptors (Fornaro et al., 2017) and its activity at 5-HT2A, 5-HT1A and 5-HT7  
increases DA levels (Huang et al., 2012; Yatham et al., 2005). This may ensure a 
sufficient and permanent input of striatal dopamine to maintain drive and affective 
responsivity (Juckel, 2016; Juckel et al., 2006). Thus, it has been suggested that a 
regionally selective balance of dopamine D2 antagonism and serotonin 5-HT2A 
antagonism may be the key to stabilising mood in bipolar depression. 
 
Second, our study was not designed to capture changes in depressive symptoms 
following lurasidone and therefore it is unclear how these would correlate with brain 
responses. The next piece of information which would be needed to infer causality, is 
whether  lurasidone-induced neural changes (reduced penalty-related ACC signalling 





anhedonic symptoms (e.g. Godlewska et al., 2016; Shiroma et al., 2014; Tranter et al., 
2009). This would require longer-term lurasidone treatment in longitudinal studies 
with assessment of pre-post changes in behavioural and neural responses. If 
behavioural and neural responses could be collected at several time points it would 
also be fascinating to explore whether the findings fit a behavioural activation model. 
This would predict a normalisation of responses to outcomes (consummation), prior to 
a normalisation of neural anticipatory signals with longer term antidepressant 
treatment (Dimidjian et al., 2011). Thus, a general direction for future research would 
be to further elucidate how lurasidone’s mechanism of action links to the cognitive 
neuropsychological model of antidepressant action (Harmer et al., 2009a). However, 
our strategy of searching for the signal of an intervention in the first place is consistent 
with current recommendations to boost drug discovery (Krystal and State, 2014). 
 
As reviewed in Section 1.6.3.7 (Table 1.9), there are a number of challenges when 
investigating the pharmacological manipulation of reward and penalty processing. Our 
study did not address some of the potential sources of noise or confounding which 
affect the dynamics of drug response. Factors known to vary dopamine baseline levels 
and should ideally be controlled when assessing response to dopaminergic modulation 
include sex, menstrual cycle (Dreher et al., 2007; Jacobs and D'Esposito, 2011), and 
genetic variants (catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT) Val(158)Met polymorphism, 
MET/MET, VAL/VAL, VAL/MET (Wichers et al., 2008)). Indeed, more knowledge 
about individual genetic and biological variation in association with reward processing 
may add to the process of prediction and improvement of treatment response to 
antidepressant medication. Quantitative measures of dopamine baseline levels (e.g. 
PET neuroimaging, eye-blink rate) could also be a useful tool. However, a recent 
study found that spontaneous eye blink rate is uncorrelated with dopamine D2 receptor 
availability and unmodulated by dopamine agonism, thereby suggesting caution in 
using EBR as a proxy for dopamine function in healthy humans (Dang et al., 2017). 
Overall, this study would have been greatly improved by an interdisciplinary 






A pressing limitation is the reward (MID task) paradigm used in the current study. 
Monetary reward may not be the prime incentive for all people, nor most fundamental 
to human functioning, and it is uncertain whether another paradigm related to life tasks 
in our sample age (social peer rewards, achievement success) may result in even 
clearer findings on reward and penalty dysfunction in depression. Future studies 
should explore a wider array of reward tasks, such as the use of positive social stimuli 
during reward anticipation (e.g. Smoski et al., 2011), combined with ecological 
monitoring of everyday experiences, to elucidate mechanisms more fundamentally tied 
to the deficits found in depression and anhedonia. A minor, but potentially important 
detail for the analysis of the outcome phase is the fact that a running total of the 
amount currently won was displayed on all trials (neutral, win, no win, loss and 
avoided loss feedback); and this stimulus may be inherently rewarding. This could 
have diminished or confound the contrast of win and loss trial types relative to the 
neutral trial. However, we avoided this in our analyses by comparing win>no win and 
loss>avoided loss outcomes. Nevertheless, these limits must be seen in the context of 
the advantages of using this task which include its excellent test-retest reliability 
(Plichta et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2014) and the fact that it is one of the most widely used 
and validated paradigms, thereby allowing for comparisons across studies and phases 
of reward processing.  
 
The mass-univariate analytical approach and ROI analysis adopted in the current study 
may have also been restrictive. Focusing on individual regions (functional 
specialisation), largely ignores the nature of the reward network (functional 
integration). Thus, connectivity analyses (e.g. Gabbay et al., 2013) and machine 
learning may provide additional insights into changes in the relationship between 
subcortical and cortical regions across normal and MDD development. Indeed, a 
previous study by Admon et al., (2017) utilised  psychophysiological interaction (PPI) 
analyses to probe group differences in connectivity separately in response to positive 
and negative outcomes (i.e. monetary gains and penalties) in the MID task. PPI is a 
method to examine whether the correlation in activity between two spatially remote 





interaction between the psychological state and the functional coupling between two 
brain areas). The task used in the current study was not optimal for PPI analyses as it 
was an event-related design with relatively short stimulus durations and less volumes 
per condition (26 trials per condition) relative to other MID tasks designed for PPI 
analyses (e.g. 45 trials per condition in Admon et al., (2017)). These two 
characteristics may have led to issues of co-activation and an underpowered analysis 
(i.e. reliably making inferences that a seed region is correlated with another given area 
with a similar signal) (Poldrack et al., 2011). Another fruitful approach would have 
been to explore the conceptualisation of hedonic capacity in MDD as a decreased 
capacity to sustain response to rewards over time (Heller et al., 2013; Pizzagalli et al., 
2008c). In line with previous studies (Carl et al., 2016b; Walsh et al., 2016), we could 
have examined depression and medication effects on the change in neural activity to 
reward and penalty outcomes across two runs of the MID task (i.e. sustained or 
attenuated activity over time), as opposed to aggregating across the two runs (i.e. 
global responses). Indeed, a previous study showed greater sensitivity in predicting 
clinical response to treatment in MDD patients when examining patterns of neural 
attenuation compared to global values. This suggests the importance of examining 
temporal changes in neural activity as an MDD endophenotype that is relevant for 
predicting antidepressant response (Walsh et al., 2016). 
An important issue which I have already discussed in 5.4.3 is the suitability of the 
MID for PE analyses. This is because the parameters of the task were pre-learnt and 
reward prediction error (RPE; i.e. the presentation of an unexpected reward or 
omission of an expected reward) would not occur in its simplest sense. Thus, other 
paradigms may have been more suited to eliciting and manipulating PEs. 
Nevertheless, the analytical framework for PE encoding  used in this thesis was based 
on prior MID PE analysis (Staudinger et al., 2009) and an effort was made to control 
for factors that influence the analysis (e.g. equal numbers of each type of trial within 
each outcome). If this study could be completed again, I would include an offline 





(2017) to assess the impact of medication and depression on reward and penalty-
related learning. 
Finally, there were also some potential issues with the ROIs chosen in this study. First, 
ACC boundaries have no anatomical derivation and are not based on standard views of 
separation of regions (Haber and Behrens, 2014). Second, the use of small regions and 
boundaried regions assumes excellent coregistration and normalisation. Third, the 
amygdala and NAcc are at risk of being offset by co-registration biases (caused by 
highly informative regions dominating the difference measures). These do not 
invalidate the ROIs chosen but do indicate that methods such as Feesurfer 6 
registrations (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/) may be better for summarising 
activation in these structures as their validation is proving to be excellent (Han et al., 
2006; Reuter et al., 2012). Nevertheless, we attempted to minimise these issues by (i) 
testing different co-registration and normalisation approaches and using the best 
method (See Methods Section 3.8.2); (ii) examining ROI overlap in each participant 
and across both sessions (good overlap, data available upon request) and (iii) 
confirming that the peaks of activation in the regions fell within the ROIs. 
 
 Overall Conclusion  5.10
The work presented in this thesis has shown for the first time the effect of acute dose 
lurasidone on the neural correlates of reward and penalty-related processing and 
prediction error in depression. Lurasidone transiently decreased penalty-related ACC 
activity and PE in individuals with high symptoms of depression and increased 
reward-related striatal activity in individuals with elevated anhedonic symptoms. 
Importantly, these findings were not altered by co-occuring anxiety symptoms, self-
reported changes in sedation and state anxiety or increased striatal CBF under 
lurasidone. Modulation of dopamine and serotonin transmission (at dopamine D2 and 
serotonin 5-HT1A, 5-HT2A, and 5-HT7 receptors) may help to normalise processing of 





and NAcc signalling respectively. Further work is needed to elucidate whether 
lurasidone reduces encoding of penalty-related PE or hypersensitive experiences to 
negative feedback in depression. Yet, lurasidone may potentiate pleasure experience, 
as opposed to reward learning in individuals with elevated anhedonia. Taken together, 
the thesis brings increased knowledge and precision to our understanding of 
abnormalities in neural reward-penalty systems across the continuum of depression 
and anhedonia severity and highlights the potential of targeted pharmacological 
treatments to normalise these processes. In particular, ACC and NAcc signalling may 
provide a new target for engagement in future drug development studies. Using an 
experimental medicine design such as the one used in this thesis, whilst accounting for 
vascular effects, could help identify relevant compounds which could then be tested 
further in using longer-term follow up. Moreover, studies exploring more precise 
facets of reward and penalty processing with appropriate tasks probing specifically PE 
could provide understanding of the systems-level operations of dopamine antagonists, 
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Appendix A.  
Literature Review of reward/penalty modulation by 
antidepressants used in the treatment of depression and 
dopaminergic modulation of reward/penalty processing. 
Data source and search strategy 
We searched Pubmed, Scopus, PsychInfo and Web of Science for articles published in 
English until November 1, 2017 (available in full-text and published in a peer-
reviewed journal). Antidepressant drug classes and names were retrieved from 
evidence-based guidelines for treating depressive illness in Bauer et al., (2007) and 
Cleare et al., (2015) and then entered into the following search syntax “[NAME OF 
DRUG] AND (Reward OR Reinforcement)”. These included: selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) (citalopram, escitalopram, paroxetine, fluoxetine, 
sertraline); serotonin and noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs) (venlafaxine, 
duloxetine); selective noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors (NRIs) (reboxetine, 
maprotiline); tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) (clomipramine, amitriptyline, 
imipramine, desipramine, lofepramine); dopamine and noradrenaline reuptake 
inhibitors (DNRIs) (bupropion); dopamine reuptake inhibitor (amphetamines, 
methylphenidate, modafinil); and dopamine antagonists (quetiapine, aripiprazole, 
risperidone, olanzapine, amisulpride, lurasidone). 
In order to identify dopaminergic drugs that have been used in human experimental 
studies, we used the following search terms: “Dopamine AND (agonist OR antagonist 
OR precursor OR transporter OR metabolism) AND Reward. Using the name of the 
drugs identified from this initial search, we then performed a second search as follows: 
“[NAME OF DRUG] AND (Reward OR Reinforcement)”. This list included: 
dopamine antagonists (haloperidol, sulpiride); dopamine precursor depletion (acute 
phenylalanine and tyrosine depletion, alpha-methyl-para-tyrosine); dopamine 





pramipexole); dopamine metabolism inhibitors (tolcapone). The reference list of all 
retrieved articles were also checked to detect any previously missed articles. 
Duplicated studies were removed using the EndNote (X7) smart group function. 
Systematic review 
 For each study, we recorded the following variables: number of participants, study 
design, dose, the time between drug administration and task completion, the task 
paradigm and behavioural/neuroimaging findings. These results are presented in Table 
1.8 and core findings are discussed in Section 1.6.3.  
Detailed Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Inclusion criteria: Studies were required to provide a measure of depression or 
anhedonia in people with major depression disorder (MDD), at high-risk of depression 
(HR) or healthy controls (HC). We only selected studies that measured depression, or 
depressive symptoms, through questionnaires, structured interviews, or clinical 
diagnosis. We included studies which were performed in human healthy subjects (even 
if these were used as controls for clinical samples). In terms of reward paradigms 
employed, and following the classification described in Richards et al (2013) we 
included instrumental-reward tasks and decision-making tasks, which require 
participants to complete an action correctly in order to obtain a reward (or avoid a 
penalty), being this action linked to the reward/penalty value in a trial by trial level. 
Hence, we excluded reward paradigms in which rewards/aversive stimuli were 
presented passively. Either positive (e.g. wining money) or negative (e.g. losing 
money) reward manipulations were permitted. No age restrictions were applied. 
Exclusion criteria: We excluded reviews, meta-analyses, proceedings publications and 
post-mortem autoradiography studies. Studies were excluded if they lacked a standard 
measure of depression. We excluded studies that measured depressive symptoms only 
in patients with another disorder (e.g. bipolar or schizophrenia, etc.), and did not 
include a depressed group also. This was done because our primary question concerns 





control group, drawing inferences about such effects would be impossible. We also 
excluded studies in which reward processing was measured through non-experimental 
methods such as self-report measures or questionnaires, or studies inspecting general 
mood effects. Furthermore, to guard against heterogeneity, we excluded studies in 
which physical punishment was delivered (e.g. heat, pain, electrical shock, etc.) as 
these are likely to engage different brain networks to receiving, for example, negative 




















This appendix shows questionnaires used to measure depression severity (BDI-II, 
Beck’s Depression Inventory II (Beck, Steer, Ball, and Ranieri, 1996); anhedonia 
(SHAPS, Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (Snaith, Hamilton, Morley, Humayan, 
Hargreaves, and Trigwell, 1995); DARS, Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale (Rizvi 
et al., 2015)); anxiety  (HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond and 
Snaith, 1983) and subjective ratings of state anxiety (STAI-S, State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene, 1970)) and sedation (VAS, Visual 


















Instructions: this questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each 
group of statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that 
best describes the way you have been feeling during the past week, including today. 
Click the box beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the group 
seem to apply equally well, click next to the highest number for that group. Be sure 
that you do not choose more than one statement for any group, including Item 16 















This questionnaire is designed to assess your ability to experience pleasure in the last 
few days. It is important to read each statement very carefully. Tick one of the boxes 
☐ to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. 
 
1) I would enjoy my favourite television or radio programme 
Strongly disagree   
Disagree   
Agree     
Strongly agree   
 
2) I would enjoy being with my family or close friends 
 
Definitely agree   
Agree    
Disagree    
Strongly disagree   
 
3) I would find pleasure in my hobbies and pastimes 
 
Strongly disagree   
Disagree   
Agree     
Strongly agree   
 
4) I would be able to enjoy my favourite meal 
 
Definitely agree   
Agree    
Disagree    
Strongly disagree   
 
5) I would enjoy a warm bath or refreshing shower 
 
Definitely agree   
Agree    
Disagree    
Strongly disagree   
 
6) I would find pleasure in the scent of flowers or the smell of a fresh sea breeze or freshly 
baked bread 
 
Strongly disagree   
Disagree   
Agree     
Strongly agree   
 
7) I would enjoy seeing other people’s smiling faces 
 





Agree    
Disagree    
Strongly disagree   
 
8) I would enjoy looking smart when I have made an effort with my appearance 
 
Strongly disagree   
Disagree   
Agree     
Strongly agree   
 
9) I would enjoy reading a book, magazine or newspaper 
 
Definitely agree   
Agree    
Disagree   
Strongly disagree   
 
10) I would enjoy a cup of tea or coffee or my favourite drink 
 
Strongly disagree   
Disagree   
Agree     
Strongly agree   
 
11) I would find pleasure in small things, e.g. a bright sunny day, a telephone call from a friend 
 
Strongly disagree   
Disagree   
Agree     
Strongly agree   
 
12) I would be able to enjoy a beautiful landscape or view 
 
Definitely agree   
Agree    
Disagree    
Strongly disagree   
 
13) I would get pleasure from helping others 
 
Strongly disagree   
Disagree   
Agree     
Strongly agree   
 
14) I would feel pleasure when I receive praise from other people 
 
Definitely agree   
Agree    
Disagree   







Instructions: Please think carefully and provide at least 2 examples of pleasurable activities/experiences for each category. Even if you have not 
had pleasure from activities/experiences lately, please use the activities/experiences you remember enjoying the most, and 
answer the questions by how much they apply to you right now.  Check the box that best describes how you feel. 
 
A. Please list at least 2 of your favourite pastimes/hobbies that are NOT primarily social 
(Examples: gardening, movies, cooking) 
 
1. _________________________________     2. _________________________________    3. ______________________________ 
 
Thinking about these activities right now: 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Mostly Very Much 
1. I would enjoy these activities      
2. I would have a desire to participate in these activities      
3. I would spend time doing these activities      
4. I want to do these activities      
5. These activities would interest me      
6. These activities would give me pleasure      
7. I would start these activities without being pushed or 
encouraged 
     
8. I would begin doing them on my own      







B. Please list at least 2 of your favourite foods/drinks 
(Examples: pizza, coffee) 
 
1. _________________________________     2. _________________________________    3. ______________________________ 
 
Thinking about these foods/drinks right now: 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Mostly Very Much 
10. I would make an effort to get/make these foods/drinks      
11. I would enjoy these foods/drinks      
12. I want to have these foods/drinks      
13. I would eat as much of these foods as I could      
14. I would make an effort to eat/drink these foods/drinks      
15. I would actively try to get these foods/drinks      
 
C. Please list at least 2 of your favourite social activities  
(Examples: making dinner with partner, meeting friends for coffee) 
 
1. _________________________________     2. _________________________________    3. ______________________________ 
 
Thinking about these social activities right now: 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Mostly Very Much 
16. Spending time doing these things would  make me happy      
17. I would be interested in doing things that involve other 
people 
      





19. I would feel cheerful from participating in these social 
activities 
     
20. I would actively participate in these social activities      





D. Please list at least 2 of your favourite sensory experiences  
(Examples: listening to music, watching a sunset, smell of favourite foods, touch) 
 
1. _________________________________     2. _________________________________    3. ______________________________ 
 
Thinking about these experiences right now: 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Mostly Very Much 
22. I would actively seek out these experiences      
23. I get excited thinking about these experiences      
24. If I were to have these experiences I would savor every 
moment 
     
25. I want to have these experiences      
26. I would make an effort to spend time having these 
experiences 







Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
Tick the box beside the reply that is closest to how you have been feeling in the past week. Don’t take 
too long over you replies: your immediate is best. 
D A  D A  
  I feel tense or  “wound 
up”: 
  I feel as if I am slowed down: 
 3  Most of the time 3   Nearly all the time 
 2  A lot of the time 2   Very often 
 1  From time to time, 
occasionally 
1   Sometimes 
 0  Not at all   0   Not at all 
      
  I still enjoy the things I 
used to enjoy: 
  I get a sort of frightened feeling 
like “butterflies” in the stomach:  
0   Definitely as much  0  Not at all 
1   Not quite so much  1  Occasionally 
2   Only a little  2  Quite often 
3   Hardly at all  3  Very often 
      
  I get a sort of frightened 
feeling as if something 
awful is about to happen:  
  I have lost interest in my 
appearance:  
 3  Very definitely and quite 
badly 
3   Definitely 
 2  Yes, but not too badly 2   I don’t take as much care as I 
should 
 1  A little, but it doesn’t worry 
me 
1   I may not take quite as much care 
 0  Not at all 0   I take just as much care as ever 
      
  I can laugh and see the 
funny side of things:  
  I feel restless as I have to be on 
the move:  
0   As much as I always could  3  Very much indeed 
1   Not quite so much now  2  Quite a lot 
2   Definitely not so much now  1  Not very much 
3   Not at all  0  Not at all 
      
  Worrying thoughts go 
through my mind:  
  I look forward with enjoyment to 
things: 
 3  A great deal of the time 0   As much as I ever did 
 2  A lot of the time 1   Rather less than I used to 
 1  From time to time, but not 
too often 
2   Definitely less than I used to 
 0  Only occasionally 3   Hardly at all 






































  I feel cheerful:    I get sudden feelings of panic:  
3   Not at all  3  Very often indeed 
2   Not often  2  Quite often 
1   Sometimes  1  Not very often 
0   Most of the time  0  Not at all 
      
  I can sit at ease and feel 
relaxed:  
  I can enjoy a good book or radio 
or TV program: 
 0  Definitely 0   Often 
 1  Usually 1   Sometimes 
 2  Not often 2   Not often 





SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE STAI Form Y-1 
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe 
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate 
number to the right of the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at 
this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on 
any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present 






VISUAL ANALOGUE SCALES 
This form is a mood rating scale and the intention is to measure your feelings as 
they are at this moment. Please read the following instructions carefully and 
proceed.  
1. Please rate the way you feel in terms of the dimensions given below.  
2. Regard the line as representing the full range of each dimension.  
3. Rate your feelings as they are at the moment.  
4. Mark clearly across each line.  
5. Do not worry if you are not familiar with the meanings of some of the 








Comparing first level models of the MID task 
This appendix follows on from Methods Section 3.8.3.1. 
In this thesis, we addressed three questions which are relevant for finding the best 
model for our version of the MID task:  
1. Are anticipation and feedback regressors highly correlated?  This question is 
important because the MID task assumes that the anticipation and feedback 
phase are separate phases or processes. The integrity of the model would be 
diminshed if the two phases were highly correlated.   
 
2. Are anticipation and feedback regressors highly correlated with the target?  
The model of the MID used in this thesis (described above) does not explicitly 
model the target as we are not interested in the neural correlates of a motor 
response. However, some studies have included the target in the first level 
model (e.g. Admon et al., (2017)), and thus it is important to understand 
whether its inclusion comprises the model via high correlations with the phases 
occurring before and after the target phase.  
  
3. Do significant results at the whole-brain level change according to the type of 
first level model used? This question is important for testing stability in the 
findings when different first level design matrices are used.  
 
To address these questions, we used three different first level models. A description of 
the regressors for each model can be found below. 
 
First level model 
of the MID 
Description and justification of model.  
 
 









Anticipation onset = cue onset (start of trial, when cue appears on 
screen) 
Anticipation duration = from cue onset until target onset. (cue 
onset + variable jitter) 
 
Feedback phase 
Feedback onset = when feedback window appears (cue+ variable 
jitter + max response duration) 
Feedback duration = 1450ms 
 
Passive trials: 
Passive Cue onset = cue onset (start of trial, when X cue appears 
on screen) 
Duration = 4250ms 
 
Implicit baseline (what is not modelled):  
Target = target onset + maximum response duration (700ms).  
We did not model the target (the motor response) because (i) we 
were not interested in the neural activity related to making a 
motor response and (ii) it has previously been thought to have 
high collinearity with the anticipation and feedback when 
modelled explicitly (personal communication). 
 
Blank screen at the end of feedback = The blank screen that occurs 
after the 1450ms feedback duration to make sure that each ‘active’ 
trial lasts 9500ms. 
The blank screen has a variable duration. You can argue that 
feedback is still being processed during the blank screen and 
should be modelled. However, we decided to not model the blank 
screen because it provides a time gap between feedback and the 
subsequent anticipation session. In this way, anticipation and 
feedback may be at less risk of being collinear. 
 
Movement Regressors – same across all three models 
Six rigid-body movement regressors, plus and additional regressor 
accounting for frame-wise displacement (i.e. the 3D movement 
from volume 1-2,2-3 etc.), and additional binary regressors to 
indicate image volumes with spikes greater than 1mm, and images 





duration) (i.e. the 
duration of the 
target changes) 
Anticipation, feedback and passive trails have the same onsets and 
durations as Model 1. The difference with Model 2 is that the 
target is now explicitly modelled. 
 
Target  
Target onset = target onset (following the cue onset + variable 
jitter) 





window according to the tracking algorithm of the task. 
We predicted that the strength of the correlations between the 
anticipation phase and the target, and the feedback phase and the 
target, would be less if the target duration was variable (i.e. 





Blank screen before feedback = the blank screen time between the 
target coming off screen and the beginning of feedback. 
 
Blank screen at the end of feedback: (see Model 1 above) 
 





(duration fixed at 
700 ms)  
Anticipation, feedback and passive trails have same onsets and 
durations as model 1. 
 
Target  
Target onset = target onset (following the cue onset + variable 
jitter) 
Target duration = Fixed at 700 ms (the maximum response 
duration). This models the time that the target is on screen as well 




Blank screen at the end of feedback: (see Model 1 above) 
 




In order to address these three questions, we ran each of the first level models for one 
subject. We tested question 1 by examining the correlation between the anticipation 
and feedback regressors. We tested question 2 by exploring the correlation between 
the target and anticipation regressors, and the target and feedback regressors. We 
tested question 3 by examining  whether the results at second level were the same 
across the three models for the main contrasts of interest: reward anticipation, penalty 





In brief, we found that across all three models, there were no corrrelations greater than 
(r =.48) between individual anticipation, target and feedback regressors and there were 
no high correlations between the sum of all anticipation regressors with the sum of all 
feedback regressors (r = -.11). Model 3, where the duration of the target was fixed at 
700 ms, had similar target-anticipation (r = 0.43) and target-feedback correlations (r = 
0.41) to Model 2 (variable target duration) (r = 0.42 and 0.46 respectively).  
Last of all, we found that significant whole-brain level results remained the same 
across the three models for all contrasts of interest. We tested the three types of first 
level design matrix: Model 1 (no target), Model 2 (target variable duration), and 
Model 3 (target with fixed duration) in a group second-level analysis (n=39). As 
shown in Figure C1 and C2, the results of a paired samples t-test (placebo > 
lurasidone) for the main contrasts of interest (anticipation win, anticipation loss) did 
not change according to the model used. Taken together, we concluded that there is a 
valid distinction between anticipation and feedback phases, that including the target in 
the model does not increase collinearity, and there is stability in results across different 


















Figure C1. Paired –samples t-test (Placebo > Lurasidone) for the contrast of interest: Reward Anticipation  

















Figure C2. Paired –samples t-test (Placebo > Lurasidone) for the contrast of interest: Penalty Anticipation across the three models. 
Model 1: Target not modelled Model 2: Target modelled (variable duration)  Model 3: Target not modelled (fixed duration) 
444 
 
 
 
 
